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INTRODUCTION TO AN INTRODUCTION 
This Article contests some of our most reassuring self-perceptions 
and offers a new way of thinking about our legal theories, our laws, 
our institutions, and, above all, ourselves. 
In lieu of a conventional, preview-heavy opening, we will begin 
with a suggestion that you, the reader, consider your situation. We 
urge you to examine the internal and external influences that may 
affect your experience of this Article. Uncommon advice, perhaps, 
in a law review article, but consider the counsel of Italian novelist 
ltalo Calvino: 
Relax. Concentrate. Dispel every other thought. Let the world 
around you fade . . . .  
Find the most comfortable position: seated, stretched out, curled 
up, or lying flat. Flat on your back, on your side, on your stomach. In 
an easy chair, on the sofa, in the rocker, the deck chair, on the 
hassock. In the hammock, if you have a hammock. On top of your 
bed, of course, or in the bed. You can even stand on your hands, head 
down, in the yoga position. With the book upside down, naturally . 
. . . Stretch your legs, go ahead and put your feet on a cushion, on 
two cushions, on the arms of the sofa, on the wings of the chair, on the 
coffee table, on the desk, on the piano, on the globe. Take your shoes 
off first. If you want to, put your feet up; if not, put them back." 
We urge you also to consider any internal influences that may affect 
your reading-elements that cannot be so readily inventoried, such 
as your attitudes, motives, and moods. These are less easily adjusted 
than the lighting, but can be even more important to the reading. 
Try to be aware of what you bring to this Article; be aware of how 
you read, why you are reading, and even that you are reading. Do 
you have expectations about what this Article will say or how you will 
feel about it? Ask yourself: What am I looking for in this Article, 
and why? Am I reading this because it has been assigned and I want 
a good grade on my final? Because I am a law professor and that is 
what law professors do? Because I need support for a proposition in 
my own article? Because a friend recommended it? Because I am 
snowed in and it is this or nothing? And as you react to what you 
read, take a moment to examine those reactions and their possible 
sources. 
3 ITALO CALVINO, IF ON A WINTER'S NIGHT A TRAVELER 3-4 (William Weaver 
trans. ,  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1981) ( 1979) . 
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In short, try as best you can to read this Article mindfully.4 This 
promises to be a difficult, but revealing, process, for the situation 
"determine [s] our mental life and our actions" far more than most 
of us realize or care to believe.5 
1. SETTING THE STAGE: Two PUZZLES 
Throughout most of this introductory Article, we will focus our 
arguments primarily on economics and law and economics. We 
believe, however, that the implications of our inquiry extend far 
beyond those domains. The tendencies we hope to elucidate find 
their origins in the human animal, not in any particular legal 
theoretic perspective. It happens that these tendencies are especially 
prominent in law and economics, currently the dominant theoretical 
paradigm for creating and analyzing legal policy. But the relevance 
of our thesis is not confined to one approach,  or even to legal­
political questions. All humans are m ore or less implicated, 
whether they are liberals or conservatives, legal economists or 
critical theorists, students or scholars, producers or consumers, 
elected officials or citizens.6 
A. The First Puzzle 
Economists usually assume that each economic actor maximizes something: 
consumers maximize utility . . . firms maximize profits, politicians maximize 
votes, bureaucracies maximize revenues . . . and so forth. 
Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen7 
J do not myself believe that many people do things because they think they are the 
right thing to do . . . . J do not think that knowledge of what is morally right is 
motivational in any serious sense for anyone except a handful of saints. 
Richard Posnd 
4 See ELLEN J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS 62 (1989) (describing the "key qualities of 
a mindful state of being: (1) creation of new categories; (2) openness to new 
information; and (3) awareness of more than one perspective") .  
5 Banaji, supra note 1 ,  at  8. 
I i  Readers should not expect, and will not find, an exhaustive defense of many of 
this Article's claims and conclusions. Our goal is to establish the basic premises of 
our argument and the conclusions to which they lead. We hope to provide a 
framework for a much larger project, where we and others defend those premises 
and conclusions. That is the subject of numerous works now in progress, which we 
cite to loosely by working title. 
7 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 1 0- 1 1  (3d ed. 2000) .  
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{TJhe tendency to make unwarranted leaps from acts to corresponding 
dispositions is perhaps the most fundamental and most common failing of social 
inference. 
-Le lWss & Richard Nisbet? 
Have you ever noticed how quick legal economists are to assume 
that individuals and institutions are motivated by selfish interests, 
usually wealth and profit?JO Have you ever been puzzled by the fact 
that they have not applied the same type of analysis to explain their 
own work and remarkable success in the marketplace of ideas? Why, 
in other words, has there not been "An Economic Analysis of the 
Economic Analysis of Law?"" 
When legal economists write about their movement,'2 they write 
of its historical affiliations, distinguished members, theoretical 
breakthroughs, scientific methods, rapidly growing numbers, 
sustained dominance within legal academia, and significant influence 
over policy.'s Implicit in these conventional narratives of the 
ascension of law and economics is an abstract and idyllic model of a 
tournament of ideas played on a level field, out of which law and 
economics emerges, on the merits, as a champion legal theory,14 
Such canonical accounts say nothing about the actors ' motives, 
except insofar as they imply that the participants have a 
8 Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning and Economic Analysis of Law: A 
Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 560 ( 1 998) . 
9 LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON Al"lD THE SITUATION 53 (199 1 ) .  
\0 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 7 (noting the basic assumptions of legal 
economists) . 
II Cf Richard Posner, The Sociology of the Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 2 
EURO J.L. & ECON. 265 ( 1 995) (claiming to use sociological methodologies to analyze 
and criticize sociological legal theories, but failing to apply the same methods to an 
analysis of Law and Economics). 
12 By "legal economists," we mean scholars in economics departments and, more 
commonly , in law schools who apply neoclassical economics to law and law-related 
issues. 
13 See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 3 (identifying law and 
economics as useful to lawmakers when evaluating policy) ;  RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 21-22 (4th ed. 1992) (providing a history of the law and 
economics movement) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw]; RICHARD 
POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEG AL THEORY 1-2 (200 1 )  [hereinafter POSNER, 
FRONTIERS] (examining the contributions of other disciplines to the understanding 
and improvement of law, including economics); Richard Posner, Some Uses and Abuses 
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. RE v. 281 ( 1979) [hereinafter Posner, Uses and 
Abuses] (explaining the applications and incorrect uses of law and economics) . 
14, See infra text accompanying notes 66-81 (describing widely held presumptions 
regarding the "marketplace of ideas") . 
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magnanimous desire to advance scientific knowledge and, perhaps, 
social welfare through normal, well-functioning, neutral processes. lr, 
For example, in his famous exchange with Professor Whitford, 
who was not a legal economist, on the enforceability of consumer 
product warranties, George Priest, one of the founding fathers of law 
and economics, wrote: "Our objectives . . .  are similar: to identify 
policies that, other things equal, will reduce the seriousness and 
frequency of injuries suffered by consumers. ,, 16 Priest went on to 
explain that Whitford, like other scholars who wrote on this topic, 
relied on arguments lacking in social scientific rigor and born of feel­
good intuition and emotion. Of the former, Priest wrote: "Professor 
Whitford's criticism . . .  rests upon a misunderstanding of the nature 
of scientific reasoning. ,,17 Of the latter, Priest declared: 
If I have distorted the approach of the exploitation theorists, It IS 
"distortion" that comes from the sharpened focus of any careful, 
scientific study. Upon closer view, a flat world becomes round, and the 
Martian canals are shown to be illusions. The brilliant and moving 
calls of Professor Kessler in 1 943 and of Professor Leff in 1970 to the 
attack on incompletely bargained contracts provoked sympathy in many 
of us in the contracts field. Their ideas have dominated our thinking 
about contractual relations, especially between manufacturer and 
consumer, and have transformed the law of products liability. 
Unfortunately, the suppositions upon which their ideas are based are 
unsuPPs0rted by the evidence. The time has come for a new view of the 
world. 
Regardless of what one thinks about the strength of Priest's 
arguments or the reliability of his conclusions, the point is that Priest 
clearly sees himself as a (winning) participant in a neutral process of 
1:1 See, e.g., vV. KJp VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 14  (19Y2) 
("By adopting a policy approach that utilizes the choice process to promote market 
competition for safer cigarettes, we could better foster individual health and 
welfare. "); George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?, 9 YALE J. 
ON REG. 23 7, 263 (1992) (,The great virtue of the economic approach to the study of 
the law is that it attempts to isolate data that bear on conflicting theories to allow a 
discerning reader to judge between them. I encourage [my critics] to turn their 
prodigious energies to the discovery of such data."); cf Posner, supra note 1 1 ,  at 275 
("I  am sure that economic analysts of law would be . . .  generous to any sociologists of 
law who wanted to borrow some of the theoretical or empirical tools of economics to 
illuminate sociological topics."). 
10 George L. Priest, Comment, 17w Best Evidence of the Effect of Products Liability Law 
on the Accident Rate: Repl)', 91 YALE LJ. ] 386, 1 386 (1982). 
17 [d.; see also id. at 1 388 ("\Nhitford misconceives the nature of scientific 
inquiry. "). 18 [d. at I 400 (footnotes omitted). 
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generating knowledge about a topic that will save lives and reduce 
lI1Juries. This type of claim to the principles of science-neutral 
testing of hypotheses against meaningful, hard empirical data-has 
been extremely common among legal economists, particularly in 
response to critics or potential critics. 
To return to the puzzle: why don't legal economists analyze 
themselves through the same models they apply to everyone else? 
Why don't they explain their success in economic terms-the 
predictable consequence of selfishly motivated, self-aggrandizing 
scholars seeking to maximize their wealth, influence, or reputations? 
We have an answer and, perhaps surprisingly, it is an answer that is 
less about highlighting a contradiction than it is about locating an 
underlying consistency. 
Simply stated, legal economists are human1!l and, being human, 
they are subject to biasing cognitive tendencies. Among the most 
fundamental biases is what social psychologists have appropriately 
named the fundamental attribution eror.20 Our proclivity is to under­
estimate the role of situational influences, and to overestimate the 
influence of individual dispositions in explaining people's behavior.21 
" [W]e tend to look for the person in the situation more than we 
19 We do not mean to suggest that the humanity of legal economists should come 
as news. We mean only to point out the obvious, and then to take its implications 
seriously. While some critics have demonized or dehumanized legal economists, we 
believe that this is wrong in fact and as a critical tactic. See, e.g., D avid Glenn, 
Calculated Risks: Haroard Professor Says Smokers Know Exactly What They're Doing, CHRON. 
OF HIGHER EDUC., May 3 1 ,  2002, at A14 (reporting economist W. Kip Viscusi's 
account of someone reacting to him as if he were "D arth Vader") , available at 
http://chronicle. com/free/v48 /i38/38aO 140 l. h tm. 
20 See infra P ans II, Vl.C (describing in greater detail much of the social 
psychological evidence regarding this attributional bias) ; see also SUSAN T. FISKE & 
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 6 7-86 (1991) (discussing the fundamental 
attribution error, defined as a "bias in social perception" whereby a person's behavior 
is attributed to "her own dispositional qualities, rather than to situational factors") ; 
ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 430 (1999) (noting that 
participants in psychological studies routinely make the fundamental attribution error 
by"underestimat[ing] the extent to which behavior is shaped by the constraints of the 
situation and overestimat[ing] the extent to which it is shaped by people's underlying 
dispositions") ; Ross & NISBETT, supra note 9, at 4 ("People's inflated belief in the 
importance of personality traits and dispositions, together with their failure to 
recognize the importance of situational factors in affecting behavior, has been termed 
the 'fundamental attribution error."') ; supra quotation accompanying note 9. See 
generally D aniel T. Gilbert & P atrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. 
BeLL. 21 (1995) (providing an intellectual history of the fundamental attributjon 
error-or correspondence bias-and a description of some of its causes and limits). 
"1 • KUNDA, supra note 20, at 429. 
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22 search for the situation that makes the person."  That is  true even 
though "human behavior is much more under the influence of 
situational variables than we usually recognize or are willing to 
admit. ,,23 
That tendency, like numerous other interpretive biases, is partially 
the result of the mind's propensity to conserve scarce resources.24 It 
is often easy to see a person's role in bringing about a particular 
event, but it takes a good deal of thought to understand how the 
situation may have wielded influence.2;; A more general description 
of this phenomenon is that the mind tends to downplay the role of 
complexifying context and overplay the role of salient behavior. 
"Background factors, social context, roles, or situational pressures 
that may have given rise to the behavior are . . .  relatively pallid and 
dull and unlikely to be noticed in comparison to the dynamic 
behavior of the actor.,,26 
A second powerful influence over human cognition stems from 
the fact that people tend to arrive at conclusions they are motivated 
to reach: " [M] otivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a 
biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, 
constructing, and evaluating beliefs . . . .  [M] otivation can be 
construed as affecting the process of reasoning: forming impressions, 
determining one's beliefs and attitudes, evaluating evidence, and 
making decisions.',27 
22 PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AlTITUDE 
 AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 93 (1991 ). 
23 Id. D aniel G ilbert and P atrick M alone also note that: 
Three decades of research in social psychology have shown that many of the 
mistakes people make are of a kind: When people observe behavior, they 
often conclude that the person who performed the behavior was predisposed 
to do so-that the person's behavior corresponds to the person's unique 
dispositions-and they draw such conclusions even when a logical analysis 
suggests they should not. 
G ilbert & M alone, supra note 20, at 21. 
24 O ther cognitive biases with related origins include well known heuristics such 
as availability and hindsight bias. 
25 See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 6 7  (identifying the "fundamental 
attribution error" as a tendency "to attribute another person's behavior to her own 
dispositional qualities, rather than to situational factors"). For other possible or 
partial explanations of the fundamental attribution error, see infra Parts I I, VI.C. 
26 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 6 7. 
27 Z iva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, lO S PSYCHOL. BULL. 4 S0, 4 S0 
(1990) . 
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One key motivation-central to "one of the most influential 
social psychological theories,,28-is the desire to see ourselves in self­
affirming ways. l!9 People tend to view themselves as well-intentioned 
and good, and will often engage in fairly dramatic cognitive 
adjustments to maintain that self-image.3o Moreover, individuals en­
gage in the same kind of motivated reasoning regarding the 
institutions, groups, and situations with which they identifY. In those 
contexts, however, the tendency is often referred to as the 
"ethnocentric" or "group-serving" bias or, more popularly, as 
jingoism, racism, sexism, heterosexism, and so on.31 The first lesson 
of motivated reasoning, whatever its manifestation, is that we 
humans tend to hold beliefs and reach judgments and conclusions 
that we desire, and we vastly underappreciate that tendency 
-particularly in ourselves. 
When those sorts of human tendencies are taken seriously, the 
initial puzzle begins to lose its mystery. The puzzle is simply an 
expression of the larger human inclination to see disposition where 
situation is largely controlling and to do so in a way that is self­
affirming. Legal economists view others as dispositionally-typically 
selfishly-motivated because they can plausibly infer such 
information from people's conduct. And the dispositions-which 
legal economists typically call "preferences"-behind that conduct 
are thereby "revealed." Or it at least appears that way to legal 
economists, given the influence of the fundamental attribution error. 
Legal economists, likewise, see themselves (and others in their move­
ment) as dispositionally driven, but their own purposes are presumed 
less crass, in part because their personal sense of themselves does not 
"reveal" such motives, and in part because they are motivated to 
attribute their successes and their competitors' concomitant failures 
to dispositional, not situational, forces.32 
28 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 3. 
2� Id. at 220 -23. 
30 Id.; see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical 
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
authors) ( reviewing key studies and summarizing evidence on role of motivation) .  3 1  See H anson & Yosifon, supra note 3 0  (describing group-affirming motive) ;  
see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 20, at  80-81 (noting that the tenns "ethnocentric" 
or "group-serving bias" refer to "the tendency of in group members to attribute 
internal causes to positive in-group behavior and negative out-group behavior and to 
attribute negative in group behavior and positive out group behavior to external 
causes") . 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 106-10 (discussing the actor-observer bias) .  
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It is not contradiction, then, but consistency that begins to 
suggest the more illuminating dimension of this puzzle. Legal 
economists presume a dispositional account of behavior, both in 
their understanding of economic actors and institutions as selfish,  
and in their view of themselves as relatively selfless.33 Social psych­
ology, however, has demonstrated that seemingly dispositional 
actions are very often more accurately identified as situational 
reactions. Since economists consistently rely on dispositionist attribu­
tions, they may be consistently wrong, both as to others and as to 
themselves. 
The point-and this is a big one-is that even though individuals 
and institutions may behave as if their goal were to maximize wealth, 
such behavior may actually reflect the social stage of interactions 
(the situation) more than it does the dispositions of the actors. 
Moreover, legal economists have failed to take situation into account 
in their understanding of their own success, both individually and as 
a school of thought. This tendency, we believe, has blinded us all­
legal economists, their admirers, and their critics. 
The first puzzle thus yields a glimpse of a central claim of this 
Article: Legal economists are correct to presume the profound 
influence of the profit motive over the behavior of individuals and 
institutions in our society, but are mistaken to locate that influence 
dispositionally rather than situationally. The latter possibility-that 
situation accounts not only for the behavior that legal economists 
analyze, but also for the success of their movement-brings us to a 
second puzzle. 
B. The Second Puzzle 
Have you ever noticed that many of the most prominent legal 
scholars actively reject the tenets of law and economics in their 
teaching and writing? And have you ever wondered about the fact 
that the criticisms that such scholars have advanced are rarely, if 
ever, acknowledged-much less rebutted-by legal economists? 
And, in light of all that, have you ever wondered why law and 
economics is nevertheless commonly (and we think correctly) 
33 I n  responding to these observations, we suspect that many legal economists 
would stress that they too are moved by selfish dispositions to advance their own 
interests, financial and otherwise. O ur point is that they seem not to begin with that 
presumption and build from there, but instead experience themselves and their ideas 
as marching beneath the pennant of scientific truth and, in all cases, take a 
dispositionist view of their own (and others') behavior. 
140 UNNERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 152: 1 29 
described as the dominant legal theoretic approach? It may be 
helpful to describe this puzzle in greater depth. 
In a 1996 survey of the most cited law review articles published 
from 1982 to 199 1 ,34 scholars taking the critical approach-critical 
legal studies, critical race theory, and feminism-vastly outpaced 
those taking a law and economics approach, forty-three to twelve, 
respectively.30 From its origins, law and economics has been subject 
to powerful and sustained criticisms from a diverse group of 
distinguished legal academics36-including, among many others, 
Bruce Ackerman,:17 Jules Coleman,38 Ronald Dworkin,3(J Grant 
Gilmore,40 Mark Kelman,41 Duncan Kennedy,42 Frank Michelman,43 
34 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 751 ( 1996) .  
:15 Id. at 751-59. 
:{6 Cf LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LA\V 693 (2d ed. 1985) 
("The 'law and economics' school was widely attacked as right-wing and excessively 
narrow; but it had gained, by the 1980s, a significant place in legal teaching, thought, 
and research.") .  37 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAt'l, RECONSTRUCfING AMERICAt'\J LA\V 45 n.16 ( 1 984) 
(" [SJupporters and opponents rightly suspect that there is more to 'law and 
economics' than disinterested science . . .  ." ) ;  Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and 
the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE LJ. 929, 929-34, 946 (1986) (arguing that legal 
academics need to adapt their rhetoric to subsume law and economics and thereby 
"put law and economics in its place" ) .  
38 See, e.g., JULES L.  COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 67- 1 50 ( 1 988) 
(criticizing severdl branches of "the new law-and-economics" school) ;  Jules L. 
Coleman, The Economic Analysis of Law, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: 
NOMOS XXIV 83, 100-01 (1. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) 
(critiquing the notion of efficiency central to the law and economics approach) ;  Jules 
L. Coleman, J<.Jficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509, 52MO 
( 1980) (evaluating and rejecting Posner's concept of "wealth maximization") ;  Jules 
Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's 
The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1 106 ( 1982) (book review) 
(arguing that "neither of Posner's arguments, nor any plausible available arguments, 
justify pursuing certain versions of efficiency") .  
39 See, e.g., Ronald M .  Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J .  LEGAL STUD. 191 ,  191 
(1980) ("In this essay I consider and reject a political theory about law often called the 
economic analysis of law.") ;  Ronald Dworkin, Why t.Jficiency? A Response to Professors 
Calallresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563, 563 ( 1980) (criticizing "economists of law 
who contemplate trade-offs" between justice and efficiency) .  
40 See, e.g., GRAJI.'T GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 100 ( 1 977 ) ("So far as 
we have been able to learn, there are no recurrent patterns in the course of human 
events; it is not possible to make scientific statements about history, sociology, 
economics-or law.") .  
41 Kelman writes: 
[MJuch of the concrete institutional study done in the Law and Economics 
movement, particularly by those whose work has been readily integrable into 
mainstream law classroom teaching, is biased, not because of an inevitable 
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Dierdre McCloskey,44 Martha Nussbaum,4:' Rick Pildes,4G Margaret 
R d· 47 J S h d 48 J S' 49 d M k T h :,0 a 10, eanne c roe er, oe mger, an ar us net. 
Indeed, at the same time that legal economists were proclaiming 
the strengths and dominance of their approach, prominent critics 
were claiming to reveal some of its fundamental flaws and 
social theoretical tilt but rather either because the people doing the work 
explicitly and substantively favor certain traditional right-wing positions that 
they have argued for rather disingenuously or because, in their frenzied desire 
to demonstrate the possibility of an economistically governed utopia, they 
distort or deny the insuperable difficulties legal institutions would have in 
overcoming the problem of "otherness," the problem that selfish people will 
inevitably harm others, no matter how we try to channel their selfishness. 
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1 5 1  (1 98 7); see also Mark Kelman, 
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 669, 6 73 (19 79 )  (arguing that the Coase Theorem "is simply wrong as a 
purportedly empirical hypothetical about whether liability rules would affect 
substantive activity as well as distribution") . . 
42 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 
33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 387-88 (198 1 ) (arguing that "liberal law and economics" is 
incoherent when applied to the whole system of private law rules) . 
43 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, economics, and the Law of Property, in 
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV 3, 3 4 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (asserting that the presumptive efficiency thesis is false) ;  
Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REv. 71 1 ,  714 (1980) (arguing that "the efficiency of private property and free 
contract cannot be deduced from the sole factual supposition of rational maximizing 
behavior") . 
44 See, e.g., Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. 
REv. 752, 753 54 (1988 )  (presenting law as a primarily rhetorical realm where 
arguments dominate that are at odds with the mathematical and logical approach of 
economics) . Donald McCloskey subsequently changed names to Deirdre McCloskey. 
45 See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a 
Particular Type oj) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 19 7, 1 198 (1997) (arguing that 
philosophical arguments cast doubts on the foundations of law and economics theory) . 
46 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: 
A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 936-40 (1991 ) (explaining that 
public policy requires more than a simple cost benefit analysis) . 
47 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADI N, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1 1 5  (1996) 
(critiquing the universal commodification of importan t aspects of human life) .  
48 See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of  the Market: A Psychoanalysis of  Law and 
Economics, 1 1 2  HARV. L. REV. 483, 491 (1998) ("I do not believe law can be reduced to 
even the most sophisticated economics . . . .  It is my judgment [that] . . . .  the ideal of 
the perfect market is . . .  inadequate to the task of making concrete legal policy 
recommendations.") . 49 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 3 7  HARV. C.R.­
C.L. L. REv. 103, 105 08 (2002) (criticizing welfare economics for discounting fairness 
as a factor in normative analysis) . 
r,o See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, "Everything Old is New Again": Early Reflections on the 
"New Chicago School," 1998 WIS. L. REV. 5 79 ,  581 8 2  (asserting that traditional law 
and economics has "become stale" ) .  
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weaknesses.51 Legal economists rarely acknowledged, much less 
rebutted, those criticisms.52 Many thoughtful observers therefore 
anticipated the eventual, if not imminent, demise of law and 
economics. For example, Arthur Leff wrote in 1974: " [O]ne would 
be forced to conclude that this kind of 'scientific' study is . . .  , as an 
attempt to present a total picture, ultimately doomed.,,53 By 1980, 
Mort Horwitz wrote that the law and economics movement had 
" 'peaked out' as the latest fad in legal scholarship.,,54 He went so far 
as to predict that " [f1uture legal h istorians will need to exercise their 
imaginations to figure out why so many people could have taken 
most of this stuff so seriously.,,;5 
Outsiders' predictions were not altogether different from those 
of insiders. Early on, even some legal economists admitted to being 
surprised by their success. As Judge Posner, in a loose version of our 
second puzzle, testified, "economics has an uphill fight in law, being 
disliked both as politically conservative and methodologically radical. 
This makes its success . . .  all the more striking.,,56 
And yet despite that evidence, those criticisms, those predictions, 
and that surprise, there is no dispute that law and economics has 
long been, and continues to be, the dominant theoretical paradigm 
for understanding and assessing law and policy. Not only is law and 
economics not a faddish habit of the past, but in the twenty years 
51 See C. Edwin Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REv. 939, 9 48 -53 (1 980) (asserting that "Posner's wealth-maximization standard 
has seemed normatively ungrounded" and that "Posner's inability to identify 
normatively appropriate starting points leaves him unable to demonstrate that his 
wealth-maximization . . .  criterion is either appealing or workable" ) ;  James R. 
Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics Theory: A Critical History of the Distri
bution/Efficiency Debate, 32 J. SociO-EcON. 361 ,  3 70-79 (recounting various critiques 
of law and economics scholars' focus on wealth maximization as the basis for 
evaluating societal utility); Duncan Kennedy, Law-and &onomics from the Perspective of 
Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 465,  471 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (criticizing law and economics theorist� for 
"manipulating the apparently value neutral, technocratic discourse of efficiency to 
support their preferred outcomes") . ' 
52 See generally Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency: 
Missing the Taste of the Pie (May 19 ,  2003) (unpublished manuscript, on fi le with 
authors) (describing history of "distribution versus efficiency" debate and some ways 
in which legal economists have avoided or postponed addressing profound criticisms 
of their approach) .  
[,3 Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE LJ. 989, 1 00 7-08 (19 78) . 
54 Morton J. Honvitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
905, 905 (1980) .  
55 [d. 
56 
. Posner, supra note 1 1 ,  at 2 74. 
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since Horwitz's prognostication, it has become even more 
entrenched among lawmakers, judges, policy shapers, and aca­
demics. ',7 And, as we highlight, lay versions of the theory have been 
gaining ground in our culture as a whole. As one critic laments, 
" [t]he law and economics movement is quite strongly entrenched in 
the law schools, and is more powerful there than any of the other 
social sciences.,,5s Marc Galanter and Mark Edwards, proponents of 
the "competing" law and society approach to legal theory, concede 
that "the flourishing of law and economics [ is] undeniable,,,59 that 
" [e]conomic analysis of law . . .  has transformed American legal 
thought,,,60 and that efficiency analysis has enjoyed "unparalleled 
success in the legal academy and in the judiciary.""! Professor Bruce 
Ackerman has described law and economics as "the most important 
development in legal scholarship of the twentieth century.,,62 
Numerous cntlcs have displayed less equanimity in 
acknowledging the dominance of law and economics, accusing its 
adherents of ruthless "imperialism.,,63 Judge Posner dismisses such 
57 Richard Posner's seminal book, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 1 3, is now 
in its sixth edition. The fifth edition, published in 1 998, recently won Harvard Law 
School's prestigious Ames Prize. Press Release, Harvard Law School, Judge Richard 
Posner Presented 2003 Ames Prize (Mar. 7, 2003) ,  at http://ww.law.harvard.edu/ 
news/2003/03/07_ames.php. In fact, law and economics has its own Nutshell and 
two encyclopedias devoted to it. JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAw AND ECONOMICS IN A 
N UTSHELL (2d ed. 2000); ENCYCLOPEDIA O F  LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geewst eds., 2000) ;  TH E  NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF  
ECONOMICS AND THE  LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998) .  
58 J.S. Sterling, The State of American Sociology of Law, in DEVELOPING SOCIOLOGY 
OF LAW: A WORLD -WIDE DOCUMENTARY ENQUIRY 805, 809 (V. Ferrari ed., 1990) .  
59 Marc Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands, 
1997 WIS. L. REV. 375, 378. 
6Il Id. 
6! Id. at 381 .  
62 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 2. 
63 See W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational Choice Theories of Social Norms and 
the Pragmatics of .explanation, 77 IND. LJ. 1 ,  29 30 (2002) (stating that "scholars in other 
disciplines often object to the imperialist tendencies of economic analysis, because of 
this tendency to translate the explanatory terms employed by humanistic and social 
science disciplines into a few concepts that are deemed admissible in economics, such 
as 'preferences' and 'expected utility"') . This characterization is not new. See, e.g., 
ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: THE ECONOMIC METHOD ApPLIED O UTSIDE THE FIELD OF 
ECONOMICS, at vii  (Gerard Radnitzky & Peter Bernholz eds., 1987) (attempting to 
show that economics can explain the behavior of living systems, despite critics who 
accuse economists of "disciplinary imperialism") ; DAVID M. KREBS, A COURSE IN 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 9 ( 1990) ("Economists are well-known among social 
scientists as imperialists in the sense that economists attempt to reduce everything to 
economic notions and paradigms.") .  
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accusations as so much " [p] rofessional envy." And who wouldn't be 
jealous? After all: 
Economic analysis of law has grown rapidly, has become the largest, 
most pervasive interdisciplinary field of legal studies in the history of 
American law, has palpably influenced the practice of law and judicial 
decisions, has launched lucrative consulting spin offs, has spawned 
courses and textbooks in economic analysis of law, has influenced 
legislation (economic analysts of law played an important role in the 
deregulation movement), has made it de rigueur for law schools of the 
first and second ranks to have one or more economists on their faculty, 
has seeded a number of its practitioners in university administration 
and the federal judiciary, and has now crossed the Atlantic and begun 
making rapid gains in Europe.
64 
In short, regardless of how different scholars feel about it, there 
is no contesting the fact that law and economics is currently the 
undisputed champion of the putative legal-theoretic competition. 
So here, again, is the second puzzle: How is it that a theory that 
is the subject of so much skepticism and criticism among legal 
academics, and that seems to have been rejected (or at least, not 
embraced) by huge segments of that community, has become the 
dominant theoretical paradigm for understanding and assessing law 
and policy? 
That puzzle begins to come together when one understands that 
scholars, as humans, are motivated to believe that the institutions 
with which they have a strong affiliation are just65 -a motivation that 
may be particularly intense in this case, given that the legal academy 
is an institution to which academy members have committed their 
professional lives and upon which their legitimacy is largely based. 
Absent undeniable evidence to the contrary, scholars so motivated 
assume that the success or failure of a theory reflects the outcome of 
a reasonably well-functioning marketplace or tournament of ideas. 
Success there, like evolutionary or market success, is thought to 
reflect a meritocratic selection process. ii; 
G4 Posner, supra note 11 , at 275 (citations omitted); see also POSNER, FRONTIERS, 
supra note 1 3 ,  at 35 ("It is not merely an ivol),-towered enterprise, especially in the 
United States, where the law and economics movement has influenced legal reform in 
such fields as antitrust law, the regulation of public utilities and common carriers, 
environmental regulation. the calculation of damages in personal injury suits .... "). 
65 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing motivations relating to an 
individual's group and system affiliations). 
66 To be clear, we do not believe that perceptive critical scholars (such as Mort 
Horwitz) consciously think to themselves that the playing field of legal theory is a 
purely meritocratic one. Our point is that even system-sensitive critical legal scholars 
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Such a faith is implied in many legal theoretic histories . Robert 
Cooter and Thomas Ulen, in their authoritative text, Law and 
Economics,m attribute the success of law and economics to its 
practitioners identifying "a vacant niche in the 'intellectual ecology'" 
of legal theory and then "rapidly fill [ing] it. "fiR Thomas Ulen recently 
expanded on that survival-of-the-fittest metaphor, boasting: 
Law and economics has been one of the most successful innovations 
in the legal academy in the last century. This intellectual revolution 
began modestly in the 1 960s and 1970s with a few important and 
innovative articles and a comprehensive, masterful text that showed the 
possibilities of the field. Then, in the 1 980s the feld exploded into 
respectability and prominence-becoming a regular course in the 
curricula of the best law schools, a vibrant legal research style that 
figured in a torrent of important books and articles, a force that 
transformed many faculty from exclusive practitioners of traditional 
doctrinal research to a more social-science-oriented research, and a 
substantial justification for important public policy changes. By the 
early 1 990s, economic analysis suffused a modern legal education, even 
one devoid of an explicit course in law and economics.
fi9 
Writing generally about economics, George Stigler explains: 
"Economics is the only reasonably well-developed social sci­
ence . . .  in that it has an extensive, operable, tested theoretical 
"iO P d th system. osner beats the same rum when he proclaims that e 
work of "anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, political 
scientists, and other social scientists . . .  is insufficiently rich in 
theoretical or empirical content to create serious competition for the 
economists. ,,7 1 Elsewhere, he makes the point more concretely: 
There is a dearth of arresting hypotheses to set off against the Coase 
Theorem, the Hand Formula, the efficiency theory of the common 
law, . . .  the economics of property rights versus liability rules, the 
implicitly reveal an unexamined trust in current institutional arrangements (or 
perhaps situational pressures discouraging the articulation of distrust), as evinced by 
the fact that such biases are rarely even hinted at in writing about what moves current 
intellectual trends in legal academia. 
67 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7. 
68 ld. at 3. 
69 Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1 997 WIS. 
L. REV. 433, 434 (footnotes omitted). 
70 GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 8 ( 1988). 
71 POSNER, ECONOMIC fu'\lALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 1 3, at 26; see also Posner, supra 
note 1 1 ,  at 273 ("The sheer modesty .. . of American sociology of law has hurt the field 
in its competition with critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence. political theory, 
economic analysis of law, and even law and literature for a place at the legal studies 
high table."). 
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activity level theory of strict liability, . . .  and the myriad of other 
concepts, many counterintuitive, that have made economic analysis of 
law intellectually exciting.;' 
When explaining their success, legal economist5 rely not just on 
proud descriptions of methods, discoveries, and insights, but also on 
the legacy of intellectual giants, from Jeremy Bentham and Adam 
Smith to Gary Becker and George Stigler.i3 The internal histories of 
the emergence of law and economics thus focus on the "great ideas" 
and "great men,,74 of the movement, as if Coase and Copernicus 
played analogous roles in advancing science.i5 Even if that is an 
overstatement, it is patently clear that legal economists see themselves 
as the rightful winners of a fair and effective process-a success that 
is measured largely in terms of real-world influence and without 
reference to the serious criticisms of their approach. 
Professor Horwitz, though no doubt disappointed with the 
outcome, also seemed to view the rise and fall of ideas and theories 
as part of a fair competition, or at least that seems an obvious 
i'l Posner, supra note 1 1 ,  at 273. Elsewhere, Judge Posner argues that law and 
economics has benefited from " [rlapid increases in recent decades in the scope and 
rigor of microeconomics (due partly to the increased incorporation of game theory 
into economics)." POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 1 3, at 4. 
i3 Posner has been repeating the same basic historiographical thumbnail sketch 
of the movement in his writings for decades. See, e.g., POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 
1 3, at 3 1  ("What I try to do . . .  in this chapter is to anchor a brief description of 
the field by reference to two of its most i l lustrious progenitors, Jeremy Bentham 
and (briefly) Gary Becker  . . . .  " ) .  For other Posnerian renditions of this sketch, see, 
for example, Posner, Uses and Abuses, supra note 1 3, at 281 84 (1 979), where he 
discusses the role of Jeremy Bentham, Gary Becker, and others in the development of 
law and economics. The same story unfolds in his chapter on the history of law and 
economics in his ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 1 3, at 2 1 28. 
i4 Cf JULIE A. NELSON, FEMINISM, OBJECfIWIY AND ECONOMICS, at xi ( 1996) 
("The mainstream academic and professional discipline of economics . . .  is built 
around distinctly masculine-based notions . . . .  " ) ;  Marianne A. Ferber, The Study of 
Economics: A Feminist Critique, 85 fu'vl. ECON. REv. 357 ( 1 995) (describing the male­
centric bias contained in economics scholarship) ;Julie A. Nelson, 77!e Study ofG/wice or 
the Study of Provisioning? Gender and the Definition of Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC 
l\1Al"l: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS 23, 33 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson 
eds., 1 993) ("Feminist theory suggests that the Cartesian divisions between rationality 
and embodiment, and between man and nautre, reflect a masculinist and separate 
view of the world . . . .  " ) ;  Diana Strassman, Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric of Disciplinary 
Authority in Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS, 
supra, at 54, 56-65 (using "stories" to illustrate the present narrowness of explanatory 
accounts in economics, which is due to the exclusion of the woman's  perspective when 
fomlUlating theories) .  
7 5  See supra text accompanying notes 16 18 (quoting George Priest for his claim 
that law and economics, more so than other fields of legal scholarship, is grounded in 
scien tific reasoning) . 
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inference to draw from his prediction about the imminent demise of 
law and economics.76 And Horwitz is by no means the only non­
economist exhibiting such faith. Indeed, it seems to be widespread in 
legal academics, as revealed by the fact that unfairness or bias in the 
marketplace of ideas is rarely discussed among its participants-even 
among those scholars whose work is built on identifYing and 
describing such unfairness and bias in other institutions." Thus, 
while scholars have not always explicitly claimed that theoretical 
dominance implies theoretical superiority, such an inference is 
manifested in the legal economists' boasting and the critics' 
collective (and now largely frustrated) expectation that law and 
economics would pass quickly. 
A closer look at the details of legal theoretic discourse reveals yet 
another nuance to the pattern. Legal economists attribute their 
success in the tournament to internal or dispositional factors. They 
seem to view their methods and insights, perhaps even their 
intellectual capacity, as simply superior to those of their competitors. 
That dispositional perspective is amplified when economists 
criticize their competitors. Not only are outsiders deficient method­
ologically, they are, as our 'Just world,,78 requires, also dispositionally 
deserving of their fate. Posner, for example, claims that some 
76 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55 (recounting Horwitz's prediction that 
law and economics would be only a short lived "fad" in legal academia) .  
77 For example, at two Harvard Law School panel discussions on the future of 
progressive legal theory, panelists had little to say about the underlying sources of, or 
possible solutions to, the fact that progressive legal scholarship has had comparatively 
little influence over legal theory or policy while law and economics has grown 
dominant. See Ari Z. Weisbard, Professors Debate Law, Economics, HARV. CRIMSON, 
Mar. 20, 2002, http://ww.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=180698 ( recounting a 
progressive panelist'S statement that "our institutions are being reformed 
everyday" by law and economics) ; Press Release, H arvard Law School, H LS 
Faculty Panel to Explore Future of Progressive Legal Scholarship (Feb. 22, 2002) , 
at http://ww .law.harvard.edu/news/2002/02/22 scholarship.php (describing 
the participants and sponsors of two panels discussing progressive legal scholar
ship) . Panelists included distinguished progressive scholars with an acute awareness 
of legal theoretic trends and historical sensitivity such as Christine Desan, Kent 
Greenfield, Janet Halley, David Kennedy, Duncan Kennedy, Mort Horwitz, Frank 
Michelman, and Joe Singer. In our view, the lack of a theoretical explanation for 
these trends reflects an implicit (and, we think, unexamined) faith on the part of even 
the most institutionally and politically sensitive scholars in the academic process as 
basically fair and self-correcting. One goal of this project is to provide an alternative 
approach to assessing legal theoretic trends. 
78 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing a more detailed discussion 
of the 'Just world hypothesis" and "system-affirming motives");  infra notes 215, 635, 
and 686 and accompanying text (briefy discussing related motives) . 
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competitors may have fared better if only they were not so spiteful 
about their losses and, so unwilling "to pick up the analytic 
techniques and models of economic analysis and use them in their 
own work."i9 According to Posner, "no one likes to retool with the 
methods of a rival discipline; it is a confession of defeat."so The 
source of the competitors' failure is, in Posner's account, not in the 
situation of the competition, but in the dispositions of the 
participants. And it is not just any disposition, but the disposition of 
selfishness-the very disposition that motivates the agents of legal 
economists' models. And it is also, in Posner's view, the disposition 
of spite and smallness-the very sort of qualities that psychologists 
have shown that we are motivated to see in "out groups" and to deny 
in our own groups, and that consequently enable us to feel that the 
misfortunes of "others" are warranted.sl 
Consequently, there are two ways in which the largely uncon­
tested "tournament of ideas" notion reflects the fundamental 
attribution error. First, as we just described, competitors are 
presumed to win or lose because of dispositional factors. Second, the 
operation and dynamics of the tournament itself is presumed to be 
independent of broader situational influences. The metaphor of a 
tournament or marketplace highlights the presumption that comp­
etition on the merits is the driving force and that the victor is 
determined through successful competitive engagements, full stop. 
Any forces exogenous to the tournament are rarely identified, much 
less systematically analyzed. 
Again, it is not contradiction, but consistency, that suggests the 
more revealing aspects of this second puzzle. Both legal economists 
and their critics presume a dispositionist account of scholarly 
behavior. But again, social psychology instructs us that seemingly 
dispositional actions are often more accurately understood as 
situational reactions. The consistent dispositional attributions, there­
fore, may be consistently wrong. A more complete solution to this 
puzzle, however, must await the balance of this Article. 
We named this Part "setting the stage,"  not simply because it sets 
the stage for the balance of the Article, but also because it is 
i9 Posner, supra note I I ,  at 274. 
80 Id. 
81 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing that tendency in greater detail 
and more general social psychological findings regarding inter and intra group 
motivations) ; infra notes 689-90 and accompanying text (summarizing the human 
tendency to see bias in others that we do not see in ourselves) . 
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intended to begin to illuminate the power of staging over acting. 
The stage is not simply the place where independent, dispositional 
actions occur, as is so commonly, so humanly, assumed. The stage is 
itself an unseen participant-one that shapes, transforms, sometimes 
determines, and almost always influences, the behaviors of the visible 
characters. If that is correct, legal scholars and policymakers need to 
ascertain how the stage is set, who has the power to set it, and what 
the purpose of the staging is. We all need to be attentive to the 
situation. 
II. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER 
A. Seeing the Actors 
Tastes are the unchallengeable axioms of a man 's behavior: he may properly 
(usefully) be criticized for ineficiency in satisfying his desires, but the desires 
themselves are data. 
-Gary Becker and George Stigler 
1 find it difficult now to identifY the motives for many things f have done . 
1 do not have a good answer to the question of my 07.vn behavior . . . .  
My memory has a strange way of selecting its contents. 
-George Stigle!' 
In our view, legal theory and the law ought to be informed by as 
realistic a vision of humanity as our learning can muster. This 
Section begins to formulate such a vision through some of the 
central lessons of social psychology. The bulk of this effort must 
await separate articles.s4 
82 George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non f.sl Disputandurn, 67 AM. 
ECON. REv. 76, 76 ( 1977). 
83 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 1 32, 1 33, 1 46. 
84 See, e.g., David Arkush & Jon Hanson, Law and Emotion (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors) (describing the role and influence of emotion, affect, 
and feelings, and assessing their relevance for law and legal theory) ; Chen & Hanson, 
supra note 52 (focusing on role and effects of schemas, scripts, stereotypes, and other 
knowledge structures and their relevance for law and legal theory) ; Ronald Chen & 
Jon Hanson, The I llusion of Law I: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and 
Corporate Law (May 3 1 ,  2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) 
(describing the biased schemas of modern policymaking and corporate law and the 
interests they serve) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I l ; Jon Hanson, Ana 
Reyes & Daniel Schlanger, Law and Attribution (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
authors) (examining how people make attributions of causation, responsibility, and 
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* * * 
Suppose you are walking down the street, on your way to class, 
when a man in a white coat comes up behind you, jabs a gun into 
your spine and barks "get into that building." Inside the building, 
you find yourself in a small room where the gunman explains that 
you will be shot unless you flip a switch (labeled "DANGER: SEVERE 
SHOCK-XXX-450 volts") on some sort of electrical box which is 
attached by wires to an electric-chair contraption in which another 
man is strapped. The gunman informs you that "although the shock 
can be extremely painful to the person in the chair, it can cause no 
permanent tissue damage." Meanwhile, that person is squirming, 
sweating, and imploring you not to flip the lever. He seems almost 
as scared as you are and is saying something about heart trouble and 
pleading to be released. The gunman cocks his pistol, aims the 
barrel at your temple, and tells you: "You have no other choice, you 
must go on." 
Despite this scene's surreal qualities, you believe everything about 
it, including that the gun pointed at your head is real and that its 
holder is ready to use it. What would you do? 
We suspect that many of you would flip the lever, as we probably 
would. And we suspect that even those of you who would not would 
still sympathize with and hold relatively blameless anyone who did. 
The situational pressure is simply too great to withstand. The power 
of the gun is unmistakable, and the "choices" to enter the building 
and to flip the lever are hardly choices at all, for the disposition of 
the person who makes them seems so clearly constrained by the 
situation as to render the results nearly determined. 
Now, suppose you are strolling across your favorite university 
campus when you are approached by a clipboard-toting, lab­
coated graduate student who is recruiting participants for an 
ongoing psychological experiment testing learning techniques. You 
agree to take part, and follow the graduate student into a building 
where you meet the professor running the study and another person, 
who, like yourself, has agreed to participate . You draw lots and find 
that in the experiment you will be the "teacher," and your fellow 
blame, and describing the relevance of attribution theory for law and legal theory) ; 
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing a fulsome overview of the social 
psychological and social cognition literatures, and, based on that, offering an 
alternative conception of the human animal to the one imagined in law and legal 
theory, and considering some of the implications of that new conception for law and 
legal theory) . 
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volunteer will be the "learner." The professor explains that h e  will 
read a list of pairs of associated words to the learner, after which he 
will read one word from the pairs as a prompt for the learner to 
supply the correct associated word. If the learner fails to provide the 
correct word, you, as the teacher, are to flip a switch that will shock 
him.  With each incorrect answer, the strength of the shock will 
increase by 15 volts. You follow the professor into an adjacent room 
where you watch as the learner is strapped into a chair and 
electrodes are attached to his body. Then you move back to the first 
room where the professor begins the experiment. Very soon into the 
procedure, the subject gets an association wrong. Do you flip the 
switch? 
Perhaps you do. Now the wrong answers continue to come. 
With each mistake you increase the voltage, and you begin to hear 
the learner moaning in pain. Poised at 150 volts, the learner 
exclaims that his heart is bothering him. When you reach 2 10  volts, 
he demands to be released, saying he refuses to answer any more 
questions. At 300 volts, he is screaming in agony. Mter 330 volts, 
the learner's room becomes silent. The professor continues to ask 
questions and announces that continued silence will be interpreted 
as a wrong amwer, bringing another shock. You look at the control 
panel and see that the next level reads "DANGER: SEVERE 
SHOCK-XXX-450 volts." You hesitate, and the professor de­
mands, "You have no other choice, you must go on." Do you flip the 
switch? Would you have made it to this point in the study? 
If you are like most people, you have almost certainly answered a 
resounding "no!" to those questions. And if you think others would 
respond to the scenario similarly, you would expect them to refuse to 
go along with the experiments as well. And you would not be alone. 
College students asked to evaluate such a proposed experiment 
estimated that, on average, most people would go to 135 volts before 
refusing to go on, and they said that only one in a hundred would go 
all the way to end of the scale-450 volts.s;; Professional psychiatrists 
surveyed about the same proposed experiment predicted that only 
one in a thousand-"the sadists"-would go all the way.86 
85 See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 67 68 (1991) ("Most said that no one 
would go all the way to 450 volts.") . 
86 /d. at 65 74 (summarizing Stanley Milgram's obedience experiments) ;  see also 
STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 27 31 (1974) [hereinafter MILGRAM, 
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORlTY] ("Each one of the 1 lO respondents sees himself disobeying 
the experimenter at some point.") ;  Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and 
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We humans do not understand ourselves well. 
The scenario described above-the one with the graduate 
student and not the one with the gun-was the basis of a series of 
actual experiments that Stanley Milgram, a pioneer in the field of 
social psychology conducted at Yale University beginning in the early 
1960s.H7 In the actual experiment, however, the flipped switches did 
not actually shock the learner.ss The responses that the teacher heard 
were scripted-a fact unknown to the teacher.89 Milgram's 
expectations matched those of the college students and psychiatrists 
who he surveyed beforehand.90 But out of the first forty teacher 
subjects he tested, twenty-six of them (sixty-five percent) went all the 
way to 450 volts.91 And that was only the beginning of a long series 
of studies revealing the disturbing "banality of evil.,,92 
By now the reason for the experimental results should be clear: 
situation, like an invisible hand, moves US.93 Milgram performed this 
Disobedience to Authority, 1 8  HUM.  REL. 57, 72-73 ( 1 965) [hereinafter Mi lgram, 
Some Conditions oj Obedience] ( "The psychiatrists predicted that most subj ects 
would not go beyond the tenth shock level [ 1 50 volts] . . . .  ") .  
87 See M ilgram. Some Conditions oj Obedience, supra note 86, at 60 ( "Pilot studies 
. . .  were completed in the winter of 1 960.") . 
88 See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study oj Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOc. 
PSYCHOL. 371 ,  373-74 ( 1 963) (explaining the basic design of Milgram's experiments) .  
89 See id. at 372 (explaining that in  most versions of the experiment the "learner's" 
responses were tape recorded and played over a sound system in the "teacher's" 
room) .  
90 See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 68 ("Milgram himself foresaw l ittle 
total obedience.") . 
91 See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORI1Y, supra note 86, at 60 tb1.3 (identif
ying these numbers as resulting from a base line condition in which the "learner" 
responded with more than just cries of anguish, including voicing concerns of a heart 
problem) . 
92 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM:  A REPORT ON THE 
BANALl1Y OF EVIL ( 1 994) ; Dk'<IEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING 
EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST ( 1 996) ; ERVIN STAUB, THE 
ROOTS OF EVIL: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE ( 1 992) ; 
Philip G. Zimbardo, The PS)'chology oj Evi� 5 EYE ON PSI CHI 1 6  (2000) , 
http://ww .psichi.org/pubs/ articles/ article_72.asp. 
93 As M ilgram learned in his experiment: 
With numbing regularity good people were seen to knuckle under the 
demands of authority and perform actions that were callous and severe. Men 
who are in  everyday life responsible and decent were seduced by the 
trappings of authority, by the control of their perceptions, and by the 
uncritical acceptance of the experimenter's definition of the situation, into 
performing harsh acts . . . .  
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experiment hundreds of times using many different variations.�14 By 
manipulating the situation, Milgram was able to increase or decrease 
conformity on the part of the teachers. For example, when it was not 
the teacher administering the shock himself, but rather a peer 
operating at the teacher's instruction, more than ninety percent of 
subjects administered the maximum shock.!>!> When an ordinary 
person rather than a scientist was demanding that the shocking 
continue, however, far fewer teachers went to 450 volts.!l6 The sixty­
five percent ful l  compliance observed repeatedly at Yale shrunk to 
forty-eight percent when the study was moved off campus and 
purportedly run by "Research Associates of Bridgeport."�)7 
The vast discrepancy between ex ante predictions about the likely 
behavior of subjects in these experiments and their actual behavior 
reveals a central lesson of social psychology-namely, the profound 
ways in which situation influences our behavior.98 The naive 
predictions themselves reveal the gross extent to which we 
underestimate the power of the situation and wrongly presume that 
behavior is motivated by disposition.99 
. . .  A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, 
irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so 
long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority. 
Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience, supra note 86, at 74 75. 
94 Milgram conducted at least twenty one different variations on the initial 
experiment. See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 207 n .6 
(" [Nervousness] data [of the subjects] are available for twenty one experimental 
conditions . . . .  ") . 
95 See id. at 1 1 9, 1 21 22 (concluding that "any factor that will create distance 
between the subject and the victim[ ]  will lead to a reduction of strain on the 
participant and thus lessen disobedience") . 
96 See id. at 93-97 (finding that despite authority "hovering in the background," 
experiments in which an ordinary man gave the orders resulted in a "sharp drop in  
compliance" to twenty percent administering the maximum shock). 
97 [d. at 68 69. 
98 The discrepancy also reveals the extent to which even psychologists frequently 
fail to anticipate how situation will move their subjects. See Jerry Fodor, Why We Are 
So Good at Catching Cheaters, 75 COGNITION 29, 32 (2000) ("When subjects appear to 
behave peculiarly in an experimental task, that is not infrequently because they are 
sensitive to a material []  variable that the experimenter has failed to notice.") . 
!J9 Milgram's research reflects what many, including Milgram, noticed about Nazi 
Germany: the ease with which situational influence can lead humans to engage in 
atrocious, morally reprehensible, individual acts. Recent primary research indicates 
that "ordinary men" those who previously led regular, civilized lives overwhelmingly 
accepted the Nazi regime's call to genocide despite an explicitly available "choice" to 
evade the action. See CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN 1 3, 55 57 
(HarperPerennial 1 998) ( 1 992) (reporting how a Nazi battalion commander in World 
War II Poland allowed "any of the older men who did not feel up to the task" of 
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As Milgram's experiments help demonstrate, unobserved 
(though observable) situation can be as potent as observed situation. 
And when it is unobserved situation that moves us, we experience it 
as dispositional consent. 
Insofar as economics, and law and economics, have been 
challenged by critics, most debate has taken place over the extent 
to which people are rational. Economists tend to assume that the 
"rational actor model" is reasonably accurate, or that its inaccuracies 
do not, for one reason or another, threaten their conclusions 
substantially. loo The critics tend to either roll their eyes at the 
obvious absurdity of the rational actor model or, more carefully, 
provide evidence to support a conclusion that the rational actor 
model is flawed and should be adjusted to take into account the 
irrational features of the typical human actor. In our view, both 
perspectives miss the far more significant assumption behind the 
rational actor model: that people are dispositional actors. As the 
Milgram experiments so powerfully demonstrate, it is our 
situations-far more than we realize, and often far more than our 
dispositions-that move us. We are, in essence, not rational actors, 
but "situational characters." 
B. Missing the Stage 
We are too ready to read personality and character traits into the behavioral 
drama and too resistant to see stage settings as the basis for the action. 
-Philip C. Zimbardo & Michael Leippe'o, 
participating in a massacre to "step out" and be given an alternative assignment) ; id. at 
64 65 (describing how during one execution in the Polish woods "anyone who could 
not take it any longer could report" and be excused) ;  id. at 74 (reporting that despite 
the opportunity to drop out, less then nventy percent of the Nazi policemen evaded 
the killing of 1500 people an entire town) .  But see id. at 65 70, 75 (relating the stories 
of German policemen who chose not to kill, several of whom felt no need to impress 
their comrades because of fnancial security and a lack of career military ambitions). 
The author of Ordinary Men, Christopher Browning, dispositionalized the massacre by 
focusing on those who avoided the situational influence-or responded to a less 
prominent situation despite the glaring fact that so few managed to do so. 
100 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (reviewing responses of economists and 
legal economists to social psychological evidence that conflicts \vith the rational actor 
model) .  
101 
ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE , supra note 22, at 93. 
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All the warld 's a stage . . . And ail the men and women merel), jJla)'ers . . . .  
- William ShakesjJeare102 
The "situational character," introduced in this Article and 
f1 h d ' . ' 1 103 d '  h k 104 • es e out In a companIon artI c e an In ot e r  wor 's ,  IS 
meant not to reconstruct, but rather to retire the basic rational actor 
model of law and economics ( including its chief competitors such 
as the behavioral actor, the boundedly rational actor, the satisficing 
actor, and the autonomous agent of classical liberalism ) .  Our goal is 
not, in other words, to offer an alternative dispositionistlO;. account, 
but rather to develop an approach to legal theory that 
conceptualizes people's behavior more accurately in the locus of 
situation. 
We thus introduce the situational character: an individual who 
does not act with total freedom (even if she does sometimes act 
extemporaneously) and who does not often choose her stage. She 
instead finds herself, and we as legal scholars find her, already in 
action on a given stage, among other characters, with dialogue and 
plot proceeding apace around her, and subject to the powerful ( if 
less visible) influence of scripts, props, backdrops, and directors. To 
be sure, such a character will often behave as if she is a dispositional 
actor, but alter the stage, the script, and so on, and you will see the 
pervasive role of situation as the actor's behavior conforms to it. 
Consider the following thought experiment: 
Your plane, a Boeing 747, is reaching cruising altitude in your flight 
from Logan to O'Hare, and the pilot turns off the "Fasten Seatbelt" 
sign. You recline in your aisle seat for a catnap when the elderly and 
somewhat feeble gentleman next to you stands and politely asks to get 
by. You move quickly into the aisle to aid his passage and then return 
to your seat as he makes his way slowly to the back of the plane to the 
lavatory-about one-eighth of the length of the plane. You don ' t  re­
buckle your seatbelt because you expect him to return shortly and you 
want to be prepared to again move into the aisle so that he can reclaim 
his seat. 
102 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7. 
103 See Hanson & Yosifon, slljJra note 30. 
104 See sources cited supra note 84. 
105 By "dispositionist" or "situationist," we mean to indicate the attributional 
perception, and by "dispositional" and "situational" we mean to indicate the 
attributional truth of the matter. Thus, describing people as situational 
disposition ists is one way of saying that they are subject to the fundamental 
attribution error. 
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Ten minutes pass, and you begin to worry because the elderly 
gen tleman seemed a l ittle u nstable. Still, you are reluctant to meddle 
and possibly embarrdss him or yourself. When another five minutes 
have passed, you decide to alert a flight attendant of your concerns. As 
you reach for the call button, the man returns, apparently no worse for 
wear. You jump out to let h im in ,  and you both slide into your seats. 
You breathe a sligh t sigh of relief that he is fine after all, and that you 
did not h ave to press the button. 
Now, without re-reading any portion of the preceding para­
graphs, estimate the distance that the old man traveled between 
leaving and returning to his seat. 
If you are like most people we asked about this scenario,  you 
estimated close to thirty feet. A more accurate estimate, however, 
would be roughly 1 000 times greater than that-approximately 1 50 
miles. In other words, most people see the man moving within the 
plane, but miss his situation, the plane itself. 106 But even the few who 
see the plane tend to miss the movement of the Earth-a failure that 
made Copernicus, one who did notice,  the butt of ridicule, and 
Galileo, another who saw what others were missing, a prisoner. And 
even those great astronomers did not perceive, just as most of us 
today do not, the immense currents of the solar system, the galaxy, 
and the universe. Indeed, when one takes those additional situa­
tional forces into account, the old man moved, in his visit to the 
bathroom, something closer to 350,000 miles. lOi 
106 
Of the thirty three people we asked, twen ty-four of them provided answers of 
between zero and one hundred feet. Nine gave answers that revealed that they 
considered the movement of the plane: more than fifty miles. But of those nine, 
seven indicated that they considered that movement because they were looking for 
the "trick," and that it took them some time to figure out the second answer. It bears 
mentioning that even the respondents in the first group appeared to be looking for 
the trick, asking questions about what they had missed, but were still unable to 
perceive the plane's movement when asked how far the man had "traveled" in fifteen 
minutes. Within the seemingly fixed environment of the cabin,  one individual's 
movement was far more salient than the (forgotten)  progress of the plane itself. 
lOi 
The Earth's average orbital velocity is 1 8.5 miles per second. See Scott Wilber, 
How Man)' Miles Does the Earth Travel in Space Each Da)'?, PHYSLINK.COM: PHYSICS & 
AsTRO;\,OMY O]\'LI]\'E, at http://wW\.i..physlink.com/Education/ AskExperts/ae548.cfm 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (stating that the "entir'e solar system, including the Earth, 
moves through t.he cosmic background . . .  for a total of 32 million miles per day") . In 
one minute, the elderly man travels l 1 lO miles due to the Earth's orbital velocity; in 
fifteen minutes, he travels 1 6,650 miles. Factoring in background movement-22,222 
miles per minute-results in 350,000 miles in fifteen minutes. 
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C.  The Bounds of Dispositionism 
We have already summarized some of the "evidence that people 
are inclined to offer dispositionist explanations for behavior instead 
of situationist ones, and that they make inferences about the 
characteristics of actors when they would do well to make inferences 
instead about the characteristics of situations . . . . 
,, 108 "Ve have also 
suggested that this fundamental attribution error has not spared the 
professional and credentialed minds of economists and legal 
economists-hence, our repeated emphasis on the fact that they too 
are human. 
But, if we humans are subject to a tendency to see disposition 
where situation is largely controlling, a critical question emerges as 
to the strength and expansiveness of that tendency. Of course, this is 
a question for which no precise answer can be given. But it is 
nevertheless a crucial issue for legal theory, and one that cannot be 
papered over by implausibly presuming near-total dispositionism. 
Some clarifying light can be shed on the matter by separating it into 
two sub-questions. First, at what point and to what degree do lay 
people and economists begin to see situation and to take it into 
account? In other words, what are the limits to our dispositionism­
how fundamental is it? Second, to what extent do disposition and 
situation actually move us? Put differently, how fundamental an 
error is our dispositionism? The first question is about how we 
perceive what we see, and the second question is about how accurate 
our perceptions are. 
1 .  How Fundamental Is Our Dispositionism? 
Regarding the first question, our gun-to-the-head examplelO\I 
makes clear that our dispositionism does occasionally give way to 
situationism. The example is particularly apt because it appears that 
we rarely see situation unless the situation is thrust upon us in the 
form of another hard-to-miss actor such as a person wielding a gun. 1 1O 
108 Ross & NISBETI, supra note 9, at 1 25.  
109 See supra Part II .A (suggesting that a threat of serious bodily harm would likely 
cause one to inf ict pain on another despite a disposition against such an action) . 
l IO There are exceptions to those basic patterns. Most notably, when making 
attributions about ourselves we often are more likely to attribute the cause of bad 
outcomes or behaviOl' to exterior situational influences. For example, if we do poorly 
on an important test, we may be quick to complain about the distractions in the testing 
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a. Economic incentives 
Even a very obvious, controllable, and tangible situational 
influence-money-is commonly overlooked in favor of dispositionist 
explanations of behavior. The effects of financial incentives on lay 
people tend to be understood in terms of stable dispositional 
proclivities. This lesson is rendered explicit by experiments in social 
psychology. 
In one such study, a first group of subjects ( the "observers") were 
asked to monitor and later draw conclusions about the conduct of a 
second group of subjects (the "volunteers") as part of a study on 
decision making. I I  I After describing a fictitious s tudy to the 
subj ects, the experimenter announced that before they began 
the experiment, she "happen [ed]  to have sort of a real decision 
for [ th e m ]  to make ." l l2 The corporate board and potential finan­
cial supporters of the college 's "Human Development Institute" were 
gathered in town for the weekend, and the Institute was seeking 
students who would help with entertainment and campus tours for 
the spouses of these businesspeople. The real experiment, of course, 
was underway. Some subjects were offered $0.50 per hour and some 
were offered $1 .50 (or some amount closer to $3 and $9, respectively, 
in 2003 values) .  Just twenty-four percent of the low-payment subjects 
volunteered, while sixty-eight percent of the high-payment subjects 
did SO. 1 13  Volunteering was therefore correlated with the amount of 
money offered, hardly a shocking result. 
environment or a biased professor who grades unfairly. Conversely, when things go 
well for us we have a tendency to attribute the cause to our own dispositions-our 
intelligence, diligence, etc.-rather than situational influences. Those patterns in the 
actor observer bias, as the phenomenon has been dubbed by social psychologists, echo 
part of our basic claim here, which is that our behavioral attributions are often 
motivated. See Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological 
Pmpectives, in HEURISTICS Al"lD BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636, 
653 65 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (reviewing social psychological findings 
concerning the actor-observer bias);  see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 72-75 
(discussing actor observer bias) . Social psychologists have identified other limits to our 
dispositionism. See infra text accompanying notes 4 1 1 4 1  (discussing cultural 
influences over dispositionist and situationist attributions) . Of course, even when we 
attribute causation to situation, we often only recognize a tiny portion of the situation. 
See also infra text accompanying notes 1 40-45 (describing other limitations to our 
ability to appreciate the role of situation).  
I I I  Richard E. Nisbett et al., Behavior as Seen &y the Actor and as Seen try the Observer, 
27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 54, 155  ( 1973) . 
1 12 [d. at 1 55-56. 
I I :{ [d. at 1 57. 
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More revealing findings, however, came out of the second part of 
the experiment. "Observers," who had been privy to all elements of 
the first part of the study, were asked about their perceptions of the 
volunteers' reasons for agreeing or declining to assist the Institute 
over the weekend. The observers apparently attributed the 
differences in volunteering to the stable dispositions of the individual 
subjects, rather than to the amount of money that each was offered 
in the situation. Asked " [h]ow likely do you think it is that [ the 
subject] would also volunteer to canvass for the United Fund?," 
observers responded that those who had volunteered in the present 
experiment would be substantially more likely to volunteer for the 
United Fund than would those who had not presently volunteered, 
regardless of how much they had been offered. 1 I 4  "Observers were 
apparently misled by the actor's behavior, assuming it reflected a 
dispositional tendency to volunteer rather than a response to a 
suitably compensated Job opportunity. ", 1 15 
This study suggests the depth of our dispositionism. It can run 
deeper than any intuitive belief in the selfish or profiteering nature 
of human behavior; we think people are the way they are, 
irrespective of the influences under which they act at any moment. 
We are prone to dispositionism even where situational factors are 
visible, countable, and widely acknowledged to be a source of 
incentives and influence. Of all the non-human, non-threatening 
situational factors, it is difficult to think of one more obvious and 
unmistakable than cash. And yet, even when money is the clear 
motive, we still tend to see disposition. 
This is one place where economists part ways with the rest of us, 
though as argued in the next subsection, not nearly so far as i t  might 
initially appear. The self-interested, rational actor of many economic 
models acts pursuant to one primary situational factor-money-in 
the forms of prices and incomes. An economist would not miss the 
implied upward-sloping supply curve in the experiment j ust 
described. The volunteer ratios would be explained immediately and 
solely by the situational distance between $0.50 and $l .50. 
b. The limits of economists ' situationism 
One should not be fooled by this fleeting attributional accuracy, 
for it is just a consequence of the otherwise dispositional assumptions 
1 14 Nisbett et aI., supra note I l l ,  at 1 56-57. 
l I 5  Ross & NISBETI', supra note 9,  at 1 27. 
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behind the rational actor model. It is actually the important 
similarity between the economist and the non-economist as 
dispositionists that is most striking. 
As we have already suggested, the reason that economists see the 
situational role of money is because of their preliminary assumption 
that people are dispositionally motivated to pursue little else. Close 
inspection reveals that economists actually provide an Ul�ustifiably 
anemic version of their favored situational factor, as their models 
allow for only a fraction of the situational force of price. For 
example, a fundamental assumption of legal economists, one that 
quietly makes possible much of their analysis, is that a person 's 
willingness to pay equals her willingness to accept for the same item. 
That is, a person would be willing to pay as much for a widget as that 
person would be willing to accept in payment from another party for 
selling that same widget. That assumption is, for example, central to 
the Coase Theorem's instruction that well-functioning markets will 
yield allocatively efficient outcomes. 
Yet, even if one ignores the growing evidence from economic 
behavioralists that willingness to pay tends to be significantly lower 
than willingness to accept,l l6 such a starting place entirely disregards 
the role of external situation. More specifically, a "basic principle of 
economics"l l 7  that assets tend to "gravitate toward their most valuable 
uses if voluntary exchange-a market-is permitted"l lR ignores the 
fact that a person's "willingness to pay," will to a great degree reflect 
that person 's "ability to pay." In other words, the basic principle of 
economics treats situation (ability to pay) as disposition (willingness 
to pay) . Richard Posner describes this translation of situational 
constraints into dispositional tendencies in the introduction to his 
seminal law and economics text: 
Suppose that pituitary extract is in very scarce supply  relative to the 
demand and is therefore very expensive. A poor family has a child who 
wiIl be a dwarf if he does not get some of the extract, but the family 
cannot afford the price and could not even if they could borrow 
against the child's future earnings as a person of normal height . . . .  A 
rich family has a child who wiIl grow to normal height, but the extract 
wil add a few inches more, and his parents decide to buy it for him. 
1 16 See, e.g. , Daniel Kahneman et aI., Experimental Tests oj the Endowment Effect 
and the Coase Theorem, 98 ] .  POL. ECON. 1 325, 1 325 ( 1990) (declaring that " [c)on
trary to theoretical expectations, measures of willingness to accept greatly exceed 
measures of wiIlingness to pay"). 
I I i  POSNER, ECONOMIC fu'lALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 1 3, at 1 0. 
l iS Jd. 
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In the sense of value used in this book [Economic Analysis of Law] , the 
pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich than to the poor family, 
because value is mea�ured by willingness to pay; but the extract would 
confer greater happiness in the hands of the poor fam ily than in the 
hands of the rich one. 
As this example shows, the term efficiency, when used as in this 
book to denote that allocation of resources in which value is 
maximized, has limitations a� an ethical criterion of social 
decisionmaking . . . .  Although no effort will be made in this book to 
defend efficiency as the only worthwhile criterion of social choice, . . .  
it is an important criterion. In  many areas of interest to the economic 
analyst of law, . . .  it is . . .  the main thing that students of public 
policy worry about."9 
161  
In  short, economists are situationally senSItIve m only the 
narrowest sense-taking into account the way in which price might 
influence people's actions based on their willingness to pay, but 
refusing to look at the situational backdrop to that disposition. 12o As 
the Posner quotation exemplifies, economists do not typically go very 
far to justify that situational blindness. 12 1  But it is a blindness that 
arguably implicates even the most central features of their theory. 
Indeed, it may be that same type of situational influence (ability 
to pay as limited by "budget constraints" or prices) and not the 
presumed dispositional forces (rational ranking of preferences) that 
puts the "down" in the downward-sloping demand curve, the crown 
jewel of economic theory.122 As Nobel Laureate Gary Becker taught 
forty years ago: 
Negatively inclined market demand curves result not  so much from 
rational behavior per se as from a general principle which includes a 
wide class of irrational behavior as well. Therefore, households can be 
1 19 ld. at 13.  
120 There are arguably other minor ways in which economists take into account 
situational considerations. For instance, they sometimes take into account the role of 
collective, as compared to individual, decisions or decisions regarding uncertain 
outcomes. But even then, their analyses are otherwise based on dispositionist assump­
tions. A group of people is usually assumed to act like a set of dispositionally 
motivated individuals who are making a choice, and little or no adjustment is made to 
consider the situational influence of even various group dynamics. 
121  V\'hen pushed, they instruct those who see it otherwise that such 
"distributional" concerns are not properly the prOvince of either economists or legal 
rules. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 52 (recounting Posner's argument that the 
economic analysis of law does not take in account income distributional 
considerations) . 
122 See, e.g. , COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 23 ( treating as axiomatic the 
downward-sloping demand curve i.e., the notion that "when the price of x goes up, 
the amoun t of x that the consumer will purchase goes down, and vice versa") . 
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said to behave not only "as if' they were rational but also "as if' they 
were irrational: the major piece of empirical evidence justifying the 
first statement can equally well justify the second . . . .  
[T] he change in opportunities resulting from a change in relative 
prices also tends to produce a systematic response, regardless of the 
decision rule. In particular, the fundamental theorem of traditional 
theory-that demand curves are negatively inclined-largely results 
from the change in opportunities alone and is largely independent of 
the decision rule.12' 
Not only utility maximization but also many other decision rules, 
incorporating a wide variety of irrational behavior, lead to negatively 
inclined demand curves because of the effect of a change in prices on • •  124 opportullltJes. 
Hence the market would act as if "it" were rational not only when 
households were rational, but also when they were inert, impulsive, or 
otherwise irrational. l" 
Indeed, the most important substantive result of this paper is that 
irrational units would often be "forced" by a [situational] change in 
opportunities to respond rationally. For example, impulsive 
households would tend to have negatively inclined demand curves 
because a rise in the price of one commodity would shift opportunities 
toward others, leaving less chance to purchase this one even 
impulsively. Other irrational households would likewise tend to have 
negatively inclined demand curves, irrational firms negatively inclined 
demand curves for inputs, and irrational workers positively inclined 
supply curves to occupations.126 
Strikingly, despite Becker's demonstration that downward-sloping 
demand curves do not imply rational behavior, many subsequent 
economists (particularly legal economists) have ignored or trivialized 
it. 12i The idea that situation is central and disposition is peripheral 
123 Gal)' S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1 ,  4 
( 1 962) .  
124 Id. at 5. 
125 Id. at 7. 
12ti ld. at 12.  
127 Richard Posner is one of the few legal economists to address it. See Hanson & 
Yosifon, supra note 30 (reviewing Richard Posner's discussion and dismissal of the 
issue) . Posner recently ridiculed Ronald Coase for suggesting that the insight might 
be taken seriously. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCO�ING LAW 442 ( 1 995) ("Could 
Coase believe that some cognitive or psychological defect prevents us from moving up 
the ladder of preferred alternatives in the manner that I described? That misfiring 
brain cells make us disregard opportunity cost or fail to disregard sunk costs? 
Unlikely.") . Very recently, however, behavioral economists have identifed several ways 
in which arbitrary anchors can provide the illusion of stable preferences and how there 
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has no purchase, given what economists seem to "know" about their 
world (as confirmed by their human vision and, tautologically, by the 
shape and slope of the demand curves they have "seen,, ) . 128 It is as 
though legal economists, like the rest of us, are so swept up by the 
play that they forget that they are watching one and come to believe 
that the characters in it are internally, disposition ally motivated. 
Becker's point has been regarded as a move in a logic game; it is 
treated as a bizarre, if strictly speaking correct, theoretical insight. '29 
His point is stripped of its power as the human figures are 
caricatured as "irrational" actors and the more revealing depth of the 
insight is not pursued: situation is often more potent than we 
acknowledge, exerting a greater influence over our actions than 
disposition. 
Besides the narrow treatment of price and budget, the other 
major exception to economists' dispositionism is, as for the rest of us, 
the case in which someone acts in response to a significant threat 
(usually of force) posed by another person-prototypically a bullet to 
t�e brain. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, in their highly regarded 
law and economics text, provide a fairly conventional description of 
when situation should be considered in the law of contracts: 
[S] ometimes one of the parties to a bargain faces a dire constraint. 
A dire constraint leaves the decision maker with little or no choice. 
Contract law treats dire constraints differently . . . .  
Law prohibits people from making threats such as, "Work for me if 
you want your sister to come home safely from school . . . . ,, 130 
Then, at the conclusion of their analysis, they ask the reader to 
explain the efficiency argument against enforcing the following 
arrangement: "Suppose that person A, while aiming a gun at person 
B, invites B to write a check.,, '31 As such hypotheticals illustrate, 
can be "stable demand curves wi t hout stable preferences". See generally Dan Ariely, 
George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves 
Without Stable Preferences, l i S  QJ. ECON. 73 (2003) . 
12R See, e.g. , POSNER, supra note 1 27, at 441 42 (acknowledging the first point, 
then trivializing it through brief tautological assertions) .  
129 See id. at 442 ("Becker's argument is that since consumers have limited budgets, 
even irrational consumers will on average purchase less of a good when [the] price 
rises, because the consumers' resources will become depleted sooner.") . 
130 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 26 1 .  
lSI  [d. at 263. 
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situation is easy to see, if not impossible to miss, when it IS 
brandishing a revolver. I :;2 
Along with those scenarios, Cooter and Ulen offer some less 
dramatic examples, such as a crew threatening to walkout midway 
through a chartered fishing voyage in an effort to extract higher 
wages from their captain.133 But even examples that do not involve 
violent threats s till  involve "threats.,, 134 And those threats are made 
clear by one or more dispositionally motivated human actors seeking 
to force one party to act contrary to his or her interests absent the 
threat. In other words, only an extremely narrow range of situational 
factors count-those of disposition ally bad actors. Cooter and Ulen's 
lesson is that constrain ts less "dire" than the sort indicated in their 
examples are ignored in contract law, and properly so from an • • 1 35 economlC perspectIve. 
But these exceptions do not reveal a true sensitivity to situation; 
they expose only the tiny and predictable exception to dispositionism 
that proves the rule. Indeed, these departures flow from the very 
same current that creates the more general phenomenon-the 
fundamental attribution error-to which they are exceptions. That 
current, recall, originates from our cognitive tendency to "see" salient 
actors and features and to miss the rest. l36 The general result is that 
we tend to attribute a person's actions to her free choices because we 
do not see the influence of situation. However, when the situation 
takes the form of a threatening actor, we see that "situation" and 
alter our conclusion regarding how free, in fact, the first actor's 
132 Revealingly, even in conditions of unmistakable situational duress, economists 
sometimes see a person 's submission as properly understood as voluntarily and 
dispositionally motivated, albeit inefficient. For instance,Judge Posner writes: 
A points a gun at B saying, 'Your money or your life. '  B is very eager to 
accept the first branch of this offer by tendering his money. But a court will 
not enforce the resulting contract. The reason is not that B was not acting of 
his own free will. On the contrary, he was no doubt extremely eager to 
accept A's offer. The reason is that the enforcement of such offers would 
lower the net social product, by channeling resources into the making of 
threats and into efforts to protect against them. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC fu'lALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 1 3, at 1 1 6. 
1 33 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 263. 
1 :14 [d. at 262 ("Bargaining, which involves demands and offers, is opposite 
from coercion, which involves threats." ) .  
1 3', See infra text accompanying notes 550 61 4 (discussing other legal theorists and 
the law's treatment of similar issues) .  
1 36 See supra text accompanying notes 2 1 26 (explaining that the fundamental 
attribution error is a function of numerous factors, including the dominant role that 
human action generally takes in our causal construal processes) .  
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choices were. Put differently, a person is seen to give up her seat for 
an 800-pound gorilla, not by free choice, but because of the half-ton 
of hairy, menacing situation. If she gives up her seat for an elderly 
person or a parent holding a child, in con trast, suddenly it is her 
kind disposition that dominates the field, eclipsing situation. 
In sum, there is little or no place in economists'  models for 
situational influences other than prices or narrowly defined threats. 
It is not just the inability of poor parents to afford pituitary extract 
for their children that the economic approach ignores; it is also the 
myriad of situational influences that Milgram's  studies and 
countless other social psychological studies have exposed, and 
that economists have yet to see, much less explain.l3i It is also the 
countless situational influences that invisibly regulate us all-as they 
would the impoverished dwarf in Posner's example whose future 
earnings presumptively would be less than those of an affluent 
person of normal height. los Thus, economists exclude most of the 
vast range of situational influences in their analyses, and provide no 
explanation for privileging guns and money over the situational 
factors that they, like the rest of us, mostly ignore. 
c. Some situation behind our dispositionism 
Social psychologists have discovered that our day-to-day 
dispositionism goes still further. When we observe a person's 
behavior, we tend to first characterize that person in terms of her 
disposition. Only then do we begin to correct our characterization 
and take into account some of the situational variables that may have 
shaped her behavior.139 For instance, when we observe someone who 
is acting nervously, we automatically infer that the person is a 
nervous person. If we then discover that the person was talking 
about her intimate life, we might adjust our initial inference to take 
1 37 See, e.g. , supra notes 86-99; infra notes 1 48 54, 1 80 81 , 192, 242, 489-9 1 , 61 6-34 
(describing some of the situational manipulations in  Milgram's studies and closely 
related studies, and how they influenced beha\�or and expectations) .  See generally 
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing an overview of situational influences) . 
1 38 See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 9 20 (presenting the pituitary extract 
exa�gle
D
) ' . I T  C'lb l'h ' k '  l '  h l b O h  A . C  h al1le . I ert, m mg Ag 1 Y A oul 1 ers: ulomallC omponents  1 e 
Social Inference Process, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 1 89 ,  193  (James S. Uleman & John 
A. Bargh eds., 1 989) . 
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that situational feature into account. We might, in other words, drop 
or doubt our inference that she is dispositionally a nervous person. 140 
While initially inferring character and temperament from 
people's behavior is an automatic process, correcting those initial 
inferences to account for the situation requires effort. 14 1 We must 
expend cognitive resources to correct our initial dispositional 
impressions. And if our cognitive resources are being utilized 
because we are, say, preoccupied, tired, or intoxicated, then we will 
be less able to correct our dispositional inferences about people's 
behavior to account for the situation. Consequently, we will 
inaccurately attribute a person's behavior to her disposition rather 
than the underlying situation. 142 Put differently, our situations 
influence the extent to which we take into account other people's 
situations-a tendency discussed at greater length below. 143 
More troubling still, "even when we appreciate the impact of the 
situation, want to correct our inferences for it, and have the cognitive 
resources necessary for doing so, we may still fail to make sufficient 
corrections."I-H The dispositional attribution that we initially and 
automatically make acts as an anchor on the adjustments that we 
allow for situational factors. "Our ultimate conclusions about a 
person may remain contaminated by our initial inferences about this 
person's character even if we consider these inferences unwarranted 
and attempt to rid ourselves of this contamination.
,, 145 
1
10 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 43 1 .  
14 1 Gilbert, supra note 1 39, at 1 93 94. 
1
12 Id. at 1 94 (f nding empirical support for the hypothesis that a perceiver who is 
distracted is more likely to engage in dispositional thinking than a perceiver who is not 
"cognitively busy");  KUNDA, sujJra note 20, at 431 ("When we are preoccupied, tired, 
intoxicated, or in a hurry, and so unable to devote careful thought to making sense of 
others, we may fail to correct our impressions for situational constraints even if we 
understand these constraints.") ; see also Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental 
Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 
1 1 6 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 1 7, 1 27 28 ( 1 994) (citing this as an example of the fundamental 
attribution bias and explaining that we often attribute a person's behavior to certain 
traits or attitudes-i.e., disposition implied by such conduct) . 
14:1 See infra text accompanying notes 415-56 (discussing the role of culture) ; infra 
Part Vl.C-E (discussing some of the situational inf uences behind our culture) .  
144 KUNDA, supra note 20,  at 431 32; see also George A. Quattrone, Ouerattribution 
and Unit Fomw.tion: When BehavioT Engulfs the Person, 42 J. PERSONAUTI' & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 593, 600 0 1 ,  604 06 ( 1 982) (reviewing two experiments demonstrating that 
there may be circumstances in which observers overattribute behavior to situational 
causes while adjusting insufficiently for information about an actor's dispositions) . 
14[, KUNDA, supra note 20, at 432; see also Wilson & Brekke, sujJTa note 1 42,  at 1 27
28 (characterizing "the tendency to attribute people's behavior to their underlying 
dispositions" as a "failure" of the "unacceptable process"). 
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2. How Fundamental an Error Is Our Dispositionism? 
As the previous subsection suggested, considerable evidence 
reveals that our dispositionism runs very deep. 146 But even if most of 
us, including legal economists, are hard-core dispositionists, there is 
a second, related question regarding the extent to which 
dispositionism is wrong: That i s ,  just how influential is situation vis-a­
vis disposition? How much like a play are the settings in which 
humans actually find themselves and observe others? 
It is difficult to read about Milgram's experiments and the 
reactions to them without strongly suspecting that the human 
presumption is exactly inverted; that what we do not see dominates 
the little that we do see. That suspicion would, in our view, be 
generally correct. But since those early studies, social psychologists 
have managed to get a better measure of that inversion, a sample of 
which we will highlight here. 
When we introduced Milgram's famous experiments, we asserted 
that most readers would, like us, predict that they themselves would 
not have carried out the instructions to shock a fellow experimental 
subject at high voltages. Most readers surely would have predicted ex 
ante that the vast majority of others would not have gone through 
with it either, j ust as the lay people and psychologists surveyed by 
Milgram before his experiment predicted. 14; This divergence 
between the common sense prediction and the actual behavior, \ve 
indicated, was due to the erroneous presumption that people behave 
dispositionally rather than situation ally. In fact, the situational 
features were central, leading many to shock their fellow subjects 
despite having an otherwise normal or benign character. 148 Once 
one is familiar with Milgram's experiments, it would seem difficult to 
deny his central claim-that situation played a major role in causing 
the subjects to perform as they did. 
And yet, social psychologists have found that even when exposed 
to the Milgram study, people continue to conclude that the subjects 
were motivated dispositionally and thus miss the power of the 
146 See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 432 41 (providing a fascinating review of 
additional types of evidence of the fundamental attribution error) . 
147 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
148 See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 70 (dismissing the argument that 
Milgram's subjects were somehow "bad apples" by pointing out that the 
experimental "results were the same: meek obedience to unjust authority" across 
a wide demographic subject population) .  
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situation even when it is made explicit. For example, social psych­
ologist Martin Safer showed students Milgram's film, Obedience, 14�l 
which portrays the dynamics of the situational forces operating in 
Milgram's experiments. One week later, Safer provided his students 
with a description of the control experiment where the subject or 
" teacher" was free to choose the shock level on his own, without any 
direction by the experimenter to increase the voltage after each 
wrong answer.ISO Safer then asked the students to make certain 
predictions, including the average shock level set by the teachers in 
the control experiment and the percentage of teachers choosing the 
maximum shock level. lr, 1 
Even after seeing the film of the obedience experiment and the 
situational pressures of the experiment, Safer's students still believed 
that disposition was driving the teachers and would do so even in 
other situations, including that in which they were given no orders 
from the experimenter. When comparing the students' forecasts to 
the actual results of the control experiment, Safer's students 
significantly overestimated both the average shock level set by the 
teachers and the number of teachers who chose the maximum 
amount of shock absent the most significant situational forces of the 
original obedience experiment. 152 In other words, Safer's students 
persisted in believing that the teachers in Milgram's  original 
experiment were motivated by stable disposition rather than the 
situation of the experiment. 153 
This, of course, completely contradicts the findings of the ex 
ante surveys in which people drastically underestimated the amount of 
149 OBEDIENCE (Stanley Milgram 1969) .  
150 Martin A. Safer, Attributing Lvii to the Subject, Not the Situation: Student Reaction 
to Milgram s Film on Obedience, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 205, 205-06 
( 1 980 ) .  
151 Jd. at 206. 
152 Jd. at 207. 
m Id. at 208. In Milgram's movie about the experiments, only one of the many 
subjects is shown flipping the final switch, even though a majority of those 
participating did so. OBEDIENCE, supra note 1 49 .  According to folk wisdom among 
social psychologists, that is because the subjects who went that far did not want to be 
shown on film doing so, presumably because they felt that their actions reflected 
badly on their dispositions. In other words, it appears that even the subjects 
interpreted what happened in largely dispositionist terms. As revealed in one subject'S 
reflections one year after the experiment, su�iects and their family members construed 
the experiment as revealing disposition ism: "As my wife said, • [yJou can call yourself 
Eichmann. '  I hope I can deal more effectively with any future conflicts of values I 
encounter." MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORrIV, supra note 86, at 54. 
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shocking that would occur with situational pressures present. The 
contradiction again reveals the underlying consistency of the 
stubborn command of our dispositionism. Even when the power of 
the s i tuation was made explicit, "subjects continued to interpret 
behavior in terms of presumed dispositions, rather than recognizing 
the crucial role that Milgram's particular situation had played in 
producing his disturbing demonstration.,, 154 Our dispositionism runs 
deep, despite the fact that situation often runs deeper. 
In another classic demonstration of this phenomenon, subj ects 
were asked to read a short essay on "Castro's Cuba" and to judge the 
true attitude of the writer toward Castro. The subjects were 
informed that the essay was a prepared answer to an examination 
question, in which some exam takers were asked to criticize Castro's 
Cuba and other exam takers were asked to defend it. Subjects thus 
understood that the writer of any exam had little choice with respect 
to the position he or she took regarding Castro's Cuba. Surprisingly, 
many of the subjects nevertheless associated the writer's true attitude 
(disposition) toward Castro with the content of the essay. If the 
writer wrote a pro-Castro essay as (situationally) directed, many 
subjects concluded that the writer was privately (dispositionally) pro­
Castro, and vice versa. IS5 Thus, even when situational influences 
should be obvious and even when people are watching what is 
tantamount to a play, humans still tend to overestimate the role of 
disposition. 
Consider another exemplary experiment. In this one, college 
students participated in a simulated quiz game and were randomly 
assigned to either of two roles: contestant or questioner. 156 
Questioners were asked to compose general-knowledge queries to be 
posed to the contestants, and the contestants were instructed to 
answer as many of the questions as they could. ls7 The situational 
\:>4 Ross & NISBETI, supra note 9, at 1 32. 
1,,[, See Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 ,  4-8 ( 1 967) . Jones and Harris observed similar 
results in a second experiment that had the subjects draw dispositional inferences 
based on hearing an opening statement in a debate. Id. at 8 14. 
156 
Lee D. Ross et  aI . ,  Social Roles, Social Control, and Biases in Social Perception 
Processes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 485, 485-94 ( 1 977) . In a separate 
experiment, observers of the simulated quiz game exhibited the same dispositional 
bias as the contestants. Thus, even though the observers were aware of the situational 
advantage of the questioners, the observers nonetheless ranked the questioners as 
more generally knowledgeable than the contestants. Id. at 490 91 .  
157 /d. at 489 94. 
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advantage of the questioners is clear, given that they could draw 
from their areas of personal expertise, while contestants were forced 
to answer questions on unfamiliar topics. Therefore, it should not 
have been surprising that contestants could only give a small 
percentage of correct answers. Ye t, when i t  came to esti mating 
the intel l igence of the two groups,  the situational advantage 
was forgotten :  both questioners and contestants grossly under­
appreciated the situational benefit of being a questioner. As a 
resul t, both groups ranked the questioners as more generally 
knowledgeable than contestants. In other words, the game was 
perceived as a fair measure of general knowledge, and the failure of 
contestan ts was attributed to disposition. 15s Put differently, 
158 This study (and the many like) it would be, if they were well known, a favorite 
among law students and anyone else on the business end of the Socratic method. Cf 
LA:-II GUiNIER ET AL, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: LAW SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 28 ( 1 997) (noting that many women are alienated by the use of the Socratic 
method, especially in the first year of law school) ;  Lani Guinier et aI., Becoming 
Gentlemen: Women :' Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 1 43 U. PA. L. REv. 1 , 6-59 
( 1 994) (describing in detail the results of the study discussed in Guinier's book) . 
In another important study, a group of subjects was asked to divide a set of their 
peers into two categories: those the subjects thought would be likely to contribute to 
a food drive, and those they believed would be unlikely to contribute. Ross & 
l\'ISBETT, supra note 9, at 1 32.  Half of each group-the "most likely" and the "least 
likely"-was then sent a personalized letter asking for a specific food donation, 
induding a map of where to deliver the item. Id. The other half of each group 
received a generic form letter requesting only a general food donation, and with no 
map. Id. 
The study confirmed both the prevalence of disposition ism and the dominance of 
situation in determining actual conduct. The subjects who selected the "most likely" 
and "least l ikely" groups predicted that dispositional ascriptions, not the type of letter 
received, would determine who would actually donate food. Id. at 1 33. Specifically, 
subjects predicted that disposition (the type of person) would be nearly five times 
more influential than situation (the type of letter). But when the letters were sent 
and the food was collected, it turned out that the influence of situation was over four 
lillles greater than the influence of disposition-those who received personal letters 
" j l h  a map were much more likely to donate food. Id. Of course, even that figure 
overstates the role of disposition, because even those seemingly "dispositional" 
influences may be explained in part by situational influences beyond the channeling 
effect of the letter. In any event, the subjects tended to see what matteI'ed least and 
miss what mattered most. 
D ISPOSITION 
Most Likely Least Likely 
SITUATION Channeling Letter 83% predicted/ 1 7% predicted/ 
42% actual 25% actual 
Non Channeling 80% predicted/ 1 6% predicted/ 
Letter 8% actual 0% actual 
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partICipants saw th e players and missed the playing field, thus 
presuming that it was level. 
Finally, consider the following experimental inquiry into the 
social-psychological lessons of the classic Christian parable of the 
Good Samaritan. In the biblical version of the story, Jesus, in 
response to questioning by a lawyer about the meaning of 
neighborliness, tells of a man mortally wounded and left on a road 
by thieves. 159 The man was passed first by a priest, who saw the hurt 
man but did not stop to help him. Next, a Levi te (a priest's 
assistant) passed the man, saw him, but continued on without 
stopping. Finally came a man from Samaria-a Samaritan. He saw 
the wounded man and "was moved to pity. He went up and 
bandaged his wounds . . .  brought him to an inn, and looked after 
him there. ,
,) (;Q Having told this story, Jesus turns to the lawyer and 
asks, "'Which of these three do you think was neighbor to the man 
who fell into the hands of the robbers?"ItH The answer, of course, is 
that the Samaritan was the neighborly one, hence earning the 
dispositional moniker the "Good Samaritan. ,, 16� 
Social psychology, however, instructs that situation may provide 
a better explanation for the conduct of the characters in this tale, as 
it does in so much of our social life. This is not merely conjecture; i t  
has been subject to experiment. 163 Princeton Theological Seminary 
Subjects predicted that eighty-three percent of the "most likely" group would 
donate if they received the detailed channeling information, and that eighty percent 
of the "most likely" group would donate if they received the general letter. ld. 
Subjects further predicted that only seventeen percent of those deemed "least likely" 
would donate if they received the letter with the channeling information, and that 
sixteen percent of the group would donate if they received the general request. ld. 
In  other words, the subjects expected that the different letters would have virtually 
no effect, but that the different "types" of recipients would have an immense effect. 
The predictions failed: only four percent of subjects donated food in the non
channeling condition (none of the "least l ikelies" and eight percent of the "most 
likelies") , while thirty three percent donated food in the facilitory condition (twenty
five percent of the "least l ikelies" and forty two percent  of the "most likelies." ) .  /d. As 
the authors of the study noted, " [t] he situational variables proved more important 
than the relevant actors' dispositions more important, at least, than any dispositions 
salient to their peers." ld. 
1 59 Luke 1 0:29 37. 
1f.o ld. 10:33 34. 
1 61 ld. 1 0:36. 
162 Perhaps revealingly, the phrase is not found in the biblical tale at all; rather, 
it has come down to us through dispositional interpretations of the parable.  
1Il 3  See John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study oj 
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALI1Y Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 1 00, 1 00 08 ( 1 973) . 
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students were asked to prepare a brief extemporaneous talk that 
would be recorded in a nearby building. 164 The experiment thus 
neatly managed to have i ts subj ects parallel the priestly 
vocations of the characters in the biblical tale .  Some of the 
students were told to discuss possible jobs for seminary students, 
while the others were told to discuss the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. 165 Mter informing them about their respective talks, the 
experimenter told some of his subjects, "Oh, you're late. They were 
expecting you a few minutes ago. We'd better get moving.,, 166 These 
s tudents were given the high-hurry situational condition. Another 
group of subjects was given an intermediate-hurry situational 
condition. This group was told, "The assistant is ready for you, so 
please go right over.,, 167 Finally, for a low-hurry s ituational 
condition,  the experimenter told the remaining subjects, "It'll be a 
few minutes before they're ready for you, but you might as well head 
,, 1 68 on over. 
Along the route between the two buildings was a man, the 
experimenter's undisclosed confederate, "slumped in a doorway, 
head down, eyes closed, not moving[ ,  coughing, and groaning] . ,, 169 
Only ten percent of the seminarians who had been told they were 
running late ( the high-hurry situational condition) stopped to help 
the ailing man, and only forty-five percent of the seminarians who 
were pressed for time (the intermediate-hurry situational condition) 
1 -0 offered help. I In contrast, among those who were not pressed for 
time ( the low-hurry situational condition) ,  sixty-three percent offered 
to help. 17 1 Again, a minor situational manipulation produced a 
major behavioral difference. Perhaps most indicative of the power of 
situational influence is that several of the seminarians who were 
pressed for time and who were to speak on the parable of the Good 
Samaritan "literally stepped over the victim" on the way to give their 
talks. 172 
164 [d. at 1 03. 
16' [d. 
166 [d. at 1 03 04. 
167 [d. at 1 04. 
168 Id. 
169 !d. 
170 [d. at 1 05 .  
1 71 [d. 
1 72 [d. at 1 07. 
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What about dispositions? Before the experiment began, the 
seminarians filled out a survey, answering a variety of questions about 
themselves. 173 For example, the seminarians were asked whether 
their interest in religion stemmed primarily from a desire to assure 
their own personal salvation or whether it was primarily related to 
their desire to help others. 174 Such dispositional self-ascriptions had 
"virtually no role in determining whether the subject stopped to 
help.
,
, 175 Mter analyzing psychological evaluations of their forty 
subjects, the experimenters found that the only significant variable 
that correlated with "helping behavior" was time, a situational 
factor. 176 The fact that some of the seminarians were to speak on the 
parable of the Good Samaritan, thereby raising the salience of 
dispositional helping norms, did not significantly affect helping 
behavior in the students. 17i 
Taken together, these experiments help bring into relief the 
profound power of situation over human action. They also reveal 
that such influences are usually left unexamined in our daily lives, in 
our stories, and in our theories about what moves people. There was 
little evidence of a "good seminarian" or a "bad seminarian," but 
there was much evidence of "situational seminarians." The differ­
ence between the priest who passes on and the Samaritan who stops 
may be more a function of a bad or good situation than of a bad or 
good disposition. 178 
We humans tend to perceive disposition as dominating situation 
even though evidence from social science strongly suggests the 
reverse; this is, again ,  the fundamental attribution error. The 
objective here is not to prove or to claim that disposition plays no 
role in our behavior, or even that it does not sometimes play a very 
important role. Rather,  the objective is to make clear what social 
science reveals about j ust how surprisingly slight that role is most of 
the time-at least as compared to what most of us believe and, 
m Id. at 1 02. 
174 Id. 
m Ross & NISBETT, sujJra note 9, at 1 3 1 .  
17(' Darley & Batson, supra note 1 63, a t  1 04-06. 
1 77 lri. at 1 07; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing a related 
portion of this experiment) . 
178 See also MILGRfu"I,  OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITI', supra note 86, at 205 (" [T] he 
social psychology of this century reveals a major lesson: often, it is not so much the 
kind of person a man is as the kind of situation in which he finds himself that 
determines how he wil act."). 
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perhaps,  wan t to believe. li9 Readers may, as we do, take some 
reassurance from the fact that ten percent of the hurried 
seminarians did stop to assist the ailing man, despite their perceived 
time crunch. But again, it is easy to miss even the profound 
situational influence wielded in that experiment by the groaning, 
slumped elderly man. Settings with less compelling situational 
pressures for help are likely to yield even less "goodness."  Indeed, a 
disheartening finding is that, in the many versions of Milgram's 
studies, not a single subj ect ever went to check on or assist the 
learner whom they believed was being shocked, despite the learner's 
protests and ultimate silence during the "experiment" and despite 
the teacher's own concern about hurting the learner. lso Why not? A 
good guess would be that offering such aid was somehow not 
situation ally scripted. l S I  
D. Some Sources of Dispositionism 
Why do we see what isn' t  and fail to see what is? We have already 
discussed several reasons. First, part of the answer stems from the 
fact that human actions dominate the field in our causal 
attributions-we see what is most obvious and salient, and tend to 
miss the rest. 182 Perhaps that would not be such a problem were we 
not so inclined to believe in the accuracy of our vision-that we see 
all there is to see, and that what we miss does not exist. Second, 
even when there are situational features that we might recognize as 
influential, we make dispositional attributions automatically, while 
our situational adjustments require cognitive effort-meaning that 
dispositionism is the default inference, mutable only when our minds 
1 79 See infra text accompanying notes 1 93 95, 393-401 ,  454-56, 638 8 1 (suggesting 
some of the ways in which dispositionism may be linked to the motive to affirm 
ourselves, our groups, and our systems) ; supra note 1 1 0 (describing our tendency to 
attribute cause to situation when doing so is self-affirming). 
1 80 ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 73-74. 
181 Without a model of action, our feelings of upset and our desire to help often 
lead to no action. Milgram discussed the frustration of a specific "teacher" as such: 
This subject did not want to shock the victim, and he found it an extremely 
disagreeable task, but he was unable to invent a response that would free him 
from [ the experimenter's] authority. Many subjects cannot find the specific 
verbal formula that would enable them to reject the role assigned to them by 
the experimenter. Perhaps our culture does not provide adequate models for 
disobedience. 
Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience, supra note 86, at 67. 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. 
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are not otherwise occupied. IR3 Third, even then our automatic dis­
positional attributions will contaminate the adjustments for situations 
that we do have the cognitive energy to make. 184 As significant as 
those reasons are, there is more to consider. 
To comprehend the robustness of dispositionism, it is necessary 
to understand that the causal ambiguities that fog our experiences 
allow, and often encourage, it. As Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett 
have argued at length , our disposi tionism often appears to be 
confirmed in the evidence we encounter in our daily lives. ls5 That is 
true in part because we tend to see what we expect to see, and, 
particularly in Western culture, disposition is the general • 186 W ' 1 1  b h f th . b 1 187 F expectatIOn. e WI return to ot 0 ese pomts e ow. or 
now it is enough to say that our construals of what we experience (or 
of our memories of what we have experienced) are far more 
malleable in service of our expectations than we recognize . 
But even if we were seeing what "is," our dispositionist theory of 
human conduct will tend to be confirmed by the evidence we 
encounter, though our interpretation of that evidence is often 
fundamentally wrong. We constantly see people behaving in ways 
consistent with our assumptions about their personality traits, and we 
often conform our own in teractions with them based on those 
dispositional accounts. Our predictions are confirmed, however, not 
because dispositions are in fact stable, but because situations so often 
are: 
In the course of ordinary experience, we rarely have a chance to 
observe the same people in radically different roles or situations in a 
way that would test fairly the cross situational consistency of their 
geniality, generosity, or ability to delay gratification. Nor do we 
systematically vary our own behavior, or our status and circumstances, 
or the nature of our relationships with others, to determine how their 
. h h 18S responses mig t c ange as a result. 
And even if "the many situations in which we observe our 
acquaintances are quite diverse, they all share an important 
'83 See supra notes 1 41-43 and accompanying text. 
JR' See supra notes 1 44 45 and accompanying text. 
185 Ross & NISBETI, supra note 9,  at 1 45 58. 
186 See infra text accompanying notes 4 1 8-52; see also KUNDA, supra note 20, at 
442 (asserting that Western culture's emphasis on personality traits leads to the 
expectation that human behavior will be consistent across different situations). 
'8;  See infra Part VI.C. 
'88 Ross & NISBETI', supra note 9, at 1 47 48. 
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I ,, 1 89 Wh d h e ement-our presence. at we see an w at we expect to see 
operate as self-fulfilling, situational forces on those we are 
observingl90-our dispositionism is part of the situation. As Ross and 
Nisbett explain, none of this implies that disposition ism is correct; it 
implies only that people will experience disposition ism as a 
reasonably reliable heuristic for predicting behavior. Because the 
people we observe will tend to behave as if they are motivated by 
disposition and not situation, the data we collect will appear to 
confirm our flawed dispositionist conception of the humans we are 
observing: 
It is precisely the confounding of person and situation that allows 
people to be well served by their naive dispositionism. When we 
predict that the behavior of professors will be professorial, that the 
behavior of dictators will be dictatorial, that the behavior of s e rvan ts 
wi l l  be s e rv i le  . . .  it makes little difference whether we do so because 
we are aware of the impact of the respective roles, because we have 
made stereotyped j udgments about the types of individuals who occupy 
such roles, or because we have taken role prescribed behavior at face 
value and ascribed corresponding personality traits to the actor. In 
each case, the performances we observe more often than not will 
confirm our predictions . . .  provided that no other powerful 
. . I  dd I ·  d 
191 
sltuatJona  su en y IDtm e. 
In all those ways, our dispositionism is shielded from having to 
regularly confront unambiguously anomalous evidence. 
189 KCNDA, supra note 20, at 442. 
190 See id. at 44243 (summarizing the "considerable amount of evidence [ that] 
suggests that our expectations of others can be self fulflling") . 
191 Ross & NISBETT, supra note 9, at 1 50. Briefy below, and in some detail in 
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30, we discuss other motives that amplify our 
dispositionism. See infra notes 1 93 94, 393 401 , 454-56, 638 81 and accompanying text 
(highlighting some of the connections between motivation and dispositionism ) .  
Research i n  system legitimation theory, for example, suggests that when we perceive 
our social systems to be under threat-as in periods of social instability-we exhibit a 
heightened tendency to dispositionalize out-groups and individuals within out-groups, 
blaming their stable character traits for the threat, and missing situational factors that 
may be the real cause of the threat. See, e.g., John T. Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the 
Theory of System Justification, in COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 86, 1 0 1  (Gordon B. 
Moskov.>itz ed., 200 1 )  (noting that "the presence of an ideological threat directed 
against the national system increases stereotypic differentiation" between inside groups 
and outside groups) .  
2003] THE SITU A nON 
E. The Fundamental Interior Attribution Error 
(or, Getting Ourselves Wrong) 
We all wear glasses that can)' a date in time and the name of some geographic 
area, and with even the keenest of vision these glasses allow us to see only limited 
distances and partial motion of our world. 
G S . l 192 - ,eorge tzg er 
1 77 
The upside-down causal ascriptions behind the fundamental 
attribution error are also explain e d  by a more subtle, though as 
we've emphasized is often the case, no less important understanding 
of the human animal. Appreciating its significance requires distin­
guishing between two types of fundamental attribution error. The 
first is the sort that we have been discussing since opening the Article 
and that social psychologists have in mind when they use the term. 
We will call this the exterior fundamental attribution error. When 
humans look at any setting and make causal attributions, certain key 
features of that setting-the observable actions of individuals-exert 
disproportionate influence over their evaluations. They see what is 
easy to see and tend to miss what is not. Thus, observers give l i ttle 
or no weight to the fact that Milgram's shock box had many switches 
i ns tead of j us t  one-a distinction that most social psychologists now 
recognize was likely influential. All the observers see is the teacher 
shocking (or, if they are imagining themselves in the teacher's role, 
not shocking) the learner. 
The theoretic primacy of dispositionism also reflects what we call 
the interior fundamental attribution error. That error, which is 
analogous to its exterior counterpart, is the tendency to "see" and 
attribute a powerful causal role to certain salient features of our 
interior that exercise comparatively little causal influence over our 
behavior while, at the same time, failing to see those interior features 
that are highly influential. Those salient features of our interior that 
we see, in turn, make possible ( if not likely) a theory of ourselves in 
which dispositions play a role-usually the dominant role-in our 
behavior. We are primed by our felt interior experience to see 
dispositions and to overlook a potentially more significant 
influence-the situati o n .  In that way, the interior fundamental 
attribution error contributes significantly to the exterior fundamental 
attribution error. 
192 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 219. 
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In a companion article, we describe what many people­
particularly those of us in the West-"see" when we look into our 
interiors: above all, we "observe" ourselves thinking, perceive that we 
have preferences, experience our "wills , "  and see our actions, 
which we attribute to that salient combination of thought, 
preferences, and will. 193 Again, that myopic vision of our interiors, 
just like our vision of our exteriors, is fundamentally distorted by our 
oversight of many far more important influences that elude our 
conscious awareness. 
The bulk of our companion article is devoted to bridging 
-though only loosely-that gulf and examining the implications of 
the fundamental interior attribution error. More specifically, that 
article describes at length how causal attributions, motives ,  
emotions, visceral factors, implicit attitudes, knowledge structures, 
affiliations and group memberships, and behavior itself invisibly 
influence our more visible cognitions, attitudes, and actions. It 
explains how the desire to see ourselves, the groups and institutions 
with which we identify, and our world in self-affirming ways, has an 
immense effect on how we construe our environs and ourselves, 
including our own interiors. 194 In doing so, the companion article 
helps to clarify how the interior and exterior fundamental attribution 
errors combine to render "axiomatic, though generally implicit, in 
many modern Western cultures," the beliefs that: 
• Actions are freely chosen. 
• Choices imply a preference. 
• Preferences are stable over time. 
• Preferences implicate the identity of the self. 
• Outcomes are mostly controllable. 
• People are responsible for (and hence the self is implicated 
in) the choices they make and the resulting outcomes. 
• Smart (good) people make good choices whose outcomes 
they are happy with. 195 
10> See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30. 
104 Id. 
1
95 Alan P. Fiske et aI., The Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in 2 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 9 1 5 ,  939 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al.  eds., 4th ed. 
1998) . 
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Those axioms are implicit for most of us, and, as this Article and 
our next illuminate, they define the starting points for most scholars 
and policymakers. Indeed, neoclassical economists have built their 
theory around a formal version of those basic axioms. According to 
conventional economic assumptions, a person's preferences can be 
inferred from that person 's choices-the latter reveal the former. l96 
As illustrated in this Article and its companion, the starting points of 
dominant legal theories are unrealistic and are based on fundamen­
tally inaccurate visions of humanity. 
III. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL REALISM 
(1]he search was on, from World War JJ onwards, for a new method to rejJlace 
the deductive aplJToach of the late nineteenth century with some criterion for 
judicial lawmaking other than open-ended, contextualized policy analysis, one 
that would be plausibly non-political. 
197 
-Duncan Kennedy 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. 
-Oliver Wendell Holrnesl!>8 
In light of evidence about how real humans actually behave, 
most conventional legal theories, which are based primarily on 
dispositionist premises, seem suspect. By way of an alternative, 
therefore, this Section introduces critical realism-the legal theoretic 
approach hinted at above, named and cursorily defined here, and 
employed in this Article and in others to follow. l��) 
Because terms like "critical" and "realism" have been widely used 
to describe a variety of legal-theoretic approaches, and because they 
have been infused with a variety of meanings, we begin by offering a 
loose, simple explanation of what we hope to capture by the phrase 
"critical realism. ,,200 
196 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 348 (explaining economists' use of 
directly observable choices to impute the decision maker's unobservable preferences) ;  
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (summarizing revealed preference theory and the 
dispositionist assumptions of economics and law and economics) . 
197 
Kennedy, supra note 5 1 ,  at 468. 
198 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1 946) 
( I88 1 ) .  
199 For a sample of these works, see manuscripts cited supra note 84. 
200 We are not the first to employ the term "critical realism." In fact, legal 
scholars have previously formulated several variants of tile phrase, though none of 
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them have adopted quite the meaning that we intend. Morton Horwitz, for example, 
used the term to denote an approach within the tradition of American legal realism 
that emphasized the practical political applications of legal theory. See MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1 870-1 960: THE CRISIS OF 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 209-lO ( 1 992) . Horwitz distinguishes "critical" realists from 
"constructive" realists, who he describes as having been more dedicated than critical 
realists to "subordinat[ing] political and moral passion to social science expertise" in 
the study of law. Id. Horwitz characterizes this brand of critical realism as a 
predecessor to the critical legal studies movement. Id. at 270-7l .  
More recently, a few contemporary scholars have adopted the term "critical 
realism" to describe their own approach to legal scholarship. Ruben J. Garcia has 
employed the phrase to name his work, which, in the tradition described by Honvitz, 
is aimed simultaneously at a critical and a political agenda. See Ruben J. Garcia, New 
Voices at Work: Race and Gender Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 79, 1 1 7 (2002) (presenting his project as one that embraces a 
'''critical' view of the endemic nature of racism and sexism in society but seeks to be 
' realistic' about potential legal reform programs in light of contemporary realities and 
the limits of legal change") . 
Howard Engelskirchen employs another modern variant of "critical realism" that 
is concerned more particularly with analyzing the "generative structures or 
mechanisms at work in nature and society that cause the manifest phenomena of our 
natural and social world." Howard Engelskirchen, Consideration as the Commitment to 
Relinquish Autonomy, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 490, 500 ( 1 997) . While part of our 
endeavor shares in that basic effort, our approach differs dramatically from that of 
Engelskirchen in two ways. First, he emphasizes that he "want[s] to distinguish 
sharply . . .  between the genesis of human actions, lying in the reasons, intentions and 
plans of people, on the one hand, and the structures governing the reproduction and 
transformation of social activities, on the other." Id. at 508 (quoting Roy BHASKAR, 
THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURALISM 35 (2d ed. 1 989» . Second, he "rel[ies] on the fact 
that the market economy in which we live is characterized by the private autonomy of 
its agents." Id. at 5lO.  As will become clear, if it is not already, we do not adopt either 
of these premises. 
Finally, Anthony Fejfar has undertaken still another version of critical realism 
based on the work of Bernard J. F. Lonergan, a knowledge theorist within the 
philosophy of science tradition. See Anthony J. Fejfar, Insight into Lawyering: Bernard 
Lonergan 's Critical Realism Applied to Jurisprudence, 27 B.C. L .  REv. 68 1 ,  682 ( 1 986) 
(presenting Lonergan's theory that knowledge is rooted in "affirmations which are 
made on the level of judgment," a presumption that serves as the foundation of 
Fejfar's approach) .  According to Fejfar, "critical realism envisages a system which is 
flexible enough to deal with the human world as it actually exists in the concrete and 
particular." Id. at 717. Fejfar has also employed concepts from developmental 
psychology in his critical realist approach, particularly with respect to a study on the 
concept of corporate voluntarism. See Anthony J. Fejfar, Cmporate Voluntarism: 
Panacea or Plague? A Question oj Horizon, 1 7  DEL. J .  CORP. L. 859, 863 ( 1 992) 
(analyzing corporate voluntarism from the perspective of liberal rationalist, critical 
rationalist, and critical realist "horizons" to determine the extent to which one's point 
of view impacts one's analysis of the subject) . 
As described in the text, we derive our notion of critical realism from our 
understanding of the American legal realist tradition and the critical legal studies 
movement. Our use of the term is meant to signal our intention to incorporate the 
best of what we find in each of these traditions, but in a manner that we hope 
advances legal theory in ways that differ from both of them. We have not been 
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A. "Realism" 
By "realism" we mean, first, to suggest that our approach is a 
descendent of American legal realism and to claim allegiance to the 
basic assumptions and attitudes that its other descendents, including 
law and economics201 and law and society, claim. The theoretical 
foundation of the legal realist tradition includes "a 'scientific 
outlook' that posits a knowable world out there beyond the text, a 
world whose workings are not transparent and which invite 
exploration to discern their deeper and truer contours. ,,202 This 
tradition of realism has been driven by the desire to "explain legal 
realities" through a commitment to the belief that "legal scholarship 
(and law) will be enriched by the application of science. ,,203 The 
"science" of this tradition is a social science, for the realist is 
committed to the consequentialist belief that "the meaning of law 
resides in its effects on human well-being (variously conceived) 
directly infonned by, nor have we attempted to directly engage, the notions of critical 
realism employed by the scholars whose use of the tenn we have noted here, though 
we have little doubt that some of our work and some of theirs are mutually 
supportive in signif cant ways. 
We also want to distinguish our "realism" from that employed in international 
relations theory, where the word "realism" has come to be associated with a somewhat
stylized school of thought focusing almost exclusively on states. Theorists of this 
school assume states to be rational , unitary, and functionally identical in  their desire 
to maximize "power" and their unwillingness to subject themselves to international 
institutions except where it serves selt�interested, power maximizing goals. See, e.g. , 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic 
Law, 1 0  AM. U .  J .  INT'L L. & POL'y 7 1 7, 721-24 ( 1 995) (def ning and discussing 
"realism" in the context of international relations theory) . This dispositionalizing 
brand of realism intentionally down plays the role of non-state actors, ideology, and 
countless other factors, holding that a simplified, state-centric view is the most useful 
heuristic for understanding the operation of international relations. Thus, in  
international relations theory, realism at  times becomes somewhat detached from 
reality; perhaps ironically, other theories purporting to be more realistic often define 
themselves in opposition to "realism." See id. at 724 31 (describing " institutional­
ism" and "liberalism" as alternatives to "realism" in i nternational relations 
theory) . By contrast, the kind of realism articulated in this project differs 
substantially in that its basic principles are an openness to rethinking traditional 
starting principles and a willingness to question familiar heuristics in light of empirical 
observations. 
201 But see POSNER, supra note 1 27, at 3 (criticizing legal realism and down playing 
its relationship to law and economics) . <>02 - Galanter & Edwards, supra note 59, at 377. For an overview of the develop
ment and historical significance of American legal realism, see HORWITZ, supra note 
200, at 1 69 92 ( 1 992) .  
203 Galanter & Edwards, supra note 59, at 377. 
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rather than in its formal characteristics. ,,204 Perhaps most import­
antly, legal realists believe that their task is not only important, but 
promising; the history of realism has been advanced under "a 
conviction that knowledge derived from [its] undertaking can 
promote greater felicity by modifying social arrangements.
,,205 We 
will return to this discussion of realism, but we first want to briefly 
explain the "critical" side of critical realism. 
B. "Critical" 
By "critical," we mean to suggest that our theory is also a 
descendent of critical legal studies and other post-modern 
approaches to law, such as feminist legal theory and critical race 
theory.206 To be critical, we believe, means to have (as we do) serious 
reservations about how "knowable" our world is, about the existence 
of truly neutral, apolitical social sciences and legal doctrines, and 
about the independence of judges, scholars, and other reputedly 
neutral actors and institutions from the influence of existing 
allocations of power. 
We do not see any necessary contradiction between the "realism" 
leg and the "critical" leg of our approach, and it is in part our belief 
that a successful legal theory must stand on both legs that motivates 
this project. Social scientists are never free from the deep biases that 
shadow human thinking, and they should therefore be continually 
self-critical and suspicious of the "knowledge" they produce. 
Nevertheless, social science done well can help us understand those 
biases and limitations, and, in turn, their influence over our theories 
and institutions. Such insights can assist us in better understanding 
our social arrangements and in improving overall well-being. 
Holmes believed that the life of the law is experience, and so it 
may be, but to make sense of and to guide that life, legal scholars, 
among others, should be skeptical of how that experience is 
construed. Legal analysis, in other words, should begin with a 
critical examination of our experience and our perceptions of that 
experience. So critical realism is dedicated to gaining knowledge 
204 [d. 
205 [d. 
206 For an overview of the meaning and significance of the critical legal studies 
movement, see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
MOVEMENT 5-42 ( 1 986) . Although GalanteI' and Edwards might disagree, see Galanter 
& Edwards, supra note 59, at 377 78, we consider critical legal studies and other critical 
schools to be as much the heirs of legal realism as law and economics, if not more. 
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about our world through scientific inquiry and theoretical analysis, 
while simultaneously seeking to unearth and understand the myriad 
biases that render suspicious the "knowledge" that our inquiries and • 207 theones produce. 
C. What Is So Critical About Realism ? 
We have been moving in a direction in which we have an increasingly limited 
control over our own lives, and that movement has been nourished by a series of 
arguments which, quite simply, are untrue. 
-Milton Friedman
20R 
With that, we can describe a second, even more important facet 
of what we mean by "critical realism." For reasons that were 
suggested above and will become more evident below, we believe 
that, to best promote human understanding and well-being, legal 
theories must be anchored in a reality-based understanding of 
human thinking and behavior. Realism, we think, is critical. To be 
realists, on this telling, means to begin with real humans and to 
build models from there, rather than to begin with models and then 
view and interpret humans through them. The distinction may be 
better understood by contrasting our approach with what we do not 
mean by realism, and by describing and distinguishing among the 
quasi-realistic commitments that some legal scholars have recently 
made. 
In a related article, we detail the justifications that economists 
offer for dispositionism in economics and the extent to which 
economic and legal-economic theorists have, in the name of realism, 
begun to relax some of the traditional assumptions behind the basic 
rational actor model.209 As we conclude in that article, there is no 
compelling justification for the various shades of unrealism of 
economics and law and economics, which are more or less premised 
207 In important ways, we understand our admittedly loose and ambiguous 
epistemology to resemble that of positionality, which "acknowledges the existence of 
empirical truths, values and knowledge, and also their contingency," Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 880 ( 1990) , and "sets an ideal 
of self-critical commitment whereby I act, but consider the truths upon which I act 
subject to further refnement, amendment, and correction." ld. at 883. 
208 Milton Friedman, Economic Myths and Public Opinion, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1 976, 
reprinted in BRIGHT PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMAt"lCE: AN ECONOMIST'S PROTEST 60, 75 
(William R. Allen ed., 1 983) [hereinafter BRIGHT PROMISES] . 
209 Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30. 
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on the same fundamental attribution error that distorts all human 
reasoning.210 In this Article, we want to focus briefly on just one of 
the more common justifications offered for eschewing a realistic 
account of the human animal. It seems that a key reason why legal 
economists have been so unwilling to get real about human nature 
has to do with a somewhat amorphous, but nonetheless powerful 
fear, that realism is dangerous. 
1 .  Facing Our Fears of Reality 
For example, in an article devoted to considering the implications 
of cognitive psychology for existing products liability laws, Professors 
Henderson and Rachlinski generally assume that consumers are 
disposi tional , if  cognitively biased,  actors. However, they con­
clude their article by briefly acknowledging the possibility that stable 
preferences may not in fact underlie consumer "choices": 
The notion that manufacturers distort consumer risk-perception 
assumes that there is some natural and appropriate risk benefit 
assessment from which manufacturers lead consumers astray. If we 
take seriously the psychological proposition that all preferences are 
constructed, then there is no magical correct level of risk that 
consumers should endure.2
1 1  
Their point seems t o  b e  that i f  policymakers were to take 
seriously that possibil i ty ,  then policy theory as we know it  
would be rendered largely meaningless. We may agree wi th 
that claim. But Henderson and Rachlinksi's closing observation 
highlights a troubling and common unwillingness-even among 
cognitive psychologists like Rachlinski-to confront the reality that 
the available evidence reveals. If the implications of cognitive 
psychology are as drastic as Henderson and Rachlinski suggest they 
might be, then why highlight those implications only in a concluding 
comment, rather than beginning with them? And why would 
Henderson and Rachlinski largely ignore those implications in 
reaching definitive policy prescriptions throughout their article (and 
work) /12 
210 /d. 
2 1 1  James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J.  Rachlinski, Product Related Risk and 
Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U .  L. REV. 
213, 258 (2000) .  
212 It is not as if Henderson and Rachlinski's policy analysis has no real world 
influence. Henderson, as a leading academic scholar and teacher, a busy litigation 
consultant and expert, and one of the Chief Reporters for the Third Restatement of 
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Likewise, numerous psychology-sensitive scholars emphasize the 
influence of context or situation when down playing the relevance of 
social psychological insights for policy, but then ignore the 
behavioral implications of context in applying the theoretical model 
of law and economics to policy analysis.2 13 One important reason for 
this tendency, we suspect, is that these scholars are human, and we 
humans want our world to make sense.214 We do not easily relinquish 
a model of behavior or a vision of ourselves that provides us wi th a 
feeling of predictability, manageability, and control, or that allows us 
to maintain positive self-conceptions. We are afraid of letting go of 
comforting, if false, images of our world and of ourselves.2l!> And that 
fear, like most, can be manipulated and exploited. 
Like Henderson and Rachlinski, Samuel Issacharoff concludes 
his review of behavioralist literature by emphasizing the need for 
"humility" among those who apply its insights. He does not dispute 
many of behavioralism's findings; instead, he worries about their 
application. As he sees it, individualism and autonomy are themselves 
threatened by what behavioralism demonstrates, a threat that 
counsels caution: 
[Behavioralism's insights] cannot possibly translate into a justification 
for greater constraints on individual decision making. Bounded 
rationality should not become the pretext for the imposition of an 
overarching regulatory structure on individuals . . . .  [I] t would indeed 
be ironic if greater insight into the complexity of human decision 
making became the justification for takin� the freedom to decide, even 
imperfectly, from those very individuals.
2 
Issacharoff implies that if a more accurate understanding of 
human behavior interferes with our preferred conception of who we 
Torts, has had as much real world influence on tort law as virtually any other living 
person. 
213 See, e.g. , Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of 
Law, 51  VAND. L. REV. 1 765, 1 765-68 (1 998) (arguing that while behavioral psycholo
gists' fndings undermine rational choice theory, their resulting understanding of 
human behavior is too uncertain to formulate a credible alternative to the 
conventional law and economics framework) . 
214 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30. 
21 5  See id. (reviewing evidence of such motives from social psychology and related 
felds) .  For other examples of this propositions, see MELVIN] . LERNER, THE BELIEF IN 
A JUST WORLD : A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION ( 1980) ; John T. Jost et aI., Non-Conscious 
Forms of System Justification: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38 
]. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 586 (2002) .  
216 Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VA1'1D. L. 
REv. 1 729, 1 745 ( 1 998). 
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are, then the former must yield. Beware of those who challenge the 
basic economic model, no matter how unrealistic it may be, he seems 
to argue, for their apparent realism may be mere pre textual cover for 
the imposition of an "overarching regulatory structure.,,2 17 Beware of 
those who interfere with your "individual decision making," for what 
is at stake is your "freedom to decide.,,218 
Posner brings Issacharoff's closeted bogeyman out into the open. 
In responding to Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein's  important work on 
behavioral economics,219 he writes, again in a concluding paragraph: 
I wish to consider · briefly [b�havioral economics' ]  possible 
normative implications. On the one hand, the picture of the human 
being that Ool1s, Sunstein, and Thaler] draw is one of unstable 
preferences and (what turns out to be related) ,  infinite manipulability. 
If you give a worker childbirth coverage, she'll like it (endowment 
effect) ; but if you don 't give it to her, she'll dislike it (more precisely, 
won ' t  pay for it in lower wages) . . . .  If you describe the threat of breast 
cancer to a woman in one way, she'll want a mammogram, but if you 
describe it another although logically equivalent way, she won't. 
It seems then that the politically insulated corps of experts that Ool1s, 
Sunstein, and Thaler] favor would be charged with determining the 
populace's authentic preferences, which sounds totalitarian. On the 
other hand, . . .  [t]he expert, too, is behavioral man. Behavioral man 
behaves in unpredictable wais. Dare we vest responsibility for curing 
irrationality in the irrational? 20 
In our view, Posne r  misrepresents Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler's 
far more nuanced and restrained normative prescriptions. 
(Rest assured, they never proposed a Bureau of Authentic Prefer­
ences.) But, for our purposes, it is enough to point out the method 
by which Posner seeks to persuade his readers. More vividly than the 
others, he seems to be stoking-and perhaps revealing his own-fear 
by embracing the very phenomena that he is attempting to have us 
disregard. He accepts the influence of the framing and endowment 
effects, while at the same time suggesting that their very invocation 
raises the specter of totalitarianism or a "confederacy of dunces." 
217 [d. 
218 [d. 
219 Christine Jolls et aI., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STA1\L L. 
REv. 1 471  ( 1 998) . 
220 POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 1 3, at 286-87. 
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2. Thinking the Unthinkable 
Legal economists often take pride in the fact that they are willing 
to reach the conclusions that their theories yield, no matter how 
unpopular or unconventional they may be. To them, that willingness 
helps prove that they are neutral scientists.22 1 "Should the sale of 
babies be made legal?" Richard Posner asks. "The idea strikes most 
people as bizarre and offensive . . . .  However, economists like to 
think about the unthinkable, so let us examine in a scientific spirit 
the objections to permitting the sale of babies for adoption. ,
,222 
Posner acts as if he is broad-minded, compelled by principles of good 
science to apply his paradigm in all settings no matter how much 
non-economists disagree with his result. 
But this habit of ending articles with a caution to readers about 
the perils of taking seriously a realistic account of human behavior 
( as noted in the previous subsection) reveals a different picture. 
These are not the words of social scientists pursuing truth wherever it  
leads them. Rather, these are more the words of a fundamentalist 
preacher warning members of his flock to avoid having their minds 
polluted or confused by anyone who would argue that dinosaurs 
once roamed the earth or that our species "evolved." These, more 
broadly, are the words of someone guarding, for himself and his 
audience, the comfort and reassurance of a worldview that faithfully 
yields familiar, easy, and agreeable answers. 
There is far more at stake than whether or not preferences are 
manipulable or what products liability law should be. These scholars 
seem worried about the threat posed to an entire school of thought 
and to their ability to generate credible conclusions using the 
methods of that school. They also seem worried about the threat 
posed to an entire socioeconomic system that is built on the same 
basic dispositionist assumpti ons that they refuse to challenge .  
Their implicit warning to readers is to close their minds, because 
othenvise something between chaos and communism will surely be 
loosed upon us. Because we are human, taking seriously evidence 
that thoroughly challenges our worldviews, our frames of reference, 
221 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC AI'IALYSIS OF LAw 1 4 1  (3d ed. 1986) ; cf 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 1 3, at 25 ("Economic analysis of law 
has aroused considerable antagonism, especially but not only among academic lawyers 
who dislike the thought that the logic of the law might be economics.") . 
222 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (3d ed. ) ,  supra note 221 ,  at 141 . 
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our theories, and our systems, is truly "think[ing] . . .  the 
unthinkable.,,223 
Our biggest problem with this sort of scare tactic is not that there 
is no truth to it. If, as the evidence suggests, preferences are 
unstable, constructed, and manipulable, this should give rise to 
concern about the legitimacy of our systems, about our being 
manipulated, and even about our being subjected to some form of 
totalitarianism. The bogeyman that law and economics scholars 
seek to keep at bay may be real. But relying on models that ignore 
that possibility does not make the evidence or its repercussions go 
away, any more than lying motionless under a blanket would provide 
a defense against an authentic monster. Hiding our heads as a 
defense tactic succeeds only when the danger is j ust in our heads. 
If we are anything close to infinitely manipulable, as Posner 
. 224 ·f 11  " d " H d conjectures, or 1 a  are constructe , as en erson 
and Rachlinski hypothesize,225 then the "free choice" that scholars 
presume to be reflected in our behavior ( and claim to want to 
protect) may be an illusion. We may already be in the grips of a 
bogeyman-a situation closer to the totalitarian nightmare than 
inadequately realistic models enable us to see. 
This returns us to one of our main themes: if situation is far 
more influential than we realize, then the dispositions that we 
assume are primary to the human experience may be largely an 
illusion. Social scientists should be committed to examining the 
implications of what we know to be true, no matter how much we 
want to deny it, and rejecting what we know to be false no matter 
how much we want to embrace it. That is what is critical about 
realism. 
223 Id. 
2
:: See supra quotation accompanying note 220. 
2.0 See supra quotation accompanying note 2 1 1 .  
2003] THE SITUA nON 
3 .  Faith or Social Science? 
{}]indings ought not to be judged by the level of comfort they provide about 
acceptable views of human nature or the personal comfort the findings 
afford. . .. It is not surprising when a lack of synchrony between our view of 
ourselves as unbiased ("/ am a morally good person ") and evidence of ourselves 
as biased ("I am not a morally good person") controls assessments of the finding 
of such discrepancies on the part of laypeoj,le; it is a bit embarrassing when tlte 
same is possibly true of scientists themselves. 
M h  R B 220 a zann anap 
189 
We are n ow ready to return to our earlier discussion of law and 
economics and Posner's claims regarding the dominance of that 
approach.227 In describing his commitment to objectivity and 
empiricism, a commitment that is shared (at least implicitly) by most 
legal economists, Posner has written earnestly of the need to employ 
the scientifi c  method. In one of his early articles, for example, he 
wrote: 
As biology is to living organisms, astronomy to the stars, or economics 
to the price system, so should legal studies be to the legal system: an 
endeavor to make precise, objective, and systematic observations of how 
the legal system operates in fact and to discover and explain the 
. h b . h "I " f  h 
228 
recurrent patterns In t e o servatlOns-t e aws 0 t e system. 
Nearly two decades later, he wrote similarly about the aspirations of 
the approach he helped found: 
To me the most interesting aspect of the law and economics 
movement has been its aspiration to place the study of law on a 
scientific basis, with coherent theory, precise hypotheses deduced from 
the theory, and empirical tests of the hypotheses. Law is a social 
institution of enormous antiquity and importance, and I can see no 
reason why it should not be amenable to scientific study. Economics is 
the most advanced of the social sciences, and the legal system contains 
many parallels to and overlaps with the systems that economists have 
studied successfully.229 
226 Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in TH E  NATURE OF 
REMEMBERING 1 37 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds., 200 1 ) .  
227 See supra notes 56, 64, 7 1-72 and accompanying text. 
228 Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies An Afterword, 1 
J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437 ( 1972) .  
229 Richard A. Posner, Foreword to ESSAYS IN LAw AND ECONOMICS 5 ,  5 (Michael 
Faure & Roger Van den Bergh eds., 1989) . 
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And recently, he has written about the concomitant need to dismiss 
the work of those who do not operate accordingly: 
The rotation of the moons of Jupiter was anomalous in medieval 
cosmology because each planet (other than the earth, which was not 
considered a planet, but instead the center around which the planets 
revolved)  was thought to be fastened to a crystalline sphere, which the 
moons would have collided with in their rotation. The anomaly could 
be dispelled by assuming that the sphere was permeable, or by 
assuming (as Cardinal Bellarmine did in his famous dispute with 
Calileo) that the telescopic observations that had disclosed the rotation 
of Jupiter's moons were a deceit by the devil. Whichever route was 
taken, the amended theory would not generate any predictions about 
planetary satellites; all it would predict was that whatever would be, 
would be.
230 
Posner's message is clear: the scientific approach should be 
embraced, and those theories grounded in little more than faith or 
non-falsifiable assertions should be rej ected, particularly when they 
compete with a viable social scientific theory. 
And i t  is purportedly based on that Galileo-like self-image that 
Posner has asserted that "the economic theory of law seems the best 
positive theory of law extant.,,231 It is simply "rich [er] in theoretical 
and empirical content" than any of its competitors.232 And Posner's 
views are held at least implicitly by most legal economists. So, for 
example, Cooter and Ulen "can say that economics provides a 
behavioral theory to predict how people respond to changes in laws," 
and that this behavioral " theory surpasses intuition, just as science 
,,233 surpasses common sense. 
We wholeheartedly agree with the general case for relying on the 
scientific method. But, for the reasons we have provided, we rej ect 
the claim by legal economists that the dominance of law and 
economics has much to do with its theoretical and empirical content 
or their loyalty to the scientific method-at least in the way they 
suggest. Legal economists have missed, among other things, that 
230 POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 13,  at 264. 
231 Richard A. Posner, The &onomic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REv. 757, 774 
( 1975 ) .  
232 [d. 
233 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 3; see also Mark Klock, Are Wastefulness and 
Flambo)'ance Really Virtues?: Use and Abuse of &onomic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 81 ,  
252 53 (2002) ("I predict that the future of law will be characterized by less 
commentary arguing that economic analysis is inappropriate and more reliance on 
alternative economics models . . . .  "). 
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they have unconsciously adopted, not the scientific approach of 
Galileo, but the fai th-based approach of Cardinal Bellarmine.234 
It is the economists who resist seeing or taking seriously what 
others are revealing, through the scientific method, about what 
moves US.235 And they are doing so based on a theory that has been 
falsified (or is non-falsifiable) and, which, therefore, is based, at 
bottom, on an evidence-blind intuition or faith. Although Posner 
and other legal economists do not stoop to warning readers about 
the "devil" being behind the heretical visions of social psychologists, 
they do, as we h ave noted, commonly raise the specter of a close 
cousin: "the totalitarian bogeyman.,,236 
D.  Some Presuppositions of Critical Realism 
What we do and do not mean by "critical realism" will become 
clearer below. But before introducing one of its important 
implications, it may be helpful to summarize several strong 
presumptions or axioms that we intend critical realism to build 
upon-principles that we have suggested in our discussion to this 
point: 
• First, we-scholars and non-scholars alike--do not understand 
ourselves well, and certainly not as well as we think we do. 
234 See Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Introduction to THE GALILEO AFAIR 1 ,  30 (Maurice 
A. Finocchiaro ed. and trans., 1 989) [hereinafter THE GALILEO AFAIR] (noting that 
Bellarmine rejected Copernican theory because it conflicted with the scriptures) . 
235 Our claim is not that law and economics is totally devoid of social science; far 
from it. But where social science does play a role, economic legal theory rarely 
generates clear answers to problems. For example, there is still considerable debate 
about what the most eflicient liability rule is in tort law, despite the fact that this is 
one of the oldest, most discussed issues in law and economics. See, e.g. , Richard S. 
Markovits, The Allocative Ajficiency of Shifting From a "Negligence" System to a "Strict 
Liability " Regime in Our Highly Pareto Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Preliminary 
Third Best Allocative Ajficiency Analysis, 73 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1 1 ,  1 33 ( 1 998) 
(analyzing "efficiency of a shift from negligence to strict liability and various 
other standard-of liability allocative efficiency issues") . See generally John C. 
Moorhouse et aI. ,  Law and Economics of Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion, 62 
ALB. L. REv. 667 ( 1 998) .  There is, in other words, considerable scholarly debate 
about most areas of law, even where efliciency is accepted as the law's underlying 
normative goal. This is where the social scientific features of law and economics take 
place-a competition among legal economists offering different efliciency-oriented 
stories and, where possible, different empirical evidence to support their views. Thus, 
with respect to the application of the basic theory to various social and policy issues, 
social scientific methods are welcome. With respect to the basic theory and its 
underlying axioms, in contrast, social scientific methods are disallowed. 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 221-23. 
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fI Second, the process of developing theories or models is a 
human one and is therefore subject to all sorts of biases and 
unperceived influences. It is largely for that reason that the 
impressions and models-informal and formal-that we legal 
scholars have created to help us understand ourselves tend to 
be flawed and self-serving. 
• Third, we cannot hope to make sense of our institutions or 
ourselves until we better understand how humans go about 
trying to make sense of themselves and their institutions. To 
develop a theory that is free of, or at least less distorted by, 
such biases, it is necessary to more closely examine both 
the process that yields those biases and the biases themselves. 
• And, fourth, a promlSlng way to understand human 
cognition and behavior is to begin with those schools of 
thought and those institutions that are devoted to 
understanding human cognition and behavior. In this 
Article, we look primarily to one such source, social 
psychology,237 but we will also look briefly at what market 
practices can teach us about ourselves. 
It is by bringing these principles together with the lessons 
taught by social psychology and markets that critical realism 
provides unique and, for many, unsettling insights about who we are, 
why we behave as we do,  and what we should do about it, if 
anything. 
237 By "social psychology," we include not only the traditional field of research 
that goes by that name, but also numerous related fields, including social cognition, 
cognitive neuroscience, and cognitive psychology. For accessible overviews of the 
history of relationships between the various fields, see FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 
20, at 1 18; KUNDA, supra note 20, at 1-7. 
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IV. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO POWER ECONOMICS 
Most Marxists . . . {believe] politics is but a reflection of the underlying 
economic order. The bourgeoisie, and especially the large corporations, will 
acquire and use the power of the state to protect and enhance their interests. . . . 
But many non Marxist scholars also doubt that the government will regulate 
an industry over the objections or against the interests of business. This view, 
held chiefly . . .  by certain economists, does not arise out of any conviction that 
the historically formed interests of the dominant social class always find 
expression in the prevailing political structure, but rather out of the assumption 
that individual behavior can best be understood by assuming that it is rationally 
self-interested. Indeed, most economists find the Marxist argument murky and 
unconvincing precisely because it lacks any psychological theory that would 
explain how class position determines individual behavior. 
 Q  238    
It 's true that if you had concentrated power in the hands of an angel he might 
be able to do a lot of good, as he viewed it, but one man 's good is another man 's 
bad. The great virtue of a market capitalist society is that, by preventing a 
concentration of power, it prevents people from doing the kind of harm which 
concentrated power can do. 
-Milton Friedman
239 
It is certainly the case that many Nazi concentration camp guards led blameless 
lives, both before and after their horrible service. To explain such complicity, 
therefore, we must assume the existence of a specific social and situational 
context that could induce ordinary people to commit extraordinarily evil deeds. 
-Ross & Nisbett240 
A. Power 
193 
Think back to our example of the gunman who commands you 
to flip a switch that will deliver a violent electric shock to a pleading 
victim.241 That is an example of power, as we mean it in this Article. 
Power is the use of situational devices (like guns) to influence 
238 James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 
357, 357 58 Games Q. Wilson ed.,  1980) . 
239 
Milton Friedman, Is Capitalism Humane?, in BRIGHT PROMISES, supra note 
208, at 83, 89. 
240 Ross & NISBETT, supra note 9, at 53. 
241 See supra text accompanying notes 84 85. 
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people's choices and to weaken the effect of their dispositions in 
order to achieve some goal. This sort of power is often viewed as 
illegitimate; offers of "your money or your life" are unacceptable 
negotiation tactics. Governmental regimes that rely on such power 
to exact obedience are typically labeled authoritarian. Particularly in 
America, we respect only actions that are consensual and the actions 
and institutions that reflect the autonomous choices of those 
involved-hence, our culture's celebration of democracy and 
capitalism. As we hope readers have begun to see, however, situation 
can have enormous consequences for our behavior, even when there 
is no gun to our head. Stanley Milgram 's groundbreaking experi­
ments demonstrate the incredible power of situation over our 
actions. People delivered what they believed were dangerous and 
painful shocks to fellow humans simply because of the situational 
pressures of a seemingly benign psychology experiment. That is 
frightening. But perhaps more frightening is that even after 
learn i n g  about Milgram's experiment, most of us still have little 
appreciation for the power of situation.242 
242 
If members of the law school community believe they are immune to the power 
of situation, they should consult Steven Hartwell's study of students at the University of 
San Diego. Steven Hartwell, Moral Development, Ethical Conduct, and Clinical Education, 
35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1 31 ( 1 990) .  Hartwell set up an experiment in the guise of a 
clinical class exercise. ld. at 1 42. Each student was to individually advise litigants in a 
small claims court, although Hartwell was available in the next room for consultation. 
Id. Unknown to the students, each "litigant" presented her student-advisor with an 
identical problem: how best to make her case in a rent dispute. Id. As Hartwell 
recounts, "I told each student to advise the client to lie under oath that she had paid 
the rent. ""hen students asked for clarif cation, I uniformly responded . . .  my advice is 
that, if your client wants to win her case, then you must tell her to peIjure herself: Id. 
The idea was for students to feel the "pull between loyalty to authority . . .  and 
prescribed ethical conduct." Id. Like the evaluators in Milgram 's initial experiment, 
Hartwell predicted that the students would uniformly "reject my advice and refuse to 
tell their client[sl to lie." ld. And, like Milgram's evaluators, he was surprised to find 
out how wrong he was. "Although many of the twenty-four participating students 
grumbled e i ther to me or to the client about my proffered advice, twenty three told 
their client to peIjure herself." Id. at 1 42-43. 
A more famous example of the power of situation over students (although not law 
students) was demonstrated in a classic experiment conducted at Stanford University, 
in which students took on the roles of "prisoner" or "guard" in a realistic prison 
environment. Craig Haney et aI., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, I INT'LJ. 
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69 ( 1 973) . Although the students had been specifically 
chosen for their apparent emotional maturity, within only a couple of days the 
"guards" began to demonstrate extreme cruelty toward the "prisoners." ld. at 80 81 .  
O n  the other side, several of the "prisoners" experienced severe emotional depression, 
while others were prompted to rebel. Ultimately, the experiment had to be cancelled 
less than a week after it began. ld. Rather than showing dispositional consistency 
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1 .  Power Blindness 
[The] systematic structuring of institutions to reflect the viewpoint and position 
of those in power is most often invisible. 
-Martha Chamallar3 
195 
There is reason to suspect that in our daily lives, we routinely 
overlook the power of our situations. As social psychology teaches, 
situational factors are cognitively hidden ( often in plain sight) , easily 
camouflaged and naturalized as mere background. Put differently, 
in most situations there is no gun, only an invisible hand and the 
seemi ngly consensual,  c h oi ce-driven behavio r  of i nd ividuals. 
Perhaps that is what political scientists Herbert Kaufman and Victor 
Jones were driving at when they wrote: 
There is an elusiveness about power that endows it with an almost 
ghostly quality. It seems to be all around us, yet this is "sensed" with 
some sixth means of perception rather than with the five ordinary 
senses. We " know" what it is, yet we encounter endless difficulties in 
trying to define it. We can "tell" whether one person or group is more 
powerful than another, yet we cannot measure power. It is as abstract 
. I fi . d 244 as tIme yet as rea as a IrIng squa . 
This is an insight of critical realism. As the quotation indicates, it 
is hard to think of anything more "real" than power. And, yet, 
despite its undeniable existence, the mechanisms of power are often 
hidden, ghostlike, in the setting. Hidden there, they tend to be 
disregarded, literally overlooked. 
Legal economists have reacted to the elusiveness of this realism 
characteristically and understandably-they have ignored it.245 For 
the most part, economic thinking has no place for the concept of 
power. A perusal of the indices of the major law and economics 
texts, for example, yields no references to the word-except when 
across environments, the students' behavior corresponded with situational cues and 
roles. 
243 MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 1 6  ( 1 999) . 
244 Herbert Kaufman & Victor Jones, The Mystery of Power, 1 4  PUB. ADMIN. REv. 
205, 205 ( 1954) ; see also ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? 90 ( 1961 )  ("One who sets 
out to observe, analyze, and describe the distribution of influence in a pluralistic 
democracy will . . .  encounter formidable problems."). 
245 Economics does occasionally take power into account in exceptions that prove 
the rule. See, e.g. , supra text accompanying notes 1 30 34 (recounting Cooter and 
Ulen's examples of economic threats); infra text accompanying notes 267-80 
(describing Stigler's "shallow capture" theory). 
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I d . h th d "  k ,,246 M . COUp e WIt e wor mar et. oreover, many economIC 
presuppositions, such as the presumed autonomy of choice-making 
agents, implicitly remove the role of power from the analysis. If one 
type of "autonomy" is given, then there is no place for the sort of 
power illustrated in Milgram's experiment to emerge.247 The subjects 
of the experiment chose to engage in the experiment. They could 
have stopped; they could have walked out, but they didn't. 
Obviously, they were made better off by shocking the other agents to 
the fullest extent possible. Economic models are as blind as we are 
to situational forces. 
This problem of "unrealism" in law and economics has been 
largely unrecognized by even its critics.248 That may be partially 
because the failure, like the problem, is hard to see. And in the rare 
instance where legal economists have acknowledged that their 
models disregard power, they use it as a basis for claiming that their 
power-blind approach is superior to competing theories. Thus, 
Richard Posner admonishes sociologists for incorporating power In 
their work given that the concept is "difficult to operationalize. ,,249 
2. Looking for Power 
We have three problems with Posner's rationale for ignoring 
power. First, what good is a theory that ignores a force so potentially 
influential that it is actually called "power," purely for the sake of 
maintaining an operable model? "Power economics," an element of 
246 When economists speak of "market power," they generally use the tenn to refer 
to a finn's control of a significant share of a particular market. Often the tenn is 
associated with monopoly practices, as when a finn enjoys such "market power" that it 
can reduce output and raise prices without experiencing a total loss of sales to 
competitors. See, e.g. , W. KIp VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION Al'lD 
ANTITRUST 1 64 (3d ed. 2000) ("Generally speaking, the market power of a finn is the 
ability to raise price without suffering a significant decline in demand. This is typically 
measured by the price elasticity of the finn's demand curve.") .  
247 See supra text accompanying notes 85-91 ( recounting Milgram's obedience 
experiments) .  
248 The law and traditional legal education also have no place for the concept of 
power. Critical theories represent an important exception inasmuch as they have 
influenced law and legal education. For instance, feminist legal scholarship has been 
particularly attentive to the operation of power dynamics in law and related social 
institutions. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 207, at 849-62 (summarizing and discussing 
feminist legal scholarship about relationships between power, gender, and social 
institutions) . 
249 Posner, supra note I I ,  at 272. 
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critical realism, is committed to starting with power and developing 
our understanding or model of human behavior from there. 
Second, any obstacle in operationalizing the concept of power 
may reflect the unrealistic starting presumptions of legal economists 
more than the inherent difficulty of incorporating power into a 
viable social scientific theory. Were economists more committed to 
understanding human behavior, they would be better able to model 
it. The ghostly quality of power, we hope to show, is less in the 
object and more in the lens. Change the lens and power is more 
likely to come into focus and will sometimes be as obvious as a gun to 
the head. This leads to our third point. 
The clear message of Milgram's experiments is that situation 
influences us. But Milgram's decades-old findings serve as j ust one 
example of a much larger situation. "Social psychology has by now 
amassed a vast store of such empirical parables.,,25o The deeper 
implication of those experiments is that situation can be managed, 
shaped, arranged, and constructed to influence us in ways that we do not 
anticipate or appreciate. Situation is thus a source and vehicle of 
power. Milgram, after all, designed and created the situation in his 
laboratory. Unfortunately the pursuit of academic or scientific 
knowledge is not the only motive that might shape the scenery that 
surrounds and moves us. 
B. Economics 
And here is where the economics of "power economics" comes into 
play. What we know about the situational character makes clear that 
people's behavior is influenced by situational factors. Thus, the 
ability to influence the situation is also the ability to influence 
people's behavior. Such power can be profitable. Because power is 
valuable to those who wield it, and insofar as power can be exercised 
through (invisible or, at least, unobserved) situational variables, those 
variables are themselves manipulable. And because those variables 
are manipulable, profit-driven agents will compete to control or 
influence them and, in turn, the people and institutions that tend to 
be blindly moved by them. More succinctly, once situation is 
understood as the locus of influence, it follows that situation will 
trade like mousetraps and widgets. 
250 Ross & NISBET , supra note 9, at 4. 
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Market actors will exert power-whether or not they are aware 
of it-because of the situational pressures of the market. If profit 
can be made by influencing the situation, we predict that it will be. 
Market competitors wil, to sUMve in the long run, "discover" 
precisely which situational manipulations most efficiently influence 
us and how. Market actors who fail to manipulate situational 
variables effectively will sooner or later be supplanted by those who 
do. 
If there is uncertainty regarding the precise workings of power­
the particular mechanisms by which si tuational influence is 
wielded-that is a problem of description, not of economics. The 
market will discover those workings and exploit them. Because 
market actors will, indeed must, attend to the operation of power, 
legal economists have no excuse, even on operational grounds, for 
ignoring it. Market forces guarantee the exercise of power through 
situational manipulation-that is the essence of power economics.251 
C. Some Implications of Power Economics 
More than when I first wrote these pages, I am now impressed with the role oj 
power in economic life-and with the great if largely innocent service of the 
conventional economic instruction in concealing it ... . [The modern business 
firm's} influence and power extend to politicians, Presidents and the Pentagon. 
This power would be much more remarked and resisted were it not for the social 
conditioning oj economics and its instruction. The latter contends that all 
producers-all business firms and corporations, from the smallest to the largest, 
from the corner drugstore to Exxon and General Motors-are substantially 
subordinate to the impersonal authority of the market. So matters are presented 
in all reputable economic discussion. . . . Power is much enjoyed, and its 
economic and political exercise can also be pleasingly remunerative. Nothing 
serves it better than a theology that disguises its exercise. 
-John Kenneth Galhraith
252 
251 For an earlier statement of power economics, though not by name, and for 
considerable evidence from consumer product markets confirming our claims, 
see jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem 
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.V.V. L. REV. 630 ( 1 999) [hereinafter Hanson & 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I] ; jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence oj Market Manipulation, 1 1 2  HARv. L. REv. 1420 
( 1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II] ; Chen & 
Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 84; see also infra text accompanying notes 393 414  
(illustrating how commercial interests have, through situational manipulations, 
promoted dispositionism) .  
252 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIElY, at xiv (4th ed. 1984) . 
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What we know from economics is that markets will eventually 
discover and exploit profi t-enhancing opportunities for power. 
Economics also helps us predict that the market actors who wil 
exploit those opportunities most successfully wil be those with the 
greatest wealth and willingness to pay. Large corporations meet 
those criteria because they amass extreme amounts of wealth2r,:l 
and possess the overriding, narrow interest in proft maximization.254 
253 Comparing the 2001 Gross National Income of all nations with the 2001 total 
revenues of the Global Fortune 500 companies helps bring this into relief. For 
example, Wal Mart's 2001 revenues ($219.8 billion) were greater than those of eight­
five countries combined. Home Depot had greater revenue ($53.6 billion) than 
Hungary ($49.2 billion ) .  The Gap had greater revenue ($13.8 billion) than Bulgaria 
($13.2 billion) .  Toys "R" Us ($1 1 .0 billion) had greater revenue than Kenya ($10.7 
billion) .  The revenue of the #500 company, a Japanese construction firm called 
Takenaka, surpassed ninety-four countries. In fact, the sum of the revenues of the 
Global 500 firms ($1 4  trillion) accounts for forty five percent of the total world GOP 
($3 1 .3 trillion) .  Compare WORLD BANK, 2003 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
(describing the 2001 gross national income of each nation) ,  with The Global 500: 
The World 's Largest Corporations, FORTUNE, July 22, 2002, at F l to F I 0  ( l isting the 
gross revenues of the five hundred largest corporations) .  
254 Cf Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Serioltsly II, supra note 251 ,  at 1 467
1 553 (providing a case study of how the tobacco industry, based on shared interest, 
managed to manipulate consumer perceptions, preferences, and behavior in order to 
increase profits ) .  With exceptions that we will explore in future research, corporations 
tend to behave as if their sole or, at least, primary-goal is to maximize profits. See, 
e.g. , Chen & Hanson, Il lusion of Law I ,  supra note 84. That is true not because 
corporations have dispositions, but because of a confluence of stable and signifcant 
situational factors. Most importantly, firms participate in a number of market 
competitions-for products, for capital, for managers, for labor, and for acquisitions 
of firms themselves. All of these markets work to winnow out those firms and 
managers that do not effectively profit maximize. Firms have charters and bylaws, 
situational restraints that typically set profit maximization as the firm's stated goal, and 
they operate within a legal environment that places, according to most corporate law 
scholars, fiduciary duties on managers to maximize profit. 
Moreover, the situational characters who work within firms face strong cultural 
norms to maximize profts and are given extensive training in business schools or by 
the firms themselves. The American business culture promotes the idea that 
"business is business" and considerations other than profit are irrelevant to decisions. 
For a history of the basic scripts of business and corporate, see id. Together, these 
and other situational forces push firms (and the situational characters who occupy 
them) to behave "as if' maximizing profit. Of course, those situational forces are 
limited, and corporations and their managers do not always behave in profit­
maxlmlzmg ways. Still, most scholars agree that, at least in the long run, the 
situational imperatives of profit and the dispositions and situations of corporate 
managers combine to push corporations firmly towards profit-maximizing conduct. It  
bears noting that our interpretation of firms as situationally motivated, at least in the 
long run, to behave as if they are profit maximizing is conventional among 
corporate law scholars. See id.; HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTER
PRISE 23 ( 1 996) (explaining why it is reasonable to assume that fi rms will, ovel' 
time, tend toward profit-maximizing, or cost-minimizing, practices) ; cf Milton 
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Power economics predicts that we are living within an ongoing 
Milgram experiment, in which we, the subjects, perceive our acts to 
be free and dispositionally motivated, but in which the 
experimenters-large business entities-wield far greater influence 
over our movements through situational manipulations than we tend 
to recognize. As in Milgram's experiment, we predict and report, in 
our common sense views and formal theories, that we are largely 
immune to such situational manipulations. Power economics 
predicts that the totalitarian bogeyman is invisible but real, and that 
we commonly behave as if there is a gun to our head. 
Of course, very often market actors compete against each other 
for situational supremacy. In a previous work, one of us (with Doug 
Kysar) has examined the battle for prime placement of products in 
supermarket aisles.255 Placement at eye level sells, and someone has 
got to be on the bottom. In those cases, competition for situation is 
often a zero-sum game. 
But there are other situational factors that help all firms: for 
example, the Muzak that wafts over the entire supermarket and has 
been found to increase overall purchasing.256 In the same manner, 
competing firms within industries often act in ways that further 
their shared interests257 or even join forces when their collective 
self-interest is at stake.258 All firms share a broad goal of profit 
maximization. This leads to secondary shared interests in promoting 
markets, preventing profit-restricting regulation, and, most impor­
tantly for our argument here, supporting a concept of human 
Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 
21-22 ( 1 953) (examining the hypothesis that individual firms behave as if they were 
seeking rationally to maximize profits ) . 
255 See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 251 ,  at 144S. 
256 See id. at 1 445 (describing how marketers manipulate consumers' "mood 
states") .  
257 See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A 
Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 259, 337 370 (2000) 
[hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously III] (describing reasons 
why firms tend not to engage in activities that increase consumer risk perceptions) .  
258 For one very recent example, competing automakers joined together this 
year in a lawsuit challenging California's strict fuel emission standards. See Bob 
Egelko, California, Bush Spar over Clean Air Rulfs: Appeals Court Ponders Block on 
Emissions Standards, S.F. CHRON. ,  Feb. 14, 2003, at AS. For other examples of firm 
cooperation in self-interest, see Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra 
note 25 1 ,  at 1467-1502 (describing tobacco industry's response to industry wide 
threats) ;  Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously III, supra note 257, at 361-66 
(describing how even competitive industries often manage to cooperate to advance 
their shared interests ) . 
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behavior that serves profit-maximizing interests. Because commercial 
interests-particularly corporate entities-are incredibly wealthy 
and powerful forces in society, when they work in complementary 
ways, they can have far-reaching effects on how we view society, 
justice, and ourselves.25!1 
Power economics predicts that situation is sold to the highest 
bidders through largely unseen market processes. Corporate entities 
manipulate situation to influence our conduct and dispositional 
self-conceptions, thereby building their wealth and increasing their 
power.260 The analogies undergirding our conclusions in this section 
may appear to be loaded. By likening situational forces to a gun, it 
may appear that we have likened market forces to a gunman. 
Indeed, we have. We are thinking the unthinkable. Posner-'s 
bogeyman reigns, but he rules from where Posner and others have 
least looked for him-that is, outside of us, or at least out of our 
sight, in the situation. 
This talk of power may look like the product of some pretty 
radical thinking. However, one can instead see our thesis as nothing 
more than the careful application of the logic unhesitatingly 
embraced by many of academia's most conservative scholars. Here, 
again, is where the economics of "power economics" plays a role. We 
are making the same assumptions as neoclassical economists about 
how markets work, but we add a more realistic account of the 
humans involved in that process. And, as will become clear in the 
next Section, we also accept the conventional economic 
presumptions with respect to the way regulatory processes operate 
-indeed, in some ways, we take that understanding more seriously 
than economists have. 
259 As will become clear below and in our future work, it is not necessary that 
corporate decision makers make conscious decisions to cooperate with others for 
corporations to be acting in complementary ways toward shared goals. See infra Pal"t 
VI.B (providing evidence of how dispositionism has been promoted by commercial 
interests) . 
�60 See id. 
202 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW [Vol . 152: 129 
V. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO DEEP CAPTURE 
A. Shallow Capture 
One cannot mention regulatory agencies without adding the observation that, of 
course, such agencies are likely to be 'captured ' by the interests they are supposed 
to ·regulate. To suggest that matters are any diferent from this is to mark oneself 
as hopelessly naive, or even disingenuous. 
-James Q. Wilson
261 
The basic story of regulatory capture has become so well 
known-indeed, such a truism-that we think it appropriate to begin 
as Steven Croley began his recent retelling: ''You've heard all of this 
before.,,262 
Because no one wants us to rehearse the details yet again, and 
because we also value efficiency, we will base our introductory 
overview on the brief rendition offered by an extremely credible 
source. In his Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist,263 George Stigler 
describes how he came to the work central to his winning the Nobel 
Prize in Economics.264 According to Stigler, prior to his work, 
academic economists writing about state policies commonly offered 
their advice on "what [the government] should do, or refrain from 
doing.,,265 They published their normative conclusions naively 
believing that governments, charged with enhancing the public 
welfare, would readily heed sound prescriptions. But after "two 
centuries" of being disregarded on issues like free trade, Stigler and a 
few o ther economists came to believe that government officials were 
not very interested in the "truths" of economics.266 It was time to 
"undertake the different and more fundamental task of explaining 
261 James Q. Wilson, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, supra note 238, 
at ix. 
262 Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7, 9 (2000) . 
263 STIGLER, supra note 70. 
264 Also significant was Stigler's work on the "economics of information." See 
generally George J .  Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J.  POL. ECON. 2 1 3  
( 1961 ) (calling o n  economists to pay more attention to the importance of 
information, for example, in ascertaining market price) ; George J .  Stigler, An 
Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J.  LEGAL STUD . 623 ( 1 980) 
(demonstrating how economic analysis illuminates choices in  favor of privacy and 
the concealment of  information ) .  
265 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 1 14. 
266 Id. at 1 14-15. 
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what states actually do, of discovering what are the forces that 
determine which policies will actually be adopted by a government.
,,267 
Stigler began that undertaking (much of it with co-author Claire 
Friedland) by examining "the actual effects of economic regu­
lations.,,268 By understanding the effects of regulation, he believed he 
could infer something about the forces that created the regulation. 
Through empirical testing unlike any that had previously been 
conducted,269 he discovered that several prominent regulatory 
policies of the 1 960s-including the regulation of electricity rates 
and the SEC's "elaborate review of the prospectuses for new security 
issues"-were not having the effects or yielding the benefits that 
ostensibly motivated them.270 To be sure, the regulations were 
creating benefits. The problem was that those benefits were accruing 
to the wrong recipients. For instance, the beneficiaries of electricity­
rate regulation were large commercial customers instead of con­
sumer households.27I Additionally, the effect of the SEC reviews was 
to inhibit competition and raise the publ ic ' s  costs. 
From these and similar findings, the now-dominant conception 
of regulation emerged: the "general theory of the behavior of 
governments,,272 is that "groups possessing political influence use the 
political process effectively to increase their incomes."273 According 
to the "economics of regulation," as this approach was initially 
dubbed,274 causal relationships and the direction of influences are the 
267 [d. at 1 14. Reflecting the immodesty that seems to characterize those who 
employ this approach, see supra text accompanying notes 71 75, Stigler went out of his 
way to add that it was "economists [who] initiated the theoretical study of the actual, 
in contrast to the desired, functions of the state," because " [o]f all the social scientists, 
only economists possess a theoretical system to explain social behavior." STIGLER, 
supra note 70, at 1 15. 
268 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 1 15. 
269 [d. at 1 1 7-18. 
270 [d. at 1 16-17.  
2 7 1  [d. at 1 1 6; see also George G. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators 
Regulate? The Case of Electricity, S J,L. & ECON. I ,  7-8 ( 1 962) (describing how commercial 
customers benefited from regulation ) .  
272 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 1 18. 
973 - [d. at 1 20. 
274 
Stigler, like many of his contemporaries, eschewed an' anthropomorphic view 
of the state and, true to the tenets of his discipline, looked for answers under the 
assumptions that governments are made up of individual people who are rational 
actors, and who therefore behave according to the very same principles, and in 
response to the same sorts of incentives, that motivate market participants. What they 
assumed was true of private choice, Stigler and his contemporaries assumed was also 
true of "public choice" (the name given to the now-immense field of research that, 
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reverse of what had been supposed. The seemingly autonomous 
administrative agency is, upon inspection, captured,275 and the 
seemingly constrained industries are liberated and enriched. 
Consequently, the industry tail wags the regulatory dog. As Stigler 
laments, "no matter how disinterested the goal of public policy, the 
policy is bent to help politically influential groups at the cost of the 
less influential. ,,2i6 And the problem is not just that for every winner, 
there are losers-the real kicker is that the winners often win less 
than the losers lose.27i Regulation is, in a word, inefficient.2i8 
The finding that industries tend to benefit from regulation led to 
another question for Stigler: "Why are some industries and activities 
regulated by the state, and not others?,,2i9 One of the most 
significant developments that emerged from this dismal perspective 
on regulation was a set of insights regarding the sources of political 
influence--or, as we would put it, power. As Stigler recounts, 
economists could explain, for example: 
[W] hy smaller groups do better than large in the political arena. 
[First, t] he smaller group is more cohesive: It is easier to organize the 
small group, collect funds for lobbying, and keep it informed. There 
are only about 70,000 beekeepers concentrated in a few western states 
(yes, there is a federal program for them) but millions of occasional 
consumers of honey. And secondly, it pays each member of a small 
group to invest resources in politics, because the payoff will be larger. 
Each beekeeper gets hundreds of times as much out of the federal 280 program as each taxpayer loses. 
Such insights regarding how groups of individuals could 
effectively coordiI1ate their behavior in pursuit of common interests 
were more the product of some of Stigler's contemporaries than of 
for the most part, has a similar premise) .  See supra text accompanying notes 303, 314
1 7  (discussing disposition ism of regulators) . 
275 This is not meant to imply that the people who run agencies are captured by 
the process. According to the basic theory, their interests are advanced by the quid 
pro quo inherent in the process. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL]. ECON. & MGMT. SCI . 3, 1 2 1 3  ( 1 97 1 )  (arguing that regulators 
may not antagonize regulated firms because they want to keep their options open 
for a high-paying job with a firm upon departing the regulatory agency) . 
276 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 1 1 9. 
277 [d. at 1 18-20. 
278 This was one of several ways in which neoclassical economics was attempting to 
demonstrate how good regulatory intentions tend to create unintended (i.e., 
inefficient) consequences. For an overview, see Milton Friedman, BRIGHT PROMISES, 
supra note 208, at 1 27-28. 
279 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 1 1 8. 
280 [d. at 1 19. 
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Stigler himself.28! But before leaving our discussion of Stigler, a few 
observations are in order regarding his important contributions. 
Look carefully at the structure of Stigler's work-at least as we 
have summarized it. Stigler was challenging a long-held conven­
tional wisdom that governments and their agencies create beneficial 
regulations. Underlying that conventional wisdom was the supp­
osition that regulatory processes were fair and that regulators were 
dispositionally motivated to serve the public interest. Stigler's 
challenge to those suppositions was initiated by his discovery that, in 
fact, a sanguine view of our regulatory institutions had no empirical 
basis and that, if anything, those institutions' actions were 
counterproductive to their espoused goals. To explain the 
phenomenon, Stigler looked to the outside influences on regulators 
and described how different groups were able to exert power over 
the regulators. Thus, Stigler contested the reassuring conventional 
wisdom that our institutions are neutral and well-functioning and 
rejected the idea that the stated goals of regulators are controlling. 
He did so by down playing dispositional factors and emphasizing 
situational factors.282 By taking situation seriously, he raised the issue 
of power inasmuch as situations are largely defined by allocations 
and dynamics of power. As Stigler and many others writing in this 
area have taken for granted (without ever actually using the term) , 
power is central. 
In this way, Stigler'S work on the economics of regulation pro­
vides a paradigmatic example of power economics. We believe that 
this Article finds confirmation in the fact  that Stigler and other 
economists stopped there-why, in  other words , neoclassical 
28\ See, e.g. , MAt'<CUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-57 ( 1 9 7 1 )  (discussing the effectiveness of small 
groups) ;  RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 42 45 ( 1982) ( reviewing Olson's 
analysis of the correlation between group size and effectiveness) . This topic of what 
interests will be best able to influence regulation is central to power economics and 
our theory of deep capture. We hope to return to it in much greater detail in future 
works. In any event, we hope readers might begin to see its relevance for questions far 
broader than simply administrative regulation. 
282 This is not to say that Stigler and other scholars, did not still see an 
important-we think too important-role for dispositions. The work he began 
initiated a great deal of scholarship that assumed that regulators were disposition ally 
inclined to be captured. See, e.g. , George J. Stigler, Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the 
Consumer?, in THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS o� REGULATION 1 78, 1 81 
( 1975) (arguing that regulators and regulation have often failed to protect the public 
interest relative to the interests of the regulated industry because "the logic and basic 
forces of regulation . . .  dictate what type of men . . .  will typically be appointed" and 
emphasizing dispositional factors) .  
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economics has not evolved into to power economics and why 
capture theory has not evolved in to deep capture theory. 
B. Deep Capture: An  Historical Example 
I, Galileo [Galileij, . . .  seventy years of age, arraigned personally for judgment, 
kneeling before you Most Eminent and Most Reverend Cardinals Inquisitors
General against heretical depravity in all of Christendom, . . . swear that I have 
always believed, I believe now, and with God's help I will believe in the future 
all that the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church holds, preaches, and 
teaches . . . .  I have been judged vehemently suspected of heresy, namely of 
having held and believed that the [Sjun is the center of the world and 
motionless and the [Ejarth is not the center and moves. 
Therefore, desiring to remove from the minds of Your Eminences and every 
faithful Christian this vehement suspicion, rightly conceived against me, with a 
sincere heart and unfeigned faith I abjure, curse, and detest the above mentioned 
errors and heresies, . . . and I swear that in the future I will never again say or 
assert, orall)' or in writing, anything which might cause a similar suspicion 
about me . . . .  
-Galileo Galilei
283 
With the foundation of shallow capture in place, we can now 
build upon it, or dig beneath it, to introduce deep capture. To catch 
your first glimpse of the phenomenon, recall the Galileo story. We 
argued, in a flip of Posner's version of the story, that it was Galileo 
who was committed to realism and Bellarmine who, like legal 
economists, was wed to an unrealistic, reductionist mode1.284 
Let us push the analogy further. Galileo was, for most of his life, 
devoted to the idea that humans could, through methods of obser­
vation, discover and make sense of the natural order.285 He was 
committed to basing theories about our world and the place of it in 
the universe on all the evidence and clues available for human 
inspection, even if doing so challenged widely held self-affirming and 
283 
Galileo's Abjuration of June 22, 1 633, in THE GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 234, 
at 292, 292. 
284 See supra text accompanying notes 230 36. 
28" In 1 61 1 ,  Galileo described his research methodology this way: 
Over a period of two years now, I have tested my instrument (or rather 
dozens of my instruments) by hundreds and thousands of experiments 
involving thousands and thousands of object�, near and far, large and small, 
bright and dark; hence I do not see how it can enter the mind of anyone that 
I have simple mindedly remained deceived in my observations. 
DAt,\,IEL J. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 31 6 ( 1 983) .  
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faith-based beliefs about the Earth 's centrality in the universe.2RG 
Recall that Galileo lived at a time when most people believed 
themselves to inhabit a stationary world. The intellectual 
establishment of the Renaissance, controlled to a large degree by the 
Catholic Church, perceived human knowledge as a fundamentally 
static thing.287 Certain environmental features seemed obvious: the 
Earth was not moving, and the Sun was rotating about the earth. 
The validity of those notions was bolstered by everyday experience 
and found confirmation in several biblical texts, and in the basic 
assumption that heaven reigned above the Earth and hell below.288 
286 Galileo had, in his lesser known work in mechanics, divined the truth of 
Copernicus' revelations long before his invention of the telescope. GIORGIO DE 
SAl'\'TILlANA, THE CRIME OF GALILEO 5-6 ( 1 955) . But Galileo was aware of how 
Copernicus had been mocked and marginalized for expressing those views and thus 
opted to wait until he had compelling proof before endorsing Copernican ideas. Id. 
at 1 1 .  In a letter to Kepler, Galileo remarked: 
Like you, I accepted the Copernican position several years ago and 
discovered from thence the causes of many natural effects which are 
doubtless inexplicable by the current theories. I have written up many 
reasons and refutations on the subject, but 1 have not dared until now to 
bring them into the open, being warned by the fortunes of Copernicus 
himself . . . .  
Id. The telescope provided Galileo with what he thought would be "irrefutable proof 
to any man in good faith," id., or, with what we might describe as evidence so 
irrefutable as to pierce the ambiguity supporting the then conventional view. 
287 At the same time, it is important to note that the Catholic Church was not an 
institution that inherently spurned logic and empirical study. Its guiding philosophy, 
Scholasticism, represented an attempt to wed divine revelation, buttressed by faith, to 
Aristotelian logical deduction. Id. at 56-57. Thus, the Church had no problem with, 
and actually encouraged, Aristotelian science that generally limited itself to the basic 
study of the natural world. Id. 
What the Church (and with it, most of European society) valued above all else, 
however, was not creativity but authority. Hence, the intellectual establishment 
inhabited, and later critiqued, by Galileo was in many ways profoundly backward
looking, in the sense that the "the progressive nature of human knowledge" was 
entirely alien to it. WILLIAM R. SHEA, GALILEO'S INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION: MIDDLE 
PERIOD, 1 620 1 632, at 31 ( 1 972) .  Traditional science and philosophy were rooted in 
the insights of the Bible and the work of Ancient Greek thinkers (notably Aristotle) .  
Scholars were to approach such authorities, not as advocates of debatable propositions, 
but as bodies of revealed truth from whom added insigh ts could then be gained via the 
process of deductive reasoning. See PIETRO REDOND!, GALILEO: HERETIC 52, 54-55 
(Raymond Rosenthal, trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1 987) ( 1 983) ("Nature the 
Aristotelian professors of philosophy said has spoken through the mouth of 
Aristotle.") . 
288 See, e.g. , Psalms 1 03:] 1 ("For, as high as heaven is above the [E] arth . . . .  ") ; 
Matthew 1 1  :23 ("[W] ill you be exalted to the skies? No, brought down to the depths!") . 
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Calileo, informed by the work of fellow astronomical realist 
Copernicus,289 was interested in exploring and studying elements of 
our planet and the celestial bodies whirling "above" it for hard-ta-see 
clues into the reality of celestial dynamics. Mathematics and a 
telescope both provided critical lenses through which he could get a 
better view.290 
Using these tools, Calileo helped to turn the dominant 
Aristotelian model of the universe, and our place in it, on its head.291 
289 Calileo wrote of Copernicus' dedication to realism: 
And so he began to investigate what the system of the world could really be 
in nature, no longer for the sole convenience of the pure astronomer, whose 
calculations he had complied with, but in order to come to an understanding 
of such a noble physical problem; he was confident that, if one had been able 
to account for mere appearances by means of hypotheses which are not true, 
this could be done much better by means of the true and physical 
constitution of the world. 
Calileo's Considerations on the Copernican Opinion ( 1 6 1 5 ) ,  in THE CALILEO AFFAIR, 
supra note 234, at 70, 74 ( 1989) . 
290 Calileo stated that: 
"Philosophy is written in this grand book the universe, which stands 
continually open to our gaze . . . .  But the book cannot be understood unless 
one first learns to comprehend the language and to read the alphabet in 
which it  is  composed. It is  written in the language of mathematics, and its 
characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures, without which it 
is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it . . . .  " 
DAVA SOBEL, CALILEO'S DAUGHTER 1 6  ( 1 999) (quoting Calileo's The Assayer, in 
STILLMAl"i DRAKE, CALILEO (Oxford Univ. Press, 1996) ( 1 980» . 
Calileo's use of mathematics is crucial. The notion of scientific empiricism was 
not, in and of i tself, offensive to the Aristotelian mindset embraced by the Church. 
Yet, in contrast to Aristotle's relatively simplistic system that relied entirely on concrete 
observations that human beings could make with their own senses, Calileo posited a 
framework of analysis that was just as abstract and theoretical as that of the Scholastics. 
See REDONDI, supra note 287, at 52 53 (describing the intricate process of deciphering 
The Assayer) . In doing so, Calileo saw himself as a kind of "philosopher of nature," 
whose work was every bit as important to the project of understanding Creation as that 
of the moralist or the theologian. Id. at 53. Thus, to the established intellectual and 
religious hierarchy, Calileo's ideas were deeply threatening. 
291 Neither Calileo nor Copernicus was the first to discover the basic astronomical 
insights that later made each of them famous. Indeed, many of the early "discoveries" 
associated with the origins of modem science had been, in other cultures, long 
known. As Dick Teresi recently summarized: 
[Tj he ancient Indians, long before Copernicus, knew that the [Ej arth 
revolved around the [Sjun and, a thousand years before Kepler, knew that 
the orbits of the planets were elliptical; the Arabs invented the observatory 
and named most of our popular stars; the Chinese mapped the sky; and the 
Amerindians noted important events with daggers of light or optical snakes 
that thrill us to this day. 
DICK TERESI, LOST DISCOVERIES: THE ANCIENT ROOTS OF MODERN SCIENCE FROM 
THE BABYLONIANS TO THE MAYA 92-93 (2002) . The belief that Copernicus or Calileo 
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It is important to note, however, that the Aristotelian model (as 
 
enhanced through Ptolemy's refinements) provided an adequate 
"as if' theory, for most purposes.2!l3 Through theory and observation, 
Galileo removed the Earth from its stable center, around which the 
Sun was revolving, and placed the Sun at the immovable center of 
the Earth's rotations. Put differently, by studying our astronomical 
situation more closely, Galileo discovered our astronomical 
fundamental attribution error. attributing the movement of the celestial 
situation to the centrality and fixity of the Earth instead of 
attributing our own movement, like that of the other heavenly 
bodies, to the celestial situation. Galileo did not provide absolute 
proof for his challenging worldview, although he believed the 
telescopic observations were sufficient to overturn the geocentric 
model. What he did provide was a refined theory and new 
observations-such as the discovery of four moons orbiting Jupiter, 
the phases of Venus, and an exegesis of the tides-that strongly 
discovered that the Earth circled about the Sun is tantamount to saying that 
Columbus discovered South America. It is accurate only from an ethnocentric 
vantage point, a problem that plagues many of our presumed accuracies. See supra 
text accompanying notes 28-30 (explaining the social psychological findings that 
people tend to view themselves in selfaffirming ways and make mental adjustments to 
preserve that self image) .  
292 Aristotle originally proposed that all celestial bodies were immutable perfect 
spheres, the Earth being fixed at the center. See SOBEL, supra note 290, at 1 70-71 
(describing the geocentric Aristotelian world view in contrast to the views of Salviati, 
Calileo and others) .  Ptolemy reasoned that this must be so, since "if the [E] arth were 
not at the center of the stellar sphere, we should not be able to always see half of this 
sphere; but we do see it . . . .  " Cali leo's Reply to Ignoli ( 1 624) , in THE CALI LEO 
AFAIR, supra note 234, at 1 54, 1 68.  When one looks at two fixed stars opposite each 
other, such that one rises when the other sets, this shows that the pan of the sky 
above the Earth is equal to the part below, and consequently that each is a 
hemisphere, and, since this phenomenon is observable for all horizons, that the Earth 
is at its center. See id. at 1 68 69 (explaining the basis for Ptolemy's reasoning) . 
Calileo called the argument "beautiful and worthy of Ptolemy" but pointed to the 
(now obvious) alternative explanation that "if we let this sphere be still and let the 
terrestrial globe turn on itself (as Copernicus does) , then regardless of where it is 
placed the same thing will happen to the two fixed stars, namely their simultaneous 
rising and setting." Id. 
293 See Albert Van Heiden, Ptolemaic System, at http://es.rice.edu/ES/humsoc/ 
Calileo/Things/ptolemaic_system.html (last visited Oct. 31 , 2003) ("Ptolemy was able 
to account for the motions of heavenly bodies within the standards of observational 
accuracy of his day. The idea was to break down the complex observed planetary 
motion into components with perfect circular motions.") . 
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suggested that the astronomical situation was far more influential 
than the then-dominant geocentric view allowed.294 
We want to push this analogy even further. Despite Galileo's 
compelling evidence that the Earth revolved around the sun, he 
appeared to have been wrong. To be sure, we might look today and 
judge that he was (comparatively) right, after all. But forget for a 
moment the revival and celebration of Galileo's pre-abjuration views, 
beginning in the eighteenth century, and temporarily ignore his 
stature today as a father of modern science.295 Instead, imagine 
yourself living in early seventeenth-century Italy. It is Bellarmine's 
view-informed by biblical passages, religious authorities, popular 
perceptions, experience, and naked-eye observations-which con­
firms your intuitions and the formal positions of the most powerful 
groups and institutions in Italy.296 And it is Galileo, not Bellarmine, 
294 Of course, Calileo's theory was more complicated than the geocentric view 
and consequently left many questions unanswered. Among other problems, a 
heliocentric Earth, without gravity (a concept which was unavailable at the time) 
could neither rotate nor revolve without sending its occupants flying. The fact that 
most of the Earth's objects seemed fairly secure (with the exception of the tower in 
Pisa) was a major reason that he (incorrectly) turned to the tides for support of his 
view. See SOBEL, supra note 290, at 75 (outlining the problems with Calileo's theory 
that the principle of gravity, then undiscovered, would have explained) .  
Legal economists justiJY eschewing realism in the name of maintaining a theory 
that is falsifiable. As the Calileo story indicates, however, there are major problems 
with that justification. First, there is no reason to believe that the more realistic a 
model, the less falsifable it is. That much is clear from Posner's own example of the 
debate between Calileo and Bellarmine. See supra text accompanying note 230. 
Bellarmine's theory was clearly neither realistic nor falsifiable. Second, even if more 
realistic theories are less falsifable, that fact does notjustify ignoring reality. Absent a 
meta-rule explaining how realism and falsifiability are to be traded off (again, 
assuming that there is such a tradeoff) , identifying the problem does not identiJY how 
the tradeoff should be resolved. Thus, Posner's claim seems to be a makeweight 
argument against realism. Furthermore, if Posner's position is that his theory is 
superior because it is falsif able, then he needs to acknowledge that it has, indeed, 
been thoroughly falsified (or been rendered, by his defenses, non falsifiable) .  As we 
discuss elsewhere, many previous economic theories have been falsified, including 
those that resemble the simplistic models of law and economics. See Hanson & 
Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing biology'S theory of "spontaneous generation" and 
economists' theories of intertemporal choice, revealed preference, and assumptions of 
"perfect information" and "stable preferences" have been more or less falsified.") ; 
Hanson et aI., supra note 84 (arguing that Posner's positive theory of tort law has been 
falsified or is non falsifiable, and provides an alternative positive theory of tort law) . 
2g5 Albert Einstein himself dubbed Calileo "the father of modern physics indeed 
of modern science altogether." SOBEL, supra note 290, at 326. 
2<)6 . As expressed in the Papal Condemnation of June 22, 1 633: 
That the [Sj un is the center of the world motionless is a propOSitIOn, 
which is philosophically absurd and false and formally heretical for being 
explicitly contrary to Holy Scripture; 
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who recants and renounces his earlier "findings" and opmlOns. 
Chances are that you, that we, would have believed Galileo was a 
heretic and never doubted the process that "proved" him to be one. 
From this perspective, Bellarmine was obviously right, and Galileo, 
clearly wrong. 
So how could one of the greatest scientists of all time be so 
wrong? The answer is obvious, indeed it is one of the reasons that 
the story is so well known: the scientific community was not 
sufficiently insulated from powerful institutions with a stake in 
scientific outcomes.297 More concretely, because Galileo's work was 
threatening to the Catholic Church and its teachings, and because of 
the Church's encompassing power, Galileo was under intense 
pressure-indeed, was ultimately convicted by the inquisitors-to 
"restate" his views on the structure of the universe.293 Galileo's 
recantation was the result, not of scientific observation, but of 
religious persecution and the very real threat of a horrible death.29\) 
The situational forces behind Galileo's "restated" views are thus 
unmistakable. Galileo made his recantation decision with the 
equivalent of a gun to his head. Of course, as we have argued 
That the [E] arth is neither the center of the world nor motionless but 
moves even with diurnal motion is philosophically equally absurd and false, 
and theologically at least erroneous in the Faith. 
Sentence of June 22, 1 633, in THE GALl LEO AFAIR, supra note 234, at 287-88. 
297 The adherence to the Ptolemaic model by university professors was a 
recurrent theme in Galileo's attempt to bring forth e\�dence to support the 
Copernican view. Professors from Pis a to Bologna to Padua rejected the telescope: 
Magini, professor of astronomy in Bologna, promised the new planets would be 
"exti�ated from the sky." DE SANTILLANA, supra note 286, at 9. 
29 Daniel Boorstin nicely summarizes the sweeping threat of Galileo's findings to 
the fabric of conventional theological and philosophic understandings of the 
universe: 
Each of his simple observations shook another pillar of the Aristotelian
Ptolemaic universe. Now, with his very own eyes, Galileo had seen fixed stars 
beyond his capacity to count them (Was the Universe infinite?) .  He had seen 
that the moon was not more perfect in shape than the earth itself (Was there 
perhaps no difference, after all, between the substance of celestial bodies and 
that of the Earth?) .  The Milky Way then proven to be simply a mass of 
countless stars (Was there nothing, after all, to the Aristotelian theOl,' of 
celestial exhaltations? Were heavenly processes not essentially different from 
those on Earth?) .  
BOORSTIN, supra note 285, at 320. 
299 See SOBEL, supra note 290 at 4, 1 7 1  (describing how Dominican friar Giordano 
Bnmo was burned at the stake in 1 600 in Rome for asserting heliocentric �ews of the 
world, a fact of which Galileo was aware) .  
212  UNIVERSITY OF PAiVNSYLVANIA LA W  REVIEW [Vol. 152: 1 29 
throughout this Article, such situational pressures are rarely so 
obvious. 
This can all be expressed, somewhat stylistically, in Stiglerian 
terms. In recanting, Galileo was "captured" by the Church much 
like, say, the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Board was once said to 
be captured by the airline industry.�loo He claimed to be saying what 
he believed "with sincere heart and unfeigned faith,,,30I independent 
of any pressure from the Church, when in fact he was serving the 
Church's interests, despite his own beliefs. 
C. Deep Capture: History Repeating Itself 
[TJ here have been opened up to this vast and most excellent science, of which my 
work is merely the beginning, ways and means by which other minds more acute 
than mine will explore its remote comers. 
-Galileo Galilei
302 
1 .  Some Deep Implications of Shallow Capture 
In identifYing the phenomenon of capture, Stigler and his 
contemporaries obliterated the once-conventional view of regulation. 
They refuted the naive presumption that had long been protected 
behind the ambiguous (and, therefore, easily defended) concept of 
"the public interest," and provided a far more realistic (albeit 
disturbing) account of the sources and effects of regulation. 
Regulation was "caused" less by public-spirited and well-advised 
regulators and more by the situational constraints imposed upon 
them by competing economic entities, with the most powerful 
entities wielding the most influence. In other words, Stigler, 
identified and substantially overturned what might be called the 
regulatory fundamental attribution error. The older "public interest" 
regulatory theory maintained a kind of dispositionist view of a 
constant figure, evaluating influences, measuring public welfare, and 
300 See generally Bradley Behrman, Civil Aeronautics Board, in WILSOl', supra note 
238, at 75. 
30J Galileo's Abjuration of June 22, 1 633, in THE GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 234, 
at 292, 292. 
302 GALl LEO GALILEI, nVO NE\V SCIENCES 1 53-54 (Henry Crew & Alfonso De 
Salvio, trans., Macmillan 1 9 1 4) ( 1 638) . 
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making decisions accordingly.505 Regulatory theory essentially rested 
on a view of the regulator as a rational actor whose stable preferences 
were in the public interest. By studying the regulator's actions and 
ignoring the regulator's words, economists like Stigler were able to 
see new patterns and surmise some of the situational influences that 
generated them. 
But Stigler's work barely breaks the surface of situation ism and 
identifies only a very shallow form of capture. When one takes 
seriously the power of the situation-exterior and interior304-one 
can begin to understand the potential depths of capture. There are 
several ways in which capture is likely to run much deeper than 
Stigler, or others applying and advancing his insights, have 
recognized. 
2. The Depth of Capture 
Again, returning to Galileo's story may help make evident what is 
invisible in our midst. First, as the Catholic Church's efforts 
revealed, there are other capture-worthy and capturable institutions 
and individuals beyond merely administrative regulators. Recall that 
Galileo had no official regulatory authority either in the state or in 
the Church. What he had was a certain level of public legitimacy, 
and therefore power, as a renowned scientist.50; His theories, 
evidence, and conclusions were important as a confirmation of, or 
challenge to, the "truth" of the Church's teachings.306 As a result, 
Galileo's positions were well worth capturing. Similarly, today any 
institutions or individuals capable of influencing existing wealth and 
power distributions will be subject to the pressures of capture. In 
this sense, Stigler and those who subscribe to his theory are, like the 
public-interest theorists they replaced, far too shallow. 
If administrative regulators are vulnerable to the forces of 
capture by certain interests, as most everyone agrees they are, then 
303 See STIGLER, supra note 70, at 1 1 4-15 (asserting that recent theories on 
government behavior no longer attribute public policies to the suggestions of 
infonned economic advisors, but rather characterize policies as a response to pressure 
from interested parties who aim to benefit from them) .  
304 See supra Part I I .E  (briefly describing "interior" and distinguishing i t  from 
"exterior") . 
30" See SOBEL, supra note 290, at 6 7 ("Gali\eo found himself lionized as another 
Columbus for his conquests . . . .  ") . 
306 [d. at 1 1 1 2 (describing Galileo's complex relation:ship with religion and the 
Catholic Church) .  
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the likelihood of a deeper capture seems undeniable. There is 
nothing special about administrative regulators-except, perhaps, the 
general concern that they may be captured. Virtually every other 
institution in our society seems just as vulnerable. Mter all, 
contemporary scholars and commentators have rarely even 
considered, much less taken seriously, the problem of deep capture. 
Given that nescience, one would expect other insti tutions to be 
constructed without heed to the dynamics of capture . In a 
world without foxes, a farmer will not guard the hen-house. And 
because deep capture occurs situationally-outside of view by, and 
with the induced consent of, the captured-any loss of eggs will 
either go unnoticed or will be perceived as natural and just. 
There is a second general way in which traditional capture theory 
is too shallow. To see this, it is necessary to look deeper than the 
behavior of the captured institutions and individuals. Beneath the 
surface of behavior, the interior situation of relevant actors is also 
subject to capture. Indeed, much of the power of deep capture 
comes from the fact that its targets include the way that people think 
and the way that they think they think. 
The Catholic Church would have been far less troubled by 
Galileo, we suspect, if he had not been writing and publishing his 
ideas broadly in an attempt to persuade others to reject then­
conventional wisdom.307 Eschewing the scientific conventions of his 
day, Galileo published many of his discoveries not in Latin but in 
Italian. He was committed to altering the opinions of people in his 
society, not simply to recording his measurements for a narrow 
scientific audience.308 It was the danger Galileo posed to the 
Church's basic knowledge structures-which were embraced by most 
of the intelligentsia and lay people of the time-that led forces, 
including vested academic interests, to urge the Church to literally 
307 
Calileo was well known and well liked by prominent Catholics, including the 
Medicis and Pope Urban VIII. DE SAt'\'TILLANA, supra note 286, at 1 1 8, 1 60 62. Thus, 
the pressure applied by the Inquisitors might have been reduced had Calileo 
attempted only to persuade fellow professors or the Church hierarchy. By taking his 
case to the Italian prelates, princes, gentlemen, and men of business, however, and by 
writing in Italian rather than Latin, Calileo presented a significant challenge to the 
Church. See MARIO BIAGIOLI, CALILEO, COURTIER: THE PRACfICE OF SCIENCE IN THE 
CULTURE OF ABSOLUTISM 33-37 ( 1 993) (analyzing Calileo's use of patronage 
relationships as a source of power throughout his career) . 
308 See BOORSTIN, supra note 285, at 323-25 (describing Calileo's campaign to 
"interest literate laymen in this new way of thinking") .  
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capture Galileo.309 Galileo's work went beyond offering a simple 
challenge to established propositions such as geocentric cosmology; it 
advocated an entirely different intellectual and moral approach, one 
that aimed to discredit the "cult" of tradition.310 Thus, when Galileo 
advanced heliocentricism, as he did in his famous letter to the Grand 
Duchess Christina, he did so in the context of a more comprehensive 
rejection of the view of knowledge as nothing more than a set of pre­
ordained revelations: 
[W] h o  wants the human mind put to death? Who is going to claim that 
everything in the world which is observable and knowable has already 
been seen and discovered? . . .  one must not, in my opinion . . .  block the 
way of freedom of p hilosophizing about things of the world and of 
nature, as if they had all already been discovered and disclosed with 
certainty. Nor should it be considered rash to be dissatisfied with 
. .  h '  h i ' II d 31 1  opmlOns w IC are a most umversa y accepte . . . .  
The message that common sense notions should be challenged 
was deeply threatening to the Catholic Church of the seventeenth 
century, which defined faith as it had since the Middle Ages-as 
obedience to the teachings of religious authorities. The highest crime 
an individual could commit was that of heresy-the word itself 
deriving from the Greek word hairesis, meaning "choice.,,312 In order 
309 Following the guilty verdict, at which time he was seventy years old, Galileo was 
imprisoned in his own home for the remainder of his life. Like so many radicals 
before and after him, Galileo continued his work while imprisoned, smuggling out of 
captivity two books for publication under an assumed name, which would ultimately 
become the basis for the theory of dynamics and gravity developed by Sir Isaac 
Newton. Boorstin notes that Galileo's imprisonment was mitigated somewhat 
before his death: 
Eventually the Pope allowed him the companionship of a young scholar, 
Vincenzo Viviani, who reported Galileo's death on January 8, 1 642, a month 
before his seventy eighth birthday. "With philosophic and Christian firmness 
he rendered up his soul to its Creator, sending it, as he liked to believe, 10 
enjoy and to watch from a closer vantage point those eternal and immutable 
marvels which he, by means of a fragile device, had brought closer to our 
mortal eyes with such eagerness and impatience." 
[d. at 326 27. 
310 See REDONDI, supra note 287, at 501 .  
311 Galileo's Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina ( 1 615) , in THE GALILEO 
AFAIR, supra note 234, at 87, 96 97. 
312 BER."IARD HAMILTON, THE MEDIEVAL INQUISITION 1 3  ( 1981 ) .  Heresy extended 
far beyond the act of challenging the Church's central theological teachings; any 
intellectual project that called into question the Church's fundamental intellectual 
authority was subject to censure. Thus, Cardinal Bellarmine condemned the 
Copernican cosmology as heretical not only (or principally) because it ran afoul of a 
few passages in the Bible, but because it stood in sharp contrast to a fundamental 
Aristotelian law of physics, which said that "the [El arth, insofar, as it is the greatest 
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to prevent the wider populace from realizing that a "choice" existed, 
Galileo had to be silenced. 
Those in power thus captured the institutions and individuals 
that threatened their dominant position, including an individual 
scientist capable of altering ideas or knowledge in a way that might 
weaken their power. They did so through a process intended to 
suggest that Galileo freely chose his recantation and resultant silence. 
Galileo, wisely, did not proclaim that he was being forced to recant 
under the threat of death; he stated instead that he was trying to 
clarify the possible confusion that his errors had created and make 
clear that he, upon reflection, "abjure [d] , curse [d] , and detest[ed] 
the above-mentioned errors and heresies . . . .  ,,313 The Church thus 
applied situational pressure to generate the appearance of 
"dispositional" recantation. And the people at that time, inasmuch 
as their knowledge structures and understanding of the world were 
influenced by the Church, and insofar as the Church managed to 
squelch other ideas or knowledge structures, were also deeply 
captured. 
Understanding that capture is directed at both our exteriors and 
interiors clears up some confusion and debate in the shallow capture 
literature. When Stigler's evidence of capture emerged, economists, 
political scientists, and public choice theorists got busy trying to 
identify the precise mechanics of the regulatory black box that 
Stigler mostly ignored. True to form, they began with the rational 
actor model of human behavior and sought to explain capture as the 
consequence of the self-interested, maximizing dispositions of 
individual regulators.314 Yet, while simple formulations have given 
way to increasingly elaborate ones,315 public-choice theory is still 
dogged by the fact that it is unrealistically "cynical" (meaning that 
the assumed dispositions of regulatory actors are perceived to be 
weight, tends naturally to that natural point which is the center." REDONDI, supra note 
287, at 39. Because the Church had accepted Aristotle as the final authority on the 
laws of nature, all others were bound to do the same. Id. 
313 Galileo's Abjuration of June 22, 1 633, in THE GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 234, 
at 292. 
314 This is yet another example of the tendency to infer dispositions from actions. 
See supra text accompanying notes 1 50 78 (describing several experiments in which 
participants tended to overestimate the role of disposition even when situational 
influence should be obvious) . 
315 See, e.g. , DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL 
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF ApPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 47 7] 
( 1994) (analyzing the failure of traditional rational choice theory to explain voter 
turnout) . 
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unrealistically selfish) .  Mter all, many governmental actors and reg­
ulatory agents often claim, and actually seem to be, motivated by the 
public interest and try to act that way;�16 that is, many regulators' 
actions appear more consistent with their ideological beliefs than 
wi th a narrow conception of self-interest.�17 
The problem with shallow capture is not that it cannot always 
explain the part played by the dispositions of regulatory actors, but 
rather that it takes dispositions so seriously in the first place. Deep 
capture makes clear that people's intentions and beliefs may have 
little to do with their behavior and that, insofar as they do, those 
intentions and beliefs are part of what interests compete to capture. 
When Catholic astronomers of the seventeenth century stated 
that they believed, as most profoundly did, that the Earth was at the 
center of the universe, deep capture was at work. Their astronomy 
was part of a larger, interconnected set of truths taught to them in 
seminary and reinforced at many turns-some seen, some unseen 
-in their society. Similarly, lay people had no reason to dispute 
those truths and faced situational influences just as powerful, despite 
being less visible, as the gun to the head or fire to the feet that 
Galileo experienced. That a regulator may act out of ideological 
dispositions no more implies that she is free from capture than the 
changing lengths of shadows on a summer afternoon implies that the 
sun is revolving around the Earth. 
316 See, e.g. , Mark Kelman, On Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical 
and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 1 99, 2 1 7 23 ( 1 988) 
(arguing that shifts in public policy demonstrate that public leaders are not motivated 
purely by self interest) ; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 31 (1991)  (describing evidence that "one 
factor in  how a legislator votes is simply that legislator's view of the public  
interest") . 
317 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 3 1 6, at 24 25, 28 33 (discounting the public 
choice theory as the sole explanation for legislators' actions) .  In such circumstances, 
the literature sometimes accommodates such ideological behavior by treating it as a 
manifestation of self-interest. See generally Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture 
and Ideology in Law and Economics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 ( 1 984) ; James B .  Kau & 
Paul H .  Rubin,  Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L.  & 
ECON. 365 ( 1 979) . Instead of pursuing the analytic inquiry that this increasingly 
non-falsifiable defnition of self interest would entail, scholars relying on it typically 
just move on, leaving the dispositionist rational actor whole and ready to be employed 
for the next analysis. A critical realist approach places the exploration of the nature 
of preference formation, and the location of its inf uences, at the start of an analytic 
inquiry, instead of avoiding it as an unfortunate impasse to simple, if unrealistic, 
analyses and seemingly clear policy conclusions. 
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The question that should be asked is not: "Who among the 
regulators is corrupt or so selfishly motivated as to disregard the 
'public interest? ' "  The question that should be asked is: "Who 
among us is the most powerful and most capable of deeply capturing 
our exteriors and interiors and, even, of capturing what we mean by 
the 'public interest? ' "  
3 .  The Invisibility of Capture 
By "deep capture," then, we are referring to the disproportionate 
and self-serving influence that the relatively powerful tend to exert 
over all the exterior and interior situational features that materially 
influence the maintenance and extension of that power­
including those features that purport to be, and that we experience 
as, independent, volitional, and benign. Because the situation 
generally tends to be invisible (or nearly so) to us, deep capture 
tends to be as well. 
This raises the question: if deep capture is so hard to see, then 
why is it  so obvious in the Galileo example? There are several 
reasons. To begin with, at the time, we doubt that it was so visible. 
VVe suspect that few observers saw anything untoward or illegitimate 
about Galileo's inquisitorial experience or any reason to doubt the 
"knowledge" that it produced.3ls The situational pressures that, to us, 
were glaringly excessive during the Inquisition were probably not 
perceived as excessive at the time.319 
The situational forces confronting Galileo may be easier for us 
to see now because we live in a radically different environment.  
We are looking at another generation of people in another country 
318 Cf REDONDI, supra note 287, at 303 (suggesting that news of Galileo's 
condemnation, although greeted "by a salvo of Aristotelian criticism," did not rise 
above the level of "routine academic skirmishes") . Galileo's trial itself was, of course, a 
hidden proceeding a series of private interrogations that the world did not learn 
about until after the fact. [d. at 326. 
319 
Such situational pressures are less likely to be visibly employed today. The 
fact that burning people at the stake is now considered to be an unacceptable 
violation of human rights does not mean that blatant situational force is no longer 
used to elicit the appearance of free, voluntary action. The still significant problem of 
"forced confessions" is just one of many possible examples of that phenomenon. See 
Jim Dwyer & Kevin Flynn ,  New Light on Jogger's Rape Calls Evidence into Question, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. I ,  2002, at Al (discussing recent evidence that the convictions in the 
Central Park jogger rape case were based on confessions that likely were coerced) ;  
Susan Saul ny, Convictions and Charges Voided in '89 Central Park Jogger Attack, N .Y. 
TiMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at Al (" [L] awyers for three of the men . . .  contend that the 
confessions were coerced by the police.") . 
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whose situational worldviews we reject and whose victim, Galileo, we 
revere.320 They are "them," and Galileo is "us . "  People are 
motivated to attribute bad outcomes to in-group members.321 
The contrast is heightened by the historical construction of the event 
as a lesson on the horrors of the Inquisition and the dangerous 
distortions that result when religion is al lowed to dominate (or, 
we might say, "capture") science. The role of disposition and deep 
capture in the Galileo story is, today and to us, conspicuous, almost 
palpable. But seeing our own situation and its deep capture is not. 
4. Learning from History 
For some of the same reasons that it is difficult to convince 
people that they would have been influenced by the situational cues 
in the Milgram experiment,322 it is nearly impossible to convince 
people that they live in, and are part of, a deeply captured world. To 
make our preliminary case, therefore, we will attempt to demonstrate 
that the situation today is very similar to the situation that existed in 
Galileo's Italy. Because the existence of deep capture is easy to see 
and accept there, by observing it, we may be better able to see and 
accept deep capture now. Perhaps by seeing that we are subject to a 
parallel influence over a parallel issue, we may be able to more 
clearly see ourselves, not in the heroic Galileo, but in the complacent 
and complicit adherents of the common sense of his day, or even in 
the reactionary Bellarmine. 
a. Institutions to deeply capture 
The first parallel is the existence of an institution or collection of 
institutions with immense wealth and power and, thus, both the 
ability and desire to influence exterior and interior situations to 
enhance those advantages. In the Galileo story, that collection of 
320 The rehabilitation of Galileo as an object of reverence was not accomplished 
until the nineteenth century, when his cause was taken up by radicals like Auguste 
Comte who portrayed him as a "martyr of the religion of humanity." REDONDI, supra 
note 287, at 32 1 .  Today, Galileo is depicted in a similar-if not somewhat anach­
ronistic-light as a great crusader for scientific fact against the superstitious monolith 
that was the early modern Catholic Church. As the Indigo Girls sing, "Galileo's head 
was on the block, the crime was looking up the truth." INDIGO GIRLS, Cali/eo, on RiTES 
OF PASSAGE (Sony Music Entertainment 1 992) .  
321 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (describing some phenomenon between 
grougs) ;  supra note 1 1 0 (discussing actor observer bias) . 
_2 See supra text accompanying notes 86-100 (outlining the Milgram experiment) . 
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institutions is, for the sake of simplicity, often treated as an individual 
actor under the heading of "the Catholic Church" or "the Vatican." 
Today, we hypothesize that the institutions with the means and the 
motive to engage in deep capture are large corporations.323 In 
virtually any present metric and manner of understanding power, 
corporations easily qualify as immensely powerful. 
Let us start with corporations' immense wealth, a fundamental 
component of power in our market economy. As is so often 
emphasized by legal economists, resources have a tendency through 
market processes to move to those who value them most, as 
measured by relative willingness to pay.324 Willingness to pay, of 
course, is heavily determined by ability to pay. No institutional actor 
controls as much wealth in so concentrated a fashion in our society 
today as do corporations and those individuals with an important 
stake in promoting the power of corporations.325 Thus, valuable 
resources (including influence over the situation) tend toward those 
with the greatest ability to pay-that is, corporations. 
Large corporate interests have several other power advantages 
beyond their wealth-advantages that likely help them to amass that 
wealth in the first place. For instance, like Stigler's beekeepers,326 
they enjoy a common single interest and thus an advantage in the 
competition to influence-an assertion that finds considerable 
support in the shallow capture literature.327 Insofar as each 
corporation is devoted to the single goal of profit maximization, they 
are, even as they compete in the marketplace, collectively committed 
323 Of course, there are many dimensions of power, many of them overlapping. 
We believe that this theory also predicts the operation of power in other social 
institutions and along other dimensions and sources of power, including species, 
gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, and physical attractiveness. 
324 See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 7-21 (discussing the ways in which 
measuring value by willingness to pay highlights a disposition while overlooking an 
important situational element-namely, ability to pay) . 
325 See supra note 253 (providing evidence of the wealth controlled by 
corporations) .  Corporate interests, to be sure, are not without competitors, such as 
churches, foundations, nonprofit organizations, labor unions, trial attorneys, 
aggregations of consumers, and individual consumers. I n  subsequent work we hope 
to examine the relative power of such institutions vis a-vis corporations, and also 
the ways in which all of those institutions are themselves targets of deep capture 
by larfe commercial interests. 
32 See supra text accompanying note 280 (describing beekeepers' advantages over 
honer. consumers in influencing beekeeper regulations). 
3 7 See supra Part V.A (summarizing that literature) 
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to a uniform regulatory end: the creation and maintenance of a 
world that maximizes profit opportunities.328 
Moreover, corporations are-in part because of market 
processes-profoundly effective at uncovering and exploiting the 
most efficient and reliable means of influencing people and insti­
tutions, a pursuit that will extend through situational influences.329 
Advertising, marketing, lobbying, and public relations are only the 
most obvious activities that corporations have refined in their profit­
maximIZIng pursuits. Even those practices are largely obscured by 
our disposition ism and largely invisible in our theories330-an 
obscurity that renders them all the more effective. In future work, 
we hope to describe those practices in more detail. For now, our 
point is that the situation of market competition has led corporations 
to become far more expert at manipulating situational factors than 
other institutions or individuals have had the need or wherewithal to 
accomplish. 
Finally, the livelihood or economic well-being of the majority of 
our population is perceived to depend directly or indirectly on the 
health of corporations-individually and collectively. For example, 
many people work for corporations, many people invest in corpor­
ations, and, more generally, the overall health of the economy, in 
which most of us feel we have a significant stake, is perceived to 
depend on the collective health of corporations. Corporate scholars 
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, for instance, recently 
described the expanding base of shareholders as follows: 
Stock ownership is becoming more pervasive everywhere. No longer 
is it confined to a small group of wealthy citizens. In the United States, 
this diffusion of share ownership has been underway since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. In recent years, however, it has 
accelerated substantially. Since the Second World War, an ever
328 See supra text accompanying notes 257 59 (briefly describing shared 
commercial ends); Chen & Hanson, I llusion of Law I, supra note 84 (analyzing the 
schemas of corporate law and how it benefits corporate interests) 
329 See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 251 ,  at 724-43 
(describing and predicting methods by which manufacturers manipulate consumers); 
Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 251 ,  at 1428 150 1  
(illustrating consumer manipulation tactics, including those used b y  the tobacco 
industry). 
330 See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 25 1 ,  at 725 
(" [SJ cholars . . .  have failed to see that manufacturers can take advantage of such 
manipulability." (emphasis omitted» ; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously 
II, supra note 251 ,  at 1 548 49 (describing "Viscusi's failure to consider how the industry 
itself might have influenced consumer risk perceptions and preferences"). 
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increasing number of American workers have had their savings invested 
in corporate equities through pension funds. Over the same period, 
the mutmil fund industry has also expanded rapidly, becoming the 
repository of an ever increasing share of nonpension savings for the 
I ·  I 
331 
popu ation at arge. 
This is not just an academic point. President George W. Bush 
has been emphasizing this theme repeatedly in the wake of corporate 
debacles since he took office. In response to Enron revelations, for 
instance, he explained: 
The reason that a single bankruptcy can cause so much concern in 
America is that more Americans than ever have invested their money in 
public corporations. Today, about 80 million Americans own stock, 
either individually or through their pension plans. This is one of the 
causes for the expansion in personal wealth over the past 20 years. 
This has been an incredibly positive development for America. Stock 
ownership allows citizens from all walks of life to own a part of the 
economy and to share in its growth. The people who run public 
companies owe a special obligation to these investors, many of whom 
have put their savings and future security on the line.332 
The widespread sense that our collective welfare turns 
importantly on the wealth and success of corporations empowers 
corporations. It does so by giving the general population a stake in 
the health of those institutions that are already the most wealthy and 
influential in our culture. As Hansmann and Kraakman put it: 
No longer do labor and capital constitute clearly distinct interest 
groups in society. Workers, through share ownership, increasingly 
share the economic interests of other equity-holders. Indeed, in the 
United States, union pension funds are today quite active in pressing 
the view that companies must be managed in the best interests of their 
shareholders.333 
331 Henry Hansmann & Renier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. LJ. 439, 452 (2001 )  (citations omitted) .  
332 President George W. Bush, President Outlines Plan to Improve Corporate 
Responsibility, Remarks at Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Ceremony (Mar. 
7, 2002) , available at http://ww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020307
3.html; see also President George W. Bush, President Reiterates Call for Corporate 
Responsibility, Remarks to Employees of America II Electronics (Mar. 8, 2002) , 2002 
WL 14547 1 1 1  ("We've got thousands of citizens who own shares of publicly held 
companies, many in pension plans, mutual funds, a lot of them direct ownership. 
And this country must hold corporate CEOs-CEOs of publicly held companies, to 
the highest of high standards.") , available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2002/03/20020308 4.htInl. 
333 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 331 ,  at 452. 
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In this way, according to Hansmann and Kraakman, "a public 
shareholder class" has developed into "a broad and powerful interest 
group in both corporate and political affairs across jurisdictions" • • TI4 promotlng corporate mterests . 
b. Fundamental attribution errors 
The second major parallel between our world and Calileo's is the 
existence of a widely held attributional intuition that is false, but 
generally viewed as a "truth"-and an obvious one at that. At that 
time, it was about what, if anything, moved the Earth and the 
celestial bodies "above" it. Now, it is about what moves us and our • • • 335 mstltutlons. 
c. Incentives to deeply capture 
The third parallel is that. in our world, too, those in power have a 
stake in maintaining the apparent veracity of that "truth" and, thus, 
in heavily promoting it. Instead of the Catholic Church sustaining 
geocentricism and dismissing Calileo's observations regarding the 
role of astronomical situation, today, in our world, it is large 
corporate interests promoting dispositionism and dismissing obser­
vations regarding the influence of exterior and interior situations on 
behavior. 
1. The stakes of geocentricism 
To the Catholic Church, maintaining an allegiance to the biblical 
account of astronomical structure, no matter how logically dubious, 
was extremely important. Although Calileo himself saw no tension 
between his scientific findings and his Catholic faith,336 portions of 
334 Id  
335 Note that in both cases, the attributions are self affirming. We like to see 
ourselves as thinking, free actors, and we like to think of our Earth as being placed, 
apparently by God, at the center of the universe. 
336 Galileo wrote that: 
[TJ hough the Scripture cannot err, nevertheless some of its interpreters and 
expositors can sometimes err in various ways . . . .  [NJ ature is inexorable and 
immutable, and she does not care at all whether or not her recondite reasons 
and modes of operations are revealed to human understanding . . . .  
. . . [TJherefore, whatever sensory experience places before our eyes or 
necessary demonstrations prove to us concerning natural effects should not 
in any way be called into question on account of scriptural passages whose 
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the Catholic hierarchy saw in his discoveries the direct 
contradiction of several theological tenets.m In their eyes, 
such weakened l inks threatened to destroy a whole chain of logic 
upon which the Church relied. 338 
The insistence on intellectual conformity in  scientific and 
philosophical subjects was intimately connected to the 
Churc h ' s  reaction to a far more fundamental challenge to i ts 
authori ty, that of the Protestant Reformation . That Galileo was 
l inked in the minds of many Catholic Church leaders to the 
Protestant Reformation is ironic, since Galileo probably 
objected to the Protestant 's  l i teral interpretations of the Bible, 
if not their reformist spirit, even more than he did to Catholic 
orthodoxy.339 At the same time, Protestantism seemed to be 
advancing the same kind of challenge to core Catholic beliefs 
that Galileo ' s  scientific approach posed to Aristotelian 
naturali sm.340 On a broader level,  at i ts inception, Protestant­
ism was fundamentally anti-authoritarian in the sense that i ts 
leaders, beginning with Luther, encouraged the radical 
decentralization of religious authority and the rationalization 
words appear to have a different meaning, since not every statement of the 
Scripture is bound to obligations as severely as each effect of nature. 
Correspondence from Galileo to Castelli (Dec. 2 1 ,  1 613) ,  in THE GALILEO AFFAIR, 
supra note 234, at 49, 49 50. 
337 In 1 546, at the Fourth Session of the Council of Trent, Church leaders 
launched the Counter Reformation, declaring that: 
[N]o one relying on his own judgment shall, in matters of faith and moral 
pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine . . .  presume to interpret 
[the Holy Scriptures] contrary to that sense which holy mother Church, to 
whom it belongs to judge of their true sense and interpretation, has held and 
holds, or even contrary to the unanimous teachings of the Fathers. 
Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Introduction to THE GALl LEO AFFAIR, supra note 234; see also id. 
at 1 1 12  (summarizing the political background of the Counter Reformation) .  
338 As one scholar of Galileo has noted: 
Bellarmine's logic is relentless. If God is the author of Scripture, everything 
in the Bible is true, whether it is essential to salvation or merely a piece of 
accidental historical information. And his reason for this is of crucial 
importance. "It is necessary to believe them because they were written." . . . This 
truth condition, which is certainly not limited to only Bellarmine's 
presentation, was clearly destined to clash with Galileo's scientific standard of 
truth. 
RiCHARD]' BLACK\NELL, GALILEO, BELLARMINE, AND THE BIBLE 32 ( 1991 ) .  
339 Cj D E  SAt"lTILLANA, supra note 286, at 326-27 (noting that Galileo was an 
"anticlerical Catholic," not a Protestant) . 
340 See REDOND!, supra note 287, at 209 (describing the Protestant challenge to the 
Catholic doctrine of transubstan tiation ) .  
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of scri p tural in terpretati o n .  The resul t was a more personal,  
in dividualized experience and i n terpretation of the scriptures. 
To the Catholic hierarchy, this was the work of the devil. And 
maintaining a strict biblical understanding of astronomy was of 
critical importance in their broader battle against diabolical 
corruption of Church dogma.34 1 
ll. The stakes of dispositionism 
Similarly, today, large corporate interests have a great deal at 
stake in maintaining and promoting a dispositionist worldview. As 
we argued earlier, it is possible to speak of a "corporate interest" in 
maximizing profit not because corporations are dispositionally 
motivated, but because there are robust and stable situational 
pressures encouraging corporations to act "as if' they want to pursue 
that end.342 
34 1 The battle was not played out merely in the minds of Europeans great armies 
also were clashing on European soil. On the eve of Galileo's trial, the Thirty Years War 
( 1 6 1 8 1 648) was going extremely badly for the Catholic side. In 1 632, the Protestant 
King of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, broke through the armies of the Catholic Holy 
Roman Emperor in Germany and advanced on Italy. He probably would have crossed 
the Alps and marched on Rome itself but for his own untimely death that same year. 
See id. at 231 .  I t  was at this time, in February of 1 632, that Calileo published The 
Dialogue, in which he called into question the entire framework of Aristotelian 
cosmology advanced by the Church. See DE SANTILLANA, supra note 286, at 38, 1 86. 
(acknowledging dispute between Calileo and Aristotelians and citing 1 632 as the date 
of publication) .  So it was that Galileo slammed into an entire framework of 
intellectual, spiritual, and political power and authority that already felt itself to be 
under attack. Consequently, the Pope "''as in no mood to be indulgent, especially since 
Bellarmine had forbidden Calileo to advance heliocentrism in 1 61 6. In response to a 
plea by the Tuscan ambassador for lenience, the Pope supposedly "exploded in anger," 
saying that in his "perverse material," Galileo had, "dared enter where he should not, 
into the most grave and dangerous subjects that one could possibly raise at the 
moment." REOONDI, supra note 287, at 256. 
Had Galileo and his discoveries come earlier, at a time when the Catholic Church 
was not losing power and influence, his findings and ideas might have met a more 
hospitable audience. Indeed, it was not until well into the twentieth century and the 
current Pope's tenure that the Church apologized for silencing Calileo. See William 
D. Montalbano, t.arth Moves for Vatican in Galileo Case, LA. TIMES, Nov. I ,  2002, at A3 
("The Roman Catholic Church has admitted to erring . . .  in formally condemning 
Galileo Galilei for entertaining scientific truths it long denounced as against the
Scriptures heresy.") ; Alan Cowell, After 350 Years, Vatican Says Galileo Was Right: It 
Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3 1 ,  1992, at Al ("More than 350 years after the Roman 
Catholic Church condemned Galileo, Pope John Paul II [will] rectifY one of the 
Church's most infamous wrongs-the persecution of the Italian astronomer and 
physicist for proving the Earth moves around the Sun.") .  
342 See supra text accompanying notes 248 5 1 (noting the situational pressures 
on market actors to maximize profits ) ;  see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 
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And, in a similar vein, just as one can speak of corporations' 
individual interests, one can also speak of their shared or collective 
interest. Although corporations are often in direct competition with 
one another, they share a collective interest in maximizing profits­
which translates to an interest in maximizing available markets and 
minimizing profit-reducing regulation. Phenomena such as trade 
associations for lobbying, industry- and sector-wide advertising and 
public relations, and illegal collaborative activities such as price­
fixing, evince these shared interests amongst competitors.343 
Coordinated lobbying efforts for policy initiatives like NAITA344 and 
for one-or-another political candidate,34; demonstrate a shared corp­
orate interest across markets. But corporations share an interest in 
more than just promoting, for example, global trade policy. They 
also share a deeper interest in promoting certain perceptions of global 
trade policy, and of many other issues that can influence their 
common pursuit of profits. It is our contention that a dispositionist 
worldview benefits both individual corporations and the shared 
corporate interest, and that corporations therefore individually and 
jointly will act situationally to promote it. Because this claim is a 
major feature of our larger thesis, and because defending it is 
somewhat complex, i t  will  be the topic of a separate article .346 We 
urge the reader to accept, or at least suspend disbelief in, this claim 
until we can flesh it out and (we hope) thoroughly substantiate it. 
For now, we will only cursorily highlight portions of that article . 
One important reason that corporations have a stake in 
dispositionism is that it is the dispositionist perspective that largely 
j ustifies their profit-seeking behavior as socially beneficial. If 
consumers are assumed to be dispositional-that is, if they act 
according to a stable set of preferences that only they can access 
directly-then it plausibly follows that the best way to maximize 
331 , at 441 42 (describing the "interests" of institutions profit maximization) ;  Chen 
& Hanson, Illusion of Law I ,  supra note 84 (describing those situations in detail) . 
343 See also supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text (making a related point and 
providing some evidence in support) . 
344 See Coalition of Business Interests is Mobilizing Support for NAFrA, 10 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 314, at 31 4 15 (Feb. 24, 1 993) (reporting that a coalition of business 
interests comprised of over a thousand organizations was lobbying in support for 
NAFTA) . 
:145 See David R. Lagasse, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power and the 
Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1 347, 1 385 ( 1995) (describing the collaborative 
creation of the Business Roundtable as a corporate lobbying organization) .  
"6 See Jon Hanson, Adam Wright & David Yosifon, The Situational Stakes of 
Dispositionism (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) .  
2003] THE SlTVA nON 227 
welfare is to allow consumers to satisfY their preferences through 
free-market transactions. It is through free markets that otherwise 
invisible preferences are satisfied (and revealed) through mutually 
beneficial transactions that enhance overall social welfare. As profit­
maximizing entities, corporations act to maximize social welfare by 
serving consumers' supposed dispositional preferences. Profit is the 
substantiation of those welfare-enhancing transactions and is there­
fore, by definition, good. In short, profit-maximizing corporations 
act in the public interest.347 
A dispositionist worldview is similarly valuable to the corporate 
interest because it helps minimize profit-reducing regulation. 
Markets, which allow the free exercise of dispositions, are understood 
as more responsive to consumer preferences than regulators who 
lack good information and the appropriate incentives. The 
dispositionist presumption translates to a presumption against 
regulatory intervention even against visible harms, for the actors 
involved are presumed to be choosing the inevitable risks that gave 
rise to those harms. Regulatory intervention is warranted only in 
circumstances in which markets demonstrably fail to respond to 
consumer dispositions-for instance, when consumers clearly lack 
information or when a transaction creates significant negative 
externalities. But, even II the presence of such market 
imperfections, calls for regulation may be rebutted on the grounds 
that imperfect markets might be preferable to imperfect regulations. 
Expressions like "the nirvana fallacy" and "the law of unintended 
consequences" have been coined to capture this fallback defense of 
markets.348 
Dispositionism also helps support common argu'ments for why 
regulators cannot be trusted. Regulators, like the rest of us, are 
presumed to be motivated to satisfY their self-interest,34!J an end that 
is often in tension with their purported goal of serving the public 
interest. Regulators are often depicted as concerned with job 
security, career advancement, and larger budgets, as well-meaning 
but ill-informed bunglers , or as zealous intermeddlers seeking to 
347 Aspects of this script are described in Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra 
note 84. 
348 See Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, Bad Arguments in Cm'jlorate Law, 78 GEO. L. J. 1 55 1 ,  
1 551 52 ( 1 990) (discussing the use o f  the Nirvana Fallacy to defend markets) ;  Kenneth 
Sanney, Cybe-rjacking, Mousetrapping, and the FTC Act: Are Federal Consumer Protection Laws 
Helping OT Hurting Online Consumers?, 3 VAt'\1D. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 221 ,  233 nAO (200 1 )  
(defining the law of unintended consequences and discussing i ts  invocation ) .  
349 See supra text accompanying notes 7 ,  303 & 314. 
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impose their visions of society upon otherwise free consumers. Such 
dispositions are likely to lead to wrongful interference in free choices 
and, consequently, inefficient outcomes-the apparent dispositional 
mechanism behind Stigler's findings. 
Another benef t of disposition ism is that it helps to preserve and 
legitimate the status quo, in which corporations are the wealthiest 
and most powerful entities. Dispositionism places consumers, not 
corporations, in the driver's seat. Corporations are viewed as com­
peting to fulfill consumers' desires in a fair competition; they are 
viewed as having no role in creating or influencing consumers' 
behavior. If consumers are unhappy with one or another outcome of 
that competitive process, they are rebuffed with the observation that 
the process is fair and that consumers have no one but themselves to 
blame. If consumers claim not to like a given market outcome, they 
can be told to change their consumption choices, reexamine their 
perceived preferences, or take it up with their fellow consumers. 
In addition, corporations gain in innumerable ways from the 
general human tendency-reflected in the fundamental attribution 
error-to attach disproportionate weight to what we see and to see 
only a small, salient subset of our environs and interiors. This 
phenomenon has many manifestations that tend to benefit large 
commercial interests. For example, when the situation is not obvious 
(as is generally the case) , people believe they are acting 
autonomously when they are actually responding to unseen 
situational cues. Not only do they miss the situational influence, they 
don 't  believe there is a situational influence. Consumers are like 
competitors in a sprint, who, not seeing the track, presume that it is 
flat and fair. The runners measure their dispositions-talent and 
drive-according to the outcome of the race, without regard to its 
situation. In such a setting, corporations can camouflage their 
situational manipulations behind reassurances that those subject to 
them are, in fact, disposition ally moved. That same tendency permits 
corporations to attribute particularly egregious corporate activities to 
the dispositions of the handful of human actors involved or the 
rather unique corporate disposition (culture) of one corporation, 
and not to larger situational influences that might implicate, say, all 
corporations or all of corporate law. 
Galileo's conflict with the Church was not a neutral scientific 
debate. It had profound implications for power-who would have it 
and how it would be wielded-in seventeenth-century Europe. 
Similarly, the divide between dispositionism and situationism is not 
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an academic point. It has profound implications for the distribution 
of power in our society. Large corporations have a stake in a 
dispositionist worldview because it helps them create and maintain 
vast situational power. Indeed, by promoting a lopsided worldview, 
based on individual stable preferences and autonomous individual 
choices, corporations can actually curtail individual autonomy and 
alter perceived preferences. That is possible, we assert, because of 
disposi tionism. 
D. The Deep Capture Hypothesis 
The universal spirit of the laws, of every country is always to favor the strong 
against the weak and those who have against those who have not. This 
diffculty is inevitable, and it is without exception. 
350 
-Jean Jacques Rousseau 
The twentieth century has been characterized by three developments of great 
political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, 
and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate 
power against democracy. 
Ale C 
351 
- X arey 
All of the key elements are in place. As with Galileo' s  capture, 
today we have an extremely powerful institutional force with an 
immense stake in maintaining, and an ability to maintain, a false, 
though intuitive, worldview.352 Our basic hypothesis (and prediction) 
is that large commercial interests act (and will continue to act) to 
capture the situation-interior and exterior-in order to further 
entrench dispositionism. Moreover, they have done so largely 
undetected, and without much in the way of conscious awareness or 
collaboration. Hence, large corporate interests have, through 
350 JEAN:JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE 236 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1979) 
( 1 762) .  
351 ALEX CAREY, TAKING THE RISK OUT O F  DEMOCRACY: CORPORATE PROPAGAl'\!DA 
VERSUS FREEDOM Al,\!D LIBERlY 18 (Andrew Loh rey ed.,  1995) .  
352 It  i s  important to  note that the deep capture prediction that large commercial 
interests will wield disproportionate influence over "knowledge" is not limited to 
simply dispositionism and dispositionist tendencies. We use dispositionism as an 
extremely important example of pro-commercial "knowledge." For other examples, 
see Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 84 (describing the deeply captured 
schemas of policymakers and corporate law) . 
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disproportionate ability to control and manipulate our exterior and 
interior situations, deeply captured our world. 
This is a hypothesis that finds support not j ust in the axiom of 
history repeating itself, although the lessons of history do indeed 
provide significant support. And it is a hypothesis that follows from 
more than just laboratory and field experiments of social psychology, 
although that literature alone should be sufficient to reverse our 
curren t  presumptions.353 The deep capture hypothesis is also the 
logical extension of several basic economic insights, including those 
associated with capture theory and market theory-infonned by a 
realistic understanding of the human animal (or situational 
character) . The question remains, however, whether such a 
provocative, counterintuitive hypothesis fnds much support in the 
various institutions that shape our exterior and interior situation. 
VI. SOME EVIDENCE OF THE DEEP CAPTURE HYPOTHESIS 
The deep capture hypothesis is too provocative to leave totally 
undefended, but covers too vast a set of institutions to adequately 
defend here. Much of the remainder of this Article, therefore, will 
be devoted to providing a sample of observations that provide 
support for our framework. The sample is intended to foster open 
minds in our readers ( if not to thoroughly destabilize eXIStIng 
dispositionist worldviews) until we can return with a more fulsome 
defense of, and more compelling evidence for, our claims. 
Here, we will attempt to show that history is, as usual, repeating 
itself-that we live in a world much like that of Galileo.354 The 
dispositionist worldview, which is so valuable to the most powerful 
institutions in our culture, is widely accepted in our population as 
common-sensical , even though that view is, according to the best 
available evidence, fundamentally lop-sided. Furthermore, those 
powerful institutions use their power to advance that view by actively 
promoting it themselves, by rewarding others who do so, and by 
seeking to penalize or delegitimate those who challenge it. Again ,  
further evidence regarding ( 1 )  precisely how dispositionism is 
incorrect, (2)  exactly how dispositionism serves large commercial 
interests (and not the public interest) , and (3) how, in practice, deep 
capture occurs are the topics of research now in progress. 
353 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30. 
354 See supra pp. 307-1 2 (describing Galileo's struggle against the intellectual 
establishment of the Renaissance) .  
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In this Article, we are, like Stigler was, initially concerned with 
just the consequences of (de ) regulatory actions. Unlike Stigler, 
however, we look less at who benefits from particular regulatory 
changes and more at what the regulators say, for it is in framing their 
regulations and in assuming one or another vision of the human 
being that they reveal their disposition ism. Furthermore, we define 
"regulation" far more broadly than Stigler did, to include, as we 
believe his analysis should have, all institutions that could possibly 
influence the fortunes of large commercial interests.355 In this Part, 
we will touch on only a few of those. 
A. Some Shallow Evidence of Deep Capture 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the 
government 's purposes are beneficial. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to 
repel invasion of their liberty by evil minded rulers. The greater dangers to 
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without 
understanding. 
-justice Louis Brandeii'·6 
First, we will consider the view of human beings adopted by the 
sort of administrative regulatory institutions that Stigler and his 
cohorts
' did focus on . Take, for example, the Federal Com­
munications Commission (FCC) and C h ai rman Michael Powell 's357 
355 See supra text accompanying notes 305 1 7  (explaining why Stigler's shallow 
capture theory and evidence have far deeper implications than he appreciated) . 
356 Olmstead v. U nited States, 277 U .S. 438, 479 ( 1 928) . 
357 Michael Powell, son of Colin Powell, was appointed by President Clinton to the 
Commission in 1 997 and was designated Chairman by President Bush in 200 1 .  Since 
joining the FCC, Powell's deregulatory rhetoric has coincided with wide ranging 
deregulatory action. It may be helpful to highlight a few of the key deregulatory 
actions of the FCC within the past several months. On February 20, 2003, the FCC 
voted to eliminate regulations that required the Bell telephone companies to lease 
broadband Internet access to competitors at discounted rates. Jonathan Krim, FCC 
Delivers Mixed Vote on Competition: Phone Giants Prevail on High Speed Internet, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 2 1 ,  2003, at Al .  On May 1 5, the FCC voted to eliminate a 40 year old 
standard that restricted the leasing of airwaves. The new regulation allows airwaves 
license holders to work out leasing deals without prior FCC approval. Yuki Noguchi, 
FCC to Let Companies Sublease Ai1Waves, WASH. POST, May 1 6, 2003, at E5. On June 2, 
the FCC relaxed regulations that limit the cross ownership of newspapers and 
television stations. Frank Ahrens, FCC Eases Media Ownership Rules: Parly Line \fote 
Clears Way for More Consolidation, WASH. POST, June 3,  2003, at Al .  The FCC regulation 
would combine two cross ownership rules-one preventing newspaper and broadcast 
station ownership in the same city and another limiting radio and TV station 
ownership in the same market-into a single rule that would lift most current 
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conception of consumers and the corresponding presumptions about 
markets and regulation: 
I am committed to building policy that is centered around market 
economics. At times, this foundation of my thinking is often 
questioned as being somehow anti consumer. In a television interview, 
the question goes something like this: "Many consumer groups express 
grave concern that your laissez-faire approach will harm consumers. 
They say you are out of touch with consumers and living in an ivory 
tower. What say you?" 
I am always a little puzzled by this question, for the premise of it has 
been so thoroughly discredited in this nation and in countries around 
the world that it should be beyond challenge. Market systems, far from 
being the bane of consumers, have unquestionably produced more 
consumer welfare than any other economic model devised by mankind. 
How is it  that anyone can argue that the pro-market policies of the 
United States have not yielded enviable productivity in our economy, 
jobs for our citizens, a higher standard of living than nearly any other 
country in the world, and a tradition of innovation and invention that 
has brought new products, tools and services to our citizens? 
A well-structured market policy is one that creates the conditions 
that e mpower consumers: 
It lets consumers choose the products and services they want­
which is their right as free citizens. 
It allows market forces to calibrate pncmg to meet supply and 
demand. Consumers get the most cost-efficient prices and enjoy the 
benefits of business efficiencies. 
The result for consumers is better, more cutting edge products, at 
lower prices. 
Contrary to the classic bugaboo that markets are just things that 
favor big business and big money, market policies have a winning 
record of delivering benefits to consumers that dwarfs the consumer 
record of government central economic planning. Thus, if you are 
restnctIons. Frank Ahrens, FCC Plan to Alter Media Rules: Spurs Growing Debate, WASH. 
posr, May 28, 2003, at A l  [hereinafter Ahrens, FCC Plan] . The plan would 
substantially raise the number of television stations a company may own and allow a 
company to reach up to 45% of the national audience, up from 35%. It would also 
relax a ban on newspaper and broadcast cross-ownership in local markets. Mark 
Wigfield & John R. Wilke, FCC Plan Draws Fire: Senators Introduce Bill to Keep Current 
Media Ownership Limits, WALL ST. J., May 1 4, 2003, at B4. The decision has met with 
strong resistance. Senators and House Representatives both sponsored bills that would 
return the cap on television ownership to 35%. Frank Ahrens, FCC Rule Fight Continues 
in Congress: Opponents of Ownership Consolidation Also Plan Legal Strategy, WASH. POST, 
June 4, 2003, at E l .  In fact, on September 16, the Senate voted 55 to 40 to override all 
of the new media ownership rules. Frank Ahrens, Senate Votes to Block FCC Media Rules, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 1 7, 2003, at Al4. The White House has refused to back down. Id. 
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tmly committed t<? serving the public inte rest, bet on a winner and bet 
o n  market policy.
308 
233 
Thus, Powell views consumers as "free citizens," who should 
therefore be allowed to "choose the products and services they want." 
And, according to that conception of consumers, free choice should 
be enabled through "market systems," which are the best mechanism 
ever "devised by mankind" for "delivering benefits to consumers," 
"empower[ing] consumers," and thereby producing "more consumer 
welfare. ,,3:,9 
There are other noteworthy features of Powell's remarks. For 
example, Powell frames his goals in terms of serving the "public 
interest," but this is the same type of assertion that Stigler claimed 
could not be trusted.360 And certainly this "trust" issue has been 
raised.361 But Powell reassures critics by claiming that deregulation 
tends toward the "public interest: " "In capital [ ist] economies," he 
writes, "the central premise is that the interests of producers (i .e. ,  
money-makers) and consumers need not diverge, but, in fact, can be 
synchronous.,,362 That may be true, but i t  is equally true that a 
358 Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, 
Consumer Policy in Competitive Markets, Remarks Before the Federal Communica
tions Bar Association, at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/200 l /spmkpl06.html 
(June 2 1 ,  200 1 ) .  
359 ld. ; see also Stephen Labaton, Policy Defeat Puts l� C. C. Chief i n  Awkward Spot, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at Cl ("Powell . . .  has set an ambitious agenda of relaxing or 
removing many regulations that have limited the nation's largest media 
con�lomerates from becoming bigger or entering new markets .") . 
60 See sujJra text accompanying notes 282, 303 (describing Stigler's critique of the 
supposed neutrality and public spirit of regulatory agencies) .  
3tH At a three hour hearing on June 4, 2003, before Republican Senator John 
McCain's Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, many senators 
expressed criticism over several of Powell's FCC decisions, most prominently the vote 
to allow broadcast networks to buy more television stations. See, e.g. , Frank Ahrens, 
Senators Attack FCC Rules: Most on Oversight Panel Sign on to Revise Changes, WASH. POST, 
June 5, 2003, at E4 ("'It looks for all the world like you could not or would not stand 
up to corporate interests . . . .  "') (quoting Democratic Senator Byron L. Dorgan); id. 
(,"Where in the world do you find the grounds for 45 percent? ' '') (quoting Democratic 
Senator Ernest F. Hollings) . 
362 Powell, supra note 358. Much of Powell's rhetoric is based on the idea that 
regulations inhibit innovations that would directly benefit the public. In defending 
the vote to allow airwaves license holders to lease \vithout prior FCC approval, Powell 
said, '' ' [o]ur decision unlocks value trapped for too many years in a regulatory box. ' "  
David Ho, FCC Votes to Let Cel/ Phone Firms Lease Airwaves, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 1 6, 
2003, at C2 (quoting Powell) . He added that the decision '''will expand spectrum 
access for innovators and entrepreneurs, increasing the number and variety of \vireless 
applications available to consumers. ' "  Id. (quoting Powell) . 
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central p'remise behind regulation is that the interests of producers 
and consumers sometimes do diverge. As if to respond to that 
potential criticism, Powell takes a page from Stigler's scholarly 
agenda, writing: 
I am the first to admit that deregulation for its own sake is not 
responsible policy. What is good policy is to carefully examine rules to 
determine if they are actually achieving their stated purposes, or if, 
instead, they are, in fact, denying consumers value by impeding 
efficient market developments that these consumers would welcome. 
Regulations are not innocuous simply because they are promulgated in 
the name of consumers. No matter how worthy the purpose, rules that 
constrain m arkets can, in fact, deny or delay benefits to the consuming 
bl' 363 p u  Ie. 
Stigler himself could hardly h ave said it better. If you want to be 
sure that regulations (or deregulations) actually serve the public 
interest, then look at their effects. Thus, Powell 's vision of 
consumers, like that of virtually all of the country's most prominent 
regulators, appears to be very close to the one that George Stigler 
complained regulators generally lacked. 
But our hypothesis is that shallow capture is still a problem, in 
part because the advantages favoring large business interests in the 
competition for regulatory influence have not changed, even if the 
Powell sees the recent move to deregulate cross ownership rules as similarly 
bolstering the public interest by expanding consumer choice. According to Powell, in 
situations where a corporation has received a waiver to own both a newspaper and a 
television station in the same city, the resull has been better local news coverage. 
Ahrens, FCC Plan, supra note 357, at AI .  In addition, he has suggested that network 
owned-and-operated television stations typically produce more local news than those 
not owned by networks. Id. I n  his words, it '''has become more difficult to simply 
assert that an ownership restriction is essential to promoting diverse viewpoints where 
so many outlets and owners thrive . . . .  ' "  Associated Press, FCC to Vote on Media 
Ownership Rules, SAt" DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 28, 2003, at C2 (quoting Powell) .  
Powell also justifies the cross ownership changes by claiming they help support 
public interest programming. In his view, if cable continues to eat away at broadcast, 
public-interest programming will be jeopardized because cable channels are under no 
FCC obligation to provide such progl<lmming. Ahrens, FCC Plan, supra note 357. 
Allowing media companies to buy more stations, which typically return profits of 20 to 
30%, would help ensure continued free,  over-the-air public interest broadcasting to 
the roughly 15% of viewers who do not have cable or satellite television. /d. 
Although Powell has described public-interest programming as necessary, he is 
uncomfortable with the FCC deciding what it should be. '''If you're using the 
government \vill to impose "castor oil" or "eat your vegetables" programming, you'd 
better be a little bit concerned that you're going to allow three of fve unelected 
officials to unduly impose what they prefer to see on TV.'"  Id. (quoting Powell) .  
363 Powell, supra note 358. 
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conceptions of consumers, markets, and regulations have. Thus, the 
same evidence that, to many scholars, might constitute proof of the 
absence of shallow capture, strikes us as evidence of deep capture 
-the faith in pro-market, anti-regulation dispositionism.354 
364 While our main emphasis in this Article is on how corporations indirectly 
capture the way we see and understand the world, we do not mean to suggest that 
corporations are not expending a great amount of energy on directly influencing 
regulators as well. In anticipation of the FCC's recent decision on how Bell telephone 
companies lease lines to competitors, " [t] he Bells spent hundreds of millions of dollars 
in a furious lobbying campaign to convince Congress and the FCC that they could not 
be expected to push broadband out into rural areas, or invest in new, advanced 
net\vorks, if they were forced to then lease them to rivals." Krim, supra note 357, at AI . 
Moreover, bet\Veen 1999 and 2002, the top t\Venty-five media companies spent $82 
million on lobbying the FCC and Congress and contributed $26.7 million in 
individual, PAC, and soft money donations. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Tracking the 
Payback: Media Ownership, at http://ww.opensecrets.org/payback/issue.asp?issueid 
=MO I &CongNo=1 08 (last visited Oct. 16 , 2003). 
One of the main forces behind the FCC's recent decision to relax regulations that 
limit the cross ownership of newspapers and television stations was Victor Miller, a 
media analyst at Bear Stearns. Coincidentally, Bear Stearns has banking and 
underwriting relationships or has rated stocks in at least fifteen media companies 
directly affected by the FCC's proceedings. Mark Wigfield, Bear Steams Analyst Helps 
FCC Reshape Ownership Rules, WAL ST. J. .  June 2, 2003, at C l .  Yet. the media ties do 
not appear to have resulted in Miller's advice being discounted. According to Susan 
Eid, Counsel to the FCC Chairman, Miller "'is enormously helpful as you sort through 
the economic issues and financial issues in the industry.' "  [d. (quoting Eid) . In the 
words of Eid, '''His analysis is rock solid.'" [d. (quoting Eid) . 
Miller's example highlights a general trend. "Wall Street's views have become 
increasingly important at the FCC since the 1 996 Telecommunications Act began 
substituting market competition for regulation as the best way to ensure that the 
nation's airwaves are used in the public interest." [d. Today, the FCC appears to rely 
heavily on non governmental private data for a range of critical regulatory factors such 
as "ownership, audience reach and cable subscribers." John Dunbar, Ctr. for Pub. 
Integrity, A Penchant for Secrecy: Why is the FCC So Determined to Keep Key Data from the 
Public?, at http://ww.openairwaves.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=1 8  (May 22, 2003) . 
A more general reliance on corporations, analysts, and investors in policy making has 
led some critics to question the neutrality of the regulatory process. Bet\Veen 
September 2002 and June 2003, the nation's top broadcasters had over seventy face to­
face meetings with FCC officials behind closed doors. Bob Williams, Ctr. for Pub. 
Integrity, Behind Closed Doors: Top Broadcasters Met 71 Times With FCC Of icials, at 
http://www. publicin tegrity.org/ dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=526&Ll= 1 O&L2= 1 0&L3 
=0&L4=0&L5=O (May 30, 2003) . 
The closed door sessions, which are officially called ex parte meetings, are 
allowed under FCC rules. The meetings are not recorded, nor are the 
participants required to keep detailed minutes of the sessions. Non FCC 
people who participate in the meetings are supposed to file a notice of the 
session by the end of the following day. The notice is supposed to include a 
summary of what was discussed. 
[d. During that same period, the FCC met with t\vo major consumer groups only five 
times. !d. Faced with this heavy lobbying, even Powell has begun to question the 
benefits of an increasingly close relationship v.<ith interest groups: '' ' I  do think . . .  that 
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sometimes it gets out of hand . . . .  I often think that we need time to do our work 
rather than hear pitches.' "  Id. (quoting Powell) .  
But then as bad as "pitches" are, they may not b e  as troubling as the "perks" passed 
on to FCC employees in recent years by big business. The Center for Public Integrity 
reports that companies and industry groups paid $2.8 million over the past eight years 
for 2,500 trips by agency officials. Bob Williams & Morgan Jindrich, Ctr. for Pub. 
Integrity, On the Rnad Again-And Again: FCC Racks up $2. 8 Million Travel Tab with 
Industries They Regulate, at http://ww.openairwaves.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=1 5  
(May 22, 2003) .  Ninety-eight of the trips were to London, which i s  not even in the 
FCC's jurisdiction. Id. The biggest sponsor happened to be the National Association 
of Broadcasters. Id. 
There are still other unsettling statistics concerning the "revolving door" between 
industIJ' and regulators. For example, before coming to the FCC, Powell worked at the 
law firm of O'Meiveny & Myers LLP, of which the GTE Corporation was a major client. 
GTE later merged with Bell Atlantic to form Verizon, the largest local phone company 
in the United States, but Powell never recused himself from participating in 
deliberations or votes relating to either company. Nathaniel Heller, Ctr. for Pub. 
Integrity, New FCC Chai17lULn Had Big Telephone Player as a Major Client, at 
http://ww.public-i.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=1 35&L1=1 0&L2=70&L3=1 5  
&L4=O&L5=O&State=&Year=2001 (Feb. 1 3, 200 1 ) .  To be sure, his actions appear to 
have been within the letter of the law. The Code of Federal Regulations requires only 
a one year cooling off period. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(b) ( 1 )  (iv) (2003) . However, one 
wonders how well his actions comport with the spirit of that law. Since the time Powell 
took office through the present, Verizon has had many regulatory issues before the 
FCC, relating from cell phones to the Internet. And in his role as Commissioner, 
Powell has often taken the pro-Verizon position,  bemoaning what he sees as the harsh 
"interconnection and market-opening requirements" imposed on GTE and others. Id. 
Passing through that same door, but in the opposite direction, Dorothy Attwood 
quit her job last year as chief of the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau and two 
months later was working at SBC Communications, guiding the telecom company 
through the FCC policies on local telephone competition that she helped draft. John 
Dunbar, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, The FCC's Rapidly Revolving Door, at http:// 
www.public-i.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=5 1 0&L1 = 1 0&L2= 1 0&L3=0&L4=0&L5 
=0 (Feb. 1 9, 2003) [hereinafter Dunbar, FCC's Rapidly Revolving Door] . Attwood was not 
a minor player. As Powell stated several months before Attwood departed, "She has 
played an i ntegral role in the FCC's implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 
1 996, and in shaping our policies in the transition to a more competitive 
telecommunications environment." Press Release, Federal Communications 
Commission, Powell Announces Changes in Wireline Competition Bureau 1 ,  at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov I edocs_publicl attachmatch/DOC 223658Al Gune 2 1 ,  2002) .  
Yet, according to the letter of the law, she was not senior enough to fall under the 
"cooling off period" ban. 5 C.F.R. § 2637.204 (2003) . Since she began at SBC, 
Attwood has met with FCC officials, including Powell's senior legal advisor, four times. 
Dunbar, FCC's Rapidly Revolving Door, supra. 
Attwood and Powell are not anomalies. I n  fact, over the last decade, several dozen 
FCC workers have crossed the busy threshold from regulated industry to regulator or 
the other way around. Id. Some have taken to straddling the worlds on both sides of 
that threshold. Former FCC Chairman Richard Wiley is now a senior partner at the 
lobbying firm of Wiley, Rein & Fielding LLP. Steven Weiss, Interview: Richard Wiley, 
CAPITAL EYE Gune 2, 2003) , at http://www.capitaleye.org/inside.asp?ID=85. He often 
appears on the so-called eighth floor of the FCC to lobby key decision makers on 
behalf of media clients like Belo Corporation, Clear Channel, and Gannett. Id. 
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Not everyone is turning a blind eye to the matter. On June 1 3, 2003, Senator 
McCain proposed a reauthorization bill that would give the FCC greater authority to 
regulate and limit the "revolving door" influence on the agency. Statement by Senator 
John McCain on the Federal Communications Commission Reauthorization Act of 
2003 Gune 13,  2003) ,  available at http://ww.senate.gov/-commerce/newsroom/ 
printable.cfm?id=20501 2. To decrease the influence of the media industry, the bill 
would bar top staffers from lobbying for one year after leaving the FCC. See id. 
(recounting the various elements of the reauthorization bill ) .  It would also bar 
companies and other interest groups from paying travel expenses of FCC officials for 
flights to nongovernment sponsored conferences, meetings, and events. [d. 
Unfortunately, these remedies may not ultimately solve the regulatory capture 
dilemma because they do not go far enough. They do not acknowledge the problem 
that people perceive the playing field as reasonably level even when it is not. In the 
debate leading up to the recent changes in media ownership rules, former FCC 
Chairman Riley saw a fair tournament of ideas between consumer groups and media 
corporations: " [A] lot of players have gotten onto the field and are participating in the 
process at the commission. So there's a lot of lobbying, pro and con." Weiss, supra. In 
his opinion: 
Money may permit you to get in the door, but I don't think it buys people's 
votes. Members of Congress are elected because they have strong viewpoints 
and they're very well informed people. I don't think they're bought and sold 
quite as effectively or quite as much as people allege in the campaign finance 
area. 
[d. That he once ran the agency, he believes, is largely irrelevant: 
[d. 
Decisions of the commission are made on the merits. I don't want to put 
myself or other former commissioners down, but it's what you're bringing in 
there in terms of the merits that is going to ,vin cases at the FCC. I truly 
believe that. Hopefully people who know the commission process can help 
their clients sort through it, but . . .  I don' t  think anybody rolls over because a 
former chairman or former commissioner comes in . . . .  I've won some, I've 
lost some, and I think that's true of other lawyers around town. 
We do not claim that there is no competition for regulatory influence, or that all 
commercial interests will always agree on every regulatory policy, or that one side of 
the competition wil always ,vin .  There does appear to be a playing field, and, as these 
examples illustrate, the competition over regulatory policy can be robust. See Stephen 
Labaton, F. G. G.  Chief Talks of Frustration and Surprise, N .Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at CI  
(describing the competing interests in regulatory policy) . The existence of a 
competition, however, is not proof of a fair, meritocratic process, as Wiley seems to 
suggest. I t  is still possible to predict which groups will be advantaged or disadvantaged 
by the playing field and the rules of the game. And that is the stuff of shallow capture. 
Furthermore, and this is a major theme of this Article, there are ways of 
conceptualizing human actors, markets, and regulations in a way that is broadly pro­
commercial. As we have argued, the dispositionist perspective that frames the 
discussions and debates about regulatory policy itself tends toward pro market and 
anti-regulatory policies. That is part of what we mean by deep capture. 
Consider the following metaphor: In Major League Baseball, there are thirty 
teams, which compete not just on the field in games, but also off the field in recruiting 
the best players to play for their teams. While on-the diamond competition is played 
on a level field, the off-the-field competition is not; the wealthiest teams have a huge 
advantage in recruiting top players because they can offer much higher salaries. So 
while there is still some competition you still have to throw strikes and score runs-
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Finally, it is worth pointing out how Powell dismisses those who 
doubt that faith.'65 He finds such apprehensions, not just 
"puzzl [ing] ,,,366 but "so thoroughly discredited . . .  that [his view] 
should be beyond challenge. ,,367 A major part of the discrediting 
comes from the fair competition that is presumed to have occurred 
m the global marketplace of political-economic systems, a 
competition that led to the "winning record" of markets and a 
"higher standard of living [in the United States] than nearly any 
other country in the world.,,368 The n o t-very-hidden implication is 
that those who don' t  embrace his views are favoring a turn toward 
"central economic planning," perhaps even communism.369 Powell, 
in other words, dismisses what he calls "the classic bugaboo that 
markets . . .  favor big business and big money",iO by raising the 
familiar specter of the totalitarian bogeyman.s7l 
off-the field situational advantages have tremendous impacts on on the field outcomes. 
In 1 999, for example, all eight teams that made the playoffs were among the top ten 
highest salaried teams in the league. Although the tenth highest salaried team made 
the playoffs and the fourth-highest did not, none of the twenty lowest salaried teams 
made it. In the 1 999 World Series, the team with the league'S highest payroll, the New 
York Yankees, defeated the team with the league's third-highest payroll, the Atlanta 
Braves. vVhile there is a playing field, the playing field is not level, and the situation of 
the playing field affects outcomes. See Lani Canfield Fisher, October is For the Rich, 1 9  J. 
COSMIC BASEBALL AsS'N (2000) (describing the payroll figures for major league teams 
and their relationship to post season appearances) , at http://cosmicbaseball.com/ 
jcbai9_octo.html. 
365 Powell's convictions as to the righteousness of deregulation are unflappable. 
After being challenged by those calling for more public input into the FCC's changes 
to media ownership rules, Powell retorted: '''You don't govern just by polls and 
surveys . . .  We have to exercise difficult judgments and abide by the law. If all of our 
rulemaking was just a case of put them out and take a referendum, things would be a 
lot easier. ' "  Ahrens, FCC Plan, supra note 357 at Ai (quoting Powell) .  '''I have had to 
make peace with myself, to know myself, to know with every fiber of my being and 
intellect and faith with the law that this is the right answer, at least in the short 
term . . . .  Though it's not the popular answer.'" Frank Ahrens, FCC Set to Vote on Easing 
Media Ownership Rules, WASH. POST, June 2, 2003, at A6 (quoting Powell ) .  
366 Powell, supra note 358. 
367 Id. 
36
8 Id. 
369 Id. 
370 Id. 
371 Powell is quite adamant in this respect: 
I don't know of another economic system in the history of the world that's 
produced as much consumer welfare for its citizenry as American capitalism 
has. You name to me the state central plan system that better served the 
maximum consumer welfare of its citizens as the free market did in American 
stock capitalism? I think that's the penultimate conclusion of the end of the 
20th Century that not only did democracy prevail, as a social value and 
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A look at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) , whose "efforts 
are directed toward stopping actions that threaten consumers' 
opportunities to exercise informed choice,,,372 is similarly revealing. 
The current FTC Chairman, Timothy Muris, seems to share Powell 's 
preference for free markets, and for all the same reasons. In 1980, 
for instance, Muris wrote (with a co-author) that 
[t] he relatively unregulated marketplace has significant advantages in 
allocating resources and promoting consumer welfare. The market 
tends to minimize waste by permitting continuous individual balancing 
of economic costs and benefits by consumers and producers. In 
addition, greater productive efficiency and more innovation result from 
the reliance on market incentives. Competitive m arkets also reduce the 
need for central collection of information; their price signals allow 
producers and consumers to respond quickly to change. Finally, 
competitive markets tend to decentralize power and make decisions 
that are fair in the sense of being impersonal. For these reasons, 
reliance on the market should be the norm.
373 
More recently, he has supplemented that pro-market view by 
emphasizing the need for certain types of regulatory interventions in 
political value, but the capital economy prevailed as the leading environment 
for the welfare of citizens and for the ferment of innovation and revolution. 
Transcript of Conversation Between FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell and Sam 
Donaldson at the NAB 2001 Convention 4 (Apr. 24, 200 1 ) ,  available at http:// 
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/200 1 /spmkp l 02.pdf. 
372 Fed. Trade Comm'n, Vision, Mission & Goals, at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/ 
mission.htm (last updated June 1 7, 1999) . 
m Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, Constraining the Federal Trade 
Commission: The Case of Occupational Regulation, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 77, 8 1  ( 1 980) 
(citation omitted) .  The FTC made a similarly revealing statement in 1 978: 
The public policy of this country favors the existence of free markets to the 
maximum extent possible. While the complexity of the modern economy 
often necessitates a departure from free market organization, as a general 
proposition a market perfecting solution to a perceived problem is 
preferable. There should be a heavy burden of proof on those who would 
opt for a different form of economic organization . . . .  
Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, 43 Fed. Reg. 24,001 (June 2, 1 978) . 
Former FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary stated that, "consumer freedom implies 
the right to buy in open markets . . . .  " Thomas B. Leary, Freedom as the Core Value of 
Antitrust in the New Millennium, 68 fu"lTITRUST LJ. 545, 553 (2000) ;  see also Thomas B.  
Leary, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, The Federal Trade 
Commission and the Defense of Free Markets, Remarks Before the David T. 
Chase Free Enterprise Institute, Eastern Connecticut State University (Oct 7, 
2002) [hereinafter Leary, Defense of Free Markets] (describing how the FTC is 
devoted primarily to protecting the freedom of sellers to sell and buyers to buy 
what they choose and the role of efficiency orien ted scholars in promoting that 
now-conventional view of the FTC) , available at http://ww .ftc.gov/speeches/ 
leary/willimantic. pdf . 
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markets. In 1991 ,  for instance, he wrote that " [o] ne of the crucial 
roles for government, as we are seeing in Eastern Europe, is to 
define and allocate property rights. ,,374 And although he acknowl­
edges the need for certain types of regulation when a market fails, he 
cautions that 
It IS Important t.o talk about the concept of market failure with care 
because the issue is failure compared to what. In the real world, 
institutions are imperfect, both government institutions and market 
institutions. It makes no sense to compare an imperfect reality to a 
hypothetical perfection. A vast literature exists on govern!lent failure, 
as large as or larger than the literature on market failure.
37:> 
With that caution, Muris appears to be emphasizing the work of, 
among others, George Stigler, for Muris goes out of his way to stress 
that 
[g] overnment agencies are not run by p h ilosopher kings who descend 
from Olympus to protect us. Instead, government agencies are, 
themselves, governed by rules that constrain what they can do, and they 
are run by individuals who are striving to advance or succeed, j ust as we 
all are. These constraints and incentives will influence how an agency 
acts in the public interest.
376 
Muris also describes how FTC regulation of advertising has 
moved from protecting industry members from competition toward 
serving consumers by encouraging competition.377 
Again ,  the chairperson of a maj or federal regulatory institution 
seems to embrace the dispositionist case for markets-as does the 
Commission itself.378 Again, that regulator seems quite sensitive to 
374 
Timothy J. Muris, Economics and Consumer Protection, 60 A.vrITRUST LJ. 1 03, 1 04 
( 1991 ) .  
:'7" Id. 
37(; Id. at 1 05-06. 
377 See id. at 1 17 (contrasting the competition motivated FTC enforcement in the 
1950s and 1960s with the consumer oriented policy that developed in the 19705) . . 
37. See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 98-] 56, pt. 1 ,  at 37 ( ] 983) ("Normally we expect the 
marketplace to be self-correcting, and we rely on consumer choice-the ability of 
individual consumers to make their own private purchasing decisions without 
regulatory intervention-to govern the market.") ;  Leary, Defense of Free Markets, 
supra note 373, at 5 (describing the "New Learning- an efficiency-orientated view of 
antitnlst [as] , today, mainstream competition law") . According to Leary: 
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the insights of shallow capture theory. And, again, we would 
conclude that, insofar as Chairman Muris fails to consider the role of 
exterior and interior situation, his views and, indeed, his position at 
the FTC, evince deep capture.379 
We could continue in this vein at some length, but for everyone's 
sake, we will stop here.38o In the following Section, we aim to dig a 
little deeper and provide some illustrative examples of how other 
"regulators," from courts to hard-hitting news networks, reflect and 
contribute to deep capture. 
Id. 
Although we may differ on the facts of individual cases, all of my [ITC] 
colleagues agree that the objective is to maximize efficient outcomes. We all 
start in the same place and we are all trying to do the same thing. This broad 
consensus is a great demonstration of the power of ideas and, in my view, has 
made an immense contribution to consumer welfare. 
379 Although we were unable to find much of his writing, i t  is widely understood 
that Hal Stratton, Chair of the Consumer Product Safety Commission has similar, 
strong pro-market, anti regulation presumptions. See, e.g., New Mexico Attorney General 
Stratton Repudiates NAAG's Horizontal Guidelines, fu'\lTITRUST & TRADE REG. REp., Issue 
No. 1 3 1 4, at 869 70 ( May 7, 1 987) (describing Stratton's objection that the merger 
guidelines proposed by the National A�sociation of Attorneys General ("NAAG") 
"needlessly impose government regulation in the market place" in a way that 
"unnecessarily interfere rs] with market forces" and "that will prejudice both legitimate 
business reorganization and consumer welfare") ; Hal Stratton, Attorneys General in State 
o/ Collusion, WALL ST. j. ,  june 1 0, 1 988, at 22, col. 4 (attributing NAAG's movement in 
this direction to " [s] ome ambitious, high-profile attorneys general [ that] . . .  are 
using the cover of ' consumer protection' to impose their own anti business, pro
government-regulation views on the entire nation and are bypassing the legislative 
process to put in place 'enforcement guidelines' that Congress itself refuses to pass") . 
One critic complains that Stratton 
inhabits a world in which government has no right to tell business what to do, 
a world where consumer choices are the best marketplace regulators, a world 
in which product liability lawsuits stifle innovation. This would be the same 
world in which consumer products never are unsafe, only used incorrectly by 
careless people. In other words, a fantasy world. 
Editorial, From Bad to Worse, THE BLADE (Toledo) , Nov. 28, 200 1 ,  available at 
http://wW\v.toledoblade.com/apps/ pbcs.dll/article?Date=200 1 1 1 28&CategoI]'=OPINI 
ON02&ArtNo=1 1 I 280045&Ref=AR. 
380 For a different but complimentary analysis of the pro market and anti
regulation schemas of policymaking, see Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 
84. 
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B. Some Less Shallow Evidence of Deep Capture 
The myth that holds that the great corporation is the puppet of the market, the 
powerless seroant of the consumer, is, in fact, one of the devices by which its power 
is perpetuated. 
-John Kenneth Gafhraith
381 
Consider briefly courts. Consider, for instance, the 1979 
dispositionist language of then-Chief Judge Irving Kaufman of the 
Second Circuit: 
[N]o  one can detennine with any reasonable assurance whether one 
product is "superior" to another. Preference is a matter of individual 
taste. The only question that can be answered is whether there is 
sufficient demand for a particular product to make its production 
worthwhile, and the response, so long as the free choice of consumers 
is preserved, can only be i nferred from the reaction of the market.
382 
Kaufman, in now-common fashion, treats the market as little 
more than a highly responsive conduit of stable, exogenous 
consumer preferences. The preferences and free choices of the 
consumers come first, and the success or failure of the product 
comes second, depending on its ability to satisfy those preferences.383 
More recently, Judge Frank Easterbrook has expressed a similar 
deference to markets, adding that, with respect to reducing at least 
some kinds of personal injury risks, courts should defer to the 
incentives of the marketplace rather than attempt to fashion judge­
made incentives. As he puts it, market incentives, " [i ] mperfect as 
they are, . . .  work better than the alternatives the legal system can 
offer. ,,384 In this vein, too, we could go on. Mter all, like Judge 
Easterbrook, many of the most prominent and influential judges 
today made their careers as academics devoted to promoting the 
dispositionist views of law and economics and libertarianism, 
including: Judge Ralph Winter, Judge Stephen Williams, Justice 
3Rl JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE ACE OF UNCERTANW 258-59 ( 1 977) . 
382 Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979 ) .  
383 Thus, "in its advertising, a producer i s  ordinarily permitted, much like an 
advocate at law, to bathe his cause in the best light possible." ld. 
384 Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 2 1 0, 2 1 7  (7th Cir. 1 990) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring) . 
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Stephen Breyer, Justice Antonin Scalia, and, of course, Judge Richard 
Posner. Moreover, some who did not begin as academics 
nonetheless rose to fame and influence in significant part because 
hard-core dispositionism was central to their judicial identity, such as 
Judge Alex Kozinski, Judge Michael Luttig, and Justice Clarence 
Thomas. Indeed, at this moment in history, it is difficult to imagine 
that any federal judge will be appointed or promoted who does not 
substantially embrace the hard-core dispositionism promoted by 
President Bush, his advisors, and the Federalist Society, which now 
has immense influence over the j udicial selection process.385 
Dispositionism, as we have already indicated386 and will return to 
below, also dominates legal academia. For instance, when, in the 
mid-1980s, the American Law Institute (ALl) amassed a large, 
somewhat representative,387 cast of influential tort scholars to assess 
the tort system and to recommend possible reforms, those scholars 
began their substantial work by embracing dispositionism. In their 
words: 
Utilitarian theorists . . .  accept as a factual premise that people are 
generally the best judges of what actions will maximize their own utility. 
This premise implies that society should strive to let states of affairs be 
determined by the choices of the individuals affected rather than by 
public decision makers. 
We reject hard paternalism here both because we find it 
unpersuasive and because we think that most Americans do not accept 
385 See Martin Garbus, A Hostile Takeover: How the �Federalist Society is Capturing the 
Federal Courts, AM. PROSPECf, Mar. 2003, at A16 (discussing the increasing influence of 
the Federalist Society on both legal and non legal affairs) . By 2001 the Federalist 
Society had become so powerful that President George W. Bush felt comfortable 
eliminating "the longstanding role in the evaluation of prospective judges by the 
resolutely centrist American Bar Association (ABA) ,  whose ratings had long kept 
extremists and incompetents off the bench. Today the Federalists have more 
influence in judicial selection than the ABA ever had." Id. The group's efforts have 
also been directed beyond judicial appointments and c1erkships through "publications, 
strategy sessions and panel discussions." Id. at A1 7. With millions of dollars of backing 
from pro-market organizations such as the John M. Olin Foundation, the Federalists 
have attacked indhiduals and agencies who attempt to regulate business, and have 
celebrated those espousing dispositionism. Id. at A16. 
386 . See supra Part LB. 
387 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social 
Insurance, 1 0  TOURO L. REv. 1 07, 1 14-15 ( 1 993) (describing the committee 
membership as "a balanced representation of well known plaintiffs' lawyers and well­
known defendants' lawyers") . 
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it. Hence, we suppose that, presumptively at least, consumers should 
choose the accident leve1.388 
The idea that consumers "choose the accident level," might strike 
some readers as an unfamiliar notion. Few of us are conscious of 
having much influence over, much less selecting, the accident level. 
But what the ALI Reporters are indicating, of course, is that through 
decentralized individual choice, a collective determination or 
variety of determinations is made by consumers. The belief that 
consumers best know their own interests and, through choice-based 
behavior, are best able to act on that knowledge, is sometimes known 
as consumer sovereignty-the normative principle that the ALI 
Reporters explicitly endorsed.389 
The ALI Reporters' terms are revealing (not to mention, 
constraining) .39o "Hard paternalism" conjures up notions of 
considerable governmental interference-something akin to central 
planning.391 In underscoring the rej e c ti o n  of such a n  approach by 
"Americans," the Reporters seem again to be implicitly using the 
shadow of the then-freshly fallen Soviet Union as an important 
j ustification for embracing pro-market dispositionism and rejecting 
any alternative. 
Whether the ALI Reporters were in fact making such an analogy, 
we (and perhaps they) cannot know. But we do know that legal 
scholars have been explicit in making just that comparison. For 
example, in a recent article, Robert Lande writes: 
An optimal level of consumer choice, which has elsewhere been termed 
"consumer sovereignty" is the state of affairs where the consumer has 
the power to define his or her own wants and the ability to satisfY these 
wants at competItIve prices. The concept of consumer choice even 
embodies some implicit notions about the rights of the individual in 
the broader society; it  is implicitly part of the Western world's response 
to Marxism and the other totalitarianisms of the Twentieth Century.392 
388 ALI, 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILIlY FOR PERSONAL Il'!JURY: REpORTERS' STUDY 
205 07 ( 199 1 )  (citation omitted) .  
389 See id. at 204 08 Uustitying their commitment to consumer sovereignty) . 
390 See id. at 203 32 (illustrating the ALI Reporters' use of the common, though 
false, dichotomy between a "pure" market solution and "hard paternalism") .  
391 See id. at  207 (noting that according to hard paternalism, "people do not have 
preferences so much as they have 'interests' "  and that "the state should choose the 
legal rule that is in the citizens' real (rather than their subjectively perceived) best 
interest" ) .  
392 Robert H.  Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. 
REv. 503, 503 (200 1 )  (citations omitted) . 
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Again, the belief in dispositionism appears to be motivated, at 
least in part, by a fear that any other belief would place us on a 
slippery slope toward totalitarianism. 
But there is more to it than that. If one looks beyond the legal 
reporters and law reviews, one wil encounter many other, far less 
formal, "regulatory" institutions that seek to promote dispositionism. 
In these contexts, the goal seems to be to present to consumers a 
vision of ourselves that we want to hold-a self-affirming image that 
we are not being moved by the situation. For example, Fidelity 
Investments tells us: 
You are not the kind of investor who blindly reacts to each and 
every new market condition. You're informed. You're involved. 
You're focused. 
Being in control of your financial future has never been more 
important. 
THERE ARE BULLS AND BEARS. BUT YOU ARE A THINKING 
ANlMAL.
393 
In other words, you, unlike all the other animals on the planet, 
are uninfluenced by situation. You think, you prefer, you choose, 
and you thereby enjoy dispositional control of your life. 
Advertisers do not mind casting the shadow of those un­
American totalitarian regimes to drive the self-affirming dispositionist 
point home. For instance, one cable news network recently placed 
this ad: 
393 Fidelity Investments, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, July 1 4, 2002, § 1 ,  at 15.  In 
light of recently burst bubbles and other corporate debacles, it i s  unsurprising that 
other strategies include actually emphasizing cognitive quirks. A recent TlAA CREF 
advertisement reads: 
Economist Robert Shiller wonders why we have such faith in the utter 
rationality of markets when we can be kinda, you know, irrational. Bad 
judgment, lousy information, half-baked strategies-there are times when 
money brings out the worst in people. That's why Professor Shiller's 
retirement dollars are invested with a company whose level headed thinking 
stands out in a world where impulse and intuition are bucking intelligence 
and insight. 
Teacher's Ins. & Annuity Ass'n-Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, Advertisement, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 84-85. Thus, the ad encourages those with doubts in 
their own rationality to trust the rationality of a disposition ali zed institution and the 
benevolence of privatized paternalism. The company is our agent (or friend) 
looking out for our interests and avoiding the pulls of our fawed disposition (here 
portrayed as "irrationality") .  The ultimate message is that the rational dispositional 
choice of investors can correct for the flawed dispositional choice of investments: you 
+ TlAA CREF = rational dispositional actor. 
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What makes America . . .  America? It's the freedom to have an 
opinion . . .  the freedom to speak your mind . . . .  [W]e know you can 
think for yourself. When it comes to covering the news, we don't  have 
an agenda . . .  and don' t  take orders from anyone. Just like every 
American. Just like you. America's News Channel MSNBC.394 
The point seems to be not just that Americans are situationally 
independent (able to think what they want to think and speak what 
they want to speak) , but also that MSNBC is uninfluenced by outside 
forces. 
MSNBC's competitor, FOX News Channel, takes the 
dispositionist view a step further and credits its own success to the 
free-choice-making dispositions of its viewers: 
Thanks to the American people. You've made FOX News Channel 
the most watched, most trusted name in news. As active participants in 
the American experience, you ensure a free and fair press for all. 
39We Report. You decide. " 
And: 
For the 3 out of 4 Americans who believe the news is biased, we present 
something quite rare: a news network dedicated to providing fair and 
balanced coverage. I t's cable news for the independent thinker, 24 
396 hours a day. 
This practice of portraying the consumer as nobody's fool is 
extremely widespread. According to some analysts, two of the most 
common themes of cigarette advertising historically were "choice" 
and "autonomy.,,397 The Marlboro Man, as we will highlight below, 
was nothing if not free and autonomous. And this imagery was not 
exclusive to men . The demise of the taboo against women smoking, 
394 MSNBC, Advertisement, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 1 2 , 2002, at Al l .  
395 FOX News Channel, Advertisement, N Y  TIMES, Jan. 2 1 ,  2003, at C3. 
396 FOX News Channel, Advertisement, NY TiMES, Sept. 1 5, 1 997, at D 1 6. But c1 
Bill Carter & Jim Rutenberg, Fox News Head Sent a Policy Note to Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
1 9, 2002, at A27 (describing claims of connections between FOX News and the 
Republican Party); Jim Rutenberg, Cable's War Coverage Suggests a New "Fox Effect " on 
Televisionjoumalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1 6, 2003, at B9 (asserting that FOX News "casts 
aside traditional notions of objectivity [and] holds contempt for dissent") ; Matt Wells, 
TV Watchdog Checks Claims of Bias on Murdoch Channel, GUARDIAN (London) , May 8, 
2003, at 5 (explaining investigation in the United Kingdom into the alleged bias of 
FOX News). 
397 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WOMEN AND TOBACCO 4 5 ( 1 992) (noting that the 
early twentieth century witnessed the beginning of public smoking by women as they 
sought to assert their newfound emancipation; this habit increased greatly during 
World War II as women contributed to the war effort and smoking became associated 
with working, independence, emancipation, and patriotism) .  
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and the concomitant doubling of potential cigarette consumers, was 
reinforced by a clever public relations campaign devised by Edward L. 
Bernays.398 To cap off that campaign, Bernays enlisted the coopera­
tion of feminist Ruth Hale to organize a contingent of ten cigarette­
puffing women to walk down New York's Fifth Avenue in the 1929 
Easter Parade. The feminists' involvement was billed and reported as 
an act of protest and a call for equality.399 And the cigarettes were, 
themselves, described as "torches of freedom.,,40o So it was that 
American Tobacco managed, through public relations, to promote 
smoking in the name of liberation and autonomy. A look at Virginia 
Slims' more recent advertising campaign slogans from 1968 until 
today reveals that the beat goes on : ''You've Come A Long Way, 
Baby," "It's a Woman Thing," "Find Your Voice," and "See Yourself as 
Ki ,,401 a ng. 
The similarity of "seeing yourself as a king" and "consumer 
sovereignty" is hard to miss and may not be an accident. The 
message not only encourages consumers to purchase cigarettes, it 
also suggests some of the larger possible stakes that commercial inter­
ests have in dispositionism. Mter all, if the consumer is king, then it 
is hard to j ustify making manufacturers pay for simply following 
orders. And this ability to place responsibility squarely on 
consumers-to say in a tort case, for instance, that they "assumed the 
risk" of their actions-has been fundamental to the tobacco 
industry's success in selling a product believed to cause more than 
440,000 prem ature deaths per year in the United States alone.402 
398 See LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN: EDWARD L. BERNAYS AND THE BIRTH OF 
PUBLIC RELATIONS ch. 2 ( 1998) (discussing Bemay's efforts in the 1 920s and 1 930s to 
encourage women to smoke) ; see also CASSANDRA TATE, CiGARETTE WARS: THE 
TRIUMPH OF "THE LITTLE WHITE SLAVER" 1 05 1 7  ( 1 999) (describing how such efforts 
reinforced, but did not initiate, cigarette smoking by women, and describing many of 
the situational social, political, and economic forces that were more influen tial ) .  
399 See Stuart Ewen, Overrated and Underrated: Public Relations Campaign, AM. 
HERITAGE, May/June 2000, a t  77, 77 78 (describing and quoting Bernays's conception 
of the campaign) ;  Steve Craig, 'Torches of Freedom': Themes of Women's Liberation 
in American Cigarette Advertising 8 (Feb. 25, 1 999) (noting that the campaign sought 
to distinguish cigarettes as "explicit symbols of a woman's defiance of traditional social 
norms") ,  available at http://ww.rtvf.unt.edu/people/craig/pdfs/torches.PDF. 
400 Ewen, supra note 399. 
401 See Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, Warning: Smoking is a Women 's Issue, 
at http://tobaccofreekids.org/reports/women/ (last modified May 3 1 ,  2002) 
(describing the tobacco industry's historical targeting of women and girls) . 
402 See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Aconomic Case 
for Ex Post Incentive Based Regulation, 107 YALE LJ. 1 163, 1 1 7 1  (1 998) (describing the 
long-time trend of holding smokers responsible for their resulting health problems) ; 
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Thus, an important reason that sellers might embrace and encourage 
dispositionism is their hope of shifting responsibility and avoiding 
costly regulation or liability.403 
A recent Pfizer Forum advertisement echoed that message: 
"Medical professionals must help patients understand that in return 
for greater power, control , and choice over the services and 
treatments they receive, they must bear greater responsibility for 
their own care. ,,404 The pharmaceutical company's message, which 
comes at a time when it seems to be facing growing threats of 
liability,405 taps into a well-established human tendency: where we see 
the ingredients of autonomous, volitional, preference-satisfying 
disposition, we place responsibility.406 
see also Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Annual SmokingAttributable i.-10nality, 
Years oj Potential Life Lost, and Economic Costs: United States 1995 1 999, 5 1  MORBIDIlY & 
MORTALIlY WKLY REp., Apr. 1 2, 2002, at 300 (reporting the 440,000 fgure and noting 
that smoking continues to be the leading cause of preventable death in the United 
States) . 
403 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, The Failure oj Economic Theory and Legal 
Regulation, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, At'lD POLICY 229, 253-54 (Paul Slovic ed., 
2001 )  (describing how the cigarette industry adopted just that strategy and its 
success) .  
404 Liz Kendall, Pfizer Forum, Advertisement, Improving Healthcare by Empowering 
Patients, ECONOMIST, July 1 3, 2002, at 1 0  (explaining that patients can and should take 
on more responsibility regarding their own healthcare) .  
405 See Editorial, No Access to Law, 9 MULTINAT'L MONITOR (June 1 988) (describing 
lawsuits and settlements over a heart valve produced by Pfizer) , at http://multinational 
monitor.org/hyper/issues/ 1 988/06/mm0688 03.html; Elisa Odabashian, Consumer 
Union, Concealed Danger: Who Is Really Behind the Bid to Kill the California Corporate 
Criminal Liability Act, at http://ww.consumersunion.org/products/pfizerwc900.htm 
(Apr. 24, 1 996) (suggesting that Pfizer has lobbied against a California liability statute 
in order to avoid criminal sanctions and further fines). 
406 We feel it is important to reemphasize that we intend only to scratch the 
surface of the evidence for, and mechanisms of, deep capture in this Article. Future 
work, much of it well in progress, will flesh out the many ways that disposition ism 
benefits powerful interests, particularly large commercial interests, and the mostly 
situational mechanisms both abstract and practical--of deep capture. 
On a similar note, we recognize that our small sample of evidence has the 
potential for bias, as we have searched for evidence to support our hypothesis and 
have postponed any attempt to consider contrary evidence or to talk much about 
overall trends. Still, at this point, we do not believe that the trends that we are 
suggesting are all that controversial. For an overview of some of the relevant 
trends, see Chen & Hanson, 1Ilusion of Law I, supra note 84. With those who 
would claim that our examples are on the extreme side of the dispositionism 
spectrum, we migh t agree but would argue that they represent the vast bulk of the 
most influential policymakers and policy theorists today. In any event, we believe 
that those who do not occupy that extreme are nonetheless fairly described as 
dispositionists. For evidence supporting that claim, see Hanson & Yosifon, supra 
note 30; inJra Part VII 
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And so we see countless instances of groups latching on to 
consumer sovereignty in order to meet the threats of heightened 
regulation and liability. Take, for example, the Center for Consumer 
Freedom, "a nonprofit coalition supported by restaurants, food 
companies, and consumers working together to promote personal 
responsibility and protect consumer choices.
,,407 The group is one of 
several created by Berman and Company, a public relations firm 
headed by Richard Berman, whose numerous projects have been 
heavily funded by the tobacco, alcohol, and restaurant industries.408 
The Center for Consumer Freedom has, among other things, 
published and broadcast numerous advertisements purporting " to 
stand up for common sense and personal choice,,409_by which it 
seems to mean, stereotypes and disposition ism. In one advertisement, 
the group warns: 
YOU ARE TOO STUPID . " to make your own food choices. At least 
according to the food police and government bureaucrats who have 
proposed "fat taxes" on foods they don't want you to eat. Now the trial 
lawyers are threatening class action lawsuits against restaurants for 
serving America's favorite foods and drinks. We think they're going too 
far.  It '5 your food. It '5 your drink. It '5 your freedom. 410 
To those suggesting that the food industry is partially responsible 
for the obesity epidemic,41 1  the Center for Consumer Freedom main­
tains its hard-line dispositionism: "We need individual solutions for 
individual problems. And the best individual solution is personal 
responsibility.,,412 And just behind that dispositionism lurks the total­
itarian bogeyman. Richard Berman, for instance, describes those with 
whom he disagrees as 
407 See Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, What is the Center for Consumer Freedom?, at 
http://www.consumerfreedom.com/mainJaq.cfm (la�t visited Oct. 1 5, 2003) .  
408 See Ctr. for Media & Democracy, ActivistCash. com/Center for Consumer Freedom, 
IMPROPAGAl'lDA REv. (last visited Oct. 15,  2003) (claiming that Berman receives advice 
and funding from industry representatives) ,  at http://www.prwatch.org/improp/ 
ddam.html. 
409 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, supra note 407. 
410 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, Advertisement, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., May 27, 
2002, at 2 1 .  
< I I  See, e.g. , KELLY BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATTLE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT: THE 
INSIDE STORY OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY, A,\IERICA'S OBESITY CRISIS Al"lD WHAT WE CAN 
Do ABOUT IT (2003) . 
412 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, Obesity: Individual Problem Demands Individual 
Responsibility, at http://ww.consumerfreedom.com/headline_detail.cfm?HEADLINE 
_ID=1962 (June l l ,  2003) .  
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aggressors [who] are a blend of self anointed "food police" actiVIsts; 
overzealous public health "experts" who'd like to raise our children for 
us; advocates of "Twinkie taxes"; lawmakers who use the cudgel of 
government to appear "enlightened" enough to be re elected; and, yes, 
those triill lawyers who smell a payday where most of us just smell 
dinner.4L1 
And to underscore the point, the Center for Consumer Freedom 
labels a recent book criticizing the food industry's role in contributing 
to the obesity epidemic as a '''Big Brother' Manifesto.,,414 
C. Some Cross-Cultural Evidence of Deep Capture 
My research has led me to the conviction that two utterly diferent approaches to 
the world have maintained themselves for thousands of years. These approaches 
include profoundly different social relations, views about the nature of the world, 
and characteristic thought processes. Each of these orientations the Western and 
the Eastern-is a self-reinforcing, homeostatic system. The social practices promote 
the worldviews; the worldviews dictate the appropriate thought processes; and the 
thought processes both justify the worldviews and support the social practices. 
-Richard E. Nisbett5 
The previous Sections provided a sample of evidence suggesting 
that various regulatory institutions are, indeed, highly dispositionist. 
This evidence should not be surpnsmg, given that social 
psychologists have demonstrated that we humans tend to see the 
world dispositionally. So, although the evidence might be consistent 
with our deep capture hypothesis and might well reveal a major 
cause for concern, i t  may only evince a shared cognitive illusion-a 
worldview that emerges solely from forces outside of anyone's 
control. 
An important implication of deep capture is that our 
dispositionism is, at least in this market-oriented culture, more 
4I3 Richard Berman, All out Assault by Food Cops: When Will it End?, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 15, 2002, at A13; see also Richard Berman, Beef Against Fast Food Could Lead to 
Economic Indigestion, BOSTON HERALD, June 2 1 ,  2003, at 1 6  ("Laugh now if you must, 
but this is serious business. How long before parents are criminally accountable for 
allowing their kids to be obese? How long before restaurants post width scales at the 
fast-food counter similar to the height scales on amusement park rides?") .  
4 1 4  Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, Would You Take Dietary Advice from this Man ?: Kelly 
Brownell's "Big Brother" Manifesto, at http://www.consumerfreedom.com/article 
_detail.cfm?ARTlCLE_ID=1 25 (Aug. 26, 2003) .  For a look at the supposed 
"manifesto," see BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 41 1 .  
4 1 5  RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: How AsIANS AND 
WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY . . .  AND WHY, at xx (2003) . 
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profound than it would otherwise be. Co rporations exercise their 
e normous power over situati o n  to encourage and reinforce 
dispositionism because it is valuable to them. This presumes that the 
basic contours of our outlook are malleable ,  that even dispositionism 
is not stable but is subject to situational influence. 
A question thus emerges as to whether dispositionism reflects 
anything more than our hardwiring as humans-a shared interior 
situation. The answer seems to be that it does. As we h ave alre ady 
indicate d ,  dispositionism varies somewhat across contexts. Thus, 
exterior situation matters too. Social psychologists have begun 
looking more specifically at the significance of culture. In a revealing 
study by Takahiko Masuda and Richard Nisbett, for example, students 
at Kyoto University and the U niversity of Michigan were shown 
animated underwater scenes containing images of various undersea 
objects, such as rocks, small fish, plants, and a "focal fish.,,41 6 The focal 
fish was larger, brighter and faster moving than the others-the sort 
of characteristics that would, according to conventional 
understandings, make them more salient to the observer.417 After 
viewing the scenes, students were asked to describe what they saw. 
Predictably, American students spoke immediately of the focal fish 
(e.g.,  "a trout, moving off to the left") and only later added references 
to its surroundings.418 The Japanese students, on the other hand, 
tended to begin by describing the context (e.g. ,  "It looked like a 
pond,,) .419 During the course of their descriptions, students from both 
universities made roughly equal references to the focal fish, but the 
Japanese participants made over sixty percent more references to 
contextual elements and twice as many references to relationships 
with inanimate aspects of the environment (e.g.,  " the big fish swam 
k") 420 past a roc . 
According to Nisbett, such evidence confirms the hypothesis that 
members of some cultures are more inclined to take in the world as if 
through a wide-angle lens, whereas members of other cultures tend to 
see the world as if through a zoom.421 Nisbett argues that this 
4\0 NISBETr, supra note 415,  at 89 92; Takahiko Masuda & Richard E. Nisbett, 
Attending Holistically Versus Analytically: Comparing the Context Sensitivity of japanese and 
Americans, 81 J. PERSONALllY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 922, 924 25 (2001 ) .  
417 Masuda & Nisbett, supra note 416, at 924. 
418 NISBETI', supra note 415,  at 90. 
419 [d. 
420 [d. 
4"1 - [d. at 89. Recognizing the differences between selfconceptions in the East 
and in the West has long been a theme in both anthropology and philosophy. See 
252 UNIVERSITY OF P!!''NSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 152: 1 29 
distinction across cultures has ancient roots and may even help 
explain why the Chinese made connections that Aristotle and Galileo, 
with their telescopic vision, missed: 
The Greeks' focus on the salient object and its attributes led to their 
failure to understand the fundamental nature of causality. Aristotle 
explained that a stone falling through the air is due to the stone having 
the property of 'gravity.' But of course a piece of wood tossed into water 
floats i nstead of sinking. This phenomenon Aristotle explained as being 
due to the wood having the property of 'levity' ! I n  both cases the focus 
is exclusively on the object, with no attention paid to the possibility that 
some force outside the object might be relevant. But the Chinese saw 
the world as consisting of continuously interacting substances, so their 
attempts to understand it caused them to be oriented toward the 
complexities of the entire 'field,' that is, the context or environment as a 
whole. The notion that events always occur in a field of forces would 
have been completely intuitive to the Chinese. The Chinese therefore 
had a kind of recognition of the principle of 'acti()n at a distance'  two 
thousand years before Galileo articulated it. They had knowledge of 
magnetism and acoustic resonance, for example, and believed it was the 
movement of the moon that caused the tides, a fact that eluded even 
Galileo.422 
Thus, the tendency goes beyond perception of non-human objects 
and is revealed as well in how "Easterners" and "Westerners" 
conceptualize and construe social contexts.423 
KUNDA, supra note 20, at 5 1 5, ( noting that anthropologists have long explored 
cultural differences in self perception and social understanding) (citing CULTURE 
THEORY: ESSAYS ON MIND, MIND SELF, AND EMOTION (Richard A. Schweder & Robert 
A. LeVine, eds. 1984» ; see also Clifford Geertz, The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the 
Concept of Man, in NEW VIEWS OF THE NATURE OF MAN 0. Platt ed. 1966) . For a 
collection of Geertz's influential writings on cultural anthropology, see THE Il\'TER­
PRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS BY CLIFFORD GEERTZ ( 1973) .  More 
recently, social psychologists have begun to demonstrate and examine the difference. 
One of their key discoveries is, as we will review in this Section, that dispositionism 
varies across cultures. See generally KUNDA, supra note 20, at 515-60 (comparing 
differences in social cognition amongst different cultures, and in particular between 
Easterners and Westerners) . 
429 - KUNDA, supra note 20, at 21 22. 
423 We recognize and apologize for the breadth of these categories. To date, the 
distinctions by social psychologists have rarely been refined much past those of 
"Easterners" and "Westerners." Still, as broad and inadequate as those two categories 
may be, they represent a key advance over the nearly complete lack of categories that 
otherwise exists in many social scientific theories and lay theories of human actors. 
And that criticism, we confess, applies to much of social psychology and to virtually all 
of this Article, which too frequently speak of "human" tendencies-as if there is just 
one relevant category of humans as revealed through studies of mostly college 
students. This practice is particularly striking in light of the fact that, as we'll describe, 
the work comparing "Easterners" and "Westerners" has demonstrated significant cross-
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The evidence about cultural variations in dispositionism provides 
some additional support for our hypothesis that humans are both 
"individually" and "culturally" dispositionist, but it may go further. It  
suggests that dispositionism is  greatest where the situational 
influence of large corporate interests has likely been greatest. 
Recall the fundamental attribution error that is at the heart of 
dispositionism fallacy-the tendency to miss the influence of 
situation and to overstate the power of disposition in understanding 
one's  own and other people's behavior. Earlier, we described the 
centrality of that bias to human perception and experience.424 Cross­
cultural comparisons, however, indicate that the fundamental 
attribution error may be more fundamental in Western societies than 
it is in other societies.425 People in Asia, for example, appear to be 
less prone to see disposition than are Westemers.42G The "focal fish" 
experiment provides some support for that conclusion. This disparity 
cultural differences. See infra text accompanying notes 425-50; see also N ISBETI, supra 
note 415, passim (providing evidence of how groups in different parts of the world not 
only think about different things, but actually think differently) . Future work will 
likely yield a more refined understanding of how we conceptualize our worlds and of 
how those conceptualizations reflect and influence those worlds. 
Additionally, we may find that much of the cognitive processes and emotions that 
social psychologists have understood as involuntary may be somewhat malleable. That, 
at least, was a recurring theme at a very recent tw<Hiay conference and discussion 
entitled, Mind and Life Xl: Investigating the Mind: Lxchanges Between Buddhism and the 
Biobehavioral Sciences on How the Mind Works, (held at MIT, Sept. 1 3-14, 2003, and co­
sponsored by the McGovern Institute at MIT and the Mind and Life Institute, and 
attended by, among others, Daniel Kahneman, Daniel Gilbert, and the Dalai Lama) . 
For an overview of the conference and materials, see, Mind & Life Inst., Mind and Life 
Xl: Investigating the Mind, at http://ww. investigatingthemind.org/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2003) . For a brief account of some of the exchanges and dynamics 
that led to the conference and research that has been initiated in reaction to previous, 
related conferences and discussions, see Stephen S. Hall, Is Buddhism Good for Your 
Health?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 14,  2003, at 46. 
The problem is not just that the category "human" is too broad. In fact, it may 
also be too narrow. We suspect that our conceptions of other animals will demonstrate 
that "humans" there we go again-are unique in fewer ways and to a lesser degree 
than "humans" have historically tended to believe. For recent general accounts along 
those lines, see JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON & SUSAN MCCARTHY, WHEN ELEPHANTS 
WEEP: THE EMOTIONAL LIVES OF A .'IIMALS ( 1995) ; GEORGE PAGE, INSIDE THE A..'IIMAL 
MIND ( 1999) . 
424 See supra text accompanying notes 8&-107 (discussing various studies that reveal 
the persuasiveness of the fundamental attribution error) . 
42r> See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 525-33 (discussing several studies that compare 
Western and Eastern paradigms about dispositional and situational attribution) ;  
NISBETI, supra note 415,  a t  123-27 ("Westerners tend to assume that events are caused 
by the object and Asians are inclined to assign greater importance to the context.") . 
426 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 52&-27, 529-32. 
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has been demonstrated in n umerous experimen ts ,  including 
variations of the famous pro-Castro, anti-Castro speech experiment 
highlighted above.427 
In the basic version of that study, recall, subjects who knew that a 
student had been instructed to write and deliver a pro-Castro speech 
nevertheless thought that the views the student expressed in her 
speech were representative of her true dispositional beliefs.428 The 
same dispositionist mistake appeared when the study was conducted 
with a group of East Asian subjects-that is, subjects at first 
overstated the role of disposition in the students ' speeches.429 A 
number of similar studies have documented this basic commonality 
between Westerners and Easterners in the tendency to overstate 
disposition.43o Social psychologists therefore do believe that 
dispositionism, in its most basic form, is a widely shared human 
d 431 ten ency. 
Differences begin to emerge, however, when the basic design of 
the experiment is altered to highlight the role of the situational 
pressure even more prominently to subjects-by, for example,  
placi n g  the subj e c t  i n  th e target ' s  shoes and requiring her to 
wri te an essay that takes a particular s tance.  American subjects 
continue to exhibit the fundamental attribution error in significant 
proportions, while East Asians become far more likely to acknowledge 
the role of situation in the speeches they hear.432 This variation In 
dispositionism has recurred in several studies comparing Eastern to 
Western subj ects.433 Such cross-cultural differences in the power of 
427 Id. at 532 33 (concluding that "East Asians are more likely than North 
Americans to pick up on cues pointing to the importance of situational constraints" ) ;  
see also Eric D.  Knowles et aI., Culture and the Process of Person Perception: Evidence for 
Automaticity Among East Asians in Correcting fOT Situational Influences on Behavior, 27 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 344, 1 348-54 (200 1 )  (discussing an experiment 
that asked students from the United States and Hong Kong to characterize the attitude 
of a speaker, based on the speaker's speech about a political issue) .  For our earlier 
description of the Castro experiments, see supra text accompanying note 1 55. 
42 See supra text accompanying note 1 55. 
429 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 532. 
430 Id. at 525 32 (discussing several studies focusing on the dispositional tenden
cies of Westerners compared to non Westerners) ;  NISBETT supra note 415,  at 1 25 
(explaining that "the illusion is sufficiently powerful that even East Asians are 
susceetible") . 
4. 1 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 532; Fiske et aI., supra note 1 95, at 915,  930-33; 
Knowles et aI., supra note 427, at 1 354. 
4'32 . KUNDA, supra note 20, at 532; NISBETT supra note 4 1 5, at 1 25. 
433 KUNDA, supra note 20 at 525-32; Fiske et aI., supra note 1 95, at 930 33. Other 
studies have yielded more specific evidence of the contours of cultural difference and 
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the fundamental attribution error suggest that, although disposition­
ism may be universal, the degree of dispositionism varies across 
cultures.434 Overall,  the findings suggest that disposition ism is itself 
subject to situational influence, a reality that helps to make deep 
capture possible. 
Another dimension to these cross-cultural experiments confirms 
that hypothesis. In a number of studies, people who are from the 
East but living in the West exhibit an outlook that falls between the 
strong dispositionism seen in Western subjects and the weaker 
dispositionism seen in Eastern subjects.435 A compelling explanation 
how it manifests in broader outlooks and motivations. One study of American and 
Japanese subjects, for example, compared self enhancement biases in Western and 
Eastern subjects. Groups of American and Japanese subjects were asked to provide a 
list of examples of situations that they felt had enhanced their self esteem, and others 
that they felt had diminished it. See Shinobu Kitayama et aI. ,  Individual and Collective 
Processes in the Construction of the Self: Self-Enhancement in the United States and Self­
Criticism in japan, 72 .J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCHOL. 1 245, 1 249 54 ( 1 997) ; see also 
KUNDA, supra note 20, at 542 47 (summarizing Kitayama's experiments) . The 
researchers then took a list of four hundred responses culled from both groups and 
administered the list to new subjects, again comprised of American and Japanese 
subjects. Id. at 544. The subjects were asked to select the situations that they felt 
were applicable to themselves, and how their self esteem had been affected by the 
situation. Id. The results revealed strikingly different self perceptions between the 
American and Japanese subjects. American subjects exhibited a more pronounced 
self serving bias, claiming that a higher proportion of the self enhancing situations 
applied to themselves than did the Japanese subjects. So significant was that 
tendency among Westerners that it held true even for self enhancing 
characterizations that had been provided by the earlier Japanese subjects; that is, 
Americans were more likely than Japanese subjects to claim that those characteriza
tions applied to themselves. Id. at 546 47. 
The self-enhancement tendency is one aspect of the broader dispositionist 
character that social psychology has documented in Western society. See supra text 
accompanying notes 1 94-95 ;  see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30. The results 
of the above study, and others like it, suggest that the tendency to see oneself as 
interacting ,vith the world as a stable dispositional actor is more pronounced i n  
individuals in  Western society than it  i s  among people in the East. Related studies, 
for example, demonstrate that self enhancement biases are less prevalent in the East 
than in the West. See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 538 43 (recounting a study that 
suggested Canadians demonstrate a greater self enhancing bias than do Japanese) . 
434 "All these studies point to the same conclusion. Westerners tend to view 
social behavior as driven by internal, stable dispositions such as traits and attitudes. 
In contrast, Easterners tend to view social behavior as determined by the individual's 
inte�ersonal relations, roles, circumstances, and cultural milieu." Id. at 531 .  
4 5 See id. at  540 (describing studies that show that Asian Canadians' dispositionist 
tendencies fall somewhere between the dispositionist tendencies of Asians and those of 
European Canadians) . In the self-enhancement study discussed above, see supra 
n ote 433,  Japanese subjects living in the United States were less prone to self­
enhancement than American subjects, but more prone than Japanese subjects l iv ing 
in Japan. KUNDA, supra note 20, at 546. Another study found that Canadians of 
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for these findings is that when subjected to different situational 
influences-that is, different cultures-people develop differences in 
how they perceive beha\�0r.4:16 In other words, situation, not 
dispositional factors such as biology or race, makes the difference. 
And importantly for our deep capture thesis, the Western cultural 
situation appears to drive people into a deeper dispositionism and 
away from situationism. Undoubtedly, differences in basic outlook 
remain among the many subcultures within Western society.437 The 
general patterns, however, are reasonably clear that dispositionism is 
stronger in the West than in the East, and that the situational 
influences of Western culture powerfully alter outlooks toward 
disposi tionism. 438 
The evidence suggesting a greater sensitivity in Eastern society 
than in Western society to situational influences over behavior at first 
appears to challenge explanations of the fundamental attribution 
error that are rooted in the mechanics of human perception. In our 
earlier discussion we s tressed, as have social psychologists, that one 
reason for the fundamental attribution error is the relative facility of 
seeing individual behavior compared to the situational influences 
that may give rise to it.439 Our limited perceptual and cognitive 
resources focus on what is stark and miss what is subtle. Therefore, 
we see the person who would administer painful shocks to a test­
subject as dispositionally bad or sadistic, rather than account for the 
myriad of situational influences that help account for that behavior.440 
Notably for our thesis, social psychologists have not abandoned the 
basic perceptual explanation of the human tendency to overstate 
Asian heritage exhibited self-enhancing biases at rates lower than those registered by 
European Canadians, but higher than those that were seen in Japanese subjects living 
in Japan. Steven J. Heine & Darrin R. Lehman, The Cultural Construction of Self 
Enhancement: An t.xamination of GroujrSeruing Biases, 72 J. PERSONALIlY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 1 268, 1 278 ( 1 997) . 
436 See KUNDA, note 20, at 540 ( "Canadians of Asian heritage who may be assumed 
to absorb Asian culture at home while being exposed to North American culture 
everywhere else show[ ]  some but not total adoption of Western cultural patterns.") . 
437 See id. at 549-56 (describing studies on differences in outlook between people 
in the N orthern and Southern United States) . 
438 Of course, it should be recognized that cross cultural social psychology is a 
nascent field; findings are at this point preliminary, and more will he learned about 
differences between the social psychologies of different cultures as this feld grows. 
See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 547-49 (cautioning that the work in this area is at an early 
stage and therefore "not conclusive").  
439 See supra text accompanying notes 19-23, 1 39 45, 182 96 (defning the 
fundamental attribution error and describing some of the causes) . 
440 See supra text accompanying notes 86-99 (discussing the Milgram experiments ) .  
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dispositionist explanations of behavior. Indeed, this basic perceptual 
account explains the baseline of similarity seen in the cross-cultural 
C h ·  441 astro speec expenments.
According to social psychologists, the ultimate divergence in the 
commitment to dispositionist explanations is a product of the 
difference in the two cultures' lay theories of the relationship 
between individuals and society.442 In the West, the perceptual 
foundation of the fundamental attribution error is surrounded by lay 
441 Supra notes 425 31 and accompanying text; see also David M. Buss, Human 
Nature and Culture: An �volutionary Psychological Perspective, 69 J. PERSONALI Y 955, 968 
(2001 ) (acknowledging a universal human nature, and recognizing that the human 
mind contains many complex psychological mechanisms that are selectively activated, 
depending on cultural contexts ) .  
442 Cf KUNDA, supra note 20, a t  537 38 (concluding that maintaining and 
enhancing one's self esteem, [which is linked to dispositionism] ,  is more important in 
Western cultures than in Eastern cultures because of differing views on the relation 
between the individual and society) . The Japanese legal system seems to reflect 
elements of their lay theories, which focus on the role of the individual as 
interdependent with the collective. See, e.g. , Koichiro Fujikura, Administeringjustice in a 
Consensus Based Society, 91 MICH . L. REv. 1529, 1 541 42 ( 1993) (discussing the position 
of Hamilton and Sanders that in Japanese society "those who insist on their legal 
rights may be seen as free riders, exploiting the collective benefit, and modern legal 
reforms in Japan can be interpreted as a 'process of constant adjustments to thwart 
the corrosive impact of litigious free riders on a nonlitigious legal order"') (quoting 
V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SAl'\'DERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILIlY AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 1 93 ( 1992) ) ;  V. Lee Hamilton & 
Joseph Sanders, Punishment and the Individual in the United States and japan, 22 LAw & 
SOC'Y REv. 301 ,  304 ( 1988) (suggesting that in Japan, "the individual is seen as 
operating in nenvorks and contexts . . .  [so] sanctions for wrongdoing are influenced 
by indi\�duals' embeddedness in roles") ; Erik W. Ibele, Government Regulation of 
Technology Licensing in the Pacific Rim: The Legacy of Industrial Policy, 1 5  WIS. INT'L LJ. 
299, 301 ( 1997) (noting that the "collective focus is evident in the language of Article 
I of the Japanese Patent Law which states, 'the purpose of this Law shall be to 
encourage inventions by promoting their protection and utilization so as [sic] to 
contribute to the development of industry"') (quoting Tokkyoho [Patent Law] , Law 
No. 121  of 1959, art. 1 ,  translated in [VI Japan] EHS Law Bull. Series No. 6850A, at SA A 
2 ( 1 994) ) ;  Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racialjustice: Using Constitutional 
Protection of japan s Indigenous Ainu PeojJie to Infonn Understandings of the United States and 
japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 419, 484 88 (2001 ) (discussing the conception of 
individualism in Japan and how that outlook has shaped interpretation of the 
American influenced, individualistically worded constitution) ;  Glenn Theodore 
MeIchinger, For the Collective Benefit: Why ja/Jan 's New Strict Product Liability Law is 
"Strictly Business, " 1 9  U. HAW. L. REv. 879, 931 ( 1 997) (arguing that Japan's new 
products liability scheme may seem toothless by our standards because it takes the 
cost of social conflict into account); Masumi Anna Osaki, Comment, A Look at Damage 
Awards Under japan 's Trademark Law and Unfair Competition Prevention Law, 8 PAC. RIM 
L. & POL'y J. 489, 492 ( 1999) ("Traditional col1ectivist values that frown upon 
personal gain have contributed to the inadequate enforcement of individual 
intel1ectual property rights in Japan . . .  [and have] trdditional1y resulted in limited 
awards . . . .  ") . 
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theories of the self as an autonomous, free, disposition ally stable 
individual.443 In this fashion, the fundamental attribution error serves 
to confirm the dispositional worldview for Westerners. On the other 
hand, cultures in the East entertain lay theories that portray the 
individual as situated in an array of interdependent social 
relationships in which roles, rather than individual actors, are 
emphasized.444 Social psychologists, thus, attribute to culture the fact 
that Eastern subjects appear to correct more easily for the 
fundamental attribution errors received from basic perceptual cues 
than do Western subjects.445 That explanation finds support in a 
number of cross-cultural studies. For instance, individuals who have 
been "multiply enculturated"-that is, exposed extensively to two or 
more cultures-can be situationally primed to activate the causal 
schemas characteristic of either culture. In one study, students in 
Hong Kong were shown one of the following: Western images (such 
as a cowboy on a horse) , Eastern images (such as a dragon) , or neutral 
images (such as a landscape) .446 Afterwards, when making causal 
attributions, subjects in the first group were most dispositionist, 
subjects in the second group were most situationist, and those in the 
control group fell in between.447 Studies by developmental psycholo­
gists have found that Eastern and Western children exhibit common 
fundamental attribution errors and, unlike their parents, Eastern 
children do not correct for those errors when situational constraints 
443 See supra text accompanying notes 194 95; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 
30. 
444 See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 537 38 (noting that Eastern cultures tend toward 
the notion that individuals are highly interdependent with others in society) . But see 
Yohtaro Takano & Eiko Osaka, An Unsuppmted Common View: Comparingjapan and the 
U.S. on Individualism/Collectivim, 2 ASIAN J .  SOC. PSYCHOL. 31 1 ,  31 6 30 ( 1 999) 
(reviewing empirical studies comparing conceptions of individualism and collectivism 
in the two nations, and finding that the standard view, which holds that Japanese are 
more collectivist than Americans, is based on flimsy grounds and might be attributable 
to the fundamental attribution error) . 
44[, See supra notes 416 23 and accompanying text (reviewing experiments that 
illustrate this hypothesis) . 
446 Ying-yi Hong, et aI., Bringing Culture out in Front: lc.1fects of Cultural Meaning 
System Activation on Social Cognition, in PROGRESS IN AsIAN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 139, 
141 -46 (Kwok Leung et al. eds., 1 997) .  
447 Id. at  1 46. Researchers have discovered the same situational sensitivity to 
cultural p rimes on the part of Asian Americans. See Kaiping Peng & Eric Knowles, 
Culture, Education, and the Attribution of Physical Causality, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 272, 1 279 83 (2003) (demonstrating that culturally instilled folk 
theories affect Chinese Americans' interpretations of physical phenomena) .  
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are highlighted.448 Having not yet learned the situational lay-theories 
that their culture provides, their perceptions appear to rest on the 
limitations that give rise to the fundamental attribution error in 
Easterners and Westerners alike.449 
It is important to note that Easterners' tendency to correct for 
dispositional overstatements is itself an unseen, sub de process. The 
studies revealing the relative depth or shallowness of the fundamen­
tal attribution error show that the adj ustments for situation are often 
made automatically; they are not the result of a conscious, explicit, 
intentional adherence to an ideology or worldview.450 The difference 
in oudook, driven by cultural differences, is attributable to unseen 
processes, not dispositional choice. Consequendy, while exterior 
situation helps explain the depth of our dispositionism, that 
influence is registered automatically, beneath our conscious control 
in the situations of our interiors. 
The fact that situational influence determines the depth of our 
dispositionism is extremely advantageous to corporations, which, as 
we have indicated, have an interest in encouraging such an 
oudook.451 The capture of this oudook can be accomplished by 
exercising power over situation, a pursuit that is itself enabled by the 
strength of the dispositionist theories that support corporate 
452 power. 
448 See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 527 ("Cultural differences in attribution appear to 
emerge only in mature individuals who have been well socialized into their culture's 
view of the person.") ; see, e.g. , Joan G. Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday 
Social .explanation, 46 J. PERSONALI1Y & Soc. PSVCHOL. 961 ( 1984) (comparing 
attributions of Indian Hindu children with those of American children and f nding 
that children in the two cultures did not differ in the sorts of explanations they gave 
and that explanations did not begin to take culturally scripted form until adolescence ) .  
449 See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 526-27 (discussing the f ndings of Miller, supra 
note 448, with regard to Eastern children's attribution behavior) . 
450 See Knowles et aI., supra note 427, at 1 354 ("East Asians . . .  have the ability to 
automatically correct [dispositionist] inferences in light of situational constraints.") . 
451 See supra Part V.CA.c.ii (arguing that a dispositionist worldview benefits 
corporations, both individually and collectively) . 
452 Hence, one might expect disposition ism to grow more robust in the East, as 
Western corporations strive to maximize profits in Eastern markets. On the other 
hand, we might expect to see differing methods of deep capture in markets where 
dispositionism is less pronounced. Certainly, even in the West, there is evidence of 
corporate appeals to group identities and situationist conceptions, such as is seen in 
patriotic or racially identified messages. It is the situation, and not our dispositionism 
directly, that makes deep capture possible. If deep capture can be accomplished 
more effectively or more efficiently by promoting other worldviews, then such efforts 
may take different forms in different cultures. 
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D.  Some Direct Evidence of Deep Capture 
As we just reviewed, evidence about cultural variation of 
dispositionism is consistent with our deep capture hypothesis in a 
number of ways. However, that evidence, by itself, does little to 
demonstrate that corporate efforts are an important cause of the 
heightened dispositionism of the West. Many would argue that any 
causal connection is actually the reverse of the one we have 
hypothesized. For instance, the prominence and success of commer­
cial interests in America could well reflect the heightened 
dispositionism of Americans. 
There is almost certainly some truth to that view. The American 
self-conception is one of individualism, a sibling concept of what we 
refer to as dispositionism. This individualism seemed to emerge 
without much obvious encouragement by large commercial interests 
and is sometimes associated with people like Henry David Thoreau, 
who seem anything but deeply captured. President Herbert Hoover 
saw individualism as the cornerstone of the American character (or 
disposition) : 
Individualism has been the primary force of American civilization 
for three centuries. It is our sort of individualism that has supplied the 
motivation of America's political, economic, and spiritual institutions in 
all these years. It has proved its ability to develop its institutions with 
the changing scene. Our very form of government is the product of the 
individualism of our people, the demand for an equal opportunity, for 
a fair chance. 
The American pioneer is the epic expression of that individualism, 
and the pioneer spirit is the response to the challenge of opportunity, 
to the challenge of nature, to the challenge of life, to the call of the 
frontier.4
53 
In this way, Americans have long seen their individualism as both 
obvious 454 and the most significant factor behind their relative 
economic and political success. That self-affirming self-conception 
may, however, be yet another example of the fundamental 
attribution error. In our view, attributing our success to our 
individualist disposition misses the more significant role of our 
453 HERBERT HOOVER, A.,\1ERICM, INDIVIDUAl.ISM 63-64 ( 1922) .  
4[,4 O f  course, as we have emphasized, the fact that something is obvious does not 
mean it is entirely true. See BARY ALAe'! SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDI
VIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF A.,\1ERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 21 ( 1994) 
("Contrary to popular belief, Americans in the years surrounding the Revolution were 
not adherents of political individualism . . . .  ") . 
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situation, which itself has fostered success and rendered more 
plausible our self-conception. Put differently, the American pioneer 
may not be "the epic expression of . . .  individualism,,
,455 as many 
tend to presume. Rather, the individualism is as much the conse­
quence of the existence of a valuable situation, including an 
immense frontier.456 
455 HOOVER, supra note 453, at 63. 
456 Again, the cultural disposition of individualism may well reveal more about the 
situation than is commonly recognized. See supra text accompanying notes 444 49 
(discussing the link between a culture's regard for individualism and that culture's 
tendency toward dispositionism) .  "The frontier" provided to those who ventured to 
America a chance to change their lives an escape in some cases, an opportunity in 
others. By sailing West to get to America and then "going West" once here, the 
situation would have seemed far less constraining: gone were many of the shackles of 
religious persecution, population density, employment pressures, and rigid class 
norms. Those who survived and thrived did so perceiving they had acted according to 
their choices. Seemingly boundless land and natural resources, together with growing 
markets and changing technologies, provided many Americans with a strong 
perception of selt:reliance and self-determination. To a large degree, that perception 
held true but largely because the situation permitted it. In other words, the 
freedom that we attribute to the disposition of individuals may more accurately be the 
consequence of the options afforded by the situation in a "land of opportunity." 
Particularly when compared to the Old World where famine, poverty, and political 
strife rendered the situation oppressive and salient the New World would have felt 
to many people (particularly young, strong, entrepreneurial, free, and white men) as 
a land where disposition decided one's fate. Again, the frontier on which the 
American pioneer was permitted to venture was itself a great situational source of 
both perceived individualism and this country's success. 
With that commentary, we have here inadvertently stumbled into the midst of a 
long standing historiographical battle. The classic work that initiated that battle was 
written in the late nineteenth century by Frederick Jackson Turner. FREDERICK 
JACKSON TURNER, The Significance of the Frontier in American History ( 1 893) , reprinted in 
THE FRONTIER IN fu\1ERICA."I HISTORY 1 ( 1 920) . Turner challenged the then
conventional "germ theory" that the American character was a dispositional legacy of 
the Old World and emphasized instead the situational effects of the frontier in giving 
shape to a distinctly American disposition. In his words: 
[T]o the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That 
coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that 
practical, inventive tum of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful 
grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great 
ends; that restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for 
good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with 
freedom-these are the traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere 
because of the existence of the fron tier. 
Id. at 37. A century of historical analysis and debate has discredited many of the details 
of Turner's frontier thesis. See, e.g. , Donald Worster, New West, True West: Interpreting 
the Region 's History, 1 8  W. HIST. Q. 1 41 ,  1 44 46 ( 1987) (rejecting the process idea 
central to Turner's thesis, preferring instead to define the West as a fixed geographical 
region) . But there remains, we believe, a strong case that situation including our 
interior situation, which may be motivated to see ourselves as the rugged individuals 
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Be that as it may, the fact that different cultures tend to be more 
or less dispositionist reveals how dispositionism can itself be 
influenced by the situation, thus leaving the door open for deep 
capture. However, it does not, in and of itself, provide direct 
evidence of deep capture. If our culture is especially dispositionist, 
one would expect our legal theorists, lawmakers, and laws 457 to share 
or reflect that fundamental bias. Similarly, one would expect 
advertisers to reflect that same view, by design or not, in marketing 
their products in America. The Marlboro Man, as a cigarette­
smoking frontiersman, may reflect little more than a shared sense 
that he is us and we are him: autonomous, free, and unfettered, . . .  
the epic expression of individualism.458 Thus, to support the portion 
of the deep capture hypothesis that predicts that large commercial 
interests actively and sometimes consciously promote dispositionist 
worldviews directly, we need a different sort of evidence, a small 
sample of which we will highlight here. 
Fortunately, providing evidence is quite simple. All one has to 
do is point to the hundreds of billions of dollars spent each year on 
advertising, marketing, and public relations.459 Large commercial 
entities are using and developing the sort of social psychological 
research of which the rest of us are either ignorant or dismissive. As 
one of us has argued at length (with Doug Kysar) ,  marketing texts 
and marketing firms are steeped in an understanding of the 
powerful role of situation.46o Moreover, they use what they know 
(and learn from market experience) to manipulate consumer 
. d b  h . 461 perceptIons an e aVIOf. 
that Turner idealized-plays far more of a role in defining who we are, or like to 
believe we are, than we recognize. Cf JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS & STEEL: THE 
FATES OF HUMfu'l SOCIETIES 25 ( 1 997) ("History followed different courses for 
different peoples because of differences among people's environments . . . .  "). 
457 For examples of the influence of dispositionist presumptions on laws, see 
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (examining dispositionism in contract, tort, and 
criminal law) ; infra text accompanying notes 598-6 1 4  (describing the dispositionism 
inherent in contract law) . 
458 See also Bruce A. Lohof, The Higher Meaning of Marlboro Cigarettes, 3 J. POPULAR 
CULTURE 441 ,  447 ( 1 969) (comparing the Marlboro image to Frederick Jackson 
Turner's vision of the frontier) . 
459 See Ticker, BRILL'S CONTEl\'T, Oct. 2000, at 33 (detailing the level of advertising 
expenditure in the United States) . 
460 For a discussion of this point, see Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously 
II, su;:a note 251 .  
"\ For more on this idea, see id.; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, 
supra note 251 ;  Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously III, supra note 257. See 
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We will not review that work here. For now, we hope it is 
sufficient to point out that when social psychologist Robert B. 
Cialdini462 wrote his popular book, Influence: The Psychology of 
Persuasion,4t;3 he devoted one of six main chapters to the Milgram 
experiments and their lessons for marketing.464 A review of the book 
in the Journal of Retailing raved that " [Influence] could be required, 
profitable 'weekend reading' for business majors.,,4fi5 Another review 
stated that " [£1 or marketers, [ this book] is among the most 
important books written in the last 10 years. ,,466 Similarly, many 
other marketing-oriented writings on consumer behavior under­
score the importance of situation over disposition in determining 
individual behavior. "An actor in a play takes his cue from a line or 
some other happening or event. The human mind takes its cue 
from its intentions and its immediate environment. Such cues can 
influence what we think about next.,,467 Such is the starting point for 
one influential marketing guide promising to "demystif[y] the effects 
of advertising and describ [e] some of the psychological mechanisms 
underlying them . . .  written primarily for those who foot the bill for 
advertising and those who produce advertising.,,468 
Marketing and advertising practices thus reveal the deep, though 
apparently unseen, irony in the advertisements that we summarized 
earlier.469 Advertisers commonly present to us a vision of ourselves 
that confirms our self-affirming, dispositionist (and non-manipula­
ble) self-image. They do so, it would seem, in order to manipulate 
our perceptions and behavior. The manipulation apparently works, 
as revealed by their choice to continue doing so at a substantial cost. 
In a way, that is our entire case in a nutshell. We are subject to 
influence and manipulation from sources that we do not see or do 
also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 403 (showing how tobacco manufacturers manipulate 
consumer perception and preferences to increase profits) .  
462 Robert B. Cialdini is the Regents' Professor of Psychology at Arizona State 
University in Tempe. 
463 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (rev. ed. 
1 993) . 
464 Id. at 208-36. 
465 Roger A. Dickinson, Influence, 60 ]. RETAILING, Winter 1 984, at 126, 128 (book 
review) . 
466 Alan]. Resnik, Influence: Science & Practice, 23]. MARKETING REs., Aug. ] 986, at 
305, 305 ( 1 986) (book review) . 
467 MAx SUTHERLAND & ALICE K. SYLVESTER, ADVERTISING AL'<D THE MIND OF THE 
CONSUMER: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, AND WHY 1 7  (2d ed. 2000) .  
468 [d. at 4. 
469 See supra text accompanying notes 393 406. 
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not consider relevant. Those with the ability to influence those 
sources wield immense influence over us, while we continue to 
believe that we are acting independently, according to our prefer­
ences. We conclude that advertising works, but deny that i t  
works on US.470 But, to borrow one of the oldest strategies in the 
book, do not take our word for it-listen to what those in the 
industry say about what they do. For example , the Web site for 
Burson-Marsteller, a public relations fiml, has this to say about their 
industry: 
What makes public relations so important is that people's opInIOn 
of . . .  a company, or a company's products or services is to a great 
extent beyond that . . .  company's control. A public relations agency 
offers these . . .  companies the resources necessary to make today's 
incredibly diverse influences work for them. It accomplishes this by 
having messages about the . . .  company or company product or service 
communicated through a credible third party such as a tmsted journalist, 
physician, television or radio commentator, entertainer, or influential 
Internet figure. In essence, a public relation agency optimizes the power of 
endorsement by successfully influencing those who influence a targeted 
audience.
471 
Hill and Knowlton, one of Burson-Marsteller's chief competitors 
and the firm responsible for designing the tobacco industry's 
response to evidence that smoking caused lung cancer,4
i2 describes 
their role in very similar terms: 
Powerful communications that make a difference [ , ]  . . .  that can 
transform, inspire, move and educate is why we exist. This power can 
be accessed by our clients wherever and whenever they need it; in 
specialist arenas and in global campaigns; in the corridors of 
-'liO See JEAN KILBOURNE, CAN'T Buy My LOVE: How ADVERTISING CHANGES THE 
WAY WE THINK Al"'D FEEL 27 ( 1 999) ("UJust about everyone in America still feels 
personally exempt from advertising's influence."); see also Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin 
& Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions oj Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 370 78 (2002) (summarizing several studies finding that 
people see motivational and cognitive biases much more readily in others than in 
themselves) . 
471 Burson Marsteller, Inc., Why You Need a PR Firm, · at http://www.bm.com/ 
resources/why_pop.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2003) (emphasis added) .  
472 See KAREN S. MILLER, THE VOICE O F  BUSINESS: HILL & I{,,\/OWLTON AND 
POSTWAR PUBLIC RELATIONS 1 2 1 45 (1 999) (remarking on Hill & Knowlton's role in 
"promot[ing] the notion that the case against smoking has not been proved," and the 
later description of Hill & Knowlton's work as "one of PR's best finger in the-dike jobs 
ever") . 
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government; in the financial centers and in the minds of consumers 
473 
everywhere. 
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Richard Berman's public affairs firm, Berman and Company, 
which represents the cigarette, restaurant, and alcohol industries, 
describes in like fashion its bold mission to " [  c] hange the debate" for 
the sake of its clients:474 
Many PR firms promise access to the media. Law firms pledge to defend 
their clients. Lobbying firms promise access to friendly legislators. At 
Berman and Company we do all this. But we go further. We change the 
debate. If necessary, we start the debate . 
. . . Our success is based on three core competencies: credible 
research as the foundation for effective messages disseminated via . . . 475 aggressIVe commumcaUons. 
By analyzing the way marketers, advertisers, and public relations 
firms view us, it is clear that we are not as dispositional as we think we 
are. A major sector of our economy is making a huge profit by 
maintaining two visions of the human animal. The public vision is 
often that of the dispositional, independent, rational actor. The 
private vision is that of the situational character, capable of 
manipulation through situational influence.  Those with the greatest 
stake in perpetuating the illusion that we are dispositionists 
encourage, promote, and market our dispositionism, in significant 
part because doing so helps make the situation that much more 
invisible. It is largely through the unseen situation that consumers, 
like other individuals, institutions, and entities in our culture, are 
deeply captured. 
From this vantage point the Marlboro Man reveals himself not as 
a reflection of what we-advertisers and consumers alike-all see 
about ourselves. Rather, he embodies that dispositionist self whom 
marketers want us to see, but whom they understand is almost as 
fictional as the Marlboro Man himself. 
The Marlboro Man first saddled up in the 1950s, as part of a 
concerted effort by Philip Morris to attract male smokers who may 
473 Hill & Knowlton, Homepage, at http://www.hillandknowlton.com/global (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2003) .  
474 Berman & Co., Homepage, at  http://www.bermanco.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 
2003) .  
475 [d. ;  see infra text accompanying notes 483 500 (describing i n  mOl·e detail the 
use of third-party spokespeople for credibility, and detailing some of the particular 
strategies and tactics used to create and maintain access to such third parties) .  
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have been frightened by then-fresh reports of the health risks of 
smoking.476 Marlboro was a filtered brand that had originally been 
marketed, with limited success, as a woman's cigarette behind the 
slogan "Mild as May.,,477 The cowboy image eventually proved the 
most popular of a group of potential pitchmen, including explorers, 
sailors, athletes and other rugged men.
478 In a three-page spread in 
the January 1957 issue of Life magazine,
479 the caption read, "The 
Marlboro Man speaks for himself. ,,480 Introducing his Western way 
of life, the Marlboro Man states: "Own my own ranch . . .  [ I ]  ride 
from one end of it to the other every day . . .  I like the life a man 
leads out here . . .  the good feeling of being your own boss.,,48 1 Over 
the next four decades, the Marlboro Man would help Marlboro 
become, in the words of a Phillip Morris competitor, "the most 
valuable brand item in the world. ,,482 The cowboy image was so 
successful because it tapped into the same American ideal of the 
independent frontiersman that Hoover credits as the "primary force 
of American civilization:,,483 
476 The tobacco industry refers to the publication of the first lung cancer reports 
as the "Big Scare," a transformative moment for virtually all industry practices, not just 
their advertising. Plaintiff's Complaint at " 68 73, Commonwealth ex rei. Fisher v. 
Philip Morris, Inc. (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. Apr. 1997) ( No. 2443) , available at 
http://ww .attorneygeneral.gov/ppd/tobacco/complaint.cfm; see also Hanson & 
Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously II, supra note 25 1 ,  at 1 483 87 (describing the 
"Big Scare" and the industry's initial concerted response ) .  See generally Richard 
Doll, Cancer by the Carton, READER'S DIG. ( Dec. 1 952) . 
477 See Katherine M. West, 17le Marlboro Man: The Making of an American Image, at 
http://www.people.virginia.edu/-tsawyer/mman/mman.html (last visited Oct. 24, 
2003) (describing the evolution of the Marlboro marketing campaign) .  
478 Lohof, supra note 458, a t  443 44 (noting that by the early 1960s the cowboy had 
surpassed these other concepts and "was promoted to supremacy") ;  see also Leo 
Burnett, Advertisement, The Marlboro Story, NEW YORKER, Nov. 15,  1958, at 41 43 
(describing the marketing campaign of Marlboro in the 1950s) .  479 Advertisement, The Marlboro Man: W7zat s He Like, LIFE, Jan. 2 1 , 1957, at  7, 7 9. 
480 Id. at 8. 
481 Id. at  8 9. 
482 Cover Letter, MKTG. INTELLIGENCE DEP'T, BRIT. AM. TOBACCO CO., HO\V 
MARLBORO LED THE PACK, ( 1994) ,  available at http://ww.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/ 
batco/OCR/l OO/I 77.txt [hereinafter BATCo REpORT] . According to the report, 
"Marlboro [i]s the most successful brand in the history of consumer marketing, more 
so even than Coca Cola, which has a higher awareness level but lower profitability . . . .  
[ I ] n 1993, Financial World reported that [ the Marlboro Man was] the world's most 
valuable trademarkL] valued at $39.5 billion." Id. 483 See supra text accompanying note 453 (quoting Hoover) (discussing individual­
ism as the cornerstone of American character) . 
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[T] he cowboy proved to be the advertising "Big Idea" achieving 
universal appeal. During the 1 950s and 60s the popularity of American 
cowboy films meant that for most people the cowboy became [ t] he 
symbol of America and the American "dream," cutting across barriers 
of sex, and social and cultural divisions . 
. . . [T] he underlying themes of adventure, freedom, independence, 
being in charge of your destiny, open spaces and escapism for the 
urban dweller have proved appealing to several generations. They still 
have contemporary relevance; the cowboy is an icon of sturdy  
the kind of person who chooses to smoke, a quiet defender of free choice.  
267 
That the Marlboro Man portrays an image of "free choice" 
should come as no surprise. It is more than an appeal to an active 
American script; it also deepens that script. Of course, it also helps 
to sell a product that most would agree gains its appeal from almost 
entirely situational sources. Those sources can be either exterior 
situational influences, such as peer pressure, or interior situational 
influences, such as addiction. From that perspective, it is striking 
that "autonomy" and "free choice" are the banners behind which 
cigarettes are sold and the self-image that consumers gain from 
smoking them. To confirm this (incorrect) self-image, cigarette 
advertisers portray smoking as something we simply choose to do. 
The RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Company used similar means to 
attract young customers to smoke Camels. As one internal 
memorandum put i t, "Advertising will rely on clearly aspirational 
appeals ( the me I want to be versus the me I am) to provide the 
motivation for target smokers to select CAMEL. ,,485 A second RJR 
memorandum states: 
484 BATCo REpORT, supra note 482, at 7 8 (emphasis added) . 
485 Memorandum Regarding CAMEL New Advertising Development from R.T. 
Caufield, RJ. Reynolds, to D.N. lauco, RJ. Reynolds 2 (Mar. 12 ,  1986) , available at 
http://iegacy.library. ucsf.ed ul cgil getdoc?tid=piI75dOO&fm t=pdf&ref=resul ts 
[hereinafter Memorandum from R.T. Caufield] . Camel's campaign had two goals. 
First, it attempted to convince young smokers that Camels give them the masculine 
ideal of "strength, authenticity and self-confidence." ld. at 3. "Reinforcement of 
masculinity is an important want among a large percentage of males and this is 
particularly true among less educated and younger adult males. (i.e., CAMEL's prime 
prospect) ." Id. Second, the advertising campaign sought to 
create the perception that CAMEL smokers project a non-conformist, self­
confident cool attitude which is admired by their peers. 
Aspiration to be perceived as cool/a member of the in group is one of the 
strongest influences affecting the behavior of younger adult smokers. 
Personality attributes respected by target smokers and inherent in their 
definition of cool include a degree of rebellion or non conformity, along 
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The fragile, developing self-image of the young person needs all of the 
support and enhancement it can get. Smoking may appear to enhance 
that self-image in  a variety of ways. If one values, for example, an 
adventurous, sophisticated, adult image, smoking may enhance ones 
self im age. If  one values certain characteristics in specific individuals or 
types and those persons or types smoke, then if one also smokes he is 
psychologically a little more like the valued image. This self image 
enhancement effect has traditionally been a strong promotional theme 
for cigarette brands and should continue to be emphasized.
486 
Again, cigarette manufacturers know exactly "who we are"-we 
are beings who want to believe that we are autonomous, free 
choosers, but who, in reality, are very susceptible to situational forces. 
We are especially susceptible to situations that make us feel as if we 
really are free choosers acting according to our own will. These 
advertising campaigns seek to exploit our situational weaknesses. As 
a result, cigarette smoking, a deadly addiction, becomes the epitome 
of free choice.487 
As Americans, we see ourselves as particularly immune to the role 
of situation. We see "individualism as the primary force" in defining 
our institutions and our lives. In fact, we are not immune to 
situation, nor are we as individualistic as we suppose. The fact that 
profit-driven actors spend billions of dollars per year to promote a 
false dispositionist image of ourselves is direct evidence of both of 
those claims and of deep capture. 
with the self confdence to remain in control of the somewhat risky, exciting 
lifestyle associated with these characteristics. 
[d. at 4. The irony is striking-RJR is trying to convince people they are "self
confident non confonnists" by using advertising that situationally manipulates this 
very aspiration. 
486 Memorandum from Claude E. Teague, Jr., RJ. Reynolds, Research Planning 
Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth 
Market 7 (Feb. 2, 1 973) ,  available at http://tobaccodocuments.orghjr/502987357-
7368.html. 
487 Widely produced advertising campaigns can affect the self-images of everyone, 
not just those who purchase cigarettes. They reinforce our tendency to see ourselves 
as dispositional free choosers. RJR recognized this: 
Campaigns which rely on literal depiction of smokers to communicate 
desired user imagery will ensure that models and situations selected are 
highly relevant and appealing to not only target smokers but broader 
demographic groups as well. Additionally, the exploratory will cover 
approaches which employ universal cues and symbols that effectively 
communicate the strategies with motivational value that transcends 
demographics. 
Memorandum from R.T. Caufield, supra note 485, at 2. 
2003] THE SITUA HON 269 
E. Some Deeper Evidence of Deep Capture: The Puzzles Revisited 
We have reviewed a sample of the evidence indicating that pro­
commercial dispositionism has been widely accepted as the 
presumptive starting place for policy analysis. Many administrative 
regulators, judges, and legal scholars, like most consumers-from 
cigarette smokers, to investors, to television-news enthusiasts-take 
dispositionism as the obvious truth. Implicitly, we have also reviewed 
one of the most common and effective strategies for promoting pro­
commercial views. Before explicitly naming that strategy, it may be 
helpful to return briefly to the Milgram experiments and some 
variations of the rendition that we described above. 
1 .  The Demand for Credible Messengers 
With numbing regularity good people were seen to knuckle under the demands of 
authority and perform actions that were callous and severe. Men who are in 
everyday life responsible and decent were seduced by the trappings of authority, 
by the control of their perceptions, and by the uncritical acceptance of the 
experimenter's defnition of the situation, into performing harsh acts. . . . A 
substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, irrespective of the 
content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long as they perceive 
that the command comes from a legitimate authority. 
-Stanley Milgram
488 
Mter discovering the unexpected power of the situation in his 
initial experiment, Milgram altered the situation in the hope of 
making visible some of the previously unseen influences. One of the 
key factors he varied was the credibility or authority of the person 
who gave orders to the teacher. In the basic experiment, recall that 
the person prompting the teacher to continue shocking appeared as 
a scientist, complete with a white lab coat. He seemed to have 
considerable knowledge and authority. When Milgram replaced that 
"experimenter" with an "ordinary man" to give the orders, the 
percentage of teachers who administered the maximum shock (450 
volts) dropped from approximately sixty-five percent to twenty 
percent.489 Apparently, the same words were less persuasive or 
488 Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, supra note 86, 
at 74-75. 
489 MILGRAM, OBEDiENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 93-97. As part of the 
experiment, when "teachers" refused to go on, the common man, in apparent disgust, 
would assert that he would take over administering the shocks. [d. at 97-99. The 
action was met with strong resistance-virtually all protested and five out of sixteen 
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influential when they came from a less credible or authoritative 
source. In addi tion , when Milgram replaced the one lab-coated 
experimenter with two lab-coated authorities who gave contradictory 
orders, the complete compliance percentage dropped to zero.490 In 
that variation, teachers could more easily justify ending the shocking 
because one person with authority was encouraging them to do so. 
Those and other variations help make clear that the credibility of 
the messenger is often more important than the message itself.491 
This underscores an important element of the deep capture 
hypothesis: the quest to promote certain ideas will include an 
endeavor to locate, create, and sponsor credible means of conveying 
those ideas. Often, those with the greatest stake in an idea have, for 
precisely that reason, questionable credibility when speaking on 
behalf of the idea. Thus, the search for an effective means of 
communication often includes a search for trustworthy spokespeople. 
The public relations firm Burson-Marsteller makes the point in just 
those terms when it describes its primary strategy as that of "having 
[one's] messages . . .  communicated through a credible third party" 
in order to "influenc[e] those who influence a targeted audience. ,,492 
Berman and Company emphasizes that the "key" to its success "is 
getting the most credible messengers to carry the strongest 
messages.,,493 To access such credible messengers, Berman and 
Company developed what it calls an "academic research network:,,494 
We commission more than a dozen major research projects each year to 
indepen dent academics at leading research u niversities, including: 
• U niversity of Chicago 
• Florida State University 
• U niversity of Texas 
• Johns Hopkins U niversity 
subjects took physical action to prevent the confederate from completing the 
experiment. ld. As Milgram noted, subjects "felt free to threaten the common man 
and were not reluctant to criticize his judgment or personally chastise him; their 
attitude contrasts sharply with the deferential politeness subjects invariably displayed in 
other experiments, when an authority was at the helm." ld. at 97 98. 
490 ld. at 1 05 07. 
491 See generally CIALDINI, supra note 463, at 216-29 (describing some examples of 
people's willingness to obey authority and how "compliance professionals" take 
advantage of that willingness) . 
492 Burson Marsteller, Inc., supra note 471 .  
493 Berman & Co., at http://www.bermanco.com/public_affairs.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2003) .  
494 Berman & Co., at  http://www.bermanco.com/research.cfm (last visited Oct. 
25, 2003) . 
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• University of Wisconsin 
• Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
• University of North Carolina 
• University of California, Los Angeles 
• Boston University 
• Michigan State U niversity 
The credibility of the material produced by these independent research­
ers is unparalleled among "brand name" trad� associations, law finns, or 
consultants active in the public policy arena.4
g" 
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Berman and Company relies on several other tactics to create 
favorable, credible third-party messengers for its clients: 
Sometimes, the best messengers are line managers from affected 
employers. We have more than a decade of experience building and 
maintaining sophisticated grassroots activation systems through which 
managers can have maximum impact with a minimal investment of time. 
CEOs of major employers, working in teams managed by Berman and 
Company, repeatedly deliver powerful messages to key legislators and 
the White House. 
Whether drawing industry allies from associations, think tanks, or the 
private sector, Bennan and Company reaches out to potential allies on a 
daily basis, providing data, infonnation, and refined messages that 
others use to make their cases-and ours-in the policy arena. Our 
clients benefit when more allies use our research and repeat our 
messages. 
When Bennan and Company publishes research from independent 
academics, we craft our publicity efforts so that the authors' credibility 
shines in the legislative spotlight. 
Sometimes, uncommon allies can get more attention than 
"traditional" spokespersons. Our staff has developed strong ties to 
individuals who are often perceived as "anti-industry" but who agree with 
focused messages that we seek to publicize.49
6 
To aggressively disseminate the credible third-party messages, 
Berman and Company attempts to "design unique programs for 
maximum impact in the debate . . .  [and to] stick with the issue for as 
long as it takes to win."m Those programs include creating and 
maintaining "web sites that constantly elicit the 'Wow! ' factor from 
,,498 C F d d' d b 499 • I f users. onsumer ree om.com, Iscusse a ove, IS an examp e 0 
that creative approach. To "change the debate," that Web site seeks to 
expose and resist "the Nanny Culture"-"the growing fraternity of 
495 Id. 
4nG · Berman & Co., supra note 493. 
497 Berman & Co., supra note 4.94. 
498 Berman & Co., supra note 493. 
499 See supra notes 407 14 and accompanying text. 
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'food cops, ' health care enforcers, militant actIViSts, meddling 
bureaucrats, and violent  radicals who think they 'know what's best for 
you"'-"and protect consumer choices.,,50o 
The same basic principle was at work in the Galileo story: the 
Catholic Church dealt with Galileo's threatening astronomical views 
by having its own worldview "communicated through" Galileo's 
recantation.501 Likewise, the principle seems to underlie Stigler's 
basic shallow capture message: institutions or groups with the requi­
site power employ the legitimacy of regulators to advance their own • 502 mterests. 
2. The Creation of Credible Messengers 
There is a vast range of interconnected evidence ( too vast to do 
j ustice to in  this subsection)  of prCK:ommercial interests investing 
to deeply capture the many "credible third parties" that might 
influence the many "targeted audiences" (including all of us) to 
accept prCK:ommercial worldviews. In this subsection we will focus 
on a small sample of that evidence.503 Although the sample is small, 
it will hit close to home for much of our audience and will, we hope, 
strike a more direct and personal chord than the Galileo discussion 
may have. 
Consider the world of legal scholarship.  Large business 
interests have attempted to locate, create, and sponsor the 
production and dissemination of pro-commercial legal scholarship by 
legal scholars who have served as credible, if often unwitting, 
spokespeople for business ends. More specifically, consider some of 
the evidence regarding the goals and influence of the John M. Olin 
Foundation. 
According to the Olin Foundation's Web site, 
the general p urpose of the John M .  Olin Foundation is to provide 
support for p rojects that reflect or are intended to strengthen the 
economic, political and cultural institutions upon which the American 
heritage of constitutional government and private enterprise is based. 
The Foundation also seeks to . . .  encourag[el the thoughtful study 
500 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, supra note 407. 
501 See supra text accompanying notes 297 314 (reviewing and evaluating Galileo's 
recantation) .  
502 See supra Part V.A (summarizing Stigler'S arguments and evidence) .  
,,03 Tn work now in progress, we provide a more fulsome description of that 
evidence. 
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of the connections between economic and political freedoms, and the 
I I h ·  h . h :;04 cu tura entage t at sustall1s t ern. 
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To advance that goal the Olin Foundation has, among other 
things, awarded tens of millions of dollars to prominent law schools 
for the promotion of law and economics scholarship. Over the past 
twenty years, Olin money has established law and economics 
programs, or "centers," at several prominent law schools: the Univer­
sity of Chicago, Yale, Stanford, Harvard, Columbia, Georgetown, 
Duke, the Universi ty of Michigan , the University of Pennsylvania, 
George Mason, and the Universi ty of Virginia.'·os In 1999, a year in 
which the Foundation paid out almost $20 million in grants to 
organizations around the country,,·06 Harvard Law School's John M. 
Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business was in the middle of a 
four-year, $6 million grant,"07 Yale Law School 's John M. Olin 
Program in Law and Economics was in the middle of a three-year, 
504 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., History and General Purposes, at http://ww. 
jmof.org/history_purposes.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) . 
5!)5 L<\,VRENCE C. SOLEY, LEASING THE IVORY TOWER: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER 
OF ACADEMIA 1 37 ( 1 995) ; Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tart 
Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1, 76 tbl.2 (2002) . 
506 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Total Grants Paid, 1 999, at http://ww. 
jmof.org/grants_1996.html ( last visited Oct. 26, 2003) .  
507 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Schedule of Grants, 1999: H, at  http://ww. 
jmof.org/grants/1999h.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) . An Olin grant helped 
establish Harvard Law School's Law and Economics Program in 1 985. Olin Gift 
Expands Law and Economics at HLS, HARV. L. BULL. , Summer 1 998, at 30. Further 
support then led to the 1995 opening of the Olin Center at Harvard Law School, 
"now the world leader in educating students, training academics, and promoting 
scholal·ship in law and economics." [d. "Among [the Olin Center's) academic 
offerings are three economic analysis seminars, courses on the economics on 
regulation and antitrust, classe:; on law and economics and on empirical methods, and 
a new course, Analytical Methods for Lawyers," for which the Olin Center faculty is 
developing a textbook for adoption across the country. Press Release, Harvard Law 
School, Harvard Law School Receives $10 Million Grant from John M. Olin 
Foundation, at http://ww.law.harvard.edu/news/2003/05/19_0Iin.php (May 1 9 ,  
2003) [hereinafter Harvard Law School Press Release) .  Beyond the classroom, " [t) he 
Olin Center supports more than twenty John M. Olin Fellows each year to conduct 
research on topics ranging from corporate governance to prenuptial agreements." [d. 
Much of the sponsored scholarship has involved the application of economic analysis 
to controversial issues, including Professor Kip Viscusi 's criticism of tobacco and 
smoking regulation. /d.; see also VISCUSI, supra note 15 ,  at 1 45 (arguing that 
government policy "should not be to deter smoking but to provide information 
concerning the valiety of smoking hazards" so that consumers can make their own 
choice) .  
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$ 1 .9 million grant,50S and the University of Chicago Law School 's 
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics was in the middle of a 
six-year, $2.5 million grant.5ml In May 2003, Harvard received another 
grant from the Olin Foundation, this time for $10 million, "the largest 
foundation grant in the law school 's 186-year history."slO 
Olin money, as we will describe in more detail in subsequent 
work, has a significant influence not only in encouraging certain 
types of scholarship,5 I l  but also in increasing the credibility of that 
scholarship. It establishes "centers" dedicated to law and economics 
theory, provides funding for journals through which law and 
economics scholarship can be stamped with the legitimacy of "peer 
review" by other legal economists, finances a series of workshops to 
encourage efficiency-oriented scholars to share and test their views at 
elite law schools, and gives scholarships and fellowships to top law 
students who participate in law and economics seminars and produce 
law and economics scholarship.512 In short, Olin money has helped 
to create and advance a critical mass of legal scholars, who begin 
with the strong dispositionist axioms of neoclassical economics, who 
write largely for one another and policymakers, and who view 
themselves (and are viewed by many others) as the only genuinely 
social scientific members of the legal academy. 
The success of the Olin Foundation's funding of law and 
economics seems fairly dramatic. Professor Steven Shave II , the 
director of Harvard Law School's Olin Program, recently provided 
one measure of that achievement. Professor Shavell surveyed the 
academic appointments at the "top 10" law schools over the last 
508 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc. , Schedule of Grants, 1999: 1', at http://ww. 
jmof.org/grants/1999y.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) . 
509 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Schedule of Grants, 1999: U. at http://ww. 
jmof.org/grants/1999u.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) . 
510 Harvard Law School Press Release, supra note 507. The gift is a testament to 
the great success of the Center in achieving the goals of the Olin Foundation. In the 
words of James Piereson, executive director of the Olin Foundation, " [t] he school has 
made an impressive commitment to the field of law and economics and has created a 
very strong program of teaching and research. We hope this gift will enable the school 
to build on this record of success.» Id. 
5 1 1  For a recent critique of the John M. Olin Foundation's neoconservative 
influence in law schools, see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 505, at 74 77. 
o l"  SOlll', supra note 505, at 5 6, 1 40 41 .  Not all institutions have accepted the 
Olin Foundation's handouts. "A short lived program in Law and Economics was 
offered at UCLA during the 1980s, but was abandoned after a curriculum committee 
found that the program was 'taking advantage of students' financial need to 
indoctrinate them with a particular ideology. ' "  SOLEY, supra note 505, at 137, 140 
(quoting UCLA curriculum committee) . 
2003] THE SITUA TION 275 
decade.513 Of forty-three total placements, he found that, twenty­
three were Harvard Law School graduates, and ten of those had been 
Olin fellows.514 As Professor Shavell told the Boston Globe, " [i ] n  the 
long run, we're going to have a heck of an impact on who's teaching 
at the leading law schools, and what the students are learning.,,515 
We would go further. The Olin Foundation and the law and 
economics scholarship that it has subsidized have already had "a heck 
of an impact." Indeed, the scholarly project that the Olin money has 
sponsored is the same project that is widely understood today to be 
the dominant paradigm for policy analysis.516 Professor Shavell has 
emphasized that the economic analysis of law "has changed the 
nature of legal scholarship, influenced legal practice, and already 
proven its tremendous value in policymaking and business."sli 
Furthermore , the Olin Foundation 's Board of Trustees recently 
declared that their contributions have "supported a wide range of 
scholars and writers who significantly changed the content and 
direction of American academic and political discussion.,,518 
Of course, the fact that the Olin Foundation poured millions of 
dollars into promoting law and economics does not necessarily imply 
that those investments played a significant causal role in the stunning 
success of the now-dominant paradigm. It may be, as most of its 
proponents presume, that law and economics was destined for 
greatness solely on the merits, and that Olin money simply facilitated 
an inevitable process that was already underway.5 19 
a. A market test 
There are several reasons to suspect, however, that the Olin 
Foundation 's support, combined with numerous other situational 
influences, has played a pivotal causal role in the success of the law 
and economics movement. First, the success of law and economics 
appears to map closely with the precise ambitions and strategies of 
5 1 3  See Thomas C. Palmer Jr. , The Right to Self-Destruct, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Apr. 
29, 2001 ,  at Dl (discussing Shavell's work in the context of the Olin Foundation 's 
impending dissolution) .  
5 1 4  [d. at  D3. 
515 [d. 
5 16 See supra text accompanying notes 57 64. 
517 Olin Gift nxpands Law and Economics at HLS, supra note 507, at 30. 
5 18 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Board Resolution (Sept. 20, 2000),  available at 
http://wwJmof.org/wes.htm. 
519 See supra text accompanying notes 68 81 .  
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the key individuals behind the Olin Foundation: John Olin ,  the 
founder of the organization,  and William Simon, its longtime 
president. Mter leaving his position as Treasury Secretary in the 
Nixon and Ford Administrations, Simon wrote two best-selling books 
that outlined his conservative and pro-commercial beliefs and his 
agenda for implementing them.520 Simon was a prominent, early 
exponent of the dispositionist, neoliberal worldview that seeks to 
promote private enterprise and to mInImize the role of 
government-a worldview shared by John Olin. They also shared a 
belief that American universities at the time produced ideas and 
graduates that were dangerously antithetical to those ends. To 
Simon, this problem was tantamount to a war of liberty versus 
totalitarianism-a war with three fronts: 
1 .  Funds generated by business . . .  must rush by multimillions to 
the aid of liberty, in the many places where it is beleaguered . 
. . . [Foundations established by such funds must] seIVe explicitly as 
intellectual refuges for the non egalitarian scholars and writers in our 
society who today work largely alone in the face of overwhelming 
indifference or hostility. They must be given grants, grants, and more 
grants in exchange for books, books, and more books. 
2 .  Business must cease the mindless subsidizing o f  colleges and 
universities whose departments of economics, government, politics and 
history are hostile to capitalism and whose faculties will not hire 
scholars whose views are otherwise . 
. . . America's major universities are today churning out young 
collectivists by legions, and it is irrational for businessmen to support 
them. 
3.  Finally, business money must flow . . .  to media which are either 
pro freedom or, if not necessarily 'pro-business,' at least professionally 
capable of a fair and accurate treatment of procapitalist ideas, values 
and arguments. The judgment of this fairness is to be made by 
businessmen alone-it is their money that they are investing. 
These are the three fronts on which to act aggressively if we are to 
create a sophisticated counter-force to the rising despotism. One of my 
own first actions on leaving the post of Secretary of the Treasury was to 
accept the job of president of the John N. [sic] Olin Foundation,  whose 
520 WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH (Berkley Books 1979) ( 1978) 
[hereinafter SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH] ;  WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR ACTION 
( 1 980) . 
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purp ose is to support those individuals and institutions who are 
working to strengthen the free enterprise system.
521 
277 
Thus, Simon, with the support of the Olin Foundation, was trying 
to alter the playing field on which academic debate takes place-and 
trying to do so situationally. Furthermore, he understood that the 
dispositionism of law and economics is pro-business and that many 
alternative views, otherwise successful in the marketplace of ideas, are 
not. Simon presented American individualism, much as ad agencies 
presented the Marlboro Man, as the American tradition and the 
source of America's greatness. However, like the Marlboro Man's 
creators, Simon seemed to appreciate that such individualism, to be 
embraced as deeply as Philip Morris, Simon, and others desired, had 
to be heavily promoted, and reinforced if it is to be widely accepted. 
And he further understood that the situation can and should be 
manipulated by, among other things, choosing particular academics, 
programs, and scholarly camps to give "grants, grants, and more 
grants in exchange for books, books, and more books.
,,522 
In light of Simon's (and thus the Olin Foundation's) pro­
business mission, there is good reason to believe that the Olin 
Foundation's sizeable l aw and economics investment was money 
well spent. The point is strengthened when one considers that the 
Foundation engaged in a kind of "stage financing" of these 
programs: grants were intended to last for only a few years, at which 
point the Foundation would consider whether to renew its 
contribution to a particular program.523 The fact that the Founda-
521 SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH, supra note 520, at 246-50. 
522 Id. at 247. 
523 We suspect that such financing arrangements may have had some influence 
over the kind of work that was produced under the auspices of each program, just as 
economists generally tend to assume that such financing arrangements can have 
incentive effects over those subject to them. See, e.g. , Francesca Cornelli & Oved 
Yosha, Stage FinanCing and the Role of Convertible Securities, 70 REv. ECON. STUD. 1 
(concluding that venture capital financing can affect the short term behavior of the 
entrepreneur) ; see also Paul A. Compers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging 
of Venture Capital, 50 J. F I N .  1 461 , 1 461  ( 1995) (" [T]he staging of capital infusions 
allows venture capitalists to gather information and monitor the progress of firms, 
maintaining the option to periodically abandon projects."). 
John M.  Olin, having witnessed the leftward trend of the Ford Foundation 
during the 1 960s and 1970s, specified that al l resources of the Olin Foundation 
were to be spent  within one generation of his death in order to prevent  its co­
option. Shawn Zeller, Conservative Crusaders, 35 NAT'L J. 1 286, 1 290 91 (2003) . 
Although currently allocating the remaining assets of the Foundation, with the 
idea of closing down by 2005, the Olin board may be making further 
arrangements to ensure that Olin's goals are not disappointed. In the same 
278 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LA W  REVIEW [Vol. 152: 1 29 
tion continued to renew many grants provides strong evidence that i t  
believed that i ts investments were generating worthwhile returns 
in terms of encouraging pro-commercial worldviews (and discourag­
ing alternatives) among students, academics, and policymakers.524 
b. Re-imagining the marketplace of ideas 
This leads to a second general reason to suspect that Olin's 
investments have played a critical causal role in the success of law 
and economics. As we noted at the outset of this Article, the 
dominance of law and economics is puzzling when one attempts to 
make sense of it without considering situational forces. Law and 
economics has been subject to many (largely unanswered) criticisms 
by extraordinarily respected legal academics, and its success seems to 
have surprised both its critics and some of its proponents.525 If the 
success of law and economics does not square easily with the 
idealized image of a neutral tournament of ideas, then that raises the 
possibility that its success reflects some largely unseen situational 
influences. 
To advance this argument further, we ask the reader to consider 
how to answer the following question:  which bird, species A or 
species B , has been more successful in the evolutionary process 
of natural selection? If you are like us, we suspect  that your 
first thought would be to compare the relative numbers of the 
two birds. With a l i ttle more time, you might decide that you 
would also like to know about relative sizes since at equilibrium 
the environment could probably sustain fewer large birds than 
small birds. Controlling for habitat needs you would seem to 
have a simple,  but  fairly accurate , measurement process. 
Now let us make the question a little more concrete: which bird, 
the bald eagle or the chicken, has been more successful in the 
evolutionary process of natural selection? Shall we do the math? 
There are approximately 70,000 bald eagles in North America, a 
statement detailing the $ 1 0  million grant to H arvard Law School, the Center for 
Law, Economics and Business announced that an "external advisory committee" 
was being set up "to assist the faculty in guiding its programs" in the future. 
Harvard Law School Press Release, supra note 507. While the structure of the 
committee has not yet been discussed, it seems likely that one purpose of the 
committee will be to serve as a substitute for stage-financing. 
524 See supra note 5 1 0  and text accompanying note 5] 8 (providing more direct 
evidence that the Foundation's leaders believe that their efforts have been successful) . 
525 See supra text accompanying notes 35-64. 
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number that is up considerably in recent years following the bald 
eagle's near extinction.',26 It is a little harder to know just how many 
chickens there are in this country at any given moment, but our rough 
calculations put the number somewhere between 1 . 75 and 2 billion.527 
That means that for every bald eagle there are twenty to thirty 
thousand chickens. 
Even discounting the figure slightly to take into account the 
eagle's larger size and habitat requirements, the numbers are clear: 
the standard farm chicken is the bald eagle's evolutionary superior. 
But that finding seems absurd. We know the bald eagle as our 
national bird, a symbol of strength and power. Eagles are 
extremely well adapted for survival in nature, given their superb 
flying, hunting, and nest-building abilities.528 For centuries, bald 
eagles thrived, and according to one history, they may have once 
numbered half a million.529 
They existed along the Atlantic from Labrador to the tip of south 
Florida, and along the Pacific from Baja California to Alaska. They 
inhabited every large river and concentration of lakes within North 
America. They nested in forty five of the lower forty-eight states. One 
researcher estimated an eagle nest for every mile of shore along 
526 Hope Rutledge, American Bald Eagle Information, at http://www.Baldeagle 
info.com (last updated Aug. 26, 2003).  
527 There are two general categories of chickens: "broilers," which are raised and 
slaughtered for meat, and "layers," whose primary purpose is to produce eggs. 
Livestock, Env't & Dev't Initiative, Poultry Production (Broilers and Layers), at 
http://lead.virtualcenter.org/en/ dec/toolbox/Indust/IndPProd.htm (last visited Oct. 
26, 2003) . Approximately 8.5 billion broilers were slaughtered in the United States in 
200 1 .  NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRlC., POULTRY SLAUGHTER: 
2001 A.,'<NUAL SUMMARY 2 (2002) ,  available at http://jan.mannlib.comell.edu/ 
reports/nassr/poultry/ppy bban/pslaan02.pdf. Assuming that broilers have an 
industry life expectancy of approximately two months, the number of broilers existing 
at any one moment is something close to 1 .5 billion. See Save Animals From 
Experiments (SAFE) ,  Profiling New Zealand 's Shameful 'Clean, Green Living', at 
http://www.safe.org.nz/campaigns/factory/animalprofles.php (last visited Oct. 25, 
2003).  Their actual life expectancy-if they were not slaughtered-would be fifteen 
to twenty years. Id. There are approximately 337 million layers alive at any one time. 
NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRlC., CHICKENS AND EGGS: 2002 
SUMMARY 1 (2003) available at http://jan.mannlib.comell.edu/reports/nassr/poultry/ 
pec bbl/lyegan03.pdf [hereinafter NAT'L AGRlc. STATISTICS SERV. , CHICKENS AND 
EGGS] . Adding broilers and layers together, the number of chickens alive at any one 
moment in this country appears to be somewhere between 1 .75 and 2 billion. 
528 NELTJE BLAl'<CHAN, BIRDS THAT HUNT AND ARE HUNTED 326 28 ( 1 905) . 
529 Hope Rutledge, History of the Bald /<'agle, at http://ww.baldeagleinfo.com/ 
eagle/eaglel 1 .html (last visited Oct. 25, 2003) .  
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Chesapeake Bay. They congregated o n  the !ower Hudson, and were 
extremely abundant along the coast of Maine. 
030 
So then we have missed something. In determining that chickens 
are more fit than eagles to withstand nature's trials and challenges, 
we have ignored critical situational influences. Why are there so 
many more chickens than eagles? The more obvious and correct 
explanation is that humans value chickens in a way that they have 
not valued bald eagles. 
Indeed, there are robust markets in both chickens and eggs.53l 
According to a recent industry-sponsored survey, Americans con­
sume, on average, eighty-one pounds of chicken per year-a figure 
that appears to be going up and that represents "the highest per­
capita consumption of any of the major meats. ,,532 They also consume 
approximately 260 eggs per year.533 Unsurprisingly, market pressures 
ensure that there are many chickens alive at any given moment. 
Well, if bald eagles are so fit, why did they nearly go extinct and 
why are there still so few of them? The following history of the bald 
eagle helps to shed light on a different sort of situational influence 
on the bald eagles' stature than is imagined in any idealized, 
unrealistic "natural selection" script. 
There is no single cause for the decline in the bald eagle 
population. When Europeans first arrived on this continent, bald 
eagles were fairly common. As the human population grew, the eagle 
population declined. The food supplies for eagles decreased, because 
the people hunted and fished over a broad area. Essentially, eagles 
and humans competed for the same food, and humans, with weapons 
530 Id. 
531 We have been unable to ascertain which came first. 
532 Press Release, Nat'l Chicken Council & U.S. Poultry & Egg Ass'n, Boom in 
Chicken Consumption Has Room to Grow (May 1 ,  2000) , available at http://www. 
eatchicken.com/statistics/pr_050100.cfm. According to John Bekkers, chairman of 
the National Chicken Council, one important reason for the growing "success" of 
chicken is its convenience. Id. "'The simple fact is that chicken fits, better than any 
other meat, the hectic, harried, time crunched lifestyle that so many people lead 
toda(" Id. (quoting Sekkers). 
033 American Egg Soard, Egg Consumption Through the Year, at http://www.aeb.org/ 
eggstravaganza/egg-consumption.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2003);  see also INT'L EGG 
COMM 'N , INTERNATIONAL EGG MARKET: REPORT NO. 67 (2002) (finding per 
capita egg consumption in  the United States was 251 .8 in 2000 and 252.6 in 
200 1 ) ,  available at http://www.internationalegg.com/html/reports/report67 / 
1 usa. pdf. There is a striking similarity between the 252 eggs consumed per person 
and the 256 eggs produced by the average laying chicken. See NAT'L AGRIc. 
STATISTICS SERV. , CHICKEN AND EGGS, supra note 527, at 1 (providing estimate for 
average laying chicken) . 
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at their disposal, had the advantage. As the human population 
expanded westward, the natural habitat of the eagles was destroyed, 
leaving them fewer places to nest and hunt, which caused the 
population of bald eagles to decline sharply by the late 1 800s. 
By the 1 930s, people became aware of the diminishing bald eagle 
population, and in 1 940 the Bald Eagle Act was passed. This reduced 
the harassment by humans, and eagle populations began to recover. 
However, at the same time DDT and other pesticides began to be 
widely used. Pesticides sprayed on plants were eaten by small animals, 
which were later consumed by birds of prey. The DDT poison harmed 
both the adult birds and the eggs that they laid . . . . 
More than 1 00,000 bald eagles were killed in Alaska from 1 9 1 7  to 
1 953. Alaskan sal,!!on fisherm [e] n feared they were a threat to the 
salmon population."34 
281 
According to that history, the threat to eagles was not that they 
were ill-equipped to survive in nature, but that their success as a 
species did not appear to serve the interests of humans. Indeed, the 
eagles competed with human interests, including commercial 
interests. 
As a result, the grand, and once ubiquitous, bald eagle was 
pushed toward extinction. Meanwhile, chickens were raised in huge 
numbers to meet the increasing demand for their eggs and meat. 
The relative success of chickens over bald eagles, then, has little to 
do with the survival of the fittest and a lot to do with "the survival of 
the tastiest" or "the survival of the profittest." 
In light of that competition among birds, look again at how legal 
scholars tend to measure the success of various schools of thought. 
As we reviewed earlier, legal academics generally assume that they 
are competing in some neutral tournament wherein ideas evolve and 
good ideas become more prominent while bad ideas disappear.53f' 
According to this view, the tournament benefits the outside world by 
generating and announcing the winning ideas, which are then relied 
upon to help make effective and desirable policy. Thus, when some 
ideas are more commonly accepted, are attracting larger audiences 
and are having more influence outside of law schools, the 
assumption is often that those ideas, like the bald eagle, soar above 
their ground-bound, clucking competitors. 
But here is the problem: the competition among ideas may have 
much in common with the imagined competition between chickens 
,,34 Rutledge, supra note 530. 
53', See supra text accompanying notes 1 2-18 (discussing the presumption that law 
and economics emerges from a level playing field in a tournament of ideas) .  
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and eagles. That is, in both contexts there appear to be very 
significant demand-side factors that help determine which ideas will 
be most prevalent and seemingly most successful. For reasons that 
we have already highlighted, the "winners" will be those ideas that 
are valuable to the more influential participants on the demand-side 
of the marketplace-specifically, pro-commercial interests. 
With that in mind, consider again how legal economists measure 
their own success. Richard Posner writes: 
Economic analysis of law has grown rapidly, has become the largest, 
most pervasive interdisciplinary field of legal studies in the history of 
American law, has palpably influenced the practice of law and judicial 
decisions, has launched lucrative consulting spin-offs, has spawned 
courses and textbooks in economic analysis of law, has influenced 
legislation (economic analysts of law played an important role in the 
deregulation movement) , has made it de rigueur for law schools of the 
first and second ranks to have one or more economists on their faculty, 
has seeded a number of its practitioners in university administration 
and the federal judiciary, and .has now crossed the Atlantic and begun 
making rapid gains in Europe."3
6 
Similarly, recall legal economist Thomas Ulen's brief history of 
the triumph of law and economics: 
Law and economics has been one of the most successful innovations 
in the legal academy in the last century. This intellectual revolution 
began modestly in the 1960s and 1 9 70s with a few important and 
innovative articles and a comprehensive, masterful text that showed the 
possibilities of the field. Then, in the 1 980s the field exploded into 
respectability and prominence-becoming a regular course in the 
curricula of the best law schools, a vibrant legal research style that 
figured in a torrent of important books and articles, a force that 
transformed many faculty from exclusive practitioners of traditional 
doctrinal research to a more social-science-oriented research, and a 
substantial justification for important public policy changes. By the 
early 1990s, economic analysis suffused a modern legal  education, even 
one devoid of an explicit course in law and economics.o37 
Posner and Ulen make no mention, and seem to have no 
conception, of the role played by outside forces in creating the 
appearance of successful ideas. Posner emphasizes the "rapid 
536 Posner, supra note 1 1 ,  at 275; see also POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 13, at 35 
("It is not merely an ivory-towered enterprise, especially in the United States, where 
the law and economics movement has influenced legal reform in such fields as 
antitrust law, the regulation of public utilities and common carriers, environmental 
regulation, [and] the calculation of damages in personal injury suits . . . .  ") .  
537 Ulen, supra note 69, a t  434. 
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growth" of the discipline just as Ulen notes the field's "explosion" in 
the 1980s. But neither seems mindful of possible situational contri­
butions to that explosive growth, much less the fact that it occurred 
in the 1980s when the Olin Foundation began to invest significantly 
in sponsoring various law and economics programs.[·38 Posner speaks 
of the "spawning courses and casebooks," while Ulen comments on 
the "torrent of important books and articles." But neither mentions 
that the Olin Foundation's  targeted efforts encouraged such a 
. d h h "  d ,,539 spawnmg an a torrent t roug grants, grants, an more grants. 
Posner recognizes the "lucrative" consulting opportunities created by 
law and economics, without considering what makes the ideas so 
lucrative in the first place or what those lucrative opportunities may 
indicate about why the school of thought is thriving. Ulen 
emphasizes that law and economics provides a "substantial 
justification for important public policy changes,,,54o and Posner 
highlights, more specifically, the fact that "economic analysts of law 
played an important role in the deregulation movement.,,541 But 
neither seems to notice just how valuable that justification for 
deregulation is to large commercial interests or how it lines up with 
the specific pro-market and deregulatory planks of the Olin 
Foundation's mission. Ulen notes that "economic analysis suffuse [s] 
a modern legal education,,,542 while Posner maintains that it "has 
palpably influenced the practice of law and judicial decisions . . .  
[ and] legislation.,,543 But neither considers that such profound ef­
fects might well have been the precise ambition of powerful 
individuals, entities, and groups in our society with the means to 
influence those important institutions through the situation. 
In short, as we stated at the outset of this Article , there appears 
to be a blindness to situational influences over legal scholarship. 
And Posner and Ulen are by no means unusual in falling subject to 
this fundamental attribution error. Even the staunchest critics of law 
and economics rarely, if ever, consider, much less challenge, its situ­
ational advantages. 
538 See, e.g. ,  SOLEY, supra note 505, at 1 37-40 (discussing various grants made by the 
Olin Foundation to programs of law and economics in the late 1980s) .  
539 See supra text accompanying notes 521 22; SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH, supra 
note 520, at 247. 
[.40 Ulen, supra note 69, at 434. 
54\ Posner, supra note 1 1 , at 275. 
542 Ulen, supra note 69, at 434. 
543 Posner, supra note 1 1 ,  at 275. 
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As we have been arguing, however, the situation is often as 
significant as it is invisible. Where Posner, Ulen, and most legal 
scholars tend to see a marketplace of ideas in which supply-side 
participants determine the winners, we see a marketplace of ideas in 
which demand-side actors are wielding an immense, unseen 
influence over the playing field and, in tum, the winners. Where 
Posner, Ulen, and most other legal scholars see a neutral, fair (and 
perhaps even natural) competitive process separating the fit from the 
unfit, we see large numbers of chickens, ensconced in elaborate 
institutions devoted to promoting the birds' growth and productivity 
for a particular end-an end that has little to do with a robust and fair 
tournament of ideas. 
We opened this Article asking why legal economists have tended 
not to apply their own sort of market analysis to help them 
understand their success. We posited several explanations, which we 
have expanded on slightly in this Section. Before moving on, we 
want to emphasize that we perceive ourselves to be providing what 
legal economists have not: a type of economic analysis of the 
economic analysis of law. The claim that legal academia is deeply 
captured strikes us as consonant, not only with Stigler's shallow 
capture theory, but also with the sort of "consumer sovereignty" 
arguments that inform the vast majority of legal-economic analyses. 
We end this Part with several assertions. First, the deep capture 
of legal academia is the result of far more situational influences than 
just those created by the Olin Foundation's funding efforts. Second, 
the consequences of the deep capture of legal academia are many, 
varied, and immense. And, third, the deep capture of legal 
academia is, we believe, only a small, though important, part of a 
much more comprehensive web of situational influence over 
"regulatory" institutions in this country and, increasingly, around the 
world. Evidence for those assertions is, again, the subject of future 
work. 
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VII. A THEORY OF ArrRIBUTIONAL PRESUMPTIONS 
I started with the belief that every person who came to the laboratory was free to 
accept or to reject the dictates of authority. This view sustains a conception of 
human dignity insofar as it sees in each man a capacity for choosing his own 
behavior. And as it turned out, many subjects did, indeed, choose to reject the 
experimenter's commands, providing a powerful af irmation of human ideals. 
-Stanley Milgram5
44 
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We have argued that law and economics is highly dispositionist545 
and that its success in legal academia and in policymaking has been a 
function of the situational demand for such a dispositionist theory. 
In that way, the exterior situation of the market for legal-policy 
theory has strongly promoted law and economics because of its 
generally pro-commercial dispositionist assumptions and analyses.  
As we noted at the outset, however, the misbegotten attributional 
tendencies that we are highlighting in this Article are by no means 
limited to legal economists. The dispositionism of human beings is 
fairly universal-though the particular contours of its manifestation 
vary across cultures, groups, individuals, and situations. The funda­
mental attribution error is just that-a strong tendency in all humans 
to see only the most salient, moving features of our exteriors and 
interiors, like the sun moving across the sky, or our own behavior in 
a moment, and to attribute cause and agency to what we see. This 
urge to downplay the rest is an animalian tendency. Thus, dis­
positionalizing legal economists as dispositionists, while maintaining 
the view that the rest of us are not, would only repeat that error. We 
are all, because of our shared interior situation, more or less 
disposi ti onis ts. 
It is important that we are not misunderstood. The phrase 
"more or less" in the last sentence is key. Our thesis is not that all of 
us (or that any of us) are wholly dispositionist, unable in any 
circumstance to recognize the possible role of the situation behind 
people's behavior.546 Neither do we assert that all of us (or any of us) 
544 Stanley Milgram, Issues in the Study of Obedience: A Reply to Baumrind, 19 AM. 
PSVCHOL. 848, 851 ( 1964) .  545 See supra Part I .B (introducing the idea that legal economists have 
overestimated the role of dispositional influences on their success). 546 As emphasized above, cultural causal schemes, motives and other variables 
influence the degree to which groups and individuals tend to appreciate the situation. 
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are wholly situational, unable to act according to our own 
preferences or attitudes and entirely driven by unseen forces. We 
believe that we are all both dispositionists and situationists in 
construing our world and that we are all, in fact, both dispositional 
and situational. 
Recognizing the significance of the situation does not imply that 
disposition is irrelevant. Disposition often plays some role, and 
sometimes a quite important role, in people's behavior. Indeed, 
even in Milgram's famous demonstration of the power of the 
situation, a sizeable minority (and, in some renditions, a clear 
majority) of subjects refused to obey the experimenter's instructions 
to continue the shocking.547 Moreover, if situational considerations 
are substantial, stable, and consistent enough, the dispositional 
assumption may become a more reliable heuristic for understanding 
our world.548 
If dispositions can in fact play a major situation-independent role 
in a person's behavior, or if the "as if' dispositional assumption can 
sometimes be justified, then the question emerges: is the 
fundamental attribution error really so important in legal questions, 
in theory, in practice, and in social debate? Should policymakers 
and policy theorists really concern themselves with it? 
We have already begun our answer to that question in this 
introductory Article and will continue to do so in subsequent articles. 
Our answer has numerous components, including what follows here. 
The tendency to see disposition and overestimate its significance, 
while missing the situation or underappreciating its effect, is quite 
robust. When the situation is observed, it is usually only a small, 
particularly salient piece of the whole. Furthermore, the way an issue 
is framed-as dispositional or situational-can have an immense 
effect on what attributions people make about behavior. Here is 
See supra text accompanying notes 41 5 23 (noting corporate motivation and cultural 
variations in disposition ism) . 
547 See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 35 tbl.2 (identifying 
the various percentages of subjects who refused to obey) . 
548 And so it is that we treat corporations as having a set of stable preferences that 
they pursue systematically over time. There is a strong and stable set of situational 
forces, including corporate law, regulatory law, the single maximand of profit, and 
the markets for products, managers, and capital. These fairly consistent situational 
influences may allow for a relatively precise dispositionist perspective on corporate 
behavior. See supra notes 253 54 and accompanying text (discussing how situational 
forces make corporations behave as if their primary goal is profit maximization) .  Still, 
we would caution that a more realistic analysis of corporate conduct is in order, a task 
that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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where deep capture comes in: the framing of an issue is one of the 
situational factors that can be disproportionately influenced by those 
with the motive and power to do so. We have argued that those in 
power have significant stakes in promoting, among other things, a 
generally dispositionist framing of an issue. Those stakes have, 
indeed, led to investments attempting to influence the situation, 
including the production and distribution of legal-theoretic 
knowledge that is strongly dispositionist in orientation. Taken to­
gether, those elements suggest that the fundamental attribution 
error is playing an immense and influential role in our policymakers' 
worldviews and in their policies. 
Our thesis can thus be understood as a positive theory intended 
to explain our presumptions about where the threshold between 
disposition and situation lies and how high it stands. When do we 
recognize the role of situation? And what portion of the situation 
will we tend to acknowledge? Thus far, our primary focus has been 
on describing, understanding, and critiquing the attributional 
presumptions of law and economics. Our argument has been that 
law and economics scholars recognize only a tiny portion-that is, 
just  a few of the most salient features-of the situation. We have 
focused primarily on that theory, in part, because of its preeminence 
and, in part, because we believe that its success both reflects and 
critically reinforces deep capture. But our thesis has implications for 
legal theory and for laws and policies that seem well outside the 
purview of law and economics. In fact, the ubiquity of dispositionism 
in our legal theories and laws likely facilitates the reception of law 
and economics's more formal, axiomatic rendition. 
A. Legal-Theoretic Presumptions 
In this Section, we want to suggest how the fundamental 
attribution error leads to dispositionist presumptions, not just in law 
and economics, but also in other mainstream legal theories, and in 
social policies that reflect such theories. Though we believe this 
problem can be seen in many, if not all, areas of contemporary legal 
scholarship, it  suffices for our introductory purposes to illustrate the 
point with reference to a familiar and important common law 
subject: contract law.549 Consider the power of dispositionism 
549 In an excellent article that we discovered only as this one was in its very final 
stage, Lee Ross (the same Lee Ross whose work we have relied on throughout) and 
Donna Shestowsky have recently considered the implications of situation ism for 
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lurking even in traditional, that is to say non-economic, scholarship 
in contract law. 
1 .  The Classical Theory of Contract 
In his influential work, Contract as Promise,550 Professor Charles 
Fried builds his case for a classical will theory of contract on a 
foundation of positive presumptions steeped in dispositionism.',51 
For theorists like Fried,  a contract represents the legal 
manifestation of "autonomous self-determination.,,552 Contracting is, 
from that perspective, a quintessential expression of individual 
freedom. So central is the concept of autonomy in the classical will 
theory of contract that, for Fried, it provides the very basis of moral 
authority for the principle of contractual obligation. "The moral 
force behind contract as promise is autonomy: the parties are bound 
to their contract because they have chosen to be. ,,553 
Fried appreciates that, to sustain this view of contracts, we must 
be confident that the choices embodied in contracts do, in fact, 
represent the expression of the individual wills of the parties 
involved. How can the traditional contract theorist be certain that 
disposition is behind contractual decision making and not situation? 
Enter the doctrine of duress.554 In his attempt to explain modem 
contract doctrines through his will theory, Fried insightfully 
acknowledges that, far from playing an outcast or ancillary role in 
conventional contract theory, the doctrine of duress and its 
criminal law. See Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contempora1Y Psychology s Challenges to 
Legal Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 108 1 ,  1 100 14 (2003) .  Their focus on 
criminal law provides a useful complement to our analysis of contract law and confirms 
our belief that disposition ism infects most, perhaps all, areas of law. Their article also 
usefuIly considers some of the possible policy implications of situationism for criminal 
law. ld. 
550 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLI
GATION ( 1981 ) .  
551 See id. at  2 ("The regime of contract law, which respects the dispositions 
individuals make of their rights, carries to its natural conclusion the liberal premise 
that individuals have rights. And the will theory of contract, which sees contractual 
obligations as essentially self imposed, is a fair implication of liberal individualism." 
(footnotes omitted) ) .  
,,52 ld. a t  94. 
5[,:1 ld. at 57. 
554 Fried also addresses related areas of contract law such as mistake and 
unconscionability. Many of his argument� are overlapping and we believe that our 
observations here readily apply to these related areas as weIl. See id. at 58-63, 103-09. 
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counterparts are central.5:,5 According to Fried, "these doctrines 
perform distinct functions that are not only compatible with the 
concept of contract as promise but even essential to it. ,,5"'; Put in our 
terms, Fried's treatment of the doctrine of duress plays an essential 
part in defining the depth of his theory's dispositionism. 
It runs deep. As he begins his discussion of duress, Fried never 
questions the basic dispositionist conception of the contracting 
agent. Duress is only identified as something that thwarts or exploits 
a will that remains exogenous to the duress: 
Certain contracts are claimed to be unfair although the parties 
entered into them with their eyes open . 
. . . The victim of duress is all too aware of what is happening and 
what will happen to him. Duress relates not to rationality or cognition 
but to freedom or volition . . . .  [Contract as promise] excludes cases in 
which a person 's asse nt is not voluntary. If I am hypnotized into 
signing a contract or if my hand is m�yed by another to make a mark 
signifying assent, I have not promised."'" 
With such a starting point, only the most salient kinds of 
situations, and not necessarily the most powerful, will find their way 
into the doctrine of duress. Fried acknowledges that the forced 
signature and the hypnotized nod are just "gross instances of 
involuntary apparent assent" and claims that there are, in fact, 
"many kinds of situations in which it does not seem right to treat a 
knowing act of agreement as binding because in one way or another it 
is felt that there was no fair choice.,,558 But this concession is not an 
"open-ended invitation [ ]  to rearrange the understandings people 
have reached.""s9 Indeed, Fried goes on to map a precise and rather 
closed-ended set of situations that may, consistent with the will theory 
of contract, be treated as constituting duress.56o 
Keeping close to the case law (as he must to sustain his project of 
both explaining and justifying modern contract law) , Fried 
recognizes only the most salient kinds of situational impediments as 
creating duress. The clearest case for Fried, beyond the two above, is 
555 [d. at 93. 
5:16 [d. 
557 [d. at 92 93 (footnote omitted) . 
558 [d. at 93 94. 
5:,9 [d. at 93. 560 See, e.g. , id. at 95-96 (offering examples of duress and noting that duress is 
characterized by a high degree of coercion ) .  
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that now familiar trope-the gun to the head: "An armed robber 
threatens his victim on a dark and lonely street: 'Your money or 
your life. ",:,Gl 
Fried explains that what is troubling about this case is not that 
there is no choice, for clearly there is: " [  t] he shrewd and brave man 
who hands his wallet over to an armed robber makes a calculated 
decision. ,,562 Rather, what is at issue is the fairness of the choice.563 
To fashion a principle through which to apply the doctrine of duress 
in more difficult cases and across the sweep of contract law requires, 
Fried concludes, a normative determination about what is a fair 
choice.564 For Fried, then, the doctrine of duress may be managed by 
his theory of rights :  " [a] proposal is not coercive if it offers what the 
proponent has a right to offer or not as he chooses. ,,565 
This righ ts analysis generates for Fried a relatively clear view of 
the parameters of duress. Because the robber has no right to threat­
en your life to get your money, contracts made in such situations are 
not enforced. But, at the other end of this spectrum, merchants 
have a right to offer their wares on extremely onerous terms, so 
contracts entered with them should be enforced. Our present 
concern is not so much with showing why we disagree with this 
particular doctrinal conclusion, but in demonstrating the narrow 
dispositionist direction that the analysis has taken. Fried began with 
a case in which the threatening situation was not only extremely 
conspicuous, but where the element of choice was also clear. In 
looking beyond that extreme case for a general theory of duress, 
Fried presumes that the same basic function of dispositional choice 
remains in place.566 This dispositionism blinds the theory to the 
enormous power of the situation. It ignores the fact that 
situation shapes the very thoughts and behavior that manifest as the 
561 Id. at 95. 
562 /d. at 94. 
f,63 See id. at 5 ("For promissory obligations to be truly self imposed, the promise 
must have been freely given. If this means no more than that the promisor acted 
intentionally, then even an undertaking in response to a gunman's threat is 
binding.") . 
564 See id. at 97 ( "These conundrums should be sufficient to show that we cannot 
escape using some normative criterion to distinguish offers from threats.") . 
�65 Id. 
566 In a footnote, Fried dismisses one source of opposition to the dispositional 
presumption. "Sometimes it is said that poor people do not understand contractual 
provisions or are unable to calculate risks rationally. Such arguments are often 
patronizing as well as paternalistic. V'I'here they are valid, the doctrine of mistake 
offers some relief." [d. at 105 n.*.  
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choices Fried crowns with a dispositionist presumption. For us, an 
inquiry, which is clearly called for but wholly unanswered by this kind 
of classical will theory, is whether and in what way the situation 
influences choice. 
Fried concludes his analysis without ever moving beyond the 
"conundrums" raised by the most salient kinds of situational forces 
-that is, beyond those "bad acts,,567 that can fit within the basic 
dispositionist framework. In an interesting parallel with economic 
theorists, the closest Fried gets to taking up the situation on a 
broader scale i s  with respect to poverty-when people do not have 
enough money to properly manifest an otherwise disposition ally 
determined Will.568 However, Fried, like the contract law he describes, 
is very hesitant to allow the doctrine of duress to play much part in 
ameliorating the challenges posed by that kind of situationist 
consideration. Keeping the doctrine of duress from undermining 
"the moral status of calculated choices as embodied in bargains" is "a 
make-or-break challenge to the liberal economic theory of the 
market.,,569 It is a threat to the regime of "free men freely • ,,570 contracttng. 
To the extent that poverty remains a situation in need of 
attention, Fried offers what is also a familiar riposte, that the 
situation should be handled by the tax-and-transfer system, not 
contract. Hence, in the end, the dispositionism that Fried begins 
with, and which he is so deeply committed to, not only drastically 
limits what kinds of situations are cognizable within the concept of 
567 Interestingly, Fried titles this section of his treatment Bad Samaritans. [d. at 
1 09. See also supra text accompanying notes 1 63 81 (reviewing a social psychological 
study replicating the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan and suggesting that 
whether or not a person will act "as if' they are a Good Samaritan may have less to do 
with the person's disposition than with the situation in which the person finds 
herself) .  
568 See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 6-29 (summarizing economists' analysis of 
the theoretical problem posed by poverty) . 
569 FRIED, supra note 550, at 94. For Fried, the slippery slope of the poverty 
situation is perilous. "If . . .  duress focuses only on the relative wealth or advantages 
of the parties to a transaction and disparities in these are held to undermine the 
voluntariness of the choice, then we might just as well redistribute directly, holding 
the rich but not the poor to their bargains." [d. 
570 [d. Cf Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 84 (describing the way the 
perception of system threat has strengthened reliance on policy schemes) ;  Hanson & 
Yosifon, supra note 30 (describing the more general phenomena as discovered by 
social psychologists) ;  infra text accompanying notes 639-97 (using Southern slavery as 
an illustration of how system threats help to promote dispositionism) . 
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duress, but also what can be done with the doctrine In those 
situations that it does recognize. 
Fried does not go much further than this with the concept of 
duress, and we need not go further here to make our basic point. 
Conventional contract theories, of which we believe Contract as 
Promise is an influential and representative example, are steeped in 
dispositionism even in those areas that purport to be most concerned 
with the situation. The lack of any critical examination of the basic 
dispositionist presumptions in such legal theories results in a 
fundamental failure to account for the role of the situation in 
shaping our conduct. It marks an abdication of any realistic inquiry 
into the basic forces shaping our own behavior beyond what 
common sense and our intuitions will provide.571 Behind this ten­
dency is the fundamental attribution error, which social psychologists 
have shown is widespread in humanity, that we have argued is at the 
core of conventional economic theory, and that, as this example 
suggests, is also robust in more traditional legal theories. 
2. The Dispositionism of Post-Classical Contract Theory 
The classical will theory of contract has been subjected to 
withering critique by generations now of "modem" or "post-classical" 
contract theorists.572 The critiques, which will not be rehashed here, 
571 Like many traditional theorists, as well as legal economists, Fried repeatedly 
takes comfort in the fact that his analysis comports with common sense. See, e.g., 
FRiED, supra note 550, at 6 ("In developing my affirmative thesis I . . .  propose to 
perennial conundrums solutions that accord with the idea of contract as promise and 
with decency and common sense as well.") ;  id. at 105 ("What needs probing is the 
notion of substantive unfairness. Analysis reveals it to be two parts sentiment and one 
part common sense." ) .  As we have been arguing, common sense with respect to the 
relative roles of disposition and the situation is fundamentally flawed. 
572 The basic legal realist analytic critique of the classical approach has been the 
claim that fundamental doctrines in contract law are far too public, and the intent of 
parties far too difficult to discern, for the will theory to explain contract. The basic 
political critique has been that so strongly privileging individual "will" in contract law 
unfairly disadvantages those without bargaining power. Both of these critiques, while 
not our focus here, are consonant with our views of both classical and modern contract 
law. The historical and intellectual movement from "classical" to "modern" contract 
theory has been a subject of sustained analysis by contract theorists. For an overview, 
see P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE A,"ID FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT ( 1 979) ;  HORWITZ, 
supra note 200, at 33-63; Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedman, Introduction, From 
"Classical" to Modem Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAw 3 (Jack 
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); see also Jay M. Feinman, Promissory A'stopel 
and judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REv. 678 (1984) (examining the development of 
promissory estoppel as one of many reforms meant to resolve the contradiction in 
classic contract theory between freedom and coercion ) .  
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share a common legacy in the American legal realist tradition, which 
provided both analytical and political reasons for doubting the 
classical approach. Our purpose here is to show that although the 
"modern" approach begins by rejecting the will theory of contract, it 
continues to embrace an unwarranted, and profoundly limiting, 
dispositionism. While the post-classical tradition has questioned the 
clarity of central concepts in classical theory, the legal realist approach 
has nevertheless held tightly to the basic tenets of dispositionism we 
have been reviewing here. Our very limited goal in this Section is to 
provide further evidence that dispositionism reaches far beyond law 
and economics in contemporary legal theory. 
We will sketch the dispositionism in modern contract theory 
through the work of Karl Llewellyn, specifically in his concept of 
"situation sense."m We take this approach for several reasons, not 
only because an article that is entitled The Situation, and that makes 
the claims we are developing here, would be remiss not to engage the 
legacy of situation sense, but also because Llewellyn'S work was 
seminal and is prototypical of the basic legal realist approach. 
Moreover, Llewellyn' s  work has been extremely influential in the post­
classical contract theories and positive law that have followed his 
work.574 
573 Of course, we will not offer a comprehensive treatment of Llewellyn 's great 
contribution to legal theory. We join a long list of commentators who have noted that 
" [al ny effort to summarize Llewellyn's elaborate theory and the importance of 
'situation sense' is bound to fall short." David Shapiro, Continuity and Change in 
Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 ,  941 n.1 03 ( 1992) . In our view, of all the 
recent efforts to summarize Llewellyn'S work, Professor Rakoffs comes closest to 
accomplishing the feat. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms oj Contracts: OJ ''Default 
Rules" and "Situation Sense," in GoOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAw, supra note 
572, at 19 1 ,  214 (defining Llewellyn 's conception of "situation sense" as a "process of 
thinking" that considers "the implications of various legal rules, matched up against 
reasonably intricate models of social situations, and brought together in light of the 
force of all the claims to be made") .  
574 Llewellyn has also had a tremendous influence o n  the development of 
contemporary contract theory and law through his contribution to the Uniform 
Commercial Code. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis oj Article 2 's 
Incorparation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 7 lO, 712 ( 1999) (noting 
that Llewellyn was a "principle drafter" of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code);  
Richard Danzig, A Comment on theJ1t1i.sprudence oJ the Unifarm Commercial Code, 27 STA". 
L. REv. 621 ,  624-27 ( 1975) (offering examples of Llewellyn's influence on the U niform 
Commercial Code);  Feinman, supra note 572, at 698 ("The method of analysis perhaps 
most characteristic of the modern cases may be characterized in the language of its 
principle exponent, Karl Llewellyn, as 'situation sense. "') ;  Allen R. Kamp, Between the
Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism and the Unifarm Cammercial Code in 
Context, 59 ALB. L. REv. 325, 370 ( 1995) (considering whether the Uniform Commer­
cial Code reflects Llewellyn's notion of "reasonableness") .  
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Llewellyn opens Part I of the Common Law Tradition,5?5 his most 
sustained exposition of situation sense, with an announcement that it 
is now common knowledgeS?fi that psychologists have undermined the 
epistemological ground on which the classical tradition once firmly 
stood: 
When the psychologists began to look into how people go about 
reaching decisions, the question they were concerned with was: how do 
people get to a decision at all, to any decision, when faced with a 
problem situation out of life? Roughly, they arrived at the conclusion 
that if it  was a true problem situation, i.e . ,  if it was really a puzzler, then it 
was seldom that the actual deciding was done by way of formal and 
accurate deduction in the manner of formal logic. The common process 
was rather one either of sudden intuition-a leap to some result that 
eased the tension; or else it was one of successive mental experiments as 
imagination developed and passed in review various possibilities until 
one or more turned up which had appeal. In any ordinary case a 
reasoned j ustification for the result represented a subsequent job, testing 
the decision against experience and against acceptability, buttressing it 
and making it persuasive to self and others. 
Today all of this is so familiar and obvious as to bore, but there were 
reasons why, four or five decades ago, it shocked our legal world.
57i 
Llewellyn'S actual account of modern contract theory, however, 
reveals that legal scholars have been too quickly "bore [d] " by the 
social scientists' challenge to conventional views about the human 
mind, and so have failed to truly incorporate its teachings. To begin 
with, interior and exterior situations influence far more than just our 
ability to reason our way through "puzzlers." Logic and deduction as 
the primary causal forces behind our behavior are, we now know, the 
exception to the rule. 
More generally, in the development of his notion of situation 
sense, Llewellyn was unaware of the basic lessons about the situation's  
unseen power, that psychology, especially social psychology, has now 
demonstrated.57s After opening the Common Law Tradition with a 
575 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION ( 1960) .  Although the 
book contains his most compendious discussion of situation sense, he developed the 
concept in somewhat piecemeal fashion over the course of over three decades of 
infuential scholarship. 
576 The phrase "announcement that it is now common knowledge," which aptly 
describes the quote that follows, may in a sense sum up the task of the legal analyst in 
situation sense theory. 
577 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 1 1 .  
578 See supra text accompanying notes 82 100 (discussing early experimental 
evidence of the situation's power to infuence behavior) ; see generally Hanson & 
Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing more extensive evidence of that power) . Of course, 
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recognition of the warning signs about our sense of ourselves, 
Llewellyn readily disregards his own cautions by the middle of his 
book, claiming that situation sense can clarify what psychology has left 
obscure: 
The argument has been, however, that whereas about other areas of 
reaching tough decision the psychologists and sociologists and other 
experts are still groping for more than indications . . .  yet in our area [of 
study] the clustered steadying factors combine with our traditions of 
craft . . .  to p rovide the wherewithal to reasonably satisfY even the 
seemingly unreasonable demands made upon [ju?ges] by the men of 
law and by the citizens who are the law-consumers.
5 /9 
Llewellyn sees the legal analysts' willingness to move ahead of the 
social scientists' struggles with mere "indications" about human 
decision making as a great advantage of modem legal theory. This 
confidence is supported by his basic dispositionist presumption that 
human thought processes are relatively transparent, and that there is 
a fairly obvious causal relationship between men and women's 
preferences and their behaviors or choices. To be sure, not every 
influence is spottable, but, as Llewellyn puts it, 
the unspottables either cancel out or operate rather on the surface than 
at the root of the deciding, or else hit the crux . . .  too rarely to do more 
than slightly decrease the percentage of available correct forecasts. This 
includes such very occasionally vital factors as the day's news, insomnia, a 
secretary's or clerk's sickness or blob, the euphoria from a son's engage
ment to the right girl, and three hundred assorted other "irrelevant" but 
real stirrers of the man. I discard them not as negligible, but as not 
alterin&; a basic workable reckonability from other and reachable factors 
alone.' 0 
For Llewellyn, as with Fried, there is little cause for concern about 
"unspottable" influences on the mind, and consequently little concern 
for ever-present though "unspottable" situational influences on 
behavior.581 In this way, Llewellyn's situation sense is a rejection of 
when Llewellyn wrote, the power of the situation was much less well understood, even 
by social psychologists. 
579 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 155. 
580 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 1 31 .  Llewellyn 's comments here parallel the 
reactions of many legal economists to the challenges posed by social psychology. See 
Hanson and Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 251 ;  Hanson & Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 251 ;  Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously Ill, supra note 257. 
581 Unspottable, that is, within a strong dispositionist mindset. 
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classical formalism to be replaced, not by social scientific inquiry, but 
by "common sense" realism.582 
Llewellyn's confidence in the reliability of common sense 
situation-sensing is further boosted by his assurance that beyond those 
assorted pedestrian distracters of humankind, there is no reason to 
suspect that more venal distractions might make situation-sensing 
problematic. His prose aroused to full flare, Llewellyn writes, "if you 
take the personnel of the appellate bench as an entirety, arranged in 
the familiar bell-shaped curve . . .  [and] knock on that bell, there may 
be a bit of dullness in the ring, but it rings true.,,;;S3 So it is that 
Llewellyn reassures himself and his readers that judges, like the rest of 
" d l b b 1 ,,584 us, are not un u y easy to am ooz e. 
We believe that Llewellyn's situation sense is badly underdevel­
oped. Our illusion of dispositionism and blindness to the power of 
situation renders us all, Llewellyn included, more or less 
bamboozled.585 Llewellyn reveals his own when he writes that "the 
situation, however eloquent, [can] operate only insofar as its elo­
quence [can] reach ear and understanding of the particular court or 
judge.",,86 Yet it is precisely where attention to situation is blocked 
582 Though a precise definition of "situation sense," is notoriously absent, see supra 
note 573 and accompanying text, its common sense eclecticism is betrayed in 
Llewellyn's description of the concept as a "compound[] of Isness and Oughtness and 
what have you more . . . .  " LLEWELL�, supra note 575, at 61 . See also id. at 1 2 1  ("The 
evidence for this [i.e., that otherwise good rules can be twisted out of shape by 
attempts to do justice in 'hard cases'] draws on more than 'common knowledge' 
(which can so often be unmasked as common superstition); it draws on that most 
uncommon knowledge which I call horse sense, the balanced shrewdness of the expert 
in the art.") . As far as what goes into this compound, for Llewellyn, "the main guide is 
felt sense and decency." !d. at 1 35. Professor Rakoff comments that "[ i ]t  appears that 
Llewellyn was in some fashion endorsing a method of practical wisdom." Rakoff, supra 
note 573, at 202. The question though is just what method guides the practice of 
situation sense. Llewellyn's explanation has often been characterized as 
"unmethodical." See, e.g. , id. at 203 (suggesting that Llewellyn offers "many examples 
[but] no clear description of a method") .  Our concern is not so much that it is 
"unmethodical" but rather that the method it  embraces is dispositionist. 
583 LLE\VELLYN, supra note 575, at 1 30. 
584 Id. at 262. Llewellyn's claims about the abilities of judges often rest on an 
implicit and sometimes explicit appeal to the reader to see that 'Judges are like other 
human beings . . . .  " Id. at 1 3 1 .  
585 We concur with Llewellyn that the problem with post-classical contract law is 
not that it is naive about the extent to which judges are corrupt or the difficulties they 
have paying attention. For us, the problem is in Llewellyn's presumption that, if those 
factors alone can be discounted, there is little else to worry about. 
[,86 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 157.  
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from the ear and the understanding by disposition ism that situation 
can have its greatest power. 
In addition to shaping Llewellyn's conception of the situation­
sensing analyst, disposition ism further limits his conception of the 
situation under inspection. Situation sense involves observing and 
analyzing the "immanent law",,87 of type-situations among contracting 
parties. The raw material for this study, the focus of the type-situation 
inquiry, is an inquiry into patterns of choices and conduct by 
individuals. The search is for indications588 of dispositional intent 
within different kinds of type-situations. When Llewellyn implores the 
legal analyst to "see it as it works" he is asking the analyst to follow how 
the type-situation has been composed by the dispositional actors that 
make it up. There is no injunction in Llewellyn' s  method to seek and 
account for unseen situational influences in type-situations. As David 
Chamy summarizes, " [i)  t is apparent that Llewellyn thought that 
custom was somehow expressive of the attitudes, preferences, and 
, I" f h th I ,,58� menta It)' 0 t e transactors emse ves . . . .  
This is because the situation-sensing analyst is urged to look at 
that which is obviously there, rather than that which may be hidden. 
And what is obviously there is individual behavior, evidence ready to 
confirm the dispositionism of the sensor. Thus, Llewellyn counsels 
that "the best safeguard against counsel's mispainting [of the 
situation, in an effort to manipulate the judge] lies in visualizing the 
hands-and-feet operations in the picture, seen as a going scheme, a 
working setup. Such operating aspects are curiously hard to 
fake . . . .  ,,590 The judge is thus instructed that, in his search for the 
"immanent law,,5�1 of situation, a reliance on what is obvious will 
5R7 See infra note 591 and accompanying text (briefly discussing the term 
"immanent law") .  
588 See supra text accompanying notes 578-82 (discussing Llewellyn's brush past 
social sciences' difficulties in discerning indications of human decision making) . 
,,89 David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 842, 846 
( 1 999) . Charny is interested in the extent to which the customary practices of areas of 
industry are legislated or stipulated by hierarchical associations, and the extent to 
which the trade customs promulgated through such associations have a formal quality 
reminiscent of classical approaches to contract law-hence, the new formalism in 
contract. [d. at 842 43. 
590 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 26 1 .  
591 Llewellyn initially quotes the term "immanent law" from the German legal 
theorist Levin Goldschmidt: 
"Every' fact pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can take it in, 
carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a natural 
law which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but rests 
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"safeguard" against mispainting.5n This "realism" is a strictly positive 
realism, not a critical realism, and so it is another symptom of the 
widely shared perspective in legal theory that begins by overlooking 
situation.593 
Were we to extend this discussion further, we would argue that 
the unreconstructed dispositionism we find in classical and post­
classical contract theory can be seen in most other areas of 
contemporary legal theory as well. The fundamentals of Llewellyn's 
situation-sense approach remain highly influential in leading non-
on the solid foundation of what reason can recognize in the nature of man 
and of the life conditions of the time and place; it is thus not eternal nor 
changeless nor everywhere the same, but is indwelling in the very 
circumstances of life. The highest task of law giving consists in uncovering 
and implementing this immanent law." 
[d. at 122 (quoting Levin Goldschmidt, Der Entwu f eines Handelgesetzbuchs fur die 
Preussischen Staaten [Draft Trade Code for the Prussian States], pt. 2, reprinted in 4 KRmSCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMr.ITE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 289 (Dernburg et al. eds., 
Heidelberg, Bangel & Schmitt 1857» . 
592 AsJay Feinman states: 
The method of situation-sense begins with fact scrutiny, in which the court 
analyzes and categorizes the facts as might a lay person familiar with the 
context of the dispute. The fact scrutiny may reveal a consensus regarding 
applicable values within the affected group or within society as a whole; at a 
minimum, such scrutiny wil limit the range of acceptable choices. The court 
then determines the appropriate legal remedy for the situation. 
Feinman, supra note 572, at 702. 
593 Llewellyn rejects attempts by critics to categorize situation sense and legal 
realism as a philosophy in general or as a fonn of positivism in particular. LLEWELLYN, 
supra note 575, at 508 09. For Llewellyn, situation sense is an approach to decision 
making that encourages the decision maker to see each situation "fresh" while 
positivism is a philosophy giving legitimacy to law because it is law. See Karl N.  
Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Lawjobs: The Problem of juristic Method, 49 
YALE LJ. 1 355, 1370 72 ( 1940); see also HORWITZ, supra note 200, at 208 12 
(summarizing the critique of Llewellyn's situation sense on grounds that it is  
positivism) . "Why should realism, which starts out as a reform movement, carry in its 
loins [an] essentially reactionary principle?" [d. at 2 1 1  (quoting L.L. Fuller, American 
Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 461 ( 1934» . 
Our critique is somewhat different. Beyond the question of whether other 
concerns will inform the judgment, we claim that there is too much positivism even in 
that component which is attempting to discern the "type situation." Our claim is that 
the type situation cannot be properly seen unless it is viewed from a critical realist 
perspective. Post-classical contract theory ultimately rests on the faith that "situation 
sensing" provides, as Professor Rakoff puts it, "good ground" for legal decision making. 
Rakoff, supra note 573, at 223; see also id. at 228 ("In short, situation-sense is a very good 
method for detennining what the default rules of contract law should be.") . In our 
view the trouble is that what is obvious to the situation sensor will only confirm and 
encourage dispositionist "mispain ting." 
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economic approaches to criminal law,594 civil rights and constitutional 
law,595 statutory interpretation,596 and international law.597 We will not 
pursue this exegesis further here, however. Our purpose has solely 
been to illustrate that conventional legal theorists, like legal 
economists, begin their legal analysis with dispositional assumptions 
and, even when claiming to be situationally sensitive, set the threshold 
unrealistically high. 
B. Legal Presumptions 
The attribution error does not stop there. Our laws and policies 
reflect the same lopsided perceptions. That is, our laws and 
policies-formal and informal-mirror our human perceptions and, 
for all the reasons that people generally do, place the threshold for 
recognizing the situation higher than they should. 
To be clear, this is not a claim that our laws totally miss the role 
of all situational influences. It is a claim that only the most salient, 
unambiguous situational features-and only those that have fairly 
straightforward implications for a generally dispositionist legal 
regime-will be appreciated. As with legal theory, dispositionist 
presumptions play a governing role in many, if not most, areas of 
law. To continue this limited exposition, we will again limit our 
focus to contract law. 
The basic dispositionist presumptions seen in Fried's classical will 
theory of contract are reflected in contemporary contract law.5\IB The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, for example, fashions a theory of 
594 See, e.g. , Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 
STAN. L. REv. 591 ( 1981 )  (applying situation sense approach to the analysis of criminal 
law) . 
595 See, e.g. , Richard H. Fallon,Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First 
Amendment Dog That Didn 't Bark, 1994 SUP. Cr. REv. 1 ,  40 41 ( 1995) (urging the 
application of "contextualization" to constitutional law problems, although noting that 
" [c]elebrations of situation sense and practical reason frequently dissolve into 
philosophical mush") . 
596 See, e.g. , David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Intqn-etation, 67 
N.Y.D. L. REv. 921 ,  941 ( 1992) (noting that a situation-sense approach to statutory 
inte�retation is "not without defenders and not without force" ) .  
0. 7 See, e.g. , LEON E. TRAKMAt"l, THE LAw MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF 
COMMERCIAL LAw 93 ( 1983) ('Judges are compelled to synthesize how merchants 
think and act if the common law is to progress as internalional commerce 
progresses. ") .  
598 Of course, this is unsurprising given that Fried's project is in part a positive 
theory of modem contract law. See supra text accompanying notes 551 71 for a 
discussion of Fried's theol)' of contract. 
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contract that is rooted in the principle of dispositional intent. A 
contract "requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of 
mutual assent . . . . ",,99 Assent is understood in terms of dispositional 
intention: " [  t] he conduct of a party is not effective as a manifesta­
tion of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct . . . . ,,600 
Of course, at the margins of contract law there are a few instances 
when, because of intense situational forces, the dispositionist 
presumption may be rebutted. For example, the Restatement (Second) 
acknowledges the problem of "improper pressure in the bargaining 
process, in the form of either duress or undue influence.,,601 
Nevertheless, even the doctrine of duress, the doctrine most 
preoccupied with situation, is wedded to a strong dispositionist 
foundation. Like legal economists and conventional legal theorists, 
the law can see the situational power of a gun to the head, but it 
d h n oes not see very muc more. 
Consider the scope of the doctrine of duress as it has been 
applied in Massachusetts, which has, like most states, long since 
adopted the basic view found in the Restatement (Second).603 The 
doctrine actually makes infrequent occurrences in the annals of 
Massachusetts cases, no doubt because of the extremely narrow range 
of situations to which it applies. This is not to gainsay its 
fundamental importance, however, for as Fried recognized, even in 
its absence, the doctrine serves to sanctifY the great range of 
599 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 7 ( 1 )  ( 1 981 ) .  
600 [d. § 19(2) .  The Restatement consistently refers back to this section as stating 
the 9ineral rule of assent in contracts. 
I [d. ch.7, topic 2, introductory note. 
602 The same is true in other areas of the law. In tort law, courts recognize the 
limits of property rights when salient situational conditions of "necessity" are in play. 
A sudden, unexpected tempest, for instance, will mute the consequences of the 
otherwise dispositional act of trespass. See, e.g. ,  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 1 97 ( 1 )  ( 1 965) ("One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of 
another if it is or reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to the 
actor . . . .  ") . In criminal law, killing a person in the "heat of passion" is treated as a 
less egregious offense than committing the same act in "cold blood." See, e.g.,  United 
States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208, 215  (D.C. 1 975) ("The purpose to kill is in legal 
contemplation dampened where the killer has been provoked or is acting in the heat 
of passion . . . .  ") .  
603 See, e.g. ,  Avallone v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 1 83 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Mass. 
1962) (explicating the principle of duress as " [cl onduct by one party which causes 
another to enter into a contract 'under the influence of such fear as precludes him 
from exercising free will and judgment''' (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 
§ 492(b) ( 1932» ) .  
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contracts the enforcement of which go unimpeded.fio4 Where duress 
is explicitly addressed, Massachusetts courts have adopted a highly 
dispositionist conception of it. As a recent Massachusetts appellate 
court summarized in Randall v. Rapoza,n05 "To avoid a contract on the 
basis of duress, a party must show that conduct by the other party [to 
the contract] caused him to enter into the contract ' under the 
influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and 
judgment. , ,,606 The court further explained that: 
[t]o show economic duress a party must show that he has been the 
victim of a wrongful or unlawful act or threat, and such act or threat 
must be one which deprives the victim of his unfettered will. AI;, a 
direct result of these elements, the party threatef!ed must be compelled 
to make a disproportionate exchange of values.
601 
The defendant in Randall, who was sued on a promissory note he 
had signed, told the court that he had entered the contract, under 
duress '''because of [Randall's] attitude and demeanor' [ and] . . .  
' his harassment. ",608 He also told the court that he was having 
marital troubles and was not '' 'thinking straight, ' "  and that he had 
been on anti-depressant medication when he entered the contract.609 
The Massachusetts court, unsurprisingly, found that these allegations 
fell "far short of painting a picture of duress" because " [h] is decision 
was not an 'arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or 
whimsical thinking. ",610 
Randall provides a typical example of the role that duress plays 
in reported cases in Massachusetts. Our purpose is not to provide an 
exhaustive account of its application, but rather to highlight that the 
"picture" of duress made out by the broad strokes of the doctrine 
demonstrates the deep dispositionist presumptions of contract law 
generally. It is presumed, for example, that in the typical case, 
where duress is not present, the choices represented by a contract 
are the product of "unfettered will. ,,61 1  While this might seem like a 
604 FRIED, supra note 550, at 93-95. 
605 Randall v. Rapoza, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 1 53 (200 1 ) .  
606 Jd  at 156 (quoting Coveney v. President of Coil. of Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136, 
1 40 (Mass. 1 983» . 
607 Jd. 
608 Id  (alteration in original) (quoting Rapoza Afr.) .  
609 Id. (quoting Rapoza Af.).  
610 Id. (quoting Bembe v. McKesson Wine & Spirits Co., 388 N.E.2d 309, 314 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (quoting Davis v .  Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 126 N.E.  841 , 844 
(Mass. 1920» ) .  
6 1 1  [d. 
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high standard, the benefit of the dispositionist presumption actually 
makes it the routine case. Despite Rapoza's contentions to the 
contrary, the Randall court concludes that the contract he entered 
into was in fact a manifestation of his "unfettered will,"  and refuses 
to find that the doctrine of duress is applicable.612 
As the law is described in Massachusetts, only the most 
conspicuous external sources of influence will be recognized as 
constituting duress. The court cites as its only example "signing . . .  
at the point of a gun. ,,613 The fundamental attribution error at work 
here sharply limits the range of relevant situations to only those that 
can be narrowly attributed to the vivid "bad act" of another 
individual. The court's explication also reveals a miserly view of what 
kind of internal situation wil be permitted to implicate the doctrine 
of duress. Only the most palpable kind of internal situation will be 
seen as evidencing duress-fear. As we have described, there are 
certainly many other features of our internal situations that can 
exercise as much influence over our conduct as does the more 
palpable situation of fear, yet those remain hidden by our 
dispositionism and are unseen in the law. Restricted by this 
dispositionist framework, the common law of contract has not 
developed categories of influence beyond salient external threats and 
internal fears through which parties can formulate their claims. 
Unless a choice can be shown to have been arbitrary, it is presumed 
to be the expression of an unfettered will. With the presumption set 
so high, parties can strive only to drum up those aspects of their 
situations that catch the dispositionist eye. Against the situational 
threshold of a gun to the head, harassing phone calls and anti­
depressant drugs will easily fail to rebut the strong presumption of 
unfettered will. 
Contract law, like many areas of law, recognizes a point where 
the situation is seen to be so significant that it renders unreliable the 
dispositionist assumptions that would otherwise govern. Making 
someone liable for outcomes over which she wielded comparatively 
little dispositional control and where her situation is relatively 
controlling would be unjust, unfair, or inefficient, depending on the 
theoretical focus. If, as we hypothesize, the threshold in the law is 
fundamentally misplaced, then the law in many of these areas may be 
fundamentally unjust, unfair, or inefficient. Put differently, if the 
612 [d. 
613 [d. at 155-56. 
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situation was as profoundly recognized in our laws as it is influential 
in our lives, the role of the situation would be presumptively 
th h . I '  I 614 paramount, ra er t an presumptIve y lrre evant. 
C. Social Policy Presumptions: Learning from History Again 
There are other places to look to try to assess the significance of 
dispositionism. If our hypothesis is correct that the fundamental 
attribution error contributes to false impressions and self-understand­
ings, and misguided legal theories and laws, then it should find 
support in the major social policy disputes that animate and define 
our history. Furthermore, there should be some evidence that the 
dominant view will typically be one that favors those in power-just 
as the geocentric view so clearly served the interests of the Catholic 
Church in the seventeenth century and, as we are arguing, the 
person-centric view serves the interests of corporations today. 
Providing such evidence is also a topic of further work in 
progress.Gl5 For now, we can highlight the major thrust of that work, 
which is that the power of the dispositionist presumption has had, 
and is now having, an immense effect on both the framing and the 
resolution of virtually every major social policy debate-from the 
obesity epidemic to the War on Terrorism. Although we will 
postpone defending that claim, it may be illuminating to highlight 
one particularly revealing and tragic example from our history: 
slavery. We have chosen that social policy issue to spotlight because 
we have suggested in this Article that power-even oppressive, 
totalitarian power-can be exercised through the unseen situation, 
in part, through the creation and promotion of dispositionist 
worldviews. Because slavery provides one of the most salient uses of 
power m United States history, demonstrating the role of 
dispositionism in enabling that oppression provides especially 
compelling evidence for our claim. 
tH4 We should not be understood as arguing that the outcome in RandaU was 
necessarily incorrect. Our point is that the reasoning is based on a flawed vision of 
what moves us-a flaw with implications that may extend well beyond this case, the 
doctrine of duress, or even the law of contracts. 
615 See, e.g., Jon Hanson, David Yosifon & Adam Benforado, Broken Scales: Obesity 
and Justice in America (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) .  
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1 .  The Teacher's View of the Leamer 
First, to set the stage, it may be helpful to return to Milgram's 
basic research, in which he manipulated hundreds of subjects to 
behave in a way that contradicted his and others' initial expectations 
and thereby revealed the othelwise hidden power of the situation. 
The teacher was given a situation-induced "preference" to shock the 
learner, a "preference" that in most cases led teachers to continue to 
increase the shocks all the way to 450 volts (beyond the point when 
the learner fell silent after screaming in agony) .'ilG The focus of 
social psychologists analyzing those experiments has long been on 
certain situational considerations, such as the authority conferred on 
the experimenter by, say, his white lab coat, in creating that 
 ,,617  
But an interesting issue emerges-one that has received 
comparatively little attention-about a different situational factor: 
that is, the teacher's perception of the leamer's dispositions. The 
learner was one of Milgram's confederates, but he was assigned his 
position as learner by an apparently (but not actually) random 
process. The teacher then observed the learner voluntarily agreeing 
to be strapped into the chair, understanding that he would be 
shocked.GIS The fact that subjects in Milgram's study appeared to 
make a free choice to enter into a "contract" may be central to 
understanding the large number of teachers who administered the 
maximum shock level of 450 volts.Gl9 
Once they had committed to participating, the teachers felt as if 
they were obligated to continue with and, in most cases, complete the 
experiment even when they believed they were inflicting pain or 
actually harming the learners.G20 The sense of obligation (and the 
formal appearance of a contract) was likely strengthened by the fact 
that teachers were paid $4.50 for their services prior to beginning the 
experiment.G21 It was also likely bolstered by the very structure of the 
616 Milgram, supra note 88, at 376. 
617 For a discussion of some variations of Milgram's experiment, see Hanson & 
Yosifon, supra note 30. 
Iii" 
Milgram, supra note 88, at 373. 
619 fd. at 377. 
620 fri. 
621 fd. at 372, 378. However, Milgrdm also notes that the results of the experiment, 
when conducted with unpaid subjects, were "very similar to those obtained with paid 
subject�." Id. at 377 n.4. 
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experiment, in which the shock level was increased in only very small 
increments of 1 5  volts. Because the learner did not protest initially, 
teachers continued to flip the switch, experiencing little internal 
conflict. Once the learner did complain, however, it was difficult to 
stop, even though many teachers experienced cognitive dissonance.622 
To reduce this dissonance, people seek ways to justify their 
actions. In Milgram's original experiment, the teacher's initial agree­
ment to administer the first shock to the learner most likely created 
internal pressure to continue with the experiment.623 With each 
incrementally higher shock level , the teacher had to justify his actions, 
and once he justifed a particular shock level, it became increasingly 
difficult to determine the level at which he should cease shocking the 
learner: 
How could they say, in effect, "OK, I gave him 200 volts, but not 21S  
-never 2 1 S!"? Each succeeding shock and its justification laid the 
groundwork for the next shock and would have been dissonant with 
quitting; 2 1 S  volts is not that different from 200, and 230 is not that 
different from 21S.  Those who did break off the series did so against 
. I . 624 enormous mtema pressure to contmue. 
The fact that the learner willingly provided answers without 
complaint through shock level twenty in the initial experiment 
seemed to provide proof that he, too, had accepted the terms of the 
agreement.625 It was only when things started not to go his way (when 
he started to get many answers wrong) that he refused to honor the 
terms-a repudiation of the rules of contract. From the teachers' 
perspective, both they and the learner had voluntarily agreed to 
participate in an experiment for $4.50; the learner had no reason to 
complain (or void the contract) because his position was assigned 
through a fair and random process.626 In the words of Milgram, 
622 [d. at 377 78. Cognitive dissonance is a feeling of internal discomfort produced 
when a person holds two or more inconsistent cognitions-in this case, the desire to 
fulf ll the terms of a valid contract and the desire not to harm another person-and 
performs an action-here, shocking the learner-that is inconsistent with the person 's 
customary positive self-conception. See ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
1 74 76 (4th ed. 2002) (defining and explaining "cognitive dissonance"); Hanson & 
Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing the cognitive dissonance and severdl related 
phenomena and their relevance for law and legal theory) . 
Li23 . Milgram, supra note 88, at 294. 
624 Id. 
625 Milgram, supra note 88, at 378. 
li2G Id. at 377. 
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" [t] hat he later becomes an involuntary subject does not alter the fact 
that, initially, he consented to participate without qualification.,,627 
It is noteworthy, we think, that in Milgram's film, Obedience, the 
learner went out of his way in front of the teacher to stop and 
carefully examine the shock generator, with all its levels and 
warnings.628 And we suspect that the teachers tended to see the 
learner as someone who freely and knowingly chose to participate 
and who, in essence, wanted, perhaps even deserved, to be 
shocked-at least up to some level. Indeed, the situation-induced 
preference to shock the learner might well have solidified that 
perception.629 In this sense, the learner could be understood as 
having accepted his lot and having assumed the risk that it entailed. 
Put differently, the learner appeared to "reveal his preference" for 
getting shocked. 
Of course, it is important to note that while theories of contract 
can be powerful forces of justification, outweighing complaints by the 
victim, they do not appear strong enough to overcome fully the voice 
of credible authority.630 Milgram attempted to test the power of 
contract notions by structuring a variation of the experiment in which, 
before signing the release form, the learner paused and stated, "I'll 
agree to be in it, but only on condition that you let me out when I say 
627 Id. 
698 - OBEDIENCE, supra note 1 49. 
629 Some anecdotal evidence provides loose support for this account. First, as 
noted above, none of the teachers ever went to find out if the learner was okay. Supra 
text accompanying note 1 80. It  is as if the teachers felt that they were not 
responsible for the learner's condition in other words, that the learner was 
responsible for himself. In addition, there is some evidence that the teachers 
dispositionalized their own actions-blaming themselves for the bad "preference" that 
was "revealed" by their actions. According to lore among social psychologists, 
Milgram was able to include only one example of a person flipping the final switch 
(450 volts) in his famous documentary about the experiments, Obedience, because 
none of the many others who did so were willing to be shown on film. Presumably, 
they did not want to be shown as "bad people." Milgram included several after the­
fact interviews of subjects, some of which revealed how the subjects attributed 
their actions to their own dispositions. See, e.g. , MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO 
AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 54 ("As my wife said, • [y] ou can call yourself 
Eichmann. '  I hope I can deal more effectively with any future conflicts of values 
I encounter." ) .  Given that they dispositionalized their own behavior behavior that 
was anything but flattering it seems likely that they also would have partially 
dispositionalized the learner's behavior. See supra note 1 10 (describing the heightened 
tendency to attribute bad outcomes suffered by others-as compared to those we 
suffer ourselves-to disposition) . 
630 See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 66 (finding that "the 
social con tract doctrine is a feeble determinant of behavior") .  
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so; that's the only condition.,,(;31 The changing of the contract seemed 
to have some effect. Approximately a quarter of the teachers, who 
defied the experimenter's authority, raised the fact that the learner 
had explicitly conditioned her consent to participate in the 
experiment.632 A number of other teachers mentioned their concern 
with the "legalities" of the experiment.633 However, sixteen of the forty 
teachers continued to the end of the experiment, as compared to the 
twenty in the control, thus showing the enormous power of authority 
even in the face of contract forces.634 
But suppose Milgram had tested the issue further. Suppose that 
the teacher arrived first and that he watched as the learner was 
dragged to the room in shackles and strapped into the chair 
involuntarily while begging, "Please, please, I never agreed to be part 
of this experiment, I was just walking by on my way to the library!" 
Or, for a less vivid version, suppose the teacher watched as the 
learner willingly sat in the chair under the false impression that he 
was going to participate in a sleeping experiment and that the straps 
were on the chair simply to measure sleep patterns. 
We suspect that such variations in the experimental protocol 
would have had an even more significant effect than the 
conditional contract on the teacher's willingness to shock the 
learner. To put i t  in more general terms, we believe that a 
person's willingness to harm another depends heavily on whether or 
not that person perceives her victim to have dispositionally assumed 
such a risk. 
There is, as it turns out, considerable social psychological 
evidence that is consistent with that understanding.635 Perhaps more 
importantly, however, there is also depressingly weighty support 
wi thin  the annals of history. When, for instance, Nazis murdered 
millions, many did so, secure in their belief that their victims 
deserved to be exterminated, for the benefit of the human species 
and the advancement of evolutionary trends.ti36 The tendency to 
631 [d. at 64. 
632 [d. at 65. 
633 [d. 
634 [d. at 66. 
635 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (summarizing relevant evidence of the 
'Just world" hypothesis and the system affirming motive in social psychology) .  
For a sample of that work, see authorities cited infra note 686. 
636 See generally JOSEPH TENENBAUM, RACE AND REICH 3-28 (Greenwood Press, 
1 976) ( 1 956) ( relating German science of racial superiority to the Nazi 
extermination campaign) .  See also Chen & Hanson, supra note 52. 
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dispositionalize in order to oppress has been particularly strong in the 
United States, where cultural notions of freedom, equality, and self­
evident, natural rights have been celebrated at the same time that 
many of the humans within our borders have been grouped and 
subjected to bondage, conquest, and exploitation.637 
Dispositionism has been the legitimating salve. 
2. The Master's View of the Slave 
I have often been utterly astonished, since I came to the north, to find 
persons who could speak of the singing, among slaves, as evidence of their 
contentment and happiness. It is impossible to conceive of a greater mistake. 
Slaves sing most when they are most unhappy. The songs of the slave represent 
the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved by them, only as an aching heart is 
relieved by its tears. A t  least, such is my experience. I have ofen sung to drown 
my sorrow, but seldom to express my happiness. Crying for juy, and singing for 
juy, were alike uncommon to me while in the jaws of slavery. The singing of a 
man cast away upon a desolate island might be as apately considered as 
evidence of contentment and happiness, as the singing of a slave; the songs of 
the one and of the other are prompted by the same emotion. 
-Frederick Douglass638 
Let us return to the topic of slavery.639 When plantation owners 
traded in human beings, they were confronted with a problem not 
637 See generally RONALD T. TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE At'lD CULTURE IN 19TH
CENTURY AMERICA (2000) (examining the cultural and economic foundations of racial 
subjugation in the United States) ; see also sources cited infra note 639 (examining 
racism in America) . 
638 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, At" 
AI\1ERICAL" SLAVE ( 1845), reprinted in 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAL" 
LITERATURE 1 874, 1 887 88 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989) . 
639 There is a vast, sophisticated, and ever-expanding literature, across many 
disciplines, that has contributed greatly to our understanding of the shocking reality of 
slavery in the United States. For useful historical overviews of the ideas we discuss here 
concerning the basic dispositionist ideology underlying "the peculiar institution," see 
generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 
1 770 1823 ( 1 975) (exploring the competing ideologies of anti-slavery and racist 
exploitation during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) ;  GEORGE M. 
FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO
AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817 1914 (197 1 ) (outlining the rise of formal
ized racism in the United States from its nineteenth-century beginnings through its 
apex during World War I) ; GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 
(2002) (synthesizing over thirty years of historical scholarship on racism) ; THOMAS F. 
GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF At" IDEA IN AMERICA (new ed. 1 997) (surveying the 
development of race theory and race relationships from the colonial period through 
the twentieth century) ; STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (rev. ed. 1 996) 
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unlike the one faced by the teachers in Milgram's experiment. In 
antebellum America, plantation owners and slave traders, among 
many others, exploited slaves for financial and social gain, while 
maintaining their own perception of themselves as the sort of people 
who would never unjustly exploit others.64o All who were more or 
less complicit with the practices and systems of slavery needed 
to believe that the groups and systems to which they belonged 
were fair and j ust, and somehow not in tension with the 
principles of equality to which so many subscribed . fi41 
a. The basic message-dispositionism 
Faced with this situation,  the plantation owners did what we 
all tend to do-and what most of us in their situation would likely 
have done at that time. They looked at their social world and 
inferred dispositionist distinctions that made slavery not only 
palatable, but natural, j ust, and in effect, Pareto superior. They 
embraced the self-affirming faith that their captives were intended 
(by God or nature) to be slaves, and that for their own good they 
642 needed to be slaves. It was the plantation owners that were 
(explaining and refuting various "scientific" theories of racial superiority) ; WINTHROP 
D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1 550-
1812  ( 1968) (analyzing white men's attitudes towards black Mricans from the pre
colonial period through the early nineteenth century) ; KENA.1\I MALIK, THE MEANING 
OF RACE: RACE, HISTORY AND CULTURE IN WESTERt'l SOCIETY ( 1996) (linking 
contemporary, post-Cold War racial ideology to the history of race and racial ideology 
in the West) . Legal scholars have also contributed significantly to our current 
understanding of racism in general and slavery in particular. See geruflly CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw 
et al. eds., 1995) (collecting seminal writings of critical race theorists engaged in legal 
scholarship) ; A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND 
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE fu\iERICAN LEGAL PROCESS ( 1 996) (surveying and analyzing the 
history of racism in the United States and its impact on legal theory and 
jurisprudence) ;  THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAw, 1619-1860 
( 1 996) (theorizing the role of race as a factor influencing the rulings of particular 
judges in the American South during the two and a half centuries before the Civil 
War) ; MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAw OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: 
CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST ( 1981 )  (studying Southern case law 
related to slavery) ; Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in 
the Nineteenth Century South, 108 YALE LJ. 109 ( 1 998) (examining the role of the law in 
the construction of race and racism in the nineteenth-century American South) .  
640 See supra note 29-3 1 (providing brief summary o f  motive to self affirm ) ;  
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing extensive summary of that motive) .  
641 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (summarizing evidence of people's 
tendency to group affirm and system affirm) . 
649 - HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 1 4. 
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designed to be the masters, that could tame, train, and protect the 
slaves from themselves.643 They found ways to believe that slavery was 
precisely what slaves preferred-for if a person sings, smiles, and 
otherwise behaves "as if' she is happy, who can deny that she is?644 
And if the slaves were not outwardly happy, there was still no 
good reason to conclude that they were unhappy. As El izabeth 
Cady Stanton summarized:  
I t  i s  impossible t o  make the Southern planter believe that h i s  slave feels 
and reasons just as he does-that i njustice and subjection are as galling 
as to him-that the degradation of living by the will of another, the mere 
dependent on his caprice, at the mercy of his passions, is as keenly felt by 
him as his master. If you can force on his unwilling vision a vivid picture 
of the negro's wrongs, and for a moment touch his soul, his logic brin�� 
him instant consolation. He says, the slave does not feel this as I would. " 
Put differently, slaveowners (and, to some extent, most of 
antebellum society)646 inferred dispositional qualities about  the 
slaves when they considered the situation of American slavery. 
They compared those qualities with their views of their own 
dispositions and concluded that the African race was 
dispositionally inferior in almost every way. This subsection will 
attempt to describe some of the manifestations of that fundamental 
attribution error-missing the situation-in this human tragedy. 
1. Revealed inferiority 
The primary, and perhaps most powerful, tendency of those who 
defended or were complicit with slavery was to see Mricans in 
America as a subhuman species, or at least as less-highly evolved 
humans.647 The truth of the Mrican slaves' inferiority was so obvious 
643 [d. 
644 See infra text accompanying notes 647-82. 
645 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of New York on Women's 
Rights (Feb. 14, 1 854) , reprinted in ELIZABETH CADy STANTON, SUSAl'l B. ANTHONY: 
CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS, SPEECHES 44, 50 (Ellen Carol DuBois ed., 1 98 1 ) .  
646 See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 12 ("The precept that Mrican Americans 
were, in some immutable way, inferior became a powerful principle around which all 
white colonists, even those who did not own slaves, could begin to foster a common 
identity . . . .  ") . 
647 A. Leon Higginbotham,Jr. has identified dispositional inferiority as the first of 
ten basic precepts of American slavery jurisprudence, and summarizes it as follows: 
Presume, preserve, protect, and defend the ideal of the superiority of whites 
and the inferiori ty of blacks. 
By considering the black as a subspecies of man or, most often, a heathen 
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as to usually be beyond debate. As Chief Justice Taney put it 1 0  
the infamous Dred Scott decision: 
[Blacks] had for more than a century before been regarded as beings 
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white 
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they 
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the 
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. 
He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of 
merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This 
opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of 
the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in  
politics, which no one thought of  disputing, or supposed to  be open to 
dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and 
habitually acted upon it  in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of 
public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this • •  64H opInIOn. 
The consequence of this dispositionist assessment of blacks was 
staggering. There were two principle holdings in Dred Scott. First, it 
meant that no Mrican could be a citizen of the United States or even 
of any state "within the meaning of the Constitution.'M9 Second, 
because blacks were not citizens in the eyes of the law, they could be 
treated as any other kind of property. According to the Court, 
Congress had no power to treat slaves differently from any other types 
of property.650 Consequently, the Court held, Congress could not 
exclude slavery from the federal territories, and therefore, that the 
Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional.651 But of course, the 
from a less advanced, oppressed civilization, many whites could justify his 
enslavement. The whites' "logic" went as follows: the Mrican is different in 
appearance and manner from us; he must not be human or at least not 
equally as human as we are; therefore, he is inferior to us and can be enslaved 
by us, his superiors. 
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery jurisprudence, 1 7  
CARDozo L .  REv. 1695, 1 697, 1 700 ( 1996) (citations omitted) .  
648 Dred Scott v .  Sandford, 60 U.S. ( 19  How. ) 393, 407 ( 1 857) .  Taney was wrong 
in his monolithic positive description of white attitudes towards blacks, and we do not 
mean to suggest that these attitudes were indeed monolithic. But Taney'S words 
certainly represented the dominant view and the powerful role of dispositionism in it. 
See generally HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 66 (analy.ling Taney'S opinion as an 
argument that "slavery did not render Mrican Americans inferior" because by Taney's 
logic "Mrican Americans, by their very nature, were inferior") .  
649 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406. 
650 [d. at 45l .  
651 See id. at 452 (" [T]he act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding 
and owning [slaves] . . .  in the territory of the United States north of the line therein 
mentioned, . . .  is therefore void.") . 
312 UNNERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 152: 129 
Court's holding in Dred Scott was considered common sense in much 
of America at that time.6;,2 We all see dispositionally, and this 
dispositionism had long made people blind to the situation of slavery, 
and to the situational influence on slaves.6"� 
Yet this common sense dispositionist presumption about Africans 
had not always been the common sense. In fact, the dispositionism 
emerged in America precisely because it was needed, as indicated 
above,654 to reconcile principles with practices.655 And few people, we 
suspect, felt the dissonance and the need to reconcile more intensely 
than did Thomas Jefferson656-civil rights theorist, father of the 
American Revolution, author of the Declaration of Independence, 
President of the United States, and Virginian slaveholder.GS7 Indeed, 
652 See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 66-67 (showing that, although the legal 
analysis was somewhat controversial, the presumption of black inferiority was 
commonly held) ; DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOIT CAsE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN 
A.\1ERJCfu'\l LAw AND POLITICS (1978) (noting that most white critics of the decision 
railed against the Missouri Compromise restriction rather than the issue of Negro 
citizenship) . 
653 See GOSSETT, supra note 639, at 29 ("The importance of Negro slavery in 
generating race theories in this country can hardly be overestimated.") . 
654 See supra text accompanying notes 639-41 . 
655 Cf Barbara Jeanne Fields, SlavelY, Race and Ideology in the United States of America, 
181  NEW LEFT REv. 95, passim ( 1990) (arguing that the concept of race emerged, and 
continues to this day, in significant part to resolve the contradiction between espoused 
rights and ideals and actual practices) .  
656 We do not mean to suggest, and would be incorrect if we did, that there was 
any unanimity in public opinion about slaves and slavery. See Gossett, supra note 639, 
at 53 (noting that, although "[t] he Negro would have to wait a long time," eventually 
"impressive voices were raised in behalf of his innate intellectual and temperamental 
equality with the whites") . There were always dissenters, visionary' thinkers, courageous 
social movements, and individuals of deep perception, who knew for themselves and 
shouted to others that slaves were suffering from a degrading and dehumanizing 
situation, not dispositional inferiority. Very often these voices in the dispositional 
wilderness came from freed or escaped slaves themselves. See, e.g. , DOUGLASS, supra 
note 638, at 1887 (remembering slaves' songs as "tones loud, long and deep; they 
breathed the prayer and complaint of souls boiling over with the bitterest anguish.") ; 
BULLWHIP DAYS: THE SLAVES REMEMBER 4] (James Mellon ed., 1988) (,"That was all 
the slave thought about, then: not being a slave. Because slavery' time was hell.'" 
(quoting former slave Mary Gaffney) ) .  Other oral histories reveal that many slaves 
themselves internalized the dispositionist account of their predicament. See generally 
FED. WRITERS' PROJECT, WORKS PROGRESS ADMIN., SLAVE NARRATIVES: A FOLK 
HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER SLAVES 
( 1 94 1 )  (providing numerous examples from among more than 2,300 first-person 
accounts of slavery) , available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov /ammem/snhtml/. This human 
tendency is part of what makes disposition ism so powerful. 
6,,7 See Tania Tetlow, The Founders and StavelY: A Crisis of Conscience, 3 Loy. J.  PUB. 
INT. L. 1 ,  ] ]  (200 ] )  (noting that Jefferson owned 154 slaves in ] 794, only ten percent 
of whom he manumitted upon his death ) .  
2003] THE SITUA nON 313  
Jefferson presumed to analyze the inherent nature of  slaves'  
inferiority through a neutral and scientific approach. In an 
extended argument in his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson 
enumerated in remarkably dispositionist terms the evidence that he 
found to justify the maintenance of slavery.6r,s We quote him here at 
length, not only because his analysis is so revealing, but also because 
it is his analysis, the careful work of a man whose desire for a shared 
freedom for all men is so celebrated in our culture:6f'9 
The first difference which strikes us is that of colour . . . .  Is it not the 
foundation of a greater or less share of beauty in the two races? Are 
not the fine mixtures of red and white, the expressions of every passion 
by greater or less suffusions of color in the one, preferable to that 
eternal monotony, which reigns in the countenances, that immoveable 
veil of black which covers all the emotions of the other race? Add to 
these, flowing hair, a more elegant symmetry of form, their own 
judgment in favour of the whites, declared by their preference of them, 
as uniformly as is the preference of the Oranootan for the black 
women over those of his own species . . . .  A black, after hard labour 
through the day, will be induced by the slightest amusements to sit up 
till midnight, or later, though knowing he must be out with the first 
dawn of the morning. They are at least as brave, and more 
adventuresome. But this may perhaps proceed from a want of 
forethought, which prevents their seeing a danger till it  be present. 
When present, they do not go through it with more coolness or 
steadiness than the whites. They are more ardent  after their female: 
but love seems with them to be more an eager desire, than a tender 
delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation. Their griefs are transient. 
Those numberless afflictions, which render it doubtful whether heaven 
has given life to us in mercy or in wrath, are less felt, and sooner 
forgotten with them. In general, their existence appears to participate 
more of sensation than reflection. To this must be ascribed their 
disposition to sleep when abstracted from their diversions, and 
unemployed in labour. An animal whose body is at rest, and who does 
not reflect, must be disposed to sleep of course. Comparing them by 
their faculties of memory, reason ,  and imagination, it  appears to me, 
that in memory they are equal to the whites; in reason much inferior, 
as I think one could scarcely be found capable of tracing and 
658 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA ( 1 787) , reprinted in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123, 264-70 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) . 
6[,9 Much has been written on Jefferson's views about slavery. See, e.g. , Aaron 
Schwabach, Jeferson and Slavery, 1 9  T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 63, 77 87 ( 1997) 
(summarizing jefferson's views on slavery and collecting citations of scholarly work on 
the issue) ; Tetlow, supra note 657, at 1 0 24 (describing the hypocrisy of the founding 
generation and examining jefferson's use of racial inferiority to resolve it) ; see also 
sources cited supra note 639 (containing extended analyses of jefferson's thoughts on, 
and contributions to, American racism) . 
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comprehending the investigations of Euclid; and that in imagination 
they are dull,  tasteless, and anomalous . . . .  But never yet could I find 
that a black had uttered a thought above the level of plain narration; 
never see even an elementary trait of painting o r  sculpture . . . .  Misery 
is often the parent of the most affecting touches in poetry.-Among 
the blacks is misery enough, God knows, but no poetry. Love is the 
peculiar restrum of the poet. Their love is ardent, but it kindles the 
senses only, not the imagination . 
. . . It is not against experience to suppose, that different species of 
the same genus, or varieties of the same species, may possess different 
qualifications.
66o 
Will not a lover of natural history then, one who views 
the gradations in all the races of animals with the eye of philosophy, 
excuse an effort to keep those in the department  of man as distinct as 
ti60 Jeffe rson is attaching himself explicitly to a particular school of thought in the 
eighteenth century which held that Mricans were in fact the same species as man, 
rather than some lesser species. See, e.g., JORDAl'l, supra note 639, at 308 (citing a 
debate at Harvard's 1 773 commencement where one student argued that Africans 
were the same species as white men ) .  But notice how l ittle difference it makes with 
respect to Jefferson's dispositionism. Whether the Africans were an inferior species or 
a lesser quality of human, Jefferson sees their condition as resulting from stable, 
internal dispositional factors, and not from the situation. Later scholars would go 
further than Jefferson and claim to demonstrate that Africans were, indeed, an inferior 
race. Samuel Morton, one of the best known antebellum scientists, amassed the largest 
skull collection in the world in his scientific endeavor to demonstrate that racial 
distinctions reflected deep genetic differences. More specifically, he applied this 
theory of polygeny to "prove" that Mricans were inferior. See SA.l\1UEL GEORGE 
MORTON, CRANIA AMERlCANA 5-7 ( 1839) (describing the African race as "the lowest 
grade of humanity") ;  see also Am. Philosophical Soc'y, Samuel George Morton Papers: 
1819-1850, at http://www.amphilsoc.org/library /mole/ m/ mortonsg.htrn (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2003) .  "Morton's work met \vith a receptive audience in much of the United 
States. Its massive empirical base was praised by the scientific elite, and his theories on 
human relations were endorsed avidly by pro slavery advocates." ld. ;  see also GoULD, 
supra note 639, at 101 04 (illustrating the connections between Morton's work and 
American slavery) . For a relatively brief history of the emergence of polygeny in 
America, and the role played by numerous scholars, including Morton and Harvard's 
Louis Agassiz, see Robert Bernasconi, Introduction to AMERICAN THEORIES OF 
POLYGENESIS, at v xiii (Robert Bernasconi ed., 2002) . Agassiz, a renowned European 
scientist who carne to America in 1 846, had initially concluded that all humans were of 
one race. Id. But after being in America and reviewing Morton's evidence, he 
converted to polygeny. Id. Apparently, it was not just Morton's highly credible 
statistical analysis that inf uenced Agassiz. In a letter that he wrote to his mother, 
Agassiz indicated that his own personal encounters with slaves were having an effect. 
Because they were, by their appearance, an evidently "degraded and degenerate race," 
Agassiz found it difficult "to repress the feeling thal they are not of the same blood as 
us." ld. For a more extended account of polygeny, see GoULD, supra note 639, at 71
1 04 (exploring the development of polygeny throughout the nineteenth century) ; 
JOHN S. HALLER, JR., OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL 
INFERIORlTY, 1859 1900 passim ( 1971 ) (describing the work of numerous American 
scientists in the late nineteenth century who, inspired largely by Darwin's work on 
evolution, attempted to use science to prove what they assumed to be true: that non
white "races" were more or less inferior to the whites) .  
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nature ha� formed them? This unfortunate difference of color, and 
perhaps of faculty, is a powerful obstacle to Ule emancipation of these 
661 people. 
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Jefferson's blindness to the situation i s  obvious to us now. We 
can, from our vantage, see the situation of slavery like we can see a 
gun to the head. But, in Jefferson's time, the situation was obscured 
by the more salient (and affirming) dispositions. While arguing that 
white people were obviously more beautiful than blacks, Jefferson 
cites blacks' "own judgment in favour of the whites, ,,662 but does not 
see the extreme power disparities that likely lead to this perceived 
reaction. This is an egregious instance of dispositions wrongly 
being though t to be "revealed" through behavior. r>63 Jefferson 
does not see that the situation of forced labor might require the kind 
of palliative function of song that Douglass spoke of,664 but rather 
concludes that the singing is evidence of a "carefree" disposition. 
Furthermore, he remarkably infers that blacks dispositionally 
required less sleep than whites, ignoring the fact that sleep was 
situationally less available to them.fi6:' Jefferson also concludes that 
blacks had inferior reason and imagination, without appreciating 
the situation-the fact that blacks were denied schooling, for 
example, or the opportunity for creative expression666-that created 
that condition.fi67 
At the same time that blacks were perceived as inferior to whites 
in reason, they were seen as disposition ally superior to whites in doing 
661 JEFFERSON, supra note 658, at 264 67, 270 ( footnote added). 
662 [d. at 265. 
663 See supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing the role played by "revealed" 
preference assumptions in conventional economic theory) . 
664 • See supra text accompanymg note 638. 
665 See, e.g. , SOLOMON NORTHUP, 1\,ELVE YEARS A SLAVE 1 67, 171  (Dover Publ'ns 
1970) ( 1 854) ("An hour before daylight me hom is blown . . . .  [TJ hey oftentimes labor 
till the middle of the night") ;  cf. WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 28-29 (Negro Univs. Press 1968) ( 1 853) (citing Soum 
Carolina's prohibition on forcing slaves to work more than fifteen hours per day in me 
summer or fourteen hours a day in the winter) . 
(i66 See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 
561-63 ( 1974) (outlining formal bans on slave education) .  
667 Of course, jefferson was not only wrong in his dispositionist explanation of 
slaves' lack of reason and imagination, he was also wrong to conclude that slaves lacked 
those qualities. Scholars have unearthed an incredibly rich world of slave culture that 
was, by situational necessity, largely kept hidden from slaveholders. Seminal studies of 
the elaborate and extensive cultures built by slaves include, among many others, 
GENOVESE, supra note 666, and LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, BLACK CULTURE Al'lD BLACK 
CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRO-AMERICAN FOLK THOUGHT FROM SLAVERYTO FREEDOM ( 1977) . 
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the sort of work that the slaveholders needed. As Jefferson noted, 
they seemed to forget their afflictions, required less sleep, and were 
more resistant to heat. Therefore, they were well-suited as forced 
laborers.668 
It is important to note that Jefferson does not entirely disregard 
the influence of the situational effects of slavery. In fact, he purports 
to examine and control for such evidence. He explains that " [t] he 
improvement of the blacks in body and mind, in the first instance of 
their mixture with the whites, has been observed by every one, and 
proves that their inferiority is not the effect merely of their condition 
of life.,,669 Jefferson continues his proof by comparing American 
slaves to Roman slaves, who he claims were treated significantly worse 
than American slaves-in other words, their situations were even 
'fl' 670 B h h i ' more stl lng. ut, as e t en c alms, 
notwithstanding these and other discouraging circumstances among the 
Romans, their slaves were often their rarest artists. They excelled too 
in science, insomuch as to be usually employed as tutors to their 
master 's  children. Epictetus, Terence, and Ph.edrus, were slaves. But 
they were of the race of whites. It is not their condition then, but nature, 
which has produced the distinction.
671 
668 This ability to see "superior" qualities in an "inferior" group helps reveal how 
the tendency to dispositionalize is often motivated largely by a desire to justity existing 
power relationships. See infra notes 685-86. By attributing superior physical strength 
and athleticism to slaves, jefferson further naturalized the division of labor. Some 
argue, quite compellingly, that the same sorts of attributions are made today, to the 
same effect. See, e.g., JOHN HOBERMAt'<, DARWIN'S ATHLETES: How SPORT HAs 
DAMAGED BLACK AMERICA AND PRESERVED THE MYrH OF RACE 3 1-51 ( 1 996) (arguing 
that the general success and superstardom of blacks on the athletic field have helped 
to justity their exclusion and inferior status elsewhere while giving the reassuring 
appearance of integration) .  
669 JEFFERSON, supra note 658, at 267 (emphasis added) . jefferson's suggestion, 
here, that the inferiority of blacks is genetic, remains only an implicit suggestion. 
Explicit "proof' for that proposition would await further scientific study by others. See 
HALLER supra note 660, at 3-39 (describing the schools of thought and methodologies 
that developed in the nineteenth century to classity races) .  
670 JEFFERSON, supra note 658, at 267-68. 
671 Id. at 268 (emphasis added) . jefferson again, ignored the situation. In 
Ancient Rome, some slaves were given tasks requiring literacy, such as accounting and 
education. See ORLAt'<DO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 1 80 ( 1 982) (noting that in Ancient Rome "skilled and literate slaves came to 
dominate not only urban industries, but education, the arts, theater, and literature") ;  
THOMA'> WIEDEMANN, GREEK AND ROMAN SLAVERY 8 ( 1 98 1 )  (noting that Roman slaves 
were "entruSted with supervisory functions such as responsibility for the city accounts 
or weights and measures") . By contrast, in many states in the American South, 
especially after the Nat Turner rebellion, it was a crime to teach a slave to read or 
write. See JANET DUITSMAN CORNELIUS, "WHEN I CAN READ My TITLE CLEAR": 
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Thomas Jefferson, who announced to the world that "all men are 
created equal,,,fii2 who founded the University of Virginia and carried 
the Enlightenment's torch through his lifelong emphasis on the 
importance of education, who believed he was an objective natural 
historian and scientist, still could not see the situation in the case of 
slavery. Dispositionism runs deep, and we can know with fair 
confidence that, were we living in Virginia at the time that Jefferson 
wrote, our position likely would have been even less situationally 
sensitive than his was.(;73 
A review of jefferson's justifications highlights the source and 
destination of our dispositionist tendencies. When we miss or 
downplay the situation, and see or exaggerate dispositions, we miss 
the hurdles, holes, quicksand, and other obstacles that can influence 
the outcome of any race, and instead attribute the outcomes to the 
racers themselves. Given the existence of the fundamental 
attribution error, it is very hard for us not to assume that we are all 
competing on a level playing field, that the victor deserves the spoils 
and the losers deserve their fate. And it is not just individuals that 
are engaged in a dispositional race. Indeed, entire "races" are 
competing against each other. The fact that one group dominates 
another often carries its own justification. Superior races, as 
measured by their ability to dominate, should dominate, as nature 
appears to reveal.fi74 As Alabama physician Josiah Nott put it in 1854, 
LITERACY, SLAVERY AND RELIGION IN THE fu'lTEBELLUM SOUTH 32 33 ( 1 99 1 )  
(describing laws in Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, and South 
Carolina prohibiting the education of slaves) . 
672 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U .S .  1 776) . 
673 Likely, that is, because acceptance of slavery was the dominant view, as we have 
noted, and will discuss below. What one thought about slavery may have depended, 
importantly, not on who one was, but rather where one stood. 
674 For many, however, it is not just revealed by nature, but by God as well. For 
example, the religious justifcation for slavery was also extremely popular and 
powerful. See generally FREDRICKSON, supra note 639, at 1 5-49 (describing the influence 
of religion on the advent of racism). The typical religious justification generally 
began wi th the claim that God recognized and sanctioned slavery in the Old 
Testament. Abraham, the benevolent and powerful patriarch, held slaves himself 
and was therefore considered the ideal for many slaveholders. See EUGENE D. 
GENOVESE, THE SLAVEHOLDERS' DILEMMA: FREEDOM AND PROGRESS IN SOUTHERN 
CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT, 1 820 1860, at 38 ( 1992) ("Abraham loomed as the principal 
Old Testament figure among the slaveholders.") . The next s tep in the religious 
argumen t was the assertion that God wanted Africans to become slaves. See 
WILLIAM JOHN GRAYSON,  THE H I RELING AND SLAVE 36-39 ( 1 854)  ( " Hence h as 
the n egro come, by God's command / For wiser teach ing,  to a foreign 
land . . . .  " ) . Indeed, even conceding that slavery was a harsh means, propo­
nents would argue that it was for good ends and part of a larger divine plan. See 
318 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 1 52: 129 
shortly before the Dred Scott decision:675 "Nations and races, like 
individuals, have each an especial destiny: some are born to rule, and 
others to be ruled. . . .  No two distinctly-marked races can dwell 
together on equal terms . . . .  [H]uman progress has arisen mainly 
from the war of the races . . . .  ,,676 
id. at 36 37 ( "And though the way be rough , the agent  s tern,  / No o ther 
mode, can human wits discern , / No better scheme, may wealth or vi rtue 
find,  / To tame and to ins truct the negro mind . . . .  " ( footnote omitted) ) ;  
id. at 38 ( "So here,  though hid the end from mortal view, / Heaven 's  
gracious p u rpose brings the negro too; / He comes by  God's  decree,  not  
chance n o r  fate, / Not  force, nor fraud,  nor grasping schemes of 
State . . . .  " ) .  God worked in mysterious ways, and mere men were not  to question 
the motives of the Almighty. As in Galileo's time, it was very difficult to question the 
teachings of various churches. See PETER KOLCHIN ,  AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1 61 9-
1 877, at 1 85, 1 86 ( 1 993)  ( describing the South as the "home of religious and 
social orthodoxy" ) .  Not surprisingly, the notion that God chose Africans to be 
slaves found its way into the legal system as well. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, 
at 14 (describing how notions of the appropriateness of slavery worked their way into 
court opinions) .  
G75 See supra notes 648 51 ,  and accompanying text (quoting Chief Justice Taney's 
opinion ) .  
676 J. C. NOTT & GEORGE R. GLlDDON, TYPES OF MA."iKIND 53, 79 ( 1854). For an 
interesting biographical account of Josiah Nott's life as a humanitarian scientist 
devoted to understanding and treating yellow fever, on one hand, and as a racial 
scientist devoted to advancing racial prejudice and white supremacy on the other, see 
REGINALD HORSMAN, JOSIAH NOTT OF MOBILE: SOUTHERNER, PHYSICIAN AND RACIAL 
THEORIST ( 1987) .  
I t  i s  worth pausing to emphasize our belief that the very concept of "race" is  itself 
based mostly on a fundamental attribution error motivated by this larger motive to 
justify inequalities. When groups of people appear to be doing better or worse than 
other groups, those experiencing and observing the difference often have a strong 
desire to attribute causation for it to a legitimating source. See infra notes 685 86 and 
accompanying text. Salient group characteristics, if they exist, are often seized upon to 
carry that weight. Racial differences, from skin color to hair texture, fit the bill nicely. 
As so often happens, though, the most salient features do not necessarily have much 
causal significance. And, as many geneticists, biologists, historians, and 
anthropologists have argued, that appears to be the case with many of the "racial" 
differences that we observe. See, e.g. , JOSEPH L. GRAVES, THE EMPEROR'S NEW 
CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENNIUM (2003) (reviewing the 
biological theories of "race" and the evidence that "race" has very little to no biological 
origins beyond those few that are sometimes evident on the surface); AUDREY SMEDLEY, 
RACE IN NORTH AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A WORLDVIEW 22 ( 1993) 
("[Race] was the cultural invention of arbitrary meanings applied to what appeared to 
be natural divisions within the human species. The meanings had social value but no 
intrinsic relationship to the biological diversity itself.") . For an interesting and 
readable on-line article on this topic, see Jonathan Marks, Scientific and Folk Ideas About 
Heredity, at http://personal.uncc.edu/jmarks/interests/Baltimore.htrnl (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2003) (describing the naturalizing but false racial categories that most of us 
have internalized and some of the effects of those categories) .  Again, there is a strong 
tendency to miss the larger context and be fooled by the vivid particulars that stand 
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II .  Consent-implied and revealed 
Those justifications led to another separate, but related, 
dispositionist justification of slavery-the myth that, were Mricans 
competent to choose, they would choose slavery for themselves. But 
because they were not, the responsibility fell on whites to choose for 
them. George Fitzhugh, a slavery proponent and celebrated 
Southern polemicist wrote , " [the Negro] is but a grown up child, 
and must be governed as a child, not as a lunatic or criminal. The 
master occupies towards him the place of parent or guardian."m 
Proponents argued that slavery was the best thing for the Africans 
because it allowed them to become "civilized," to become Christian, 
and to live a comfortable life, free from the dangers of their former 
life as Mrican savages.6i8 Thus, there was at least an implied consent 
on the part of blacks to the slavery system. 
out. When Jefferson began his defense of slavery with the phrase "the first difference 
which strikes us is that of colour," he was evincing what we would call the fundamental 
racial attribution error. 
677 
GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH, OR THE FAILURE OF FREE 
SOCIETY 83 ( Burt Franklin 1965) ( 1 854) . 
C7S This concept is vividly portrayed in verse: 
And yet the life, so unassailed by care, 
So blest with moderate work, with ample fare, 
With all the good the pauper Hireling needs, 
The happier Slave on each plantation leads; 
Safe from harassing doubts and annual fears, 
He dreads no famine, in unfmitful years; 
If harvests fail from inauspicious skies, 
The Master's providence his food supplies; 
No paupers perish here for wan t of bread, 
Or lingering live, by foreign bounty fed; 
No exiled trains of homeless peasan ts go, 
In distant climes, to tell their tales of woe; 
Far other fortune, free from care and strife, 
For work, or bread, attends the Negro's life, 
And Christian Slaves may challenge as their own, 
The blessings claimed in fabled states alone­
The cabin home, not comfortless, though mde, 
Light daily labour, and abundant food, 
The sturdy health, that temperate habits yield, 
The cheerful song, that rings in every field, 
The long, loud laugh, that fi'eemen seldom share, 
Heaven 's boon to bosoms un approached by care, 
And boisterous jest and humour unrefined, 
That leave, though rough, no painful sting behind; 
While, nestling near, to bless their humble lot, 
Warm social joys surround the Negro's cot, 
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A more extreme version of that paternalistic dispositionist fallacy 
was the view that slaves actually chose to be slaves-their consent and 
support for the institution was actually revealed by their happiness 
and satisfaction. In this view, there was really nothing paternalistic 
involved. Slaves were perceived to have consented by the fact that 
they seemed to like it. In this conception, slavery was contrasted with 
the system of wage labor in the North, and was seen as clearly 
superior. Fitzhugh again made the argument: 
The negro slaves of the South are the happiest, and, in some sense, the 
freest people in the world. The children and the aged and infinn work 
not at all, and yet have all the comforts and necessaries of life provided 
for them. They enjoy liberty, because they are oppressed neither by 
care nor labor.
619 
In 1 861 ,  former United States Senator James Henry Hammond 
from South Carolina explained the seemingly unchallenged "logic" 
of the system: 
"In all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to 
perfonn the drudgery of life. That is, a class requiring but a low order 
of intellect and but little skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, [and] 
fidelity. Such a class you must have, or you would not have that other 
class which leads progress, civilization, and refinement. It constitutes 
the very mudsill of society and of political government. . . .  Fortunately 
for the South, she has found a race adapted to that purpose at her 
hand. A race inferior to her own , but eminently qualified in temper, in 
vigor, in docility, in capacity to stand the climate, to answer all her 
purposes. We use them for our purpose, and we call them slaves.H
68o 
From where Hammond stood, the need for slaves was beyond 
question. That was the way great societies had always done it. If you 
accept as a starting point that certain people are inherently and 
The evening dance its merriment imparts, 
Love, with his rapture, fills their youthful hearts, 
And placid age, the task of labour done, 
Enjoys the summer shade, the winter's sun, 
And, as through life no pauper want he knows, 
Laments no poorhouse penance at its close. 
GRAYSON, supra note 674, at 52-54. 
679 GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 29 
(Richmond, A. Morris 1 857) ; see also DON E. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 652, at 428 
(noting that ChiefJustice Taney described the l ives of slaves as "usually cheerful and 
contented" (quoting SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY, L.L.D. 660 64 
(2d ed. 1 876» ) .  
tiRO CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE 
THURGOOD MARSHALL 1 0  ( 1 993) (quoting Senator James Henry Hammond). 
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dispositionally inferior, the best way to maximize the utility of society 
is to put those people at the bottom.fisl And if it happens that even 
the slaves prefer-or would if they were competent-to be slaves, then 
the idea of emancipation is ludicrous. 
b. A mplifying dispositionism: The anti-slavery bogeypeople 
In addition to those dispositionist rationales, defenders of the 
status quo of slavery also pointed to threats of bogeymen lurking in 
any change to the situation. Change was frightening, and could be 
made to seem even more so, not only to slaveholders, but to lower 
classes as well, including non-slave holding planters and poor white 
laborers. Each of these groups viewed the maintenance of the social 
system as essential to keeping their fears from becoming reality. As 
historian James McPherson puts it, " [slaveholders] managed to 
681 We can now see what might be called a "Pareto inefficiency bogeyman" to 
justify slavery. It was widely held that the lives of blacks wouldn't  improve much after 
slavery, and that the l ives of whites would get considerably worse. Proponents would 
argue, why rock the boat when it would make some people worse off without making 
others better? For instance, Alexis de Tocqueville sUl-mised that: 
If [a slave] becomes free, he often feels independence as a heavier burden 
than slavery itself, for his life has taught him to submit to everything, except 
to the dictates of reason; and when reason becomes his only guide, he cannot 
hear its voice. A thousand new wants assail him, and he lacks the knowledge 
and the energy needed to resist them. Desires are masters against whom one 
must fight, and he has learned nothing but to submit and obey. So he has 
reached this clima.x of affliction in which slavery brutalizes him and freedom 
leads him to destruction. 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318 G.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., 1 969) ( 1 850) .  George Fitzhugh made a similar point: 
Would the abolitionists approve of a system of society that set white children 
free, and remitted them at the age of fourteen, males and females, to all the 
rights, both as to person and property, which belong to adults? Would it be 
criminal or praiseworthy to do so? Criminal, of course. Now, are the average 
of negroes equal in information, in native intelligence, in prudence or 
providence to well-informed white children of fourteen? We who have lived 
with them for forty years, think not. The competition of the world would be 
too much for the children. They would be cheated out of their property and 
debased in their morals. Yet they would meet every where with sympathizing 
friends of their own color, ready to aid, advise and assist them. The negro 
would be exposed to the same competition and greater temptations, with no 
greater ability to contend with them, \�;th these additional difficulties. He 
would be welcome nowhere; meet with thousands of enemies and no friends. 
If he went North, the white laborers would kick him and cuff him, and drive 
him out of employment. If he went to Mrica, the savages would cook him 
and eat him. If he went to the West Indies, they would not let him in, or if 
they did, they would soon make of him a savage and idolater. 
FITZHUGH, supra note 677, at 88. 
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convince most non-slaveholding whites in the South (two-thirds of 
the white population there) that emancipation would produce 
economic ruin, social chaos, and racial war.,,682 
Even those that perhaps philosophically favored emancipation 
feared that, if blacks were released, hell might break loose. For 
instance ,  in a particularly grave rendition of this concern , 
Thomas Jefferson predicted that 
[d] eep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand 
recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained; new 
provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made; and m any 
other c ircumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce 
convulsions which wil probably never end but in the extermination of 683 the  one or the other race. 
682 JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATILE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 8 ( 1 988) . 
This fear expressed is evident within the Dred Scott decision: 
For if [slaves] were . . .  entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it 
would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from the 
police regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own safety. 
I t  would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in 
any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever 
they pleased . . .  and it would give them the full liberty of speech in publiC 
and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to 
hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms 
wherever they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject 
race of the same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing 
discontent and insubordination among them, and endangering the peace 
and safety of the State. 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. ( 1 9  How. ) 393, 4 1 6-17 ( 1 857) ; see also Bryan v. 
Walton, 1 4  Ga. 1 85, 202, 206 ( 1853) (" [The freed slave] resides among us, and yet is a 
stranger . . . .  Generally, society suffers, and the negro suffers by manumission . . . .  
[Freedom] to the colored man . . .  is worse than slavery itself.") ; FEHRENBACHER, supra 
note 652, at 428 (commenting on Taney's view that "sudden emancipation [of 
African-American slaves] would mean 'absolute ruin ... ·) . Many social historians have 
studied the part played by the putative advantage of racial superiority in non
slaveholders' support for the social system of slavery. and the racial apartheid that 
would follow in the jim Crow period. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF 
WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICA,,, WORKING CLASS 3-1 3  (Rev. ed. 
1999) (summarizing predecessor scholarship and arguing that notions of racial 
superiority allowed the white working class to distinguish and bolster itself vis-a-vis 
blacks, thus encouraging poor whites' complicity in the social system and inhibiting 
the development of social movements based on shared interests among poor whites 
and goor blacks) .  
3 JEFFERSON, supra note 658, at 264. Abraham Lincoln also feared a version of 
this bogeyman and, therefore, at one point early in the Civil War. suggested that 
blacks be kept separate from whites after emancipation. See HIGGINBOTHAM:, supra 
note 639, at 67 (noting that Lincoln even considered repatriation of African 
Americans) . 
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Defenders of slavery pointed to what they saw as the inevitable 
and total destruction of the fabric of Southem society if slavery was 
abolished. As historian Eugene Genovese notes, " [  t] he proslavery 
theorists never tired of proclaiming that the greatness of ancient 
Egypt, Israel, Greece, and Rome had been based on slavery . . . .  ,,684 
The defenders of slavery assumed that there could not be a great 
and prosperous society without slavery; they were unable to imagine 
something that differed from the status quo. The only way to be 
prosperous, they believed, was the "proven" way, and thinking about 
alternatives was a dangerous endeavor. Of course, the views that 
blacks were inferior, that a successful society depended on the 
social system of slavery, and that only chaos would ensue from 
changing it, were wrong. 
But the fear-mongering served an important purpose for those 
who engaged in it beyond simply predicting hypothetical future 
outcomes. As we have hinted throughout this Article and as we will 
describe in more detail in other work,685 there is considerable and 
growing social psychological research indicating that the presence of a 
threat to existing systems activates in us a general motive to justifY or 
legitimate the system, as is.fi86 That research further reveals that one of 
the most effective means of legitimating the system is to 
dispositionalize those groups that might otherwise be seen as unjustly 
victimized. By increasing fears that the system was at risk, and that any 
change to the system would be calamitous, the defenders of slavery 
were, consciously or not, acting to reinforce the system and the 
dispositionism of slaves on which the system relied. And they were 
likely having that effect on all groups, regardless of their relationship 
with the system of slavery, including those who were in fact being 
harmed. 
684 GENOVESE, supra note 674, at 5. 
H8;, See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I ,  supra note 84; Hanson & Yosifon, 
supra note 30. 
686 A useful sample of that work containing support for the propositions in this 
paragraph and much more would include the following articles: John T. Jost & D. 
Burgess, Attitudinal Ambivalence and the Conflict Between Group and System justification 
Motives in Low Status Groups, 26 PERSONALIIT & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 293 (2000) ;  John 
T. Jost et aI., Non Conscious Forms of System justification: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences 
far Higher Status Groups, supra note 215;  John T. Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory 
of System justification, supra note 1 9 1 ,  at 89; John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, The 
Psychology of System justification and the Palliative Function of Ideology, 1 3  EUR. REv. Soc. 
PSYCHOL. I I I  (2002); John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in 
System-justification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 
( 1 994) .  
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c. Dispositionalizing the oposition 
We have thus far explored several ways in which knowledge 
structures evolved to justify the institution of slavery on behalf of those 
who sought to legitimize it. More specifically, we have emphasized 
how slaves-and all identity groups for that matter-were more or less 
dispositionalized in order to "make sense" of the systems of slavery, 
and to inoculate them with the "patina of consent. ,,687 But the deep 
capture of "knowledge" is not accomplished without the deep capture 
of knowledge production, and that is also part of the unseen situation. 
As was true during Calileo's struggles with the Catholic Church, as 
Stigler argued was true four decades ago of administrative regulators, 
and as we hypothesize is generally true today, conceptions of 
ourselves, others, and our institutions do not just emerge from 
bottom-up, individual analyses of the given facts. Nor do they emerge 
from a fair tournament of ideas, in which the most meritorious ideas, 
beliefs ,  and knowledge structures win out. Instead, the winners are 
created, promoted, subsidized, and protected by the systems, 
institutions, and individuals who enjoy the greatest power to define 
the situation. Influencing the interior situation means influencing, 
among other things, the information people have access to, how it is 
framed, and its credibility. The success of pro-slavery dispositionism 
required that dynamic.688 
In this subsection, we focus briefly on one of its many elements: 
dealing with competing ideas and criticisms of abolitionists. Here was 
the problem. Although dispositionalizing slaves helped many 
Southerners ease the dissonance they felt from not permitting the self­
evident natural rights that they were preaching, it did not relieve the 
dissonance created by the emerging abolition movement. Particularly 
after the Nat Turner rebellion in 1 831 , those who justified and 
endorsed slavery had to explain why so many other people were not 
persuaded by the force of their seemingly air-tight arguments. 
The dissonance was likely significant. According to social psy­
chologists, when such a conflict grows strong, something usually has to 
687 The phrase is Duncan Kennedy's. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as 
Trainingfor Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40, 41 (David 
Kairys ed., 1982) ("Students act affirmatively within the channels cut for them, cutting 
them deeper, giving the whole a patina of consent and weaving complicity into 
everyone's life story.") . 
688 For a sample of some of the laws prohibiting or discouraging the promotion of 
any ideas that might encourage questioning or criticism of slavery, see GOODELL, supra 
note 665, at 384-86. 
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give.G8\1 Of course, a person could reconsider and alter her own views, 
but that is a rare event, particularly when there is a lot at stake, as 
there was on the issue of slavery. Research shows that an extremely 
common means of extinguishing that sort of interpersonal or 
intergroup dissonance is to attribute the gap between our outlook and 
someone else's to a lack of objectivity on their part. We assume that 
there is some dispositional source of their bias-stupidity, or laziness, 
or corruption, or self-interest.69o Again, dispositionism saves the day. 
And that is largely what happened in the South. To defend 
slavery and the entire worldview on which it was based, slavery's 
proponents dismissed abolitionists and their ilk as ignorant, 
hypocritical, and jealous of the success achieved in the South. As 
historian James McPherson summarizes: 
[Slavery] also established the foundation for an upper class of 
gentlemen to cultivate the arts, literature, hospitality, and public 
service. It created a far superior society to that of the "vulgar, 
contemptible, counterjumping" Yankees . . . .  " Instead of an evil ,"  said 
John C. Calhoun in summing up the southern position, slavery was "a 
positive good . . .  the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in 
the world. 
"691 
Southern newspapers echoed this sentiment. '''The great evil of 
Northern free society,' "  insisted a South Carolina newspaper, '' ' is, that 
it IS burdened with a servile class of MECHANICS and 
LABOURERS,  unfit for self-government, yet clothed with the attributes 
and powers of citizens. ",692 A Georgia newspaper was even more 
emphatic in its distaste: 
Free society! we sicken at the name. What is it but a conglomeration 
of greasy mechanics, filthy operatives, small-fisted farmers, and moon
689 See generally Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications 
for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 1 03, passim (Edward 
S. Reed et al. eds., 1996). 
690 See, e.g. , Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and 
Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. PERSONALI1Y & Soc. PSYCHOL. 53, 60 ( 1998) (noting 
that test-subjects commonly overestimate the impact of self-interest) ; Dale T. Miller & 
Rebecca K. Ratner, The Power of the Myth of Self-Interest, in CURRENT SOCIETAL CONCERNS 
ABOUT JUSTICE 25, 30 (Leo Montada & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1 996) (same) ; Emily 
Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Vtmus 
Others, 28 PERSONALI1Y & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002) (demonstrating our 
tendency to see other people as biased while assuming that we are unbiased) . 
691 MCPHERSON, supra note 682, at 56 (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d 
Sess., app. 61-62 ( 1 838) (remarks of Senator Calhoun» . 
692 LAWRENCE R. TENZER, THE FORGOTTEN CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR: A NEW 
LOOK AT THE SLAVERY ISSUE 126 ( 1 997) (quoting a South Carolina newspaper) , 
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struck theorists? . .  The prevailing class one meets with [in the 
North] is that of mechanics struggling to be genteel, and small farmers 
who do their own drudgery, and yet are hardly fit for association with a 693 southern gentleman 's body servant. 
In retrospect, such attacks on the dispositions of abolitionist 
enemies appear to be a fairly transparent tactic to discredit them. At 
the time, however, those who offered the critiques and those who 
shared in them, undoubtedly believed that the attacks were a fairly 
neutral assessment of the truth. 
d. Our dispositionalization of slavery 
In just that way, today, we look back with horror at slavery and 
the institutions, customs, laws, and mindsets that made it possible. 
We express outrage that "those people" could have embraced such 
inappropriate dispositionist assumptions, when it is so clear, in 
hindsight, that those assumptions were not only wrong, but self­
serving mechanisms of oppression. 
The same central lessons of the Galileo story are all evident 
here. We retrospectively wi tness powerful groups abusing their 
power by creating and enforcing oppressive laws based on false, but 
self-serving, dispositionist attributions. As with the Galileo story, we 
manage to dispositionalize the people involved as "evil"-and 
obviously different from us. Yet, we are nonetheless confident that 
history is not repeating itself today, confident that we are not blinded 
too by some false dispositionism, confident that we are not also 
unduly missing the situation. In the examples of Galileo and Ameri­
can slavery we can, in hindsight, see situation as palpably as we can 
see a gun to the head. And such a visible form of influence is, we all 
agree, unacceptable. Because we can see the situation in retrospect, 
we can take comfort in the belief that we are not subject to anything 
similar and that, unlike those who advanced or participated in those 
oppressive practices or "bad acts," we are dispositionally "good." 
But here is the rub. Those are precisely the same dispositionist 
assumptions that the groups who we see as "bad" made about 
themselves. They did not see oppressive power shaping their society. 
We suspect further that we take comfort in our own outrage at these 
obvious evils of the past, comfort that helps convince us that we must 
not be missing anything like it in our own situation.694 The problem is 
693 MUSCOGEE H ERALD (Georgia) , reprinted in N.Y. TRIB., Sept. 10, 1856. 
694 Today, one of the most well known parts of Galileo's story is the legend that, 
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that we do not understand that the best defense against such 
patterns comes less from identifying flawed ideas than it does from 
identifying the flaws in those who construct the ideas. The problem 
is in the human animal and our faith that we are immune to that 
which we generally neither see nor understand: the situation. 
Indeed, instead of assuming that our current views about slavery 
and Galileo's imprisonment provide evidence that we will not again 
make such horrific errors, a more reasonable inference would be 
that those examples, and the countless others like them, constitute a 
compelling indication that history will continue to repeat-precisely 
because we do not appear to know what is moving it. If humans are 
capable of believing that those we directly harm (be they slaves, or 
Milgram's "learners") deserve their fate, it should be even easier to 
rationalize the harms imposed less directly, less saliently, and more 
situationally. 
3 .  Conclusion 
We can thus see that the power of dispositionism, and the patterns 
to which it gives shape, are witnessed again and again not just in social 
psychology's attributional experiments, nor just in the mundane basic 
habits of our lives, but in large and central questions of social policy 
and human society. We will not pursue this exegesis further here, but 
the basic pattern is becoming clear. When we see disposition and miss 
situation, we implicitly presume that the situation is neutral, that the 
playing field is stable, and that everything else is equal. We see 
outcomes, then, as dispositionally deserved. When the system is 
challenged or threatened, all those involved in the system have a stake 
in reinforcing it and, thus, reinforcing its legitimating rationalizations. 
As this discussion has indicated, the institution of slavery emerged 
first and was justified later. And the justifications came piecemeal as 
the need arose. Jefferson's initial attempt to make sense of the 
institution was, at least by comparison to later efforts, quite tentative. 
as he was leaving his confession, after he had claimed that the Earth did not move, 
Galileo said under his breath, "and yet it moves." It's just a legend; there is, as far as 
we have been able to discover, no real evidence that Galileo said it. But, hundreds of 
years later, we like to believe he did. It comforts us by illustrating how Galileo's 
capture and ultimate vindication are so very obvious in retrospect. "Those people" 
should have known better, and our hero, Galileo, did. What should be unsettling is 
that, in Galileo's time, this part of the story was invisible. No one knew, or probably 
would have even believed, that Galileo said such a thing. Those living through deep 
capture are rarely able to see enough of the situation to realize it. 
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By the middle of the nineteenth century, with the attacks on slavery 
growing to a feverish pitch, the institution's justifications were fully 
formed and robust. And they did the trick. What had once been a 
"necessary evil" had been rendered a just, natural, and enviable path 
to civilized greatness. And many in the South were proud of that 
transition. South Carolina's Senator James H. Hammond spoke of 
earlier times when Southerners "'believed slavery to be an evil­
weakness-disgrace-nay a sin . . .. [I]n fear and trembling [they] 
awaited a doom that [they] deemed inevitable.",695 But that belief was 
temporary, as was the resultant fear. '" [A] few bold spirits took the 
question up; they compelled the South to investigate it anew and 
thoroughly, and what is the result?' [asked Hammond,] 'Why, it would 
be difficult to find a Southern man who feels the system to be the 
slightest burthen on his conscience. ",696 Hammond's fellow South 
Carolinian, John C. Calhoun, recounted the same history from 
dissonance to resonance as follows: "Many in the South once believed 
that [slavery] was a moral and political evil; that folly and delusion are 
gone; we see it now in its true light, and regard it as the most safe and 
stable basis for free institutions in the world.,,"97 And so it is that 
visible evil fades into the situation and, with it, becomes invisible. 
D. The Situational Bogeypeople 
If not before, it is usually at this point in the presentation of our 
ideas to friends, family, students, and colleagues that we are stopped 
with one or another version of "I hear what you are saying and I may 
even agree, but I think you are going too far. Is it not dangerous to 
take the situation so seriously?" 
We suspect that many of our readers may be experiencing similar 
reactions, and we understand the concern. To continue our argu­
ment, then, we think it is necessary to directly engage several versions 
of this kind of reaction to our claims. We are doing so not only to 
try to mollify our readers' worries, but also because these common 
reactions harmfully narrow the boundaries of most social and political 
debates in our society today. 
695 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR 299 (1966) (quoting Senator 
James Henry Hammond, Oct. 29, 1858) . 
69
6 Id. 
697 CONGo GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess., App. 61 62 (1838) (remarks of Senator 
Calhoun). 
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One of our main concerns with those arguments is that they are 
not always what they purport to be. In our experience, they are not 
offered as a concern that emerges once the power of the situation is 
fully recognized. Rather, they are implication-based fears that pre­
vent people from truly understanding the nature of our argument 
-that is, of the situation. Still, those responses are routine, usually 
as a fallback position-a final trump card. So we will do our best in 
this Section to respond to commonly held intuitions, which we call 
situational bogeypeople-siblings of those that we encountered earlier. 6g8 
These intuitions seem to come in several varieties. 
1. The Communism Bogeyman 
The most popular version of the challenge goes like this: 
The playing field is level. And, as long as everyone is starting the race 
together, there is no reason to be concerned about the fact that there 
will be some winners and some losers. That's what a fair competition is 
designed to do: separate winners from losers as it creates incentives to 
win in the process. Equality of opportunity does not guarantee equality 
of outcome. If policymakers were to begin looking to outcomes as a 
measure of opportunity, they would transform our free world into a 
communist or socialist regime. 
A major weakness of this challenge is that it is not actually a 
response to, as much as it is a denial of, our point. Our claim that 
situational influences benefit some groups and disadvantage others is 
a claim that the playing field is, in ways unseen, not level and that we 
are all operating under the wrong presumption. To assert that the 
playing field is level may, in fact, confirm our point: people do not 
see relevant situational influences (which would include many fea­
tures of the playing field) and overattribute outcomes to dispositions. 
That basic challenge sometimes finds some reinforcement, 
though, by retreating to the following version of the communist 
bogeyman: 
Even if the playing field is not perfectly level, it is level enough for us 
to attribute success or failure to the participants' dispositions. After all, 
many people who appear to start with situational disadvantages outrun 
those who appear to begin with situational advantages-simply because 
they were disposition ally inclined to overcome those disadvantages. 
698 
See supra text accompanying notes 219-25, 682 86 (discussing the concepts of 
the totalitarian and anti slavery bogeymen); see also supra notes 312-13 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Catholic Church's fear of heresy). 
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This response is just a more nuanced form of denial. 
Acknowledging trivial unevenness on the playing field can often be a 
disarmingly effective means of justifying ignoring that unevenness. 
Of course, it is possible that the field is only trivially uneven, but the 
evidence typically adduced for that claim tends to be very thin and 
seems to be based more on shared intuition than situational 
sensitivity. We do not want to deny that Horatio Alger, and many 
like him, have successfully managed to turn adversity into 
opportunity-or, in other words, have dispositionally chosen to 
overcome significant situational opposition. Nor do we want to deny 
that the hope of just such an outcome is inspiring for many poor 
and hard-working people in our society.699 But neither do we believe 
that such exceptional success stories are much more than that 
-exceptional. The fact that there is some movement across socio­
economic groups does not imply that situation does not immensely 
affect outcomes.7 0 0  
First, when members of disadvantaged groups compete against 
advantaged groups, the situation will influence the outcome even if 
there are exceptions. An extremely fast and driven runner with a 
brick tied to his foot may well outpace a slower, unencumbered 
runner. But a class of brick-laden runners will tend to seem 
plodding or malingering as they fall behind their brick-free competi­
tors. 
Moreover, what may be true individually almost certainly cannot 
be true generally. For instance, the fact that some hard-working 
people manage to climb out of poverty does not mean that all could, 
if only they worked as hard. The point about a competitive race is, 
69 See BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMEO: ON (NOT) GETTING By IN 
AMERICA 118 (2001) (recounting the response of one of her maid service co
workers to the question of how she feels about working for people with so much 
when she h as so little: "All I can think of is like, wow, I'd like to have this stuff 
someday. It motivates me and I don't feel the slightest resentment because, you 
know, it's my goal to get to where they are.") . 
700 Perhaps a parallel argument may be useful to help make our point. The 
tobacco industry for decades successfully clouded the causal connection between 
smoking and diseases such as lung cancer by emphasizing two key facts: many 
smokers do not die of lung cancer, and many non-smokers do die of lung cancer. See 
RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 203, 209-11 (1996) (discussing the debate 
over the link between smoking and lung cancer in the 1950s ) .  By focusing on 
those individuals, cig-arette companies succeeded in distracting us from the fuller 
situation-which was that the trends in lung cancer closely tracked smoking habits, 
the incidence of lung cancer among smokers vastly exceeded that of non smokers, 
and the amount that a person smoked correlated with her probability of contracting 
lung cancer. !d. at 193 97. 
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after all, to separate winners from losers. The situation of the 
competition creates a meaningful limit to the number of winners. If 
everyone ran as hard as Horatio Alger, the speed of the race would 
increase to be sure, but the number of winners and losers would 
701 not. 
In any event, the claim that policymakers should not look to 
outcomes to help determine if there is a problem with the playing 
field simply denies a major feature of our argument. Because the 
playing field is part of the situation, there is little reason to be 
confident that we can know when it is level and fair. 
Recall that nobody believed that the teachers in Milgram's 
experiment would shock the learners all the way up to 450 volts.702 
The fact that two-thirds of them did suggests that even the experts, 
including Milgram, misperceived the power of the situation and 
overestimated the role of disposition. What social psychology and 
history teach us is not to trust our perceptions, but to doubt them. 
Of course, claiming that we should learn from outcomes is a very 
different claim than "from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs[.], , 703 Our argument is not that we should all 
finish the race together, but that where people finish may reveal 
more about the race than it reveals about the racers. Outcomes can 
serve an immensely valuable evidentiary role in any serious attempt 
to ensure that the playing field is level. 
Moreover, the deference to outcomes as a measure of the process 
is nothing new. Indeed, it was Stigler who introduced that very 
methodology in assessing whether regulations were serving their 
purported goal of advancing the public interest. This outcome-based 
701 For example, at Harvard Law School, new students are encouraged to believe 
that by working hard, they can substantially increase their chances of getting A's in 
their first year courses. They are encouraged to attend exam preparation sessions and 
to heed feedback on mid-semester assignments. What students and faculty often 
seem to forget, however, is that those efforts will do little to influence the grade 
distribution, which is largely determined by a curve. What they may influence, 
however, is the sense of dispositional control and responsibility that students may feel 
for their grades. A common complaint among second and third year students is that 
grading is, in fact, not well correlated with how much energy they put into their 
courses a belief that may help explain why so many seem to reduce their efforts. 
702 See supra text accompanying notes 87 99 (describing Milgram's experiments) .  
703 Karl Marx, Critique of  the Gotha Programme, inJUSTICE 162 (Alan Ryan ed., 1993) . 
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assessment, as we indicated above, is one of the most important 
foundational insights of conventional economic theory.7 04 
Finally, the idea that taking situation into account will somehow 
reduce the incentives of the situation ally disadvantaged to try to win, 
strikes us as counterintuitive and contrary to the most basic 
assumptions of those who promote free competition. If, in fact, the 
playing field is uneven, it seems that all competitors gain, not lose, 
incentive to run faster by leveling the field. Those who are 
disadvantaged on the current field will be given a fair chance, and 
those who are advantaged will be given a meaningful challenge.7 os 
2. The Personal-Responsibility Bogeyman 
A second popular version of the situational bogeyman goes like 
this: 
If we begin to take situation into account, people will no longer be 
held personally responsible for their actions. Criminals will be able to 
blame almost anything they do on the fact that they had a bad 
situation. "It wasn't me, it was the situation; I'm a victim of circum­
stances" will be heard in all the courts of the land and criminals will 
run free. 
We have several responses to this bogeyman. 
First, as we summarized above, the law already takes situation 
into account, through doctrines like duress in contract, 7 06 necessity in 
d "h f . ,,7 07 . . . al I 7 08 Th bl trespass, an eat 0 pasSIOn m cnmm aw. e pro em, as 
we see it, is that the situation is far from being an occasional, 
glaringly obvious gun to the head, as the current law treats it. It is a 
704 Supra text accompanying notes 263-82. Similarly, market oriented critics of the 
welfare system motivate their criticisms largely by arguing that the welfare system has 
failed to achieve its ends. 705 Another version of the argument to which we are responding is that even if 
situational influences are significant, it is better to pretend that they are not, because 
otherwise doing so would remove any self help incentive from those who are 
situationally disadvantaged. This version of the personal responsibility argument has 
several problems. First, it assumes that nothing can be done about leveling the 
playing field. Clearly, if the playing feld could be leveled, there would be no need to 
pretend or to create the added incentive. Second, it is an argument that seems in 
direct tension with the pro-freedom assumptions that most of the people who offer it, 
claim to embrace. In the name of individualism, they are basically calling on us to 
embrace paternalism: "let's not tell anyone what we admit to be true, for their own 
benefit." 706 • Supra text accompanymg notes 554-614. 707 Supra note 602. 708 [d. 
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force of greater or lesser magnitude in nearly every human interac­
tion. When we argue that the law must take situation into account, 
we are asking the law to continue to function as it always has, but in 
a way that gives the situation the weight that social science dem­
onstrates it possesses in human affairs. 
Second, there is a strong element of stereotype in the account of 
this bogeyman. The stereotype is that the situational character-our 
model of the human animal-is a puppet on the strings of the 
situation, entirely lacking in disposition or volition. But this is a false 
picture of our model. We fully agree that humans possess disposi­
tions and that dispositions likely play some role in a great portion of 
our behavior. But, as we argue above, current legal theory and the 
law overestimate the point at which disposition ends and the 
situation begins. No one wants criminals to run free, but at the same 
time, we do not want to lay blame where it is not due. A law that takes 
a nuanced view of the roles of situation and disposition will be better 
able to correctly assign dispositional responsibility and blame where 
they belong. 
Nevertheless, it might seem that, if the law were to expand its 
acknowledgement of situational factors, the result would be to 
expand the avenues for evading responsibility. Far from it. As we 
have shown, people systematically-and often quite erroneously­
attribute causation, responsibility, and blame to the most visible 
actors in a given situation. They compound their mistakes through 
the fundamental attribution error, by assuming that action is 
attributable to disposition, rather than situation. Judges, juries, and 
legislators are as vulnerable to these cognitive biases as anyone else. 
If we are truly committed to the principle of personal responsibility, 
then we should be deeply troubled by the prospect that we are 
applying it without taking these biases into account. For the 
damages to fit the tort or the punishment to fit the crime, we must 
first be sensitive to the situation. 
It is our contention that, by ignoring situation, we may be 
ignoring the true role of disposition and letting those actors who are 
most responsible for the harms we seek to redress off the hook. To 
better illustrate this point, we offer a thought experiment, a variation 
on an actual experiment. Imagine an alternate world in which 
Stanley Milgram is actually interested in studying the effects of 
negative reinforcement on learning. Having seen the power of the 
situation, he designs an experiment identical in every respect to the 
actual one, with one difference: the learner receives real electric 
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shocks. Unfortunately, when Milgram runs these experiments, the 
learner receives third-degree bums and sues for damages. Who 
should be held responsible? 
Under commonly held notions of "personal responsibility," some 
might blame the learner. He was an adult and ought to have known 
what he was getting into. After all, everyone knows that elec­
tricity is hot! Therefore, he should be made to deal with the 
consequences of his decision, instead of looking to blame others for 
them. Some people, also citing "personal responsibility," might 
blame the teacher who flipped the switches because she had many 
opportunities to stop. There were teachers who refused to go along 
with the experiment when they saw the learner's suffering; no one 
held a gun to this teacher's head. Shouldn't she be responsible for 
the (quite visible) consequences of her actions? 
A typical "personal responsibility" view of this lawsuit would likely 
stop at that analysis in either allowing the loss or imposing liability. 
But what of Stanley Milgram? Shouldn't he have known of the risks 
to the learner? Shouldn't he be held "personally responsible" for 
setting up a situation in which the teacher was quite likely to flip the 
switches? Or perhaps Yale University should be held responsible for 
not better monitoring Milgram. Milgram apparently conducted his 
original experiments with the university's knowledge and may have 
been motivated by the university's tenure standards to perform this 
sort of research. Doesn't Yale profit, even to this day, from the 
attention garnered by Milgram's work? 
If any part of this account conflicts with your intuitions, then 
consider the famed McDonald's coffee case of a few years ago.'09 In 
that case, hot coffee spilled on Stella Liebeck's lap, giving her third­
degree burns. 7l o When she won a verdict against McDonald's, 
Liebeck became a symbol of the law's role in absolving citizens of 
personal responsibility and the poster child for tort reform.711 
" [R]adio talk-show hosts around the country . . .  lambasted the 
plaintiff, her attorneys and the jurors on air. Declining to be 
interviewed [,] . . .  one juror explained that he already had received 
709 See Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided that a Coffee Spill is 
Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST.j., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al (recounting the events leading up 
to the lawsuit and the trial) . 
710 
ld. 
711 
See, e.g., This is True, Inc., 77le TRUE Stella Awards, at http://ww.stella 
awards.com (last updated Apr. 2003) (showcasing abuses of the tort system in America 
and naming an award for such abuse after Stella Liebeck) . 
2003] THE SITUA nON 335 
angry calls from citizens around the country.,, 712 Under the common 
sense "personal responsibility" view, Ms. Liebeck was responsible for 
knowing the coffee was hot and ought to have been more careful in 
handling it. Mter all, "she spilled it on herself. ,,713 However, when 
the jurors were forced to look at the situation, they were able to see 
that McDonald's  shared responsibility for the burns.714 
We present this case and our hypothetical to make clear that the 
term "personal responsibility" does not resolve difficult questions of 
fault. It merely begs them. Our point is not that people should 
never be held responsible for their acts, but that one should not 
assume that their "common sense" can be trusted to assign respon­
sibility.715 The law must be concerned with questions of situation. 
34. 
712 Gerlin, supra note 709, at AI. 
713 Aric Press et aI., Are Lawyers Burning America?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1995, at 32, 
714 See Gerlin, supra note 709, at AI, A4 (summarizing jurors' views). Contrary to 
popular perceptions, seventy nine year old Liebeck was not driving, nor was the car in 
motion, when the accident occurred. Her "absurd" conduct was simply to place the 
coffee cup between her legs as she tried to remove the plastic lid. CARL T. BOGUS, 
WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 19 (2001). Furthermore, McDonald's served 
its coffee at between 180 and 190 degrees Fahrenheit, whereas the average household 
cup of coffee is between 130 and 140 degrees Fahrenheit. [d. A doctor testified that 
lower temperatures would have slowed the rate of burning. Gerlin, supra note 709, at 
A4. Although McDonald's had received 700 complaints of coffee bums in the 
preceding decade, it did not sufficiently warn consumers of the possibility of bums or 
intend to reduce its coffee temperature. Press et aI., supra note 713, at 35; see also John 
F. Bramfeld, Spilled Coffee and a Shot in the Foot, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 18, 1995, at 6 
(suggesting that keeping temperatures high despite complaints was a justified, 
deliberate, profit.maximizing business decision). 
Before ever filing a suit, Ms. Liebeck reported her injuries to McDonald's and 
requested compensation for her medical expenses (she spent eight days in the hospital 
and underwent a series of skin grafts, leaving her with permanent scars over sixteen 
percent of her body). BOGUS, supra, at 19 20; Press et aI., supra, at 34. Rebuffing 
Liebeck's request for $2,000, McDonald's offered $800 to close the matter. [d. At trial, 
Ms. Liebeck only sought damages based on the difference in injury between spilling 
140 degree coffee and spilling 180-degree coffee. BOGUS, supra, at 20. Furthermore, 
despite media coverage suggesting a "rogue verdict," the jury did not ignore Liebeck's 
role in the accident or absolve her of responsibility. They found her to be twenty 
percent comparatively negligent and reduced the compensatory damages for medical 
costs and disability to $160,000 from $200,000. [d. Moreover, the punitive damages 
were not quite as arbitrary as commonly depicted the $2.7 million reflected two days 
of coffee sales revenues for McDonald's. Gerlin, supra note 709, at A4. The judge 
later reduced the punitive damages to $480,000. BOGUS, supra, at 20. Finally, to avoid 
an a�peal, Liebeck settled the case for an undisclosed amount. [d. 
b For similar arguments about other products, see Hanson & Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 251, at 1467-1553 (providing evidence of how the 
tobacco industry manipulated-and thus shared responsibility for consumer smoking 
habits); Hanson & Logue, supra note 402, at 1350 52 (challenging the conventional 
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How much does the situation influence individuals? Who controls 
and profits from particular situations? How might the situation be 
altered to influence individuals in other ways? These are not easy 
questions, but to avoid them may be to encourage personal 
irresponsibility. 
Put differently, the concern that taking hard-ta-see situation into 
account may "encourage criminals to run freely through our streets" 
ignores the less visible possibility that disregarding situation may 
encourage even more. 
3. The Paternalism Bogeyman 
No contingent of bogeypeople would be complete without the 
paternalism bogeyman. Unlike the prior bogeypeople, the figure of 
paternalism appears more prominently and openly in legal theoretic 
discourse. Although its precise definition often remains shrouded in 
mystery, that has not stopped it from exercising a powerful influence 
in legal-theoretic debate.il6 Generations of theorists have agreed that 
paternalism is no friend of the dispositional human actor presiding at 
the core of the traditional liberal picture. John Stuart Mill, who early 
laid down the line against paternalism in a "civilized" society, stated 
that, "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not 
a sufficient warrant.,, 71 7 
Professor David Shapiro, in his famous article on the subject, 
claimed that the concept of paternalism can be conceived of in a 
number of weaker or stronger formulations.7IB But the basic anti­
paternalism suspicion has, by now, attached to almost any version of it. 
In his article, Shapiro set out, in part, to challenge Duncan Kennedy' S 
seminal claim that paternalism was actually quite widespread in 
private and public social arrangements, including, importantly, many 
"personal responsibility" argument against cigarette liability) ; Hanson, Yosifon & 
Benforado, supra note 615 (describing the situational manipulations by the food 
industry that have contributed to the obesity epidemic) .  
716 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 388 92 (describing the ALI Reporters' 
rejection of hard paternalism in favor of consumer sovereignty) . 717 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1982) (1859) . 
718 David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 520 
( 1988). 
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areas of the law. 7Hl Shapiro gave a renewed voice to the traditional 
view of paternalism as showstopper, arguing that legal justifications for 
many of the kinds of arrangements Kennedy had pointed to were 
actually well grounded in anti-paternalism (at least rhetorically) .'20 
Professor Shapiro claimed that, in fact, "anti-paternalism (which [we] 
should perhaps . . .  [be] calling 'pro-autonomy') is a dominant strain 
in our tradition.,,'21 Moreover, as we have already indicated, legal 
economists, when met with claims they perceive as threatening to 
individual autonomy, are quick to retreat behind, not economics per 
se, but an anti-paternalistic defense of individual freedom.'22 Much of 
the most recent law and economics-oriented scholarship on 
paternalism has been directed at defining the boundaries and types of 
paternalistic social policies that can be justified, assuming that strong 
deference should be given to the basic "libertarian" view of individual 
autonomy.'23 The paternalism bogeyman, despite the efforts of 
Kennedy and others, reigns. 
719 Shapiro was primarily responding to the argument found in Duncan Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to 
Compulsary Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 624 49 (1982) . 
This was also the view taken by H.L.A. Hart. See H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTI At"1D 
MORALITI 30 34 (1963) (advocating the separation of law from morality in certain 
areas of personal conduct) . 
'20 Shapiro, for example, notes that courts have consistently rested their 
upholding of "seat belt" or "helmet laws" on public policy grounds such as efficiency, 
and even, with respect to the upholding of laws against sodomy, on the ground of 
supporting public morals or public will. Shapiro, supra note 718, at 541 42. Neither 
type of law has been justified on the ground that it forces people into behavior that is 
good for them despite their thinking to the contrary. Shapiro himself claims that "one 
reason" he voted in favor of Massachusetts' seat belt law was that it would lower 
insurance rates. [d. at 530 n.37. 
'21 Shapiro, supra note 718, at 572. While ultimately coming down as a strong anti
paternalist, see id. at 572-75, part of Shapiro's purpose was to present an analysis from 
the perspective of "legal process," an approach to thinking about the law that Shapiro 
argued had suffered unwarranted neglect by the critical legal scholars who he saw as 
emer:§ent in 1988 when he wrote his article. !d. at 521. 
, See supra text accompanying notes 551-70; see also Hanson & Yosifon, Missing the 
Situation, (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (describing this pattern in 
legal economists' writings).  
'23 See, e.g., Paul Burrows, Analyz.ing Legal Paternalism, 15 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 
489, 497 (1995) (advocating an expanded emphasis on people's preferences and 
choice of behavior) ; Colin Camerer et aI., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
l!.Conomics and the Case for Assymmetric Paternalism (forthcoming) (on file with authors) ;  
Cass R.  Sunstein & Richard H.  Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism and the Law 
(forthcoming) (on file with authors) (contributing a new perspective to welfare 
economics) ; Eyal Zamier, 17ie Eficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv. 229, 230 (1998) 
(arguing that paternalism is "compatible with theoretical foundations of normative 
economics" and that "efficiency analysis provides a central justifcation" for it) . 
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A central effect of its reign is to scare away potential interventions 
in the apparent dispositional choices of individuals or arguments that 
would put the meaning of such choices into doubt. To do so, the 
paternalism bogeyman patronizes the dispositional actor by 
highlighting only the most salient kinds of situational exercises of 
power over individuals, calling these paternalism, and demanding 
they yield in the name of the freedom that is assumed otherwise to 
govern. In this way, the paternalism bogeyman, like the others, 
succeeds against our argument only by denying what social science 
teaches (and markets reveal) about the power of the unseen situation. 
Shapiro, for example, provides a vivid but profoundly 
dispositionist picture when he "lay[s] out some baselines" for the 
study of paternalism. 724 Adopting the axiom of "consent" as central to 
the analysis, Shapiro discerns the quintessential form of what he and 
most theorists find to be a permissible kind of paternalism-self­
paternalism. 720 The guiding figure here is Odysseus, that hero of the 
disposition human journey, binding himself to the mast of his ship as 
it passes by the Sirens, and instructing his crew that they should not 
untie him no matter how vigorously he demands to be unbound. 726 
Odysseus fears his future-self will, if set free, choose to stay forever 
among the beautiful, seductive voices of the Sirens.i2i In contrast to 
this permissible "baseline" of self-paternalism is an even more vivid 
dispositionist vision of the sinister paternalism bogeyman-the Grand 
Inquisitor: 
[T] he case for a claim of weak paternalism is itself weakened . . .  when 
the asserted incapacity exists on a question of basic values or 
assumptions, especially (but not exclusively) when those values or 
assumptions are shared by a large group of mature adults. The Grand 
Inquisitor who is convinced that the souls of the heretics can be saved 
only if they are coerced into recanting their heresy' may see the case as 
the quintessence of weak paternalism. But I do not.
728 
Shapiro accepts as a premise that power can be exercised to alter 
people's opinions even on "basic assumptions," but this power is 
pictured as a salient external power, in the figure of the Grand 
724 Shapiro, supra note 718, at 523. 
7
25 [d. at 522-25. 
7
2
0 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 14647 (Walter Shewring trans., Oxford Univ. Press 
1980) (n.d. ). 
727 [d. 
7
28 Shapiro, supra note 718, at 529. 
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Inquisitor. 729 The possibility that power is exercised in unseen ways 
over "basic assumptions" is not even imagined; and the charge of 
paternalism becomes a bulwark against examining the power 
operating in the formation of those assumptions. If paternalism is a 
troublesome exercise of power when implemented through salient 
situational influences, then critical realism suggests that we ought to 
begin our analysis at exactly the place where Shapiro places the 
bogeyman's barricades. Put differently, if our ambition is to foster a 
world in which people are encouraged to act according to their 
values, attitudes, and assumptions, then legal analysts need to look far 
deeper than just the obvious tip of the situational iceberg. 
Further examination reveals that Shapiro's conventional 
"baselines" are the product not of analysis or theory, but of the 
fundamental attribution error. Defending his decision to "embrace 
the anti-paternalist position,,, 73 o Shapiro falls back, as do so many, on 
intuitions and common sense perceptions: "on so basic a question of 
human relations I am not sure how feasible it is to do more than chart 
my own course.,, 731 Indeed, most defenders of anti-paternalism, 
Shapiro admits, have offered weak justification for their urge "to 
defend freedom against its critics.,, 732 In charting such a course, 
Shapiro argues, "[e]ventually, a leap of faith is inevitable.", 733 In 
addition, the stakes in this leap are profoundly important, for "under 
prevailing community standards, the paternalist has the burden of 
• 
,, 734 persuasIOn. 
The problem, of course, is that the prevailing community 
standards reflect a fundamental flaw in human attributions, a flaw that 
appears to be greatly encouraged and enhanced by those who can best 
influence our situation. Thus, in the name of avoiding obvious (that 
is, paternalistic) influences on people's choices, we may be turning 
ourselves over to less obvious, but no less powerful, influences. Or, 
put slightly differently, in the name of protecting dispositionism from 
729 [d. Readers will no doubt be reminded that the same salient inquisitorial 
power was actually present in the Galileo story. See supra text accompanying notes 297
30l. 
730 Shapiro, supra note 718, at 545. 
731 [d. The metaphor of navigational charting may not be coincidence. It implies 
the kind of choice-contemplating, choice-making dispositional figure that sets the 
"baselines" of his view of paternalism and who, like Odysseus, straps himself to the 
mast when anticipated temptations loom. 
732 [d. at 546. 
733 [d. 
734 [d. at 545. 
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blatant situational threats, we may be unleashing hidden, but deeply 
captured, situational forces that leave us feeling as though we chose 
our lot. 
Our purpose here is not to propose or defend a strong form of 
paternalism. Indeed, we think our argument would demand a 
thorough reconceptualization of such conventional categories 
(strong-form paternalism, weak-form paternalism, self-paternalism, 
and so on) before such a discussion could be fruitful. What we are 
arguing is that the charge of paternalism, as it is typically made, is an 
inadequate response to the claims we have presented. What we 
propose is a more realistic exploration, and acceptance, of the 
powerful situational influences over human behavior that go far 
beyond the ropes of Odysseus and the fires of the Grand Inquisitor. 
When we yield in our inquiries to the paternalism bogeyman, we may 
be yielding to basic assumptions that are themselves contestable and 
the subject of powerful situational influences. The problem of 
paternalism is profound, but it cannot be answered with the 
conventional bogeyman response. 
4. Summary: The Bogeypeople as Response to, and Creation of, 
Threat 
Some of the owner men were kind because they hated what they had to do, and 
some of them were angry because they hated to be cruel, and some of them were cold 
because they had long ago found that one could not be an owner unless one Wffe 
cold. And all of them were caught in something larger than themselves. Some of 
them hated the mathematics that drove them, and some Wffe afraid, and some 
worshipped the mathematics because it provided a refuge from thought and from 
feeling .... 
735 John Steinbeck 
Although there are others, 736 the previous Sections provide a fair 
sample of the bogeypeople. We are less interested in providing a full 
735 JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 42 43 (Viking Critical Library ed. 
1972) (1939) . 
736 Broadly speaking. virtually any human motive. we suspect. might be tapped into 
in order to generate a bogeyperson. For instance. the human motive for closure. see 
Hanson & Yosifon. supra note 30. is often activated by those who seem unwilling to 
take "the situation" seriously unless its precise implications for policy and legal 
doctrine are made explicit. Similarly. the motive for control. see id .• is often tapped 
into by those who assert that situational causation is far more difficult to influence in 
predictable ways. (As an aside. we suspect that the combined motives for closure and 
control may help explain the fundamental attribution error. ) 
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catalogue of the beasts than we are in understanding what motivates 
them. People invoking the bogeypeople often begin by claiming to 
concede that the situation can have an immense, unseen effect on 
people's conduct. They then follow that concession with a gen­
eral "so what? " or, more specifically, with the invoking of one 
or more of the bogeypeople to make their case that it is better 
to pay no more attention to the situation than people already 
do. Upon closer inspection, however, this technique of responding is 
better seen as a disarming means of denying our basic argument 
about the power of the situation. It is not surprising that our 
audience would tend to disbelieve our claims. Indeed, it is to be 
expected-just as it is easy to understand why so many people 
initially found Galileo's claims to be fanciful. Without the telescope, 
it was one person's claim against the obvious. 
We do not believe that our arguments are immune to critique. 
We strongly suspect that they are in many ways flawed. But our worry 
and our experience is that they are not given a chance largely 
because people reject them because they are hard to see, and, more 
importantly, because they do not want to see them. The specter of 
the bogeypeople provides a mechanism for evading the situation. 
Indeed, we suspect that one major reason for the success of 
neoclassical economics and disposition-driven theories of law is not 
simply that they are good for business, but also that they serve to 
protect us all from the disquieting possibilities that many of our basic 
systems are both harmful and rigged. With that possibility in mind, it 
is illuminating to consider Milgram's career. 
Mter revealing, to his own surprise, the power of the unseen 
situation, Milgram's findings spawned an enormous hullabaloo. In 
the words of Thomas Blass, "more than any other research in social 
psychology, the obedience experiments have been embroiled from 
the beginning in a number of controversies in which they have played 
a central and enriching role. These include the ethics of research, the 
social psychology of the psychological experiment, and the deception 
versus role-playing controversy.,,737 It seems likely that much of the 
criticism found its source in the threat that Milgram's results posed to 
the notion that these systems are just. To defend against that threat, 
Milgram's work had to be denied, challenged, and minimized in any 
way possible. 
737 Thomas Blass, Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The 
Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
398,398 (1991) (citations omitted) . 
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The upset generated by a Milgram . . .  in part stems from ethical 
concerns. But another part of [his experiments'] power lies precisely in 
their demonstration of how strong situational determinants are in 
shaping behavior. No resort to a correlation between 'those' people who 
do 'evil' things is allowed: the subjects were randomly assigned.
73 
Despite his profound influence on psychology and the importance 
of his work to the fields of philosophy, political science, and 
education, Milgram was never granted tenure at Harvard.739 As Blass 
suggests, "[s]ome of the opposition toward Milgram came from 
colleagues who felt uneasy about him, ascribing to him certain 
negative properties of the obedience experiment.,,740 Focusing on 
Milgram's protocol may well have been a cover for a deeper 
uneasiness about his findings, as well as, a means of de-legitimating his 
work and, more importantly, legitimating our world. 
There is another, perhaps more telling, means of demonstrating 
that those who conjure the bogeypeople are, perhaps unconsciously, 
denying or minimizing our claim. Consider the likely reaction to our 
argument if we were describing more visible, salient, and obvious 
forms of situational constraints. Suppose, for example, that we were 
writing about antebellum slavery. It does not seem controversial to 
argue, as we did, that slavery placed an immense and unjust 
situational constraint on slaves, or that slaves' conduct-including 
their singing-did not reveal dispositional consent to their fate. We 
do not believe that the situational bogeypeople would be invoked in 
response to those claims. Nobody would accuse us of being 
communists for arguing that the situation of slaves should be taken 
seriously or that slavery should be abolished. There is no tendency 
to invoke the communist bogeyman in that context because, in 
retrospect, the situational constraints that caused the unequal 
outcomes are clear. If we truly accept the idea that the situation 
wields a commanding influence, then the idea of attending to that 
influence seems obvious and unobjectionable. 
Similarly, the personal-responsibility bogeyman remains dormant 
when the situation is slavery. It should be remembered that slaves 
exercised some freedom under slavery: they developed their own 
738 Robert Helmreich et aI., The Study of Small Groups, 24 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 337, 
343 (1973) . 
739 Thomas Blass, The Man Who Shocked the World, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. Apr. 
2002, at 72, available at http://www.psychologytoday.com/htdocs/prod/proarticle/ 
pto-200203. 
740 [d. In 1967, Milgram was given full professor status as head of the social 
psychology program at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. 
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cultural patterns and practices; they found or created items of value 
to trade and sometimes earned money to buy things; they negotiated 
in various ways with their masters for, among other things, freedom 
upon their master's death; they plotted and executed escapes; and in 
some circumstances they bought their own freedom.741 So, while 
slaves undoubtedly operated under severe situational constraints, 
they were not without recourse to influence their own lives. There 
was room for disposition, and it undoubtedly played a role in their 
experiences. 
Yet nobody today would claim that slaves should have taken 
personal responsibility for the conditions in which they lived. 
Frederick Douglass, among others, bought his own freedom, and yet 
we do not blame those who did not for their predicament. In such 
cases, the situation is obvious, and personal responsibility lies less 
with those enslaved by it, and more with those who created it. 
Placing personal responsibility on the slave is offensive. When, on 
the other hand, the situation plays a significant role in the lives and 
conditions of those who enjoy "freedom" (here defined as "not 
slaves"), invocations of Horatio Alger and the personal responsibility 
bogeymen emerge. If we recognized the full sweep of the situational 
influences over our lives, we might be more hesitant �ith the charge 
of "personal responsibility," and the emergence of this bogeyman 
. h b I . 742 mIg t e ess automatIc. 
741 See, e.g., IRA BERLIN, GENERATIONS OF CAPTM1Y: A HISTORY OF AFRICAl'l
AMERICAN SLAVES 5 (2003) (depicting the cultural habits and beliefs which 
transformed the experience of slaves into a culture which joined them together as a 
class) ; FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 224 27 (discussing the family life and rights of 
slaves) ; GENOVESE, supra note 666, passim (illuminating the "world the slaves made"); 
WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL, LIFE INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE MARKET 63 77 
(1999) (commenting on the development of a slave community and the launching of 
slave revolts) . 
742 This, of course, is not to say that we are all slaves, or that the situational 
constraints on slaves were not more dramatic and severe than those that surround us 
today. It is, however, to suggest that just as the "personal responsibility" trope loses 
much of its force when situational constraints are salient, we should be suspicious of 
its use where situational influences are less visible. 
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CONCLUSION: FACING OUR FEARS 
"It may be that we are puppets-puppets controlled by the strings of society. But 
at least we are puppets with perception, with awareness. And perhaps our 
awareness is the first step to our liberation. " 
-Stanley Milgram
743 
Man is the only government-making animal in the world. 
 deri k D l 744  C oug ass 
We all got to figure. There's some way to stop this. It's not like lightning or 
earthquakes. We've got a bad thing made by men, and by God that's something 
we can change. 
-John Steinbeck745 
The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one, it is what is 
already here, the inferno that we live every day, that we form by being together. 
There are two ways to escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the 
inferno and become such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is 
risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and learn to 
recognize who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make 
them endure, give them space. ' 
Italo Calvino
746 
We understand that there is reason to be frightened and to feel 
threatened. In fact, that is our point. There is much at stake. But 
to thwart the real dangers of the situation-the vulnerability to 
manipulation, the complex legal, social, ethical, and personal 
problems that it raises-we should look beyond the bogeypeople and 
face our fears. 
The goal of this Article is to encourage us to take seriously the 
situation. We, and we hope others, will say more in future work 
about its implications. Regardless, the most important implication 
743 http://ww.stanleymilgram.com/quotes.html (attributing quote to Stanley 
Milgram) .  
744 Frederick Douglass, Appeal to Congress for Impartial Suffrage (Jan. 1867), 
available at h up:! /www.law.ou.edu/hist/suff.htm!. 745 STEINBECK, supra note 735, 42 43. 
746 ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES 165 (William Weaver trans. , Harcourt & Brace 
Jovanovich 1974). 
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should be evident: there is not going to be a salient, simple policy 
solution to our predicament. The belief or hope that such solutions 
exist is a manifestation of the problem-seeing a tiny portion of what 
is moving us and assuming that nothing else does. 
The problem is akin to another problem that is easier to 
imagine. Who was responsible for slavery in this country? Clearly, it 
was not the slaves. Their situation was too vividly powerful-like a gun 
to the head-to conclude otherwise. The most obvious answer is the 
slavemaster, and for good reason. Slavemasters bought and sold 
slaves, controlled slaves' environments, and dictated-often using 
brutal force-much of the slaves' conduct.747 There is more, how­
ever, to the situation than just the most prominent actors. Slavery 
was, among other things, a social system-a powerful situation-that 
was larger than both the slaves and the masters. Slavery was a highly 
profitable industry, not only for the South, but also for the North, 
where textile mills, for example, relied on the availability of cheap 
cotton. A plantation owner who freed his slaves would not only lose 
the economic value of his chattel but also the ability to produce his 
crops profitably. 
Moreover, freeing slaves was illegal in some states and highly 
discouraged by social norms and conventions in all slave states.74 8 In 
that and countless other ways, the laws and the customs that slave 
owners lived under were highly constraining. But those situational 
constraints were not, any more than the others, a natural, inevitable, 
or even random circumstance. The situation was itself the conse­
quence of a profitable economic system that created institutions and 
individuals with an interest in maintaining it. 
As we have described, slave owners held situationally influenced 
"knowledge" and beliefs that also acted to reinforce the system 
and justify their place in it as powerful as the economic and social 
forces that they faced. As we indicated above, a freed slave was, by 
some accounts, unhappy. If a freed Mrican slave could not function 
outside of the paternalistic protection of the "peculiar institution," or 
if they would almost certainly be kidnapped and sold again into 
slavery and perhaps down the river, or if, at best, "freedom" meant 
laboring in the North where the working conditions were far worse, 
how could a plantation owner-even a "social welfare-maximizing" 
plantation owner-justifY freeing his slaves? Furthermore, if 
747 HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 50 51,201 02. 
748 See GOODELL, sujJTa note 665, at 338. 
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slaveowners faced the threat that without slavery their society 
would not prosper and evolve, then the emancipation of slaves 
might come at a cost to freedom. 749 In short, slaves were not the 
only people who were subject to powerful situational influences. 
Slaves, their owners, and their shared society, were all deeply 
captured. So, who do we blame? 
The point is that this may be the wrong question. Suppose we 
were given the task of developing a means of emancipating Mrican 
Americans from slavery and the many situational chains that have 
hindered them since. Suppose that we had to accomplish that end 
without the horrors and shame of the Civil War, of Reconstruction, 
of Jim Crow, of segregation, and of disparate opportunities and 
outcomes that remain with us. What would we do? 
Whatever our answer, it won ' t  be simple, and i t  will require 
gaining a better understanding of the situation. 
749 See MCPHERSON, supra note 682, at 56 (,"Indeed', said Senator Robert M. T. 
Hunter of Virginia, 'there is not a respectable system of civilization known to history 
whose foundations were not laid in the institution of domestic slavery.' 'Instead of an 
evil , '  said John C. Calhoun in summing up the southern position, slavery was 'a 
positive good . . .  the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in the world."' ) .  
